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ABSTRACT 
The thesis compares legal and social theories about the discipline of lawyers with an 
examination of the actual experience in Queensland. It closely exammes rationales for 
discipline contained in case law and legislation. While a tension exists between the 
Supreme Court and the legislature - as the court has continued to enforce a much 
narrower common law view of discipline - both emphasise that an individual lawyer is 
only to be disciplined if this is necessary to protect the public. Reputational concerns are 
not sufficient to justify action. The thesis then contrasts this with the social theories of 
Larson {The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis) and Halliday {Beyond 
Monopoly). A close reading of their work reveals a prediction that the profession will use 
professional discipline to gain external legitimacy - to enhance its reputation - not to 
protect the public. 
The thesis then examines the role that the Queensland legal profession has played, both in 
establishing disciplinary structures and in the use of those structures, to look for evidence 
of the profession taking initiatives to protect the public, even when this was unlikely to 
enhance, or could even harm, its reputation. Specific chapters are devoted to the orders 
made by disciplinary tribunals in Queensland, given that selective use of strike off orders 
is more likely to enhance the profession's reputation than less decisive measures (such as 
suspensions and fines). The degree to which publicity has enhanced or detracted from any 
legitimation project is also examined. The thesis documents strong differences in the two 
branches of the Queensland legal profession and considers possible reasons for this, as 
well as the utility of the social theories referred to previously. 
Even stronger than the courts' emphasis of protection not reputation as the justification 
for discipline, has been their rejection of punishment. The thesis concludes that a higher 
degree of retribution is present than has been conceded. Retribution can be seen in the 
types of orders imposed, the reasons given, and the personal factors used to mitigate 
orders. The thesis considers possible reasons for the presence of this retributive approach, 
and its possible interplay with protection and legitimation. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
l . l AIMS 
I have a number of aims in this thesis. My primary aim is to determine the role played by 
the professional discipline of lawyers in Queensland. The legal profession in the State of 
Queensland, Australia, has a number of features in common with professions in other 
Australian States, as well as with New Zealand (a jurisdiction of comparable size) and 
England (an unusually large jurisdiction in terms of population and the number of 
lawyers). The findings of this thesis are therefore likely to be of relevance in those places. 
They are also likely to be useful in jurisdictions where the structure of the profession is 
less similar, just as the findings of studies into lawyers and lawyer discipline in particular 
jurisdictions of the United States' and Canada^ have been later used in research 
throughout the common law world. 
' Jerome Car! in, Lawyers' Ethics; a Survey of the New York City Bar (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 
1966); Terence Halliday, Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers, State Crises, and Professional Empowerment 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987); Michael Powell, 'Professional Divestiture: The Cession of 
Responsibility for Lawyer Discipline' (1986) American Bar Foundation Research Journal 31. 
" Robert Evans and Michael Trebilcock, Lawyers and the Consumer Interest: Regulating the Market for 
Legal Services (Butterworths, Toronto, 1982). 
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One criticism of professional disciplinary systems in many jurisdictions has been that 
they are used by the legal profession to justify its privileged position, without any true 
commitment to protecting the public.^ In the thesis I will consider whether this criticism 
is justified in Queensland. The claim will be informed by a secondary aim of my thesis -
to consider the degree to which disciplinary tribunals and courts in Queensland have 
focused on censure or retribution - rather than protection - when imposing disciplinary 
orders. A third important theme running through the thesis is the tension which has 
existed between Queensland legislatures and regulators in determining the proper scope 
of discipline. Finally, I explore, and consider reasons for, differences between the 
discipline of barristers and solicitors in Queensland. 
1.2 PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE MERELY TO ENHANCE THE PROFESSION? 
In Chapter Three 1 explore the argument that disciplinary systems tend to become a part 
of a legal profession's 'professional project'. 1 give particular attention to tiie work of 
Magali Larson,'* as her work is often cited as the most comprehensive assessment of how 
professions engage in such a project, at the expense of the public interest. I explore a 
number of limitations and flaws of Larson's theory. 1 also consider the work of Terence 
Halliday, who appeared to contradict Larson, and claimed to provide evidence of 
professions acting beyond the interests of its members.^ However, as 1 explain in that 
chapter, a closer examination of Halliday's work shows that, while his claims may be true 
^ For instance, Richard Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (Blackwell, Oxford, 1988); 
Jerome Carlin, above n 1. 
"* Magali Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1977). 
' Halliday,above n 1. 
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in regard to some areas of professional endeavour, he was not making such a wide claim 
in relation to professional discipline. 
In subsequent chapters I attempt to apply these theories to the experience in Queensland. 
In Chapter Four I examine how disciplinary bodies have evolved, to see whether there is 
evidence of the profession acting against the interests of its members and in the public 
interest. In Chapter Five I explain why, if the profession was using discipline as part of a 
'professional project'^ to legitimate the profession, strike offs would be the most common 
form of order. Suspensions would be used only rarely, because they send unclear 
messages to the public. I then look at the practice of the disciplinary tribunals and courts 
in the imposition of strike off orders and suspensions and consider the implications for 
any theory of legitimation. In Chapter Six I consider fines, note the frequency with which 
the disciplinary tribunal (but not the court) has used fines when disciplining solicitors, 
and consider whether the tribunal's high use of fines can be explained as part of a 
'professional project'. 
If the profession is using discipline to send particular messages to the public, then the 
relationship between disciplinary proceedings and the mass media is critical. I explore 
this relationship in Chapter Eight, where I also suggest that a professional project would 
dictate that only limited cases, in which harsh disciplinary action has been taken to expel 
a person from the profession, should be publicised. Cases which portray the profession as 
ineffective in its ati;empts to self-regulate, or suggest that too many unethical or 
incompetent lawyers remain in practice, would not be publicised. I then compare this 
^ See definition below section 3.2. 
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hypothesis with the experience in Queensland. I document the very different experiences 
and practices of the two branches of the profession, and consider whether this could be 
because the two branches have been at different stages of a 'professional project', and so 
had differing needs in the use of publicity. 
1.3 DISCIPLINE AS PREVENTION OR CENSURE? 
1.3.1 Why Doubts About Protection Arise 
The typical orders imposed by disciplinary tribunals are strike off orders, suspensions, 
and fines.^ As I explain in Chapter Six, legislation in Queensland allows for disciplinary 
fines of up to $100,000. This immediately invites connotations of criminal punishment. 
Despite this, the courts have consistentiy stated that the primary aim of discipline is to 
protect the public, not to punish lawyers. I document the attitude of the court in Chapter 
Two. Clearly, the presence of monetary penalties in a system focused on protection raises 
doubts as to how punishment can be avoided, and closer examination is warranted. I do 
this in Chapter Six. But it is not only in the chapter on fines in which I raise doubts about 
the extent to which discipline aims to protect and not punish. I return to this theme in a 
number of other chapters. For instance, even though I conclude in Chapter Two that the 
courts have overwhelmingly reaffirmed protection as the primary purpose of discipline, I 
also consider judicial comments which have been retributive in tone. 
Each of these are described in more detail below section 1. 
Below section 6.2.1. 
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In Chapter Five I consider evidence that some solicitors were suspended because the 
tribunal did not consider their misconduct to be sufficiently 'culpable' - sufficiently 
dishonourable or disgraceful - for a strike off order to be made. In Chapter Seven I look 
more closely at a number of personal factors which disciplinary tribunals and courts have 
considered as reducing the 'culpability' of misconduct. Culpability is a central concern of 
retribution - and does not relate as significantly to protection. A proper understanding of 
the distinction between protection and culpable retribution requires an explanation of the 
various ways in which the disciplinary system could protect the public, and the various 
ways in which it could punish fransgressing lawyers. Much of my discussion in the 
following section draws from the debate in criminology as to whether criminal 
ptmishment should censure or prevent harm. 
1.3.2 How do Disciplinary Orders Vary from Criminal Sentencing? 
Before looking at the censure-prevention debate more closely, it should be acknowledged 
that discipline claims to be something other than criminal in nature - although sometimes 
it is described as 'quasi-criminal'. I consider much of that argument in Chapter Six. For 
the moment, let's assume all the possible ways in which a disciplinary system could 
protect the public, regardless of whether similar features appear in criminal sentencing. 
First, the public can be protected if an individual who is likely to cause harm is removed 
from legal practice. Second, the public is also protected if steps are taken to rehabilitate 
lawyers who have been found guilty of misconduct. Third, the public is protected if 
disciplinary action deters others from similar conduct in the future. These three features 
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of a disciplinary system are also considered valid aims of punishment for the commission 
of a criminal offence. They are also forward-looking in nature - by incapacitating, 
rehabilitating or deterring, the disciplinary action aims to prevent, or at least reduce, 
future harm to the public. Disciplinary action could also protect the public by 
compensating those who have suffered as a result of lawyer misconduct. While 
compensation has not been a major theme in lawyer discipline, it has figured in a handful 
of cases,^ and is now promoted in the relevant legislation.'° However, its place in 
discipline remains a tenuous one. Civil litigation, insurance and fidelity funds remain the 
primary means of compensating loss. In addition, regulators have rarely brought 
disciplinary proceedings where the complaint appeared co-extensive with a civil claim 
for negligence, instead focusing on cases where dishonesty could be established.'^ This 
has reduced the need for tribunals or courts to consider their compensatory role. 
Traditionally, compensation has played no role in criminal sentencing.''^ The criminal law 
has considered this more appropriately dealt with by private civil action. Compensation is 
one point of distinction between criminal sentencing and discipline. In addition, of all the 
ways in which discipline can protect the public mentioned so far, only compensation is 
backward-looking, in the sense that it aims to redress what has happened in the past. 
Such as where a solicitor was suspended until money was repaid to a client {Re Batho (1868) 1 QSCR 
196; Re Knapp (1878) BCR, 21 May 1878), or where the court ordered that a sohcitor not be suspended, 
because this would inhibit his ability to repay $46,420 owing to clients. Instead the solicitor was fined 
$25,000 (;?eZ(1999) 5 Disciplinaiy Action Report 24, 26). 
'° Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 288. 
'' See below section 2.4.3.4. 
" This may be changing where restorative justice principles are being implemented. See Lucia Zedner 
'Reparation and Retnbution: Are They Reconcilable?' (1994) 57 Modem Law Review 228-50 excerpted in 
Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth (eds). Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 
(2"" ed, Hart Pubhshing, Oxford, 1998). * « ^ roncy 
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Criminal punishment is thought to be a mixture of backward-looking and forward looking 
elements — often described as retribution or censure (backward looking) and prevention 
(forward looking). The primary disagreement among theorists concerns the 'general 
justifying aim''^ of punishment and the appropriate relationship between retribution and 
prevention when determining individual sentences. 
So, incapacitation, rehabilitation and deterrence each have a role in both discipline and 
criminal sentencing. Compensation has played only a minimal role in discipline and 
criminal sentencing. So when it is said that discipline aims to protect and not punish, 
what does this mean? What unique aspect of 'punishment' is being excluded from 
discipline? It is suggested that it could only be retribution which is being excluded. 
1.3.3 Retribution 
Retribution forms an established part of criminal sentencing. It is not claimed that 
retribution will protect the public by preventing future crime. Retribution is justified on 
other grounds. The term 'retribution' is not as commonly used today. Instead, some 
theorists prefer to talk in terms of 'just desert', 'desert theory proportionality' or 
'censure'.'"* It is sufficient for our purposes to use the more traditionally understood term 
'retribution'. The term will be used here to describe any approach which believes the 
primary aim of punishment is to respond to the 'urongness' of past conduct. Importantly 
'^  Adopting the term introduced by Hart: HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968). 
'•* Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2005) 1, 13; Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth (eds), Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory 
and Policy (Northeastern University Press, Boston, 2""* ed, 1998) 141. 
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for the purposes of this thesis, is to note that retribution is backward looking, and makes 
no claim about how the punishment will reduce misfeasance rates in the future. The 
harshness of the retributive response depends on how culpable the conduct was. 
Culpability is determined by the seriousness of the conduct - the intentions of the 
perpetrator and the degree of harm suffered. A retributive response directs itself to the 
perpefrator as a moral being, capable of moral deliberation.' Therefore, the degree of 
response will vary depending on intentions - was the conduct deliberate, reckless or 
accidental,'^ premeditated or spontaneous; was the perpetrator indifferent to the 
consequences of their act; or was the perpetrator of diminished capacity? Harsher 
punishment will also be imposed if - regardless of the perpefrator's intentions - the 
conduct caused greater harm. This is why the criminal law imposes a greater sentence for 
murder than for attempted murder, or for theft of $ 1 million than for theft of chewing 
gum.'^ 
1.3.4 Greater Deterrence, or Greater Retribution? 
The most obvious explanation for a repeated insistence by disciplinary courts and 
tribunals that they are protecting and not punishing, is that they must justify harsher 
freatment than would be warranted in the criminal jurisdiction - presumably because the 
need for deterrence is so great that fewer factors which would have reduced culpability in 
von Hirsch and Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing, above n 14, 17. 
" The criminal law will not normally punish acts which \ack mens rea, but some acts are deemed 
criminally negligent by legislation. 
von Hirsch and Ashworth (eds). Principled Sentencing, above n 14, 186. 
' ' Retribution draws the notion of harm more broadly than physical or economic hann, and includes harm 
to an individual's potential standard of living and sense of well-being, such as through humiliation or 
breach of privacy: ibid 187. 
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the criminal setting can be taken into account.'^ Some doubts about the appropriateness 
of such an approach are raised by research in penology which questions the general 
effectiveness of deterrence, although it is possible that lawyers might be more easily 
deterred than the general community - a point I consider in Chapter Six. In subsequent 
chapters I also consider another possibility - that insistence upon harsher treatment is not 
linked to a need for greater deterrence but - paradoxically - to a perceived need for 
greater retribution. This is despite the fact that this is the very thing which the courts 
deny. 
The notion of retribution within professional discipline has intuitive appeal. One of the 
earliest forms of disciplinary response - a 'censure' - has sfrong moralistic overtones.^' 
Another disciplinary response, the 'reprimand', is a sharp form of censure.^^ Discipline 
was established so as to uphold the high moral standards of the legal profession as one of 
the most honourable and noble professions, 'in which every member, of whatever 
standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth'.^^ It has principally concerned itself 
with responding to conduct considered 'disgraceful or dishonotirable'^'* - ie, which is 
culpable. Robin Duff considered retribution to be a communicative act which hoped for 
'^  von Hirsch and Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing above n 14, 15, describing the 'Benthamite' 
deterrence model of Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1982 
ed, edited by J Byrne and HLA Hart, Methuen, London, 1982). 
^^  Sally Simpson, Corporate Crime, Law, and Social Control (Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2002) 35; John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2002) 102. 
'^ The first recorded use of the word 'censure' was to describe 'a spiritual punishment inflicted by some 
ecclesiastical judge': Oxford English Dictionary, T^ online ed, 1989. 
"' A reprimand is 'a sharp rebuke, reproof, or censure, esp. one given by a person or body having authority, 
or by a judge or magistrate to an offender'. It is now more commonly used to mean 'to pronounce an 
adverse judgment on, express disapproval of, criticize unfavourably; to find fault with, blame, condemn: 
ibid. The legislation provides for reprimands explicitly: Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 280(2)(e). 
-^  Bolton vLaw Society [1994] 1 All ER 486, 492. 
'^* See below section 2.433. 
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the moral penance of the individual.^^ Andrew Von Hirsh rejected Duffs suggestion that, 
in imposing criminal sanctions, the State had as much concern with a defendant's moral-
wellbeing as the head of a monastic community. However, if professional discipline 
concerns itself with the moral worth of lawyers, then judges disciplining lawyers may be 
more likely to see some analogy between themselves and an abbott. 
1.3.5 Private Retribution ? 
There may be difficulty in explaining a role for retribution if discipline takes place in 
private. Criminal sentencing takes place in open court and it is taken for granted that 
criminal justice is a public symbolic process which casts shame and signifies public 
disapprobation of conduct which has threatened society's dominion. This has not 
necessarily been the case for lawyers facing discipline. As I demonsfrate in Chapters Four 
and Eight, much discipline of Queensland lawyers has taken place behind closed doors. 
While private discipline can still protect through incapacitation, its secret nature reduces 
its ability to deter generally. Without a public hearing it may also lack the retributive 
element of the criminal law. Private discipline may aim to protect the public in a more 
indirect but perhaps ineffective way, by maintaining greater control over the degree of 
stigma and shame which lawyers suffer, and thereby facilitating their rehabilitation.^^ The 
fmal alternative may be that private discipline does not expect to protect or censure as 
- Robin Duff, 'Desert and Penance' in von Hirsch and Ashworth (eds), Principled Sentencing, above n 14, 
164. 
•^  von Hirsch and Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing, above n 14, 95. 
-' Zedner, above n 12, 340. Regulatory prosecutions make a similar public statement: Keith Hawkins Law 
as Last Resort (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002) 416. 
'^ Zedner, above n 12, 341. 
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much as public discipline. Instead, it aims to legitimate claims by the profession that it 
does self-regulate, but without that self-regulation being examined too closely. I discuss 
this possibility in more detail in Chapters Four and Eight. 
1.4 TENSION BETWEEN LEGISLATURES AND REGULATORS 
In Chapter Two I set out the legal rationale for professional discipline as determined by 
the lawmakers - courts and legislatures. While lawmakers have stated protection to be the 
primary function of discipline, I also uncover discrepancies between the aims of 
discipline as deduced from the language and stated justifications of the legislation, and 
the approach of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The court has preferred to hold on to 
notions of professional discipline as understood at common law, regardless of a 
broadening notion of discipline in the legislation being administered by the court. 
1.5 BARRISTERS AND SOLICITORS 
The final sub-theme running through the thesis is a comparison of the ways in which 
barristers and solicitors have been disciplined in Queensland. The difference is striking. 
In Chapter Four I look at the role played by professional bodies in establishing 
disciplinary bodies to deal with allegations of misconduct. While the Bar Association of 
Queensland vacillated as to whether it wanted disciplinary powers at all, and what form 
they should take, the Queensland Law Society had been actively seeking statutory powers 
over members since the late 1800s and, whenever there was a suggestion that standards 
11 
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among solicitors were slipping, lobbied the government - successfully - for even greater 
statutory power. 
Differences between solicitors and barristers can also be seen in the way they were 
disciplined. In Chapter Five I consider the popularity of suspensions for solicitors but 
note that no Queensland barrister has been suspended since 1882. In Chapter Six I look at 
the use of disciplinary fines. Solicitors can be fmed up to $ 100,000 and fines have been 
the most popular way of disposing of disciplinary matters against solicitors. But no 
Queensland barrister has received a disciplinary fine. While I consider some practical 
reasons why these differences may have arisen, I also consider whether there may be a 
more profound explanation of the difference, that is grounded in the way that barristers 
and solicitors are perceived. 
I also consider differences between barristers and solicitors in Chapter Eight. Until 2004, 
when legislation required any discipline of a barrister to be heard in public and reported 
in a discipline register,^'' barristers were very secretive about any discipline they imposed 
on a colleague. While the Queensland Law Society also preferred to deal with matters 
behind closed doors, they conceded the inevitability of public hearings much sooner than 
barristers, and cooperated in the publication of disciplinary outcomes. The society also 
sometimes chose to 'trumpet' some harsh disciplinary action that had been taken against 
a solicitor - something that the Bar Association of Queensland has appeared loath to do. 
-' Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) ss 296, 474. 
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1.6 THE BROADER REGULATORY CONTEXT 
While my thesis examines the notion of professional discipline, professional discipline 
plays only one part in a much broader regulatory context. David Wilkins, writing in 1992, 
noted the many ways in which lawyers in the United States were regulated at that time.^° 
As well as through professional discipline, US lawyers were regulated by what Wilkins 
categorised as liability, institutional and legislative controls.^' Liability controls include 
the ability of clients to sue for negligence or breach of confidence. 
In comparative terms, discipline has not played a large, active role in the regulation of 
Queensland lawyers. Many more allegations of substandard conduct by lawyers have 
been dealt with by the professional indemnity insurer - what Wilkins would describe as a 
liability confrol. For instance, between 1977 and 1991 the professional indemnity scheme 
run through the Queensland Law Society paid out over $28 million on almost 1,200 files 
in which the insurer accepted that the solicitor's conduct had caused loss.^ ^ Some of these 
claims may have included litigation, but in the vast majority of cases the matter is likely 
to have been settled with little or no publicity. Not only did the insurer compensate 1,200 
clients during that time. The insurer also responded by putting financial incentives in 
place to encourage higher standards of conduct. These included deterrent deductibles, 
claims history discounts and loadings, and staff to principal ratio loadings.^^ If effective, 
these incentives protected the insurer and the insured solicitor, as well as consumers of 
'° David Wilkins, 'Who Should Regulate Lawyers?' (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 801-887. The 
implications of this broader context is discussed in more detail below section 3.10.1. 
'^ Ibid 804. 
" 'The Q and A of PI Insurance', 1992 Proctor, March, 11-15, 12. 
^^  Ibid 14. The staff to principal ratio loadings are designed to encourage proper levels of supervision. 
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legal services. During the same 14 year period that the insurer took action in 1,200 cases, 
only 125 disciplinary hearings were held. The insurer would appear to have more directly 
regulated lawyers - and protected the public - more often than did professional 
discipline. 
Queensland lawyers have also been regulated by the general law^ "* and by courts 
exercising powers in relation to contempt of court and wasted costs. Even when 
clients suspect misconduct by their lawyer, they do not necessarily make a disciplinary 
complaint, particularly given the time and delay involved and the lack of compensation 
•y-j 
powers in the discipline jurisdiction. 
Even when a complaint is lodged, it will not necessarily lead to a disciplinary hearing. 
Only 1.7% of the written complaints received by the Queensland Law Society during the 
1990s led to formal discipline.^^ Until 2004,^ ^ all statutory disciplinary hearings relied on 
voluntary, part-time tribunal members, most of who continued to run their full-time legal 
practices. All of this demonstrates the modest role which professional discipline has 
played. 
For instance, the law on misleading or deceptive conduct and the criminal law. 
'^  Lewis V Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682. 
^^  White Industries (Qld) v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169. 
" Roman Tomasic found that those who use lawyers most often (eg property owners) were the most 
sceptical about using law society complaints procedures: Roman Tomasic, Lawyers and the Community 
(Law Foundation of New South Wales, Sydney, 1978) 133. 
Linda Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis' 
(2001) \3 Bond Law Review \-45, 6. 
'' The Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 429 provides for the tribunal to be constituted by a sitting 
Supreme Court judge. 
J,"^VT!^"' in 1996-1997 13 disciplinary heanngs were held, and disciphna.y expenses amounted to 
$359,849: Queensland Law Society Inc, 69" Annual Report, 1996-1997, 61. These comprised 'general 
disciplinaiy expenses', and the expenses of the two tnbunals, the Statutory Committee and Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tnbunal. In 2004-2005, the costs of handling complaints and discipline was $3,556,404.00: 
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In comparison to other forms of lawyer regulation, discipline was applied to only a very 
small proportion of lawyers. That is not to say that discipline is not worthy of the detailed 
study contained within this thesis. While discipline may not have played a large and 
visible role in regulating individual lawyers, its mere presence on the regulatory 
landscape may have had an effective impact in encouraging high standards of conduct. 
The mere presence of the disciplinary system may also be significant in other ways. As I 
show in the following chapters, substantial effort has been put into designing and then 
redesigning disciplinary structures, and amending legislation. The mere fact that so much 
energy has been put into the issue of professional discipline in Queensland, despite the 
modest role that it has appeared to play - and is likely to play"" - makes it worthy of 
detailed study. 
1.7 TERMINOLOGY AND DEHNITIONS 
In this thesis I use the terms 'lawyer' and 'legal practitioner' to describe a person whose 
name appears on the roll of legal practitioners and is eligible to practise law, subject to 
holding a practising certificate. Except where it is clear from the context, my use of the 
term 'lawyer' or 'legal practitioner' is not intended to make any distinction between a 
Legal Services Commission (Qld), Annual Report 2004-2005, 35. This did not include the cost of the 
Supreme Court judge who presided over the tribunal. During the period four disciplinary hearings were 
held, although this unusually low number is likely to be due to a hiatus as disciplinary responsibilities were 
transferred from the Queensland Law Society to the Legal Services Commissioner. 
Given the cost-effectiveness of other forms of regulation, such as civil litigation. 
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42 person with a practising certificate and one without. I use the terms interchangeably 
'Lawyer' and 'legal practitioner' are both generic terms which I use to describe both 
barristers and solicitors. Barristers are those lawyers who have chosen to specialise in 
appearances before courts (advocacy) and in specialist advice work. Barristers are 
sometimes referred to as 'counsel', and are collectively described as 'the bar'. There is no 
similar collective noun to describe Queensland solicitors. Solicitors can also appear 
before all courts - act as solicitor-advocates - but their range of work is usually much 
broader than that of barristers. It includes, for instance, contract negotiation and other 
transactional work. Queensland lawyers have been represented by two main professional 
bodies. The Bar Association of Queensland has represented barristers and the Queensland 
Law Society has represented solicitors. 
As I discuss in Chapters 2 and 4, discipline can be imposed on barristers and solicitors by 
the Supreme Court of Queensland, exercising its inherent jurisdiction. In 2004, the Legal 
Practice Tribunal and Legal Practice Conmiittee were established as statutory tribunals to 
discipline both barristers and solicitors. Until then, only Queensland solicitors were 
subject to statutory discipline. Over time, the relevant tribunals were variously known as 
the Statutory Committee, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal'*^ and the Solicitors 
Complaints Tribunal. Unless the particular title is important to the discussion, the generic 
term 'tribunal' will be used. 
'- See Mortensen's discussion of the confusing terminology used in the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld)-
I^r^'ilw^nnT?; ;^""°'^'"g " ^^^y^^"- ^^^"^ Admission to Practice under the Legal Profession Act 2004 
(Qld) (2UU4)23 University of Queensland Law Journal 1,19-146, l,'i9. 
'' This operated as a lower level tnbunal alongside the Statutory Committee which heard more serious 
matters. 
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1 J TYPES OF DISCIPLINARY ORDERS 
In this thesis I look closely at the ways in which disciplinary courts and tribunals have 
disposed of matters that have come before them. The most common forms of disciplinary 
orders have been strike offs, suspensions and fines. A 'strike off is an order that a 
person's name be removed fi^om the roll of legal practitioners."^ This is also described as 
disbarment - particularly when barristers are involved. As practitioners must be on the 
roll of legal practitioners and hold a practising certificate before they can practise law,'*^ 
practitioners can also be temporarily removed from practice by a court or tribunal 
ordering that their practising certificate be suspended."^ ^ I will normally refer simply to 
the 'suspension' of a practitioner. 
* * * * 
^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 280(2)(a). 
'^^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) ss 6, 24. 
^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 280(2)(b). 
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CHAPTER Two 
LAWMAKERS' RATIONALES FOR DISCIPLES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter 1 look at possible rationales for the discipline of lawyers, as indicated by 
the courts and by relevant legislation. Particularly in earlier cases, the High Court of 
Australia and Supreme Court of Queensland drew a simple division between protection 
of the public and punishment of the lawyer. Case law demonstrates that the 'protect not 
punish' aim of discipline is stated almost as a mantra in disciplinary hearings. More 
contentious is the degree to which other purposes, such as retribution or protection of the 
reputation of the legal profession, can also influence disciplinary outcomes. I will 
consider this dichotomy between protection and punishment before exploring the concept 
of punishment in more detail, in particular, the deterrent and retributive elements of 
punishment. I conclude with a consideration of the issue of reputation. 
The articulated purpose of discipline seems to depend in part on the natiire of the body 
imposing discipline. While in this chapter I focus on discipline imposed by courts and 
stattitory tribunals, it should be noted that a private body, such as the Bar Association of 
Queensland can apply discipline for its own purposes, subject only to the rules relating to 
18 
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private tribunals and as agreed to by members.' While the private disciplinary powers of 
the Queensland Law Society over solicitor members existed alongside the society's 
statutory powers from 1927 until 2004, the private powers became largely irrelevant in 
the presence of much more effective statutory powers. Private powers are also unlikely to 
be used when they have little practical impact. In the case of barristers, the Bar 
Association of Queensland had no power to remove a barrister's right to practise, and so 
private disciplinary action against members was rare. Private action is likely to become 
even rarer now that a statutory system has been put in place for all legal practitioners, 
including barristers.^ 
I will seek to demonstrate that decisions of, and statements by, the High Court of 
Ausfralia have generally indicated that court's view that disciplinary proceedings should 
be primarily concerned about an individual's actual fitness to practise law. The High 
Court has consistently declared that discipline should have no penal element and -
although it has not stated this explicitly - it can be inferred from decisions of the High 
Court that it discounts the possibility that protection of the reputation of the legal 
profession would be a sufficient justification for taking disciplinary action. The 
significance of this finding will become more apparent when I look at theories of 
legitimation in Chapter Three. 
In this chapter I will also show that, in contrast to the High Court, until recently the 
Supreme Court of Queensland appeared to tolerate at least the possibility of using 
' John Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (Federation Press, Sydney, 2002) 18. 
- Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) ss 5, 6, 8, 248, 249. 
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disciplinary proceedings to punish a legal practitioner. While in recent times the court has 
more clearly denied any penal intent in discipline, it has acknowledged simultaneously 
the positive role that deterrence can play in protecting the public. 
Interspersed with my discussion of the courts' attitude to discipline is a discussion of the 
Supreme Court of Queensland's response to attempts by the Queensland Parliament to 
strengthen the protective focus of professional discipline. I will suggest that, while the 
court clearly acknowledged the protective focus of discipline, its view of the nature of 
that protection lagged behind the view of the legislature. 
2.2 JUDICIAL RATIONALES FOR DISCIPLINE 
2.2.1 High Court of A ustra Ha 
The ultimate body with the power to remove a lawyer from practice in Queensland is the 
Supreme Court of Queensland. However, when looking at the attitude of the courts to 
discipline, I will also consider decisions of the High Court of Ausfralia, other Australian 
State Supreme Courts and English courts. Decisions of the High Court of Australia, 
whether on appeal from Queensland or another Australian jurisdiction, are considered 
because of the nattire of the court hierarchy and doctrine of precedent in Australia. The 
High Court hears appeals from any State Supreme Court^ if a party aggrieved by a 
decision of a State Supreme Court is granted special leave to appeal to the High Court."* 
Australian Constitution s 73. 
^ Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 35(2). 
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The Supreme Court of Queensland is bound to follow relevant decisions of the High 
Court of Ausfralia, even decisions which originated outside Queensland, unless they are 
distinguishable by reason only of differences in the statute law of the different States.^ 
While relevant decisions of the High Court are binding on the Supreme Court of 
Queensland, it is relatively rare for appeals against disciplinary decisions to proceed to 
the High Court of Australia. This is not only because of the need to obtain special leave 
to appeal, but also because the High Court has generally indicated an imwillingness to 
become involved in admission or disciplinary matters, on the basis that it is the Supreme 
Court of the State in which a person wishes to practise that must be satisfied as to that 
person's fitness to practise law. Hence the High Court has expressed reluctance to 
'second guess' a State Supreme Court's view as to a person's fitness. For instance in 
Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association the High Court noted the danger of 
overturning the Supreme Court's decision to allow Clyne to remain in practice in New 
South Wales, given the Supreme Court's view that he was unfit to practise and 'given the 
essential trust and confidence which must exist between the Supreme Court and all 
members of the Bar.' In Wentworth v NSW Bar Association the High Court emphasised 
the width of the power of State Supreme Courts to conduct admission and disciplinary 
proceedings however they wished, subject only to statutory obligations and procedural 
fairness.^ The High Court drew its powers on appeal particularly narrowly in Walsh v 
^ As the common law is deemed to be uniform across the nation: Lange v Australian Broadcasting 
Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520; John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503. 
^ Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186, 198. 
Ibid 198. On this occasion the court considered the Supreme Court was 'entirely right' in removing the 
barrister from practice: 199. 
^(1999) 198 CLR 73. 
Ibid 251 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
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Law Society of New South Wales,^^ stating that, where an appeal is brought pursuant to 
statutory disciplinary procedures, it is not open to the court to ignore the legislative 
protections given to the practitioner and to consider the case as if brought within the 
court's inherent jurisdiction. 
2.2.2 Other Australian State Supreme Courts 
In this thesis I also consider decisions of other Supreme Courts in Australia. While the 
Supreme Court of Queensland is not bound by these decisions, it looks to decisions of 
those courts for guidance and because of the desirability of consistency between 
Australian jurisdictions. 
2.2.3 English Courts 
2.2.3.1 Australia's English Heritage 
Australian courts also have sought guidance from decisions of English courts and, until 
the Australia Acts of 1986 abohshed appeals to the Privy Council, were bound to follow 
decisions of that court in appeals from Australia. Australian courts have generally chosen 
to pay close attention to decisions of other English courts as well, even tiiough not bound 
to follow them. This is particularly true in the period before 1901 when the Privy Council 
was the sole second-tier court of appeal. But even after the High Court was established. 
'"(1999) 198 CLR 73. 
''ibid 97. 
'" Queensland Law Society v Roche [2004] 2 Qd R 574, 588. 
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State Supreme Courts looked to decisions of the English appellate courts, largely because 
Australia inherited much of its legal tradition from England. 
This section looks at the view of English courts as to the rationale of discipline. In 
particular, English courts took quite a different approach to the discipline of solicitors 
than they took to the discipline of barristers. 
2.2.3.2 The Nature of England's Divided Profession 
Since the earliest times of the common law'^ English barristers'"* have belonged to one of 
four Iims of Court,'^ and it is these Inns, through its more senior members, known as 
benchers, which have been primarily responsible for the education, admission and 
discipline of barristers in England. Judges retained supervisory power over barristers, 
sitting as visitors to the Irms of Court and when hearing appeals to the Court of Appeal.'^ 
The other branch of the profession, now referred to as solicitors, previously comprised 
attorneys,''^ proctors and solicitors. Attorneys had been allowed to become members of 
the Inns of Court until the sixteenth century and were subject to the discipline of the 
'^  Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, (West Publishing Co, St Paul, 1953) 87. 
See also Paul Brand, The Origins of the English Legal Profession (Blackwell, Oxford, 1992). 
'"* Until the seventeenth century, barristers were known as 'apprentices at law': Pound, above n 13, 101; 
Brand, above n 13, 158. 
'^  Lincoln's Inn, Gray's Inn, Inner Temple and Middle Temple. 
^^ Rv Visitors to the Inns of Court, ex parte Calder [1994] QB 1. 
Solicitors arose as part of the legal profession in the fifteenth century and played a similar, although 
inferior, role to that played by attorneys previously: William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (first 
published 1924, 2""^  ed, 1937) vol 6, 449; John Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2003) vol VI 1483-1558, 438. By 1750 solicitors and attorneys held equivalent 
positions in the legal profession and were subject to the same disciplinary controls: Holdsworth, at 457. 
Christopher Brooks, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society Since 1450 (Hambledon, London, 1998) 131. 
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19 Inns,'* but were then excluded from membership unless they were studying for the bar, 
Despite efforts by judges in the seventeenth century to insist that attorneys become 
members of an Inn,^ ° the Inns resisted and no attorney could become a member unless 
first ceasing to practise as an attorney. 
A barrister was admitted to practise law by the Inn of which he was a member and so was 
independent of the court. Solicitors (meaning solicitors, attorneys and proctors) were 
admitted directly by the court in which they planned to practise. A different form of 
discipline for solicitors was therefore necessary and became enfrenched after solicitors 
were excluded from the Inns. 
2.2.3.3 Practical Consequences Given the Nature of England's Divided 
Profession 
Holdsworth noted that the courts fotmd it difficult to discipline solicitors, who were 
widely scattered and sometimes had no registered address^ "* - hence described as 
'vagabond attomeys'.^^ In stark contrast to barristers who remained without statutory 
control for many years, English solicitors were subject to statutory regulation as early as 
'7 ft 
1605 and the level of control became increasingly strict. In 1729, an Act was passed to 
Holdsworth, vol 6, above n 17, 441. 
" Ibid 442. 
-° Ibid 443. 
-' Ibid 442. 
" Baker, above n 17, 438. 
-^  Pound, above n 13,99. 
Holdsworth, vol 6, above n 17, 443. 
J^  William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1938) vol 12 53 
3 James I. C.7. cited in Holdsworth, vol 6, above n 17, 434, n 7. 
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deal with the regulation of attorneys and solicitors.^^ It required judges to enquire into the 
applicant's 'fitness and capacity to act as an attorney' before admitting the candidate to 
practise.^^ It also sfrengthened the penalties for practising as an attorney while 
unqualified.^^ Despite the legislative requirement that the court enquire into the 
applicant's fitness to practise, the enquiry was done in a perfunctory way,^° leaving the 
Society of Gentlemen Practisers, established in 1739, to carry out more substantial 
investigations into allegations of misconduct^' before presenting the cases to the court for 
action. 
2.2.3.4 English Courts Articulate Protect not Punish ' Dichotomy When Dealing 
with Solicitors 
In the case of Re Brounsalf^ - decided in 1778 - an attorney had been convicted of 
stealing one guinea, sentenced to nine months imprisonment and branded on his hand. In 
subsequent disciplinary proceedings against him it was argued that he had already been 
punished, but Lord Mansfield responded emphatically that no element of punishment was 
involved: 
... this application is not in the nature of a second trial or a new punishment. ... but the 
question is whether, after the conduct of this man it is projjer that he should continue a 
member of a profession which should stand free from all suspicion. ... It is not by way of 
punishment, but the Courts on such cases exercise their discretion whether a man whom 
they have formerly admitted is a proper person to be continued on the roll or not.^ ^ 
27 2 George II c 23. 
2 George II c 23. 
Holdsworth, vol 12, above n 25, 55. 
°^ Ibid 61-2. 
" Ibid 67. 
^^  (1778) 2 Cowp 829; (1778) 98 ER 1385. 
"Ibid. 
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Lord Mansfield's comments were endorsed by the English courts 120 years later in Re 
Weare}^ The potential rationales for discipline were again presented as a simple 
dichotomy - protection or punishment -, with the court denying that its aim was to further 
punish the solicitor. Instead, the solicitor's name was removed from the roll because the 
offence 'makes it unfit that he should remain a member of this stiictly honourable 
profession.'^ ^ 
In 1778, in Re Brounsall,^^ the court confirmed that an attorney struck from the roll after 
being convicted of theft was removed not to pimish him ftirther but because he was unfit 
to continue to practise. In contrast, the later case of Re Elsam, heard in 1824, appeared 
to carry many hallmarks of the criminal jurisdiction. Although the attorney in that case 
had misled the court, the court was influenced by the fact that no fraud was intended and 
the attorney had already incurred expenses of £40. The court saw its main aim was to 
deter any future deception, ordering the attorney to pay a fine of £40 and imprisonment 
until he paid the fine. 
In Chapter One I noted the various elements of punishment: deterrence, retribution and 
rehabilitation.^^ Both deterrence and rehabilitation can also protect,. The English courts 
have noted that the deterrent aspect of discipline can lead to a harsher order against 
^''[1893] 2 QB 439. 
" Ibid 445 (Lord Esher). 
'* (1778) 2 Cowp 829; (1778) 98 ER 1385. 
^^ Re Elsam (1824)3 B & C 597; 107 ER855. 
*^ Above section 1.3. 
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solicitors than would otherwise be the case, as shown by comments of Lord Coleridge in 
Re Farman, 
...it seems to me to be very important that conduct of this kind should be checked...if 
sentences inflicted for these offences seem sometimes severe, it must be remembered that 
they are inflicted upon officers of the Court who, clothed by the Court with an 
exceptional power and character which the Court itself confers upon them, are able to 
perpetrate these frauds [because] cases of this sort [are] so common; ... it was the 
more necessary that, when brought before the Court, they should be dealt with in an 
exemplary maimer.*'* 
Lord Coleridge's statement was approved in Queensland by Hart AJ in Re M, a 
Solicitor. 
2.2.3.5 A Different Focus in the Discipline of English Barristers? 
Examples of English barristers disciplined so as to protect the public were less common. 
The Inns were in a much better position to exercise control over the barristers who lived 
and worked within the Inn and who relied on the Inn for the right to practise, than a court 
seeking to control a disparate collection of solicitors. Nevertheless, most rules of the Inns 
of Court dealt with relationships and conduct within the Inns themselves rather than with 
members' relationships to the outside world,"^^ and reports of discipline imposed by the 
Iims dealt overwhelmingly with internal issues'*^ rather than misconduct in legal practice. 
^' [1883] 18 L Jo 352. 
^ Ibid. 
'*' [1938] St R Qd 454, 461. That case arose from a barrister's complaint that a solicitor had retained £80 
received from the client to pay counsel, so it could be argued that barristers were the primary group who 
would be protected from deterring solicitors from such practices, and the public only protected in a more 
distant fashion. 
*^  Baker, above n 17, 462; William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (first pubhshed 1924, 2"" ed, 
1937) vol 4, 264. 
^^ Holdsworth, vol 12, above n 25, 38-9. 
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The hms suffered a decline from the seventeenth century to the middle of the nineteenth 
centtiry, particularly in relation to their role in education. Holdsworth referred to the 
riots which occurred in the Inns in the latter half of the seventeenth century and noted that 
'the problem of discipline [became] much less acute' once the Inns ceased to educate 
students for the bar."*^  He provided by way of example of the declining disciplinary 
problem the fact that no challenge was mounted to a rule bannmg the discharge of 
fnearms within Gray's Inn."^ ^ This suggests a very different focus of discipline in the two 
branches of the profession, although by 1862 the English courts had claimed that the 
discipluie of barristers should be to protect the public - although perhaps as a secondary 
aun to the need to protect the honour of the bar: 
The Benchers exercised their jurisdiction partly for the protection of the profession and 
partly for the protection of the public ~ for the protection of the profession that it might 
not be disgraced by having enrolled among its members those who dishonoured and 
discredited it, and for the protection of the public that their confidence in the rank of the 
barrister being a sufficient test of the trustworthiness and honour of each individual 
member of the Bar might not be misled and abused. *'' 
The following discussion will show that many aspects of the English approach to 
discipline were followed in Australia, although Australia never had institutions 
equivalent to the English Irms of Court. Ausfralian barristers have always been admitted 
by colonial and State Supreme Courts in the same way as solicitors. Accordingly, at least 
in theory, Australian barristers have fallen under direct judicial supervision in ways that 
English barristers have not. Nevertheless, in my examination in subsequent chapters of 
^ The reasons for the decline were numerous and ranged from the invention of the printing press to a lack 
of commitment by students and readers, and lack of interest by the courts or government- Holdsworth vol 
6, above n 17, 490-3. 
•*' Holdsworth, vol 12, above n 25, 27. 
^*Ibid 
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the discipline of barristers in Queensland I will suggest that - at least in that State -
barristers may have avoided effective supervision either by a court or by any Australian 
equivalent to an Irm. 
2.3 HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 
2.3.1 English Fit and Proper' Test Adopted 
The first case heard by the High Court of Australia concerning the regulation of 
Ausfralian lawyers was Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher,^^ an 
appeal by the Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales against a decision of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales readmitting Meagher to practise as a solicitor. The 
High Coint gave its view of, not only eligibility for admission, but also the role of 
professional discipline. Both of the early English cases - Re Brounsalf^ and Re Weare^^ -
were cited by Isaacs J as providing the appropriate test for discipline, namely whether a 
lawyer is a 'fit and proper' person to remain on the roll. As had the English courts in Re 
Brounsalf^ and Re Weare,^'^ Isaacs J denied any penal element in discipline.^^ 
"•^  Seymour V Butterworth (1862) 3 F&F 372, 381-2; 176 ER 166. 
''^(1909) 9 CLR 655. 
"' (1778) 2 Cowp 829; (1778) 98 ER 1385. See above section 2.2.3.4. 
°^ [1893] 2 QB 439. See above section 2.2.3.4. 
'^ (1778) 2 Cowp 829; (1778) 98 ER 1385. 
52 [1893] 2 QB 439. 
" (1909) 9 CLR 655, 680. Isaacs J did allude to the public interest in disciplinary proceedings by noting 
that the duty to remove those no longer fit to practise was owed, not only to the court itself and to the rest 
of the profession, but also to the 'suitors' of the profession and the whole community (681). The High 
Court concluded that Meagher was still not fit to resume pracfise and overturned the order of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court readmitting him to practise. 
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54 As recentiv as Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association heard in 1960, the High Court 
had not refined its view of the rationale for discipline any further, claiming that the test 
was 'not capable of more precise statement' than as expressed 130 years earlier in the 
Charter of Justice 1823, that the 'issue is whether the appellant is shown not to be a fit 
and proper person to be a member of the bar of New South Wales.'' ,55 
If the court takes its obligation to protect the public seriously, then the public must be 
protected from incompetent or weak, as well as dishonest, practitioners. Later discussion 
shows how the Supreme Cotirt of Queensland was slow to consider professional 
discipline as a legitimate means of protecting the public from honest but incompetent 
lawyers.^ ^ But as early 1909, in the High Court's decision of Incorporated Law Institute 
of New South Wales v Meagher, ^ ^ Isaacs J drew the protective net widely, stating that 
C O 
fitness to practise included not only honesty but also knowledge and ability. Meagher 
had argued that he was innocent of any guilty intent to deceive and was merely a 'dupe' 
of his business partner. But Isaacs J noted that, even if Meagher's version was accepted, 
'he would be much too simple and confiding to bear the heavy strain of responsibility 
required of him as a solicitor.'^^ Again in New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt,^^ 
the High Court emphasised the need to protect the public from the uicompetent as well as 
•^^  (1960) 104 CLR 186. 
"ibid 189. 
Below section 2.4.3.4. 
"(1909) 9 CLR 655. 
^^  Ibid 682. 
59 
60 
Ibid 688. We see a similar point made later, in Barristers Board v Youns [20011 OCA 556 
(1968) 117 CLR 177. ^ ^ 
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the dishonest by holding that Evatt's failure to understand the error of his ways of itself 
demonsfrated his unfitness to practise.^' 
2.3.2 High Court Denies Any Penal Element 
While the High Court m Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association^^ felt unable to 
express the rationale for discipline more expansively than as expressed in the Charter of 
Justice 1823, it remained anxious to dispel any penal intent, reiterating that, 'although it 
is sometimes referred to as the "penalty of disbarment", it must be emphasised that a 
disbarring order is in no sense pvmitive in character'^^ and is made for the 'protection of 
those who require protection'.^ Interestingly, the High Court went on to say that a 
disbarring order is also made, 'from the professional point of view, in order that abuse of 
privilege may not lead to loss of privilege'. ^ This statement raises concerns about the 
possible use of discipline in the interests of the profession itself - an issue taken up later 
in this chapter when discussing reputation. 
'^ Ibid 183. The relevance of insight into past misconduct is explored more fully in Reid Mortensen, 
'Lawyers' Character, Moral Insight and Ethical Blindness', (2002) 22 The Queensland Lawyer 166. 
"(I960) 104 CLR 186. 
Ibid 201 (emphasis added), 
^^bid. 
^^ I^bid. 
Below section 2.6.1. 
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2.3.3 Personal Mitigating Factors Less Relevant 
Because of the protective nattire of disciplinary proceedings, personal mitigating factors 
are less relevant than in criminal proceedings.^^ An apparent misunderstanding of this 
issue by the Supreme Court of New South Wales led the High Court to overturn a two 
year suspension and order that the barrister's name be removed from the roll in New 
South Wales Bar Association v Evatt.^^ The High Court was critical of the mercy shown 
to Evatt by the lower court and concluded that the Supreme Court of New South Wales -
in portraying Evatt as a young man who had not imderstood the error of his ways - had 
misconstrued disciplinary proceedings as pimitive in nature and went on to state 
unequivocally that discipline was 'entirely protective' with 'no element of punishment 
involved.'**' In Chapter Seven I explore whether disciplinary bodies in Queensland have 
fallen into the same error as the Supreme Court of New South Wales, in placing too much 
emphasis on personal mitigating factors. 
2.3.4 Protection as a Moderating Force 
The High Court has consistentiy unequivocally denied any element of punishment in 
cases hi which it has taken harsher action on appeal, to explain why individual mitigating 
factors were misapplied by the State court appealed from. But equally, the High Court 
has overturned Supreme Court decisions which the High Court considered went beyond 
what was necessary to protect the public. Sometimes this was accompanied by evidence 
*^  Attorney-General v Gregory [1998] QCA 409 [3] 
''* (1968) 117 CLR 177. 
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that the decision of the State court included a punitive element, requiring correction by 
the High Court. This can be seen in Harvey v Law Society of New South Wales^^ where 
the High Court corrected what it saw as the Supreme Court of New South Wales' 
punitive view of disciplinary orders. The Supreme Court had ordered that the solicitor 
cease practising immediately and supply the Law Society of New South Wales with the 
names of all of his clients in the past 12 months or who had lent money to companies 
associated with him. The High Court thought such orders were not necessary to protect 
the public, overlooked the interests of creditors of the practice, and amoimted to a 
ptmishment of the solicitor. 
2.3.5 Protection Can Subsume Procedural Protections 
In Wentworth v New South Wales Bar Association the High Court spoke in general 
terms of the need for procedural fairness. But in cases dealing more dfrectly with the 
issue,^ "* the protective focus of discipline has led the court to subordinate some procedural 
protections - which a lawyer may have in criminal or civil proceedings - to the public 
interest. For instance, in Weaver v Law Society of New South Wales the lawyer argued 
that earlier charges against him could not be re-litigated because of issue estoppel, but the 
High Court disagreed, stating that issue estoppel did not apply to disciplinary proceedings 
Ibid 183 (emphasis added). See also Smith v NSW Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256, 270 (Deane J). 
(1975) 7 ALR 227. 
^'Ibid 231. 
^^(1992) 176 CLR 239. 
" Ibid 251. Discussed above section 2.2.1. 
'''^ Wentworth v New South Wales Bar Association was primarily concerned with the standing of the NSW 
Bar Association or Bar Council to oppose an application for admission. 
"(1979) 142 CLR 201. 
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because of then protective focus.^ ^ The High Court again subordinated the concerns of 
the individual lawyer facing discipline to the need to protect the public in Walter v 
Council of Queensland Law Society^^ when it noted that the protective focus of 
disciplinary proceedings meant that a successful appeal did not necessarily mean that the 
original 12 month suspension ordered by the Queensland Statutory Committee^^ was 
simply restored.^ ^ Noting that a 'primary object of [disciplinary] proceedings is to 
protect members of the public from professional misconduct', the High Court thought it 
important that the Queensland Law Society have a further opportunity to document its 
allegations against Walter. It therefore remitted the matter to the Statutory Committee for 
further consideration.^' More recently the High Court has enforced procedural 
protections afforded to lawyers facing discipline, although these have been protections 
expressly required by relevant legislation. 
2.3.6 Lack of High Court Finesse 
It is perhaps because State Supreme Courts hear significantiy more disciplinary cases 
than the High Court that the exploration of what 'public protection' may mean in an 
mdividual case has been more fially explored in those courts than in the High Court. In 
'^ Ibid 207. 
"(1988)62ALJR153. 
78 
Then the statutory disciplinary tribunal for Queensland solicitors 
' ' Ibid. 
'° Ibid, citing New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 117, 183-4 and Weaver v Law 
Society of New South Wales (1979) 53 ALJR 585, 587. 
" ^^1 ^uT^ Committee reheard the matter on 26 September 1988 and suspended the solicitor for six 
months, half the penod of its original suspension: (1988) 18 Queensland Law Society Journal 527 
wl1lmo]7JZ^2f6''^ '^"' "'"'" ''''''''' "^ ^ ''-^ '^^'^' ^  '^ '^^-^ ^ /^- ^ -^ 
^^  Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW). 
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those cases which have come before the High Court, often that court has simply stated the 
issue as if it were a dichotomy between protection and punishment, with each category 
mutually exclusive - almost amounting to a statement that discipline cannot be about 
ptmishment because it is about protection. Perhaps the court would now recognise the 
flaws of such a dichotomy - it recently acknowledged the difficulties of attempting a 
simple binary division between protective and punitive provisions in civil penalty 
proceedings brought against a company director under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).^'' 
In later chapters I will demonstrate how such a dichotomy in disciplinary proceedings 
oversimplifies the nature of both protection and punishment. For instance, deterrence is a 
well-established purpose of criminal punishment and aims to protect the public from 
future harm. The simplistic 'protect not punish' dichotomy does not indicate the degree to 
which disciplinary orders can be motivated by a desire to deter other lawyers from similar 
misconduct in the future. The issue of deterrence is taken up later.**^  Nor does the 
dichotomy reflect the actual practice of courts and tribunals when imposing disciplinary 
orders. Retribution aims only to punish the individuals who are culpable.^^ I will also 
demonstrate the degree to which elements of retribution have been present in some 
disciplinary decisions in Queensland, despite the High Court's denial of its role.^ ^ 
^Rich V Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] HCA 42, [32]. 
Below sections 2.5.2, 6.6.2.2. 
* See discussion of retnbution above section 1.3.3, below sections 2.5.3, 6.1. 
^ Below section 6.5.2, 7.9. 
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hi the following sections of this chapter I explore the protection-punishment dichotomy 
in more detail, in particular, drawing a distinction between the views of the High Court 
and the Supreme Court of Queensland. 
2.4 SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND 
2.4.1 'Protect not Punish ' 
In its earliest disciplinary decisions, the Supreme Court of Queensland averted to the 
protective focus of discipline, but not always explicitly. For instance, in Re Swanwick in 
1882, the Supreme Court removed a barrister from the roll after a series of incidents,^^ 
the last being the sending of a threatening letter. Lilley CJ noted that lawyers were 
entrusted with great power which could be easily abused and the court had to be extra 
vigilant because members of the public would only rarely have enough knowledge to 
know to complain about a lawyer's conduct.'' 
By the time the Supreme Court of Queensland heard the case of Queensland Law Society 
V Carberry ^ in 2000, Supreme Courts throughout Australia had so regularly restated tiie 
protective focus of discipline that Moynihan SJA and Atkuison J were minded to 
comment: 
°° (1882) QLJ, Febmary 1, 1883, 117. 
'' Re Swanwick (1882) May 1, QLJ 66 (suspended until ftirther order for gross misconduct in reftising to 
cross examme witness and implying improper conduct by presiding judge); Re Swanwick (1882) QLJ 116 
(complaint of acting without instructions, not proved) 
°^ (1882) QLJ, Febmary 1, 1883, 117, 117, 118. 
c ^'t ^w "t'^r.^Amfl^I^f'.'rrf^f" '•"' *^^"^"''y of detection was also discussed m Queensland Law Society V Wright [2001] QCA 58, [67] (McMurdo P). 
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It is now trite to say that the primary role of proceedings such as those before the 
Tribunal is to protect the public from persons not fit to be held out as officers of the court 
and as a proper person to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of the 
solicitor.'^ 
2.4.2 The Language of Punishment and Penalty 
The 'protect not punish' manfra continues to be stated in the Queensland case law.'"* 
However, while denying any penal intent, many of the judges of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland have spoken of discipline in terms of the punishment to be imposed.'^ The 
court's use of such terminology may suggest to some that the court has misconstrued the 
role of discipline, but it is a fault in terminology which has continued throughout the case 
law, even in recent times when the protective focus of the court appears otherwise better 
enunciated. Some think that a convention had arisen in the courts to avoid the use of the 
term 'punishment' when dealing with disciplinary cases,'^ but a survey of Queensland 
Supreme Court decisions shows that the court continues to use the term 'punishment' 
'- [2000] QCA 450. 
" Ibid [38]. 
^ ReM [1948] St R Qd 454, 461; Attorney-General and Minster for Justice v Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350, 
356: 'the end objective of such a [disciplinary] system is not the punishment of the practitioner but the 
protection of the public'; Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253, [32]: ' [removal of the right to 
practise is done] not by way of punishment but in order to protect the public and maintain public 
confidence in the administration of justice'; Gregory v Queensland Law Society Inc [2001] QCA 499, [17] 
(Thomas J): 'the Court is not concerned with the question of punishment.' 
'^  Re Gilbert [1933] St R Qd 281: '.the only point to my mind is now the adequacy or inadequacy of the 
punishment.'(286, Blair CJ), '[a]s to the punishment...' (287, Webb J), 'I am not prepared to say that seven 
months is too little punishment...' (289, Henchman J); Re B, a Solicitor, [1938] St R Qd 361: 'The 
remaining question is as to the amount of punishment...' (365, Webb J); Re M, A Solicitor [1938] St R Qd 
454, 457 (Webb J), where his Honour uses the term 'punish' or 'punishment' seven times, (463, Graham 
AJ) where his Honour uses the term 'punishment' five times). Note however that in the same case. Hart J 
expressly states that a strike off order is not imposed by way of punishment. Hart J therefore uses the term 
'sentence', although his Honour also uses the term 'punishment' (462). 
'^ Transcript of Proceedings, Walsh v Law Society of New South Wales (High Court, Kirby J, 3 March 
1999): 'It used to be ... in the old days the convention of the court that it would avoid the word 
"punishment" lest it get into its mind the fact that it was sitting there as a punishing tribunal as distinct fi-om 
having the purpose which hangs over all these cases, of protecting the public, as distinct fi-om punishing the 
practitioner. The consequence may be punishment in the real sense but you kept your eyes fixed on the 
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97 
when deciding the appropriate order to impose. The use of terms such as 'punishment' 
and 'penalty' - in cases which simultaneously deny any penal intent - may be partly 
explained by the paucity of other, more appropriate, terms, leaving the court to ask what 
'order' should be imposed. To ask whether an order of the disciplinary tribunal was too 
'harsh' or too 'lenient' also risks reflecting a penal mtent. Perhaps the appellate court 
simply needs to ask if the tribunal's order was manifestly inappropriate^^to ensure there is 
no subconscious drift away from protection. 
2.4.3 Statutory Discipline 
2.4.3.1 Judicial Responses to Statutory Discipline 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to judicial claims about the purpose of discipline came 
with the introduction of legislation to deal with the discipline of solicitors.^ It then 
became possible that the legislature requfred discipline to be imposed for purposes 
different to those developed by the courts tmder the common law. An examination of 
statutory appeals to the Supreme Court of Queensland illuminates this issue. In the vast 
majority of cases it appears that the court simply presumed that the purpose of statutory 
purpose of the jurisdiction.'; '...die temi "sanction" is regarded as more felicitous that "penalty".'- John 
Forbes, Disciplinary Tribunals (2°'' ed, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1996) 153 
r , ^ f . f • ^ ^''^'"^'"' f^ ^^ ^^  ^^ ^ ^'^ '*^'^' "^ ^^  ^^^^^ J)' "^ 62 (Hart AJ), 463 (Graham AJ); Re G, A Solicitor 
[1939] QWN 67, 68 (Blair CJ); Re G, A Solicitor [1940] QWN 7, 10 (Macrossan SPJ, with whom Douglas 
and Philp JJ agreed); Re H. A Solicitor [1940] QWN 8, 13 (Macrossan SPJ), 14 (Webb J) 14 (Philp J)- Re 
NEG, A Solicitor [1940] QWN 25, 38 (Webb J), 38 (Douglas J); Re H, A Solicitor [196o'] Qd R 407 414 
(Hanger J, with whom Townley and Stable JJ agreed): 'The evidence ...shows not only conduct desei-ving 
of punislmient, but also conduct which indicates that in the interest of the public, his name should be 
removed from the roll of solicitors ' 
98 
Attorney General v Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350 
''Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld). Legislation to deal with the discipline of banisters came much 
later, with the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). 
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discipline was the same as the purpose of discipline imposed under the court's inherent 
jurisdiction. 
In some cases it seems that members of the court did not even consult the relevant 
legislation to elicit the express or implied purpose of statutory discipline, any statutory 
definitions of conduct liable to discipline or the types of order provided for in the 
legislation. Both statutory definitions and prescribed orders could have provided the 
court with important indications as to whether the legislation was intended to vary the 
purpose of discipline from its purpose under the common law. 
As the following discussion shows, it would seem that from time to time, Queensland 
legislation has tried to sfrengthen the protective ambit of the professional discipline of 
solicitors, through changes to the definition of conduct liable to disciphne and, more 
recently, by expressly incorporating a range of orders with a clear protective focus. 
Despite this, it would seem that the Supreme Court of Queensland continued to apply its 
common law understanding of the purpose of discipline - a purpose which allowed a 
greater retributive element than arguably was anticipated by the legislation. 
2.4.3.2 Judicial Response to Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) 
A statutory disciplinary system for solicitors first came into operation in 1927.'^° 
Thereafter and until 2004, the Supreme Court continued to be the only body which could 
Although the Queensland Law Society Act came into force in 1927, the first disciplinary case was not 
heard by the Statutory Committee until 1930. The first appeal against a decision of the Statutory Committee 
appears to have been In re a Solicitor [1932] St R Q 33. Apart from determining that proceedings before 
the Statutory Committee were judicial, the court did not discuss the aim of such proceedings. 
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discipline barristers. But in relation to solicitors, the Supreme Court only rarely heard 
disciplinary matters within its inherent jurisdiction and encouraged the use of the 
stattitory process.'^' This meant that the court's main ftmction was to hear appeals from 
the ttibunal constittited under the relevant legislation. 
The initial Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) (the 'Act') did not articulate the aim 
for which a solicitor was to be disciplined under the Act, other than to state that the 
Statutory Committee (the tribunal established tmder the Act) had jurisdiction to 
determine charges of 'illegal or professional misconduct'.'°^ Illegal conduct was not 
defined in the Act, but the Attorney-General, in his second reading speech, limited the 
term to 'offences',''^ ^ suggestuig it was intended to cover only breaches of the criminal 
law.'*^ "* In other, and much clearer ways, the jurisdiction of the committee was narrower 
under the 1927 Act than it was subsequently to become. The Act expressly stated that 
professional misconduct, as defined by the Act, did not include 'any conduct which, 
either from its trivial nature or from the surrounding circumstances' did not in the public 
interest disqualify a person from practising his profession.''°^ 
Such a definition was likely to exclude many forms of lawyer misconduct from which the 
public required protection, but which did not warrant a person's removal from practice. 
It would appear to suggest that, apart from instances of illegal conduct, the stattitory 
103 
104 
' ' Queensland Law Society V Smith [2001] 1 QdR649. 
'°- Queensland Law Society Act of 1927 {Q\d) s, S{\){d). 
Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 15 November 1927, 1001 (John Mullan). 
Apart fi-om guidance provided by this comment in the second reading speech, the reference to 'illegal' 
conduct IS ambiguous and may suggest there was no necessity to demonstrate a link between the illegal 
conduct and the practice of law. If this was the case, the junsdiction of the committee was perhaps wider in 
this regard than it was to become later. See below section 2.4.3.4. 
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tribunal only had jurisdiction over those whose conduct required their removal from 
practice. "^ ^ It could also be argued that this required the Statutory Committee to apply a 
much narrower view of discipline - and the Supreme Court of Queensland when 
exercising its appellate jurisdiction - than when discipline was applied by the court 
within its inherent jurisdiction. For instance, in some of the cases brought within the 
court's inherent jurisdiction (which predated the Act), the court imposed disciplinary 
fines upon lawyers. The imposition of a fine in such cases suggests that the court did 
not consider the lawyer 'disqualified from practice' in the sense used by the later Act. 
The debates which preceded the passage of the Bill provide no conclusive evidence as to 
whether Parliament intended the Act to depart from the common law understanding of 
conduct liable to discipline. During the second reading speech, the Attomey-General 
explained that the exclusion from the definition of professional misconduct of conduct 
which did not disqualify a person from practice was designed to 'save the practitioner 
from bdng harassed by the Queensland Law Society Incorporated'.'"** This would 
suggest that Parliament only intended the society to deal with a narrower range of 
conduct than the court could deal with in its inherent jurisdiction. But later m the debate 
the Attomey-General suggested the new Act would overcome the previous difficulties of 
having insufficient evidence to prove a person should be struck from the roll, and 
compared the new Act to the Trust Accounts Act, which had 'saved some weak 
Section 5(6) (emphasis added). 
'°* Where the solicitor had engaged in illegal conduct, the same excuses did not appear to be available.. In 
other words, under the earliest version of the Act, disciplinary action was sufficientiy justified if a person 
complained that a solicitor had engaged in illegal conduct. 'Unprofessional conduct' did not appear in the 
Act until 1938. 
'°^ For instance, Re Batho (1868) 1 QSCR 196, where the solicitor was suspended from practice, but only 
until he had repaid monies owed to the client. 
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practitioners from themselves.''°'^ These comments suggest that the committee was to 
have jurisdiction over a broad range of conduct, perhaps even to the point of imposing 
strict liability, similar to that imposed by the Trust Accounts Act. 
In summary, there is some evidence in the language of the Act itself and the expressed 
intention of those who passed the Act that the statutory meaning of professional 
misconduct was intended to differ from its common law meaning. However, when the 
Supreme Court heard appeals from the Statutory Committee, it does not appear to have 
applied any test different to its pre-1927 view of the purpose of discipline. *^ ° 
A close reading of decisions by the Supreme Court of Queensland after the passing of the 
Queensland Law Society Act 1927, particularly decisions until 1939, suggests that the 
court had very little apparent interest in, or knowledge of, the new statutory provisions 
relating to discipline. The court's decisions until 1939 also suggest that, while 
acknowledging in a cursory way the need for discipline to protect the public, the court 
still struggled with the rationale for discipline, despite the fact that by the 1930s there was 
clear High Court authority to guide the court.'" Decisions of tiie court during that period 
also suggest that the court had not fully considered how the public should be protected or. 
Queensland, Par/jawen/ao'^eZ)ato, Legislative Assembly, 15 November 1927, 1001 (John Mullan) 
'"' Ibid 1002. 
"° See Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253. 
' " During this period there were Queensland cases which repeated the 'protect not punish' mantra, for 
instance the admission case oi Re Bridgman [1934] St R Qd 1. Delivering the court's judgment, Blair CJ 
referred to Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher, Southern Law Society v Westbrook 
and Re Brounsall in stating the need to protect the public and absence of any penal element (6) However 
the court did not go on to explore what this may mean. Re M [1938] St R Qd 454 was the first disciplinar^ 
decision by a Queensland court to explicitiy state that an order striking a practitioner fi-om the roll was not 
imposed by way of punishment: 'The question is whether he is fit and proper to remain on the roll' (461 
Hart AJ), citing Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher [1909] 9 CLR 655, 680 (Isaacs 
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erroneously, gave too much weight to a lawyer's personal mitigating factors. This can be 
demonstrated by examining a group of cases from the 1930s which dealt with solicitors 
who had misused client money. 
2.4.3.3 Judicial Response to Trust Accounts Act 1923 (Qld) 
During the 1920s and 1930s solicitors faced the pressures and temptations which 
culminated in the Great Depression. Parliament enacted the Trust Accounts Act 1923 
(Qld) to deal with the problem of solicitors stealing trust money. Nevertheless, it seems 
that - at least imtil the latter half of 1939^^ - the Supreme Court underestimated the need 
to demand strict compliance with that Act and thereby failed to protect the public from 
solicitors' misuse of client money. 
For instance, in Re Gilbert two members of the court took a narrow view of obligations 
under the Trust Accounts Act, doubting whether anything less than 'continual or 
persistent'"'* or 'systematic'"^ breaches of that Act could amount to professional 
misconduct. The court overturned the Statutory Committee's imposition of a 12 month 
suspension and held that a seven month period of suspension was adequate, despite the 
fact that the solicitor had knowingly converted trust money. The only judge to discuss the 
purpose of discipline or any case law was Blair CJ, citing the aim of protecting the 
" Discussed below section 2.5.2. 
"^[1933]StRQd281. 
'"* Ibid 287 (Webb J). 
"^ Ibid 289 (Henchman J). His Honour thought that, normally, the Statutory Committee should only 
recommend whether proceedings under the Act should be taken against a solicitor, rather than take action 
itself 
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public."^ Notably, he was also tiie only member of the court who did not overturn the 
Statutory Committee's finding of professional misconduct m relation to the breach of the 
Trust Accounts Act. 
1 1 T 
In confrast, the only member of the court in Re Gilbert to cite individual sections of the 
Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) was Henchman J, although not to emphasise the 
need for a heightened level of public protection. Quite the opposite. Instead His Honour 
went into exhaustive detail as to the basis upon which members of the Statutory 
Committee and members of the Queensland Law Society Council could be disqualified 
from practice. He concluded that, as a member of the council was only disqualified from 
membership following conviction on two occasions for breaches of the Trust Accounts 
Act, then surely the drafters of the Act did not intend that one breach could amount to 
professional misconduct."^ Such a literal approach to the Act, focusing as it did on the 
potential outcomes for a council member, could not be said to reinforce the protective 
aim of discipline."^ 
The Supreme Court continued to place littie importance on solicitors' hoist account 
obligations in Re B, '^ " heard in 1938. Both judges who heard that appeal agreed tiiat the 
solicitor's false statements to his client satisfied the common law test of professional 
116 c 
The Court m admitting solicitors to practice, incurs a great responsibility to the public, and on their 
b ^ g admitted there is no doubt a greater responsibility to the public m a proper surveillance of these 
otticers. : Ibid 286. he went on to cite Southern Law Society v Westbrook (1910) 10 CLR 609 618 and the 
court s eariier decision in Re a Solicitor [1932] St R Qd 33 
'"[1933] St RQd 281. 
"° Ibid 289 
119 
Although Henchman J also suggested that, had the discretion been his rather than the Statutory 
Committee s, he would have imposed a more severe order (289) 
'-°[1938]StRQd361. 
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misconduct, but disagreed as to how the solicitor's numerous breaches of the Trust 
Accounts Act should be categorised. Because the solicitor's acts and omissions were 
'continual or persistent','^' Webb J - consistent with his comments in Re Gilbert^^^-
found that this constituted professional misconduct. Graham J disagreed, noting that, 
despite the numerous breaches of the Act over three years, this 'fails to raise in me the 
sfrong sense of indignation which should be raised by any disgracefial or dishonourable 
action.' His Honour therefore felt unable to construe these actions as amounting to 
professional misconduct. This perhaps demonstrates the shortcomings of applying the 
common law test of professional misconduct - 'conduct, in the pursuit of a profession, 
which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by professional 
brethren of good repute and competency''^'' - to relatively new legislation. Parliament 
had indicated its intention that breaches of the Trust Accounts Act be treated seriously, by 
providing for summary prosecution in the courts. But a disciplinary tribunal, applying the 
common law test of professional misconduct, will not necessarily respond to breaches of 
the legislation until the need to conform strictly with the Act has been internalised by the 
legal profession and courts. In other words, a breach of the Trust Accounts Act could not 
amount to professional misconduct imtil professional brethren considered such a breach 
'disgraceful or dishonourable'. 
'"' The solicitor had filed to conduct an audit or keep proper receipt books or records for three years, and 
practised for two years without a practising certificate. 
'^'[1933]StRQd281. 
'-^  [1938] St RQd 361, 365. 
^^^Allinson v General Council of Medical Education [1894] 1 KB 750, 761. 
'"^ ^ Both judges agreed that the three month suspension should stand, but ordered the removal of a condition 
that the solicitor be fiirther suspended until he paid costs Re B [1938] St R Qd 361, 365 (Webb J), 366 
(Graham AJ). 
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This is a theme to which this thesis will repeatedly return - that common law or statutory 
discipline which defines professional misconduct according to what the legal profession 
may consider 'dishonourable or disgraceful' necessarily limits its potential to protect. 
At its worst, such an approach could mean that no conduct could be subject to discipluie 
while the majority of the profession was engaging in it, or if it invoked too empathetic a 
response from colleagues. In the subsequent section of this chapter I demonstrate how the 
Supreme Court continued to overlook or ignore Parliament's intention that statutory 
discipline break away from the 'disgrace and dishonour' mould and take a broader view 
of public protection. 
2.4.3.4 Judiciary Continues to Ignore Strengthening Legislation: 1938 - 2004 
The types of conduct liable to statutory discipline was subject to continued legislative 
amendment between 1938 and 2004, demonstrating Parliament's consistently expressed 
desire to sfrengthen the protective focus of statutory discipline.'^^ However, the Supreme 
Court did not necessarily recognise or comply with the legislative intent. Instead it 
continued to apply its common law understanding of the purpose of discipline and the 
types of conduct liable to discipline. 
126 This does not necessarily mean that Parliament provided sufficient funds to enhance the protective 
functions of the regulatory body. Legislative changes without adequate funding can be viewed cynically, as 
in Ira Horowitz, 'The Economic Foundations of Self Regulation in the Professions' in Roger Blair and 
Stephen Rubin (eds), Regulating the Professions (1980) 16, citing Richard Posner, 'Theories of Economic 
Regulanon' (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 335, 337. See discussion below 
section 3.10.2.1. However arguably, the changes considered here did not require extra fianding, simply a 
change of attitude by the court. 
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For instance, amendments to the Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) in 1938*^^  
widened the jurisdiction of the Statutory Committee by removing the reference to illegal 
conduct and requiring the Statutory Committee to hear and determine charges of 
'malpractice, professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct'.'^^ Arguably, this 
greatly sfrengthened the protective focus of statutory discipline, makuig it clear that the 
Statutory Committee's jurisdiction extended beyond cases which required a solicitor to 
be removed from practice to now also include matters which were less serious, but 
nevertheless evidenced sub-standard conduct from which the public must be protected, 
namely 'malpractice' and 'unprofessional conduct'. This is also suggested by comments 
made during debate on the 1938 Bill. Although the Attomey-General did not state 
expressly why the Bill added 'improfessional conduct' to the jurisdiction of the Statutory 
Committee, he did express dissatisfaction with the lenient approach of the Statutory 
Committee in the past. He also expressed disdain for legal members of Parliament who 
had thought Parliament should not interfere in the regulation of the profession and 
claimed the new legislation was 'solely concerned with the pubhc interest.''^° He claimed 
that three previous pieces of legislation had improved the conduct of Queensland 
solicitors,'^^ so that the Queensland legal profession had already become 'an example to 
the rest of Ausfralia'.'^^ Despite this, the Attomey-General thought there was a need for 
Queensland Law Society Acts Amendment Act 1938 (Qld). 
'"^  Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) s 5(1 )(a), as amended by Queensland Law Society Acts 
Amendment Act 1938 (Qld) s 2. 
'•^ ' Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 7 September 1938, 318 (John Mullan). 
"° Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 September 1938, 375 (John Mullan). 
'^' Trust Accounts Act 1923 (Qld); Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld); Queensland Law Society Act 
Amendment Act 1930 (Qld). 
'^ " Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 September 1938, 374 (John Mullan). 
'"ibid 375. 
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,134 further legislation 'to keep the profession up to the scratch.' These comments, together 
witii the words of the legislation itself, indicate that it was tiie intention of Parliament to 
broaden the range of conduct liable to stattitory discipline beyond the traditional range of 
professional discipline at common law. 
Surprismgly, the inclusion of such a broad term as 'malpractice' has been largely ignored 
by the courts, apart from a brief comment ui Queensland Law Society v Smith that the 
term was probably limited to conduct in the course of practice.' At the time tiiat the 
term was introduced into tiie Act, the term 'malpractice' had a broad meaning and was 
used in common language to mean not only malicious or dishonest conduct but also poor 
performance due to incompetence, negligence and ignorance.'^' Certainly, an exhaustive 
survey of the reported cases on lawyers' discipline in Queensland mdicates that 
disciplinary tribunals and appellate courts m Queensland have only found professional 
misconduct or unprofessional conduct, never 'malpractice'. It is difficult to explain why 
the inclusion of the term 'malpractice' has been overlooked for nearly 70 years, other 
than that the court continued to apply its own understanding of the rationale for 
discipline, regardless of any statutory rationale. 
''' Ibid 374 . 
'^^[2001] lQdR649. 
'^ ^ Ibid 652 (Thomas JA). 
' " Oxford English Dictionary (2004): ' Law. a. Treatment given by a member of the medical profession 
tiiat departs from a generally accepted standard of practice and results in injury to the patient, through 
negligence, ignorance, lack of skill, or malicious intent. ... 1816 A. C. Hutchison Pract. Observ. Surg. 
(1826) 181 This boy is dangerously ill, and likely to die, in con.sequence of such malpractice.' 
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'Unprofessional conduct' - also mcluded for the first time in 1938 - was not defined at all 
by the legislation until 1997, but at common law required a substantial shortfall in 
standards.'^^ It could be argued that the inclusion of the term in the legislation in 1938 
removed any doubt, which may have been still present in the common law, that a person 
could be disciplined for inadvertent as well as deliberate breaches of standards of 
conduct. Yet there appeared to be resistance by the Supreme Court to view 
unprofessional conduct as anything very different to professional misconduct and, as late 
as 2006, the court appeared to conflate the two definitions.'''^ It is therefore not surprising 
that Parliament saw a need to provide an explicit statutory definition of unprofessional 
conduct in 1997. 
The 1997 amendments to the definition of conduct liable to discipline extended the 
definition of unprofessional conduct from its common law definition to include also 
'serious neglect or undue delay, the charging of excessive fees or costs or a failure to 
maintain reasonable standards of competence or diligence.''"" The words of the statute 
suggest there was no longer a need for the shortfall to be 'substantial' before the statutory 
definition was satisfied. During the second reading speech of the Bill, the Attomey-
General confirmed the Government's intention to extend the definition of unprofessional 
conduct and 'broaden the umbrella of matters that come within the ambit of the 
"^ Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 3B (repealed), inserted by Queensland Law Society 
Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Qld) s 5, provided a partial definition. 
'^' 'Conduct which may reasonably be held to violate, or to fall short of, to a substantial degree, the 
standard of professional conduct observed or approved of by members of the profession of good repute and 
competency': Re R, a Practitioner of the Supreme Court [1927] SASR 58, 61. 
'*° Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498; Re Wheeler [1992] 2 Qd R 690; Baker v 
Legal Services Commissioner [2006] QCA 145, [46]; David Searles, 'Professional Misconduct -
Unprofessional Conduct: Is There a Difference?' (1992) Queensland Law Society Journal 239. 
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complaints tribunal.'^^ He expected cases of delays and costs to 'now come before tiie 
complaints tribunal', which would increase its workload 'considerably'.'^^ 
144 hi 2001, in Queensland Law Society Inc v Smith, the court appeared to apply its 
disciplinary fimction witiiin its inherent jurisdiction in just the same way as when hearing 
disciplmary appeals under the statutory regime.'"^ As recentiy as 2006, the court 
preferred to cite the common law definition of professional misconduct, despite the 
very extensive definition contained in the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). Despite the 
comments of the Attomey-General that the government's intention was to broaden the 
range of conduct liable to statutory discipline, if anything, the court in Smith toyed with 
the possibility that the statutory definition of conduct liable to discipline may be 
narrower than its breadth at common law. Thomas J thought that the term 
'professional misconduct', as used in the legislation and at common law, only applied to 
misconduct in the course of legal practice,'"* so couldn't apply to Smith who was already 
under suspension and not involved with a legal practice at the time of his dishonest 
Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 3B (repealed), inserted by Queensland Law Society 
Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Qld) s 5. 
' Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 6 May 1997, 1442 (Denver Beanland). 
'"^ Ibid 1440 (Denver Beanland). 
"^[2001] l Q d R 6 4 9 . 
Even though this case involved a solicitor and occurted after a statutory disciplinary scheme for 
solicitors was introduced, the case was brought within the court's inherent jurisdiction because the solicitor 
was already under suspension at the time of the further misconduct and the Queensland Law Society was 
unclear whether the case came within the statutory jurisdiction. 
"^ Baker v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] QCA 145, [46], citing Adamson v Queensland Law 
Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498. Both Adamson and Baker conflated the common law tests of professional 
misconduct and unprofessional conduct. 
"*^  Section 245. 
With whom McPherson JA and Atkinson J agreed. 
" ' [2001] l Q d R 6 4 9 , 6 5 2 . 
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conduct.'^° While his Honour thought that part of the statutory definition of 
unprofessional conduct - 'serious neglect or tmdue delay, charging of excessive fees or 
costs, or failure to maintain reasonable standards of competence or diligence''^' - was 
'surprisingly limited','" this was remedied by the remainder of the section,'^^ which 
preserved the 'proper limits' of unprofessional conduct.'^'' Thomas J's comments should 
be read in their proper context: the case had been brought within the court's inherent 
jurisdiction because the Queensland Law Society was unclear as to whether the statutory 
definition of 'unprofessional conduct' extended to conduct outside of legal practice. It is 
quite likely that Thomas J thought part of the statutory definition to be 'surprisingly 
limited' because it clearly limited itself to aspects of legal practice such as fees and 
delays. The court in Smith only had to decide if fraudulent conduct outside practice could 
lead to statutory discipline, not the degree to which issues of incompetence could lead to 
discipluie. 
However, despite the clear words of the statute and Parliament's intention, this 
interpretation of the legislation was not embraced by the Supreme Court until much later, 
in 2000 m the case of Attomey-General v Clough. 
Admittedly, the court could avoid determining the statutory meaning of 'unprofessional 
conduct' or 'malpractice' because the Queensland Law Society determined which matters 
'^ ° He had been convicted in the District Court of dishonestly applying $12,000 regarding three amusement 
machines and again in the District Court of misappropriating $156,000 in relation to ostrich-farming 
activities. 
'^' Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 3B(1). 
'"[2001] 1 QdR649, 651. 
' " Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 3B(2). 
'^^[2001] lQdR649, 651. 
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would be prosecuted and focused generally on more serious matters where the common 
law test of professional misconduct - dishonour and disgrace - would be easily satisfied. 
As a consequence, most disciplinary appeals dealt with matters involving 'professional 
misconduct'. 
The Supreme Court did not undertake an extended discussion of the meaning of 
'unprofessional conduct' until Attomey-General v Clough^^^ in July 2000. Even then the 
discussion of the extent of tiie statutory definition of unprofessional conduct was obiter 
dicta as tiie court found the common law test of a 'substantial shortfall of standards' to be 
satisfied.'" Muir J commented that there was a trend in England to conflate the tests of 
'malpractice, professional misconduct and unprofessional conduct', and both he and 
Pincus JA noted that the fiill range of orders became available on the tribunal or court 
finding professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct, making the need for 
categorisation less necessary.'^ '^  However, Pincus JA's judgment is notable because it 
represents the first occasion upon which a Queensland judge clearly and explicitly 
acknowledged and embraced the intent of the legislature to encompass the 'merely' 
incompetent. His Honour took the opportunity to expressly state that, under the 
legislation, it was not necessary to show indifference or recklessness before an 
incompetent lawyer could be disciplined - incompetent but well-meaning lawyers were 
also liable.'^° 
Altiiough decided in 2000, it was not reported until two years later: [2002] 1 Qd R 116. 
156 Ibid. 
'"ibid 134-5 (Muir J). 
'^ ^ Ibid 137. 
52 
Chapter Two: Lawmakers' Rationales for Discipline 
The protective focus of the legislation in Queensland was strengthened even ftirther by 
the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). Barristers were brought within the statutory regime 
for the first time. The amendments also discarded the notion of 'improfessional conduct' 
and included a new form of conduct liable to discipline - 'unsatisfactory professional 
conduct'. 'Unsatisfactory professional conduct' is not defined exhaustively by the Act, 
but includes conduct in relation to practice which 'falls short of the standard of 
competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a 
reasonably competent Ausfralian lawyer.''^' This appears even wider than the definition 
of unprofessional conduct which it supersedes and arguably indicates an even stronger 
legislative intention that even conduct that in the past would have been considered 
'simply negligence' and not liable to discipline, is included within the definition and so, 
now, liable to discipline. No longer is the benchmark what colleagues may consider a 
shortfall of standards but what a member of the Australian public is entitled to expect. 
The Legal Services Commissioner agrees with the view that the 2004 definition 
encompasses this much broader range of conduct and believes that 'consumers have been 
put first at the very core of the new complaints and disciplinary regime.' Given that it 
is now the commissioner who prosecutes discipline in Queensland, it will be interesting 
to see whether his wider understanding of his protective jurisdiction will lead to changes 
in the profile of disciplinary cases and outcomes.'^^ Time will tell whether the 
'^' Ibid 138. 
'^ ^ Ibid 120. 
'*' Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 244. 
' " John Briton, Legal Services Commissioner, 'The System for Dealing with Complaints: the 
Commission's Approach' (Paper presented at the Bar Association of Queensland Annual Conference, 
Sanctuary Cove, Queensland, 5 March 2006) http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/speeches/BAQ050306.pdf at 13 
March 2006. 
' " By contrast, although the ACT legislation speaks in terms of what a client is entitled to expect and 
incorporates the notion of a 'substantial, recurring or continuing' departure from standards in the more 
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Queensland Pariiament, the Supreme Court and the prosecuting body have finally 
reached consensus on tiie breadtii of conduct liable to statijtory discipline. 
It is not only in definitions of conduct liable to discipline that the Queensland Parliament 
has expressed an apparent desire that the protective nature of discipline be sfrengthened. 
This can also be seen in tiie nature of orders prescribed by tiie legislation, particularly 
orders which proactively seek to ensure that, although allowed to continue to practise, a 
lawyer's standards of performance will improve in the fiiture. A good example is 
provided by amendments in 1988 which allowed the disciplinary tribunal to order a 
solicitor to make files available for ftiture inspection, to submit reports and to comply 
with conditions, such as attendance at various continuing legal education courses.'^ 
Amendments in 2004 continued this trend, extending the suggested range of orders to 
include supervised practice or limited practice.'^^ 
Another way in which the public is protected from substandard conduct by lawyers is by 
compensating clients for loss. Provisions for disciplinary tribunals to order lawyers to pay 
compensation to 'persons aggrieved' have been present in the legislation since 1987,'^ ^ 
senous professional misconduct (Legal Practitioners Act 1970 (ACT) s 37), the Supreme Court of tiie ACT 
still appears to read down the definition of unsatisfactory professional conduct to require there to be a 
'significant departure' and for tiiis to be a significant departure from the standards expected of legal 
practitioners of good repute', not standards expected by clients: PG v The Law Society of the Australian 
Capital Territory [2004] ACTSC 99, [22] (emphasis added). This is arguably a misreading of the court's 
decision in Howes v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [1998] ACTSC 71. 
'^ ^ Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6 (3)(ab) (repealed), inserted by Queensland Law Society Act 
and Another Act Amendment Act 1988 (Qld) s 5. 
' " Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s (4). 
'*' Queensland Statutory Committee Rules 1987 (Qld) s 24 (allowing for orders that portions of fines be 
paid to 'persons aggneved'; Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6R, inserted by Queensland Law 
Society Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Qld) s 9. Now contained in Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 
280(4)(b). Moorhead et al have demonstrated how the inclusion of compensatory powers in the disciplinary 
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providing further evidence that the protective focus of the legislation has strengthened 
over time. 
2.5 PUNISHMENT 
2.5.1 Punishment Per Se 
The High Court has not drawn a sophisticated rationale for discipline in most cases that 
have come before it and has usually been satisfied to pose the issue as a simple 
dichotomy between protection of the public and punishment of the lawyer, expressly 
disavowing any element of punishment in the disciplinary order. But, as I noted in 
Chapter One, punishment can contain a number of elements. Two elements relevant to 
the current discussion are deterrence and retribution. There has been a greater analysis of 
the concept of punishment in State Supreme Courts than in the High Court, and an 
acknowledgement that some purposes of punishment - namely deterrence - can also be 
directed towards the protection of the public. 
context has led to confusion in the decision making process: Richard Moorhead, Avrom Sherr and Sarah 
Rogers, Compensation for Inadequate Services (Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London, 2000) 45. 
'^ ^ Above section 1.3.2; HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (1968) 
43. 
55 
Chapter Two: Lawmakers' Rationales for Discipline 
Early Queensland cases sometimes emphasised a penal element in discipline.'^^ For 
instance, only a few years after his apparent endorsement of the protective ftmction of 
discipluie in Re Swanwick,^^'^ in Re Chubb^^^ Lilley CJ spoke of the punishment of 
discipline'^' and gave weight to personal factors that would be less relevant if the court's 
focus was on protection.'^^ Even though Chubb had sent a threatening letter, the court 
accepted that he had been sunply 'ignorant and foolish''^^ rather than deliberately 
threatening .and ordered that he only be censured because of the court's 'domestic 
knowledge' of his good character'^'' and strong character references from Bundaberg, 
where he practised. 
'^ * Re Swanwick; ex parte Bain (1882) QLJ, February 1, 1883, 117 (Lilley CJ, with whom Harding and 
Pring JJ agreed): 'There are many instances of misconduct on the part of officers of the court visited by 
severe punishment....'(118); 'We are sitting in judgment to-day, not upon the question whether he has or 
has not been guilty of the statutory offence, but whether his conduct has been such as requires the exercise 
of the penal jurisdiction of the court over him, by means of disbarment and striking him off the roll.' (119); 
'severe punishment'(119); Re Chubb [1887] 3 QLJ 35, 36 (Lilley CJ): Our jurisdiction being exemplary 
and severe even to the extent of professional extinction of the wrongdoer...', ' . . . the solicitor acted 
ignorantiy and foolishly, but not in such a way as to call for the severest form of punishment.'; In re 
Bridgeman [ 1927] QWN 21: 'proceedings taken in the Supreme Court against a solicitor for the purpose of 
bringing any improper or unprofessional conduct by him before the Court for consideration, ought in all 
cases to be instituted by calling upon him to show cause why the Court should not exerci.se its disciplinary 
and punitive powers over him in regard to such conduct.' 
'*'' (1882) QLJ, February 1, 1883, 117. Discussed above section 2.4.1. 
'™ [1887] 3 QLJ 35. 
Ibid 36: Our jurisdiction being exemplary and severe even to the extent of professional extinction of the 
wrongdoer...', ' . . . the solicitor acted ignorantiy and foolishly, but not in such a way as to call for the 
severest form of punishment.' 
" See discussion of personal factors in Chapter Seven. 
' "[1887] 3 QLJ 35, 37. 
[1887] 3 QLJ 35, 37. It is possible that this solicitor, AFB Chubb was related to the prominent Chubb 
legal family, which included Charies Frederick Chubb and Charies Edward Chubb: Ross Johnston, A 
History of the Queensland Bar (Bar Association of Queensland, Brisbane, 1979) 49-50, which could 
explain the court's 'domestic' knowledge of him, a knowledge which other lawyers facing discipline may 
not be able to call upon. It should also be noted tiiat the legal profession was extremely 'close knit' at this 
time. Lilley CJ and his son Edwyn Lilley were both criticised because of the fi-equency with which the son 
appeared before the father Johnston at 43-4. hi Re Chubb itself, the son Edwyn Lilley appeared on behalf 
of the Queensland Law Association, while his father sat on the bench. In Re Costello (1889) 3 QLJ 129, 
concerning whether a student at law was fit to be admitted as a barrister, Chubb and Lilley appeared for the 
Board of Examiners for Barristers, before a bench which included Lilley CJ. If indeed AFB Chubb was a 
member of this prominent Chubb family, Re Costello shows the degree to which the legal profession in 
Queensland was then a close network of friends and relatives. 
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The Supreme Court had still not expressed a sophisticated rationale for discipline when it 
heard Re a Solicitor^^^ in 1913. By then the High Court had heard both Incorporated Law 
Institute of New South Wales v Meagher^^^ and Southern Law Society v Westbrook,^^^ in 
which the High Court clearly stated the protective focus of discipline and the need to 
17Q 
protect the public from the 'simple and confiding' as well as the dishonest. Yet neither 
of those cases, nor any other case law, either from Australia or elsewhere, was cited by 
any members of tiie bench.'**" In a half page judgment. Cooper CJ'^' simply noted that the 
solicitor's breach of the Suppression of Gambling Act 1895 (Qld) involved neither 
'personal dishonour nor dishonesty', but only ignorance, and proceeded to caisure him. 
As recently as 1987, at least one member of the Supreme Court of Queensland could be 
thought to consider punishment to be a primary aim of discipline when he said that the 
court's concern in disciplinary proceedings is "not only with punishment of solicitors 
guilty of professional misconduct but also with the protection of members of the 
public.''^^ However, as the following discussion shows, the court has generally endorsed 
'"Ibid 37. 
' " [1913] St R Qd 223. The solicitor is not named in this case, although the previous practice in 
Queensland was to name, even if misconduct was not established, as in Re Swanwick (1882) QLJ 116, 
where a complaint of acting without instructions was not found to be established on die evidence. 
'"(1909) 9 CLR 655. 
'^^(1910) 10 CLR 609. 
'™ Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher (1909) 9 CLR 655, 688, discussed above 
section 2.3.1. 
'*° Altiiough in die course of argument, counsel for tiie solicitor referred to the two English cases oi Re 
Weare [1893] 2 QB 439 and Re a Solicitor (1905) 22 TLR 127; 93 LT 838. 
'*' With whom Chubb and Lukin J J agreed. 
'*' Re Walter, (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Full Court, Shepherdson, Connolly and 
Williams JJ, 22 May 1987) 12-13 (Williams J, emphasis added). On appeal by the solicitor to the High 
Court, in Walter v Council of Queensland Law Society (1988) 62 ALJR 153, the High Court overturned the 
decision of the Supreme Court on the basis tiiat tiiere had been no allegation of dishonest use of client 
funds, tiirough wrongful conversion or stealing, and the findings of the Statutory Committee could have 
been equally based on a finding of 'procedural impropriety and incompetent management of lending 
transactions' (156) rather than fraud. Equally, the High Court cautioned against finding dishonesty simply 
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the primary role of public protection in discipline, as well as articulatmg a more 
sophisticated rationale for discipline than appears from judgments of the High Court. 
2.5.2 Deterrence 
In the relatively few disciplinary cases which have come before it compared with 
disciplmary cases before tiie State courts, usually tiie High Court has stated simply that 
no punishment is involved in discipline and has not articulated the ways in which 
discipline can protect the public. In comparison, and possibly because of the greater 
numbers of occasions upon which they have been requfred to explore the complexities of 
discipline, lower courts have explicitly acknowledged that the public can be protected 
through deterrence. 
Although the Supreme Court of Queensland did not appear to be well acquainted with the 
relevant legislation until much later, it recognised the protective impact of deterrence as 
early as 1939. This was largely a response to the court's belated acknowledgment that the 
number of cases in which solicitors had misused, or stolen, client money required a 
proactive response from the court. While the court did not refer to 'deterrence' by name, 
in a group of cases in the second half of 1939, the court applied a deterrent approach. For 
instance, in Re G Webb J identified the numerous trust account frauds that had come to 
tiie court's attention in recent years'^ "* and stated explicitly tiiat lawyers must strictly 
because tiie Statutory Committee rejected the solicitor's version of events (157). The High Court did not 
comment on the reference to 'punishment' in the lower court 
'^ ^ [1939] QWN 39. 
'^^Ibid. 
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comply with the Trust Accounts Act or risk being struck from the roll.'^^ In a case also 
called Re G"*^ but heard four months later, the court gave a fiirther unequivocal 
indication that, in the future, a solicitor found guilty of stealing client money would 
normally be struck from the roll.'^^ 
The court continued this strong message of deterrence in Re //,'^^ where Macrossan SPJ 
warned of the need to avoid ftirther confusion by 'whittling down' the decision in Re 
G, and emphasised the need for clear and consistent deterrence of misconduct in the 
profession: 
The shocking prevalence of malversation of clients' funds by solicitors over the last few 
years, as shown by a list of cases prepared by the Registrar,''*" ftirther points to the 
necessity for clear and unambiguous condemnation by the Court, and the enunciation of 
some principle to cover cases of proved dishonesty.'^' 
The earliest detailed and explicit analysis of the deterrent function of discipline was in 
Law Society of New South Wales v Bannister.^'^~ The High Court's comment in Clyne v 
New South Wales Bar Association^^^ - that the power to discipline is entirely protective 
with no element of punishment involved - was qualified by Sheller JA, who suggested 
that this dichotomy may be not only misleading but also simplistic. Although retribution 
played no part in discipline, Sheller JA had no doubt that deterrence did have a clear role 
'^^Ibid. 
'^ ^ [1940] QWN 7, (heard 2 October 1939). 
Ibid 11 (Macrossan SPJ, with whom RJ Douglas and Philp JJ agreed). 
™ [1940] QWN 8, heard 14 December 1939, 13 (Macrossan SPJ and Philp J, Webb J dissented). 
'^' [1940] QWN 7 (heard 2 October 1939). 
"° This was tiie list prepared for the court in Re M [1938] St R Qd 454. 
' " [1940] QWN 8, heard 14 December 1939, 13. 
' (1993) 4 Legal Profession Disciplinary Reports 24 (New South Wales Court of Appeal). The deterrent 
fiinction of discipline was mentioned earlier, but only briefly, by the Supreme Court of the Australian 
Capital Territory in Re a Solicitor (1992) 110 FLR 9, 24. 
"^ Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186, 198. 
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to play.'"^ His comments were later endorsed in New South Wales Bar Association v 
Hamtnan. 
The legitimate use of deterrence in discipline was also noted by Pincus JA in Attorney-
General V Bar. 
Although I accept that the remedies of suspension or sttiking-off are not applied by way 
of punishment, but rather for the protection of the public and of the profession's standing, 
there is also a deterrent element. 
The question whether it would be valid to remove a person from practice merely to deter 
others is a more likely outcome if it is acknowledged that deterrence can lead to a harsher 
result. It is difficult to assess the courts' view of such a proposition, as courts are usually 
careful to find that a person is in fact unfit to practise at the time of the disciplinary 
proceedings, before endorsing the role played by deterrence. 
... the distinction between the two stated objectives of protection and punishment is blurred and can be 
misleading. ... The order for removal is not punitive but protective But the supervisory jurisdiction of 
the Court and the Tribunal is also directed to protecting the public more generally by maintaining and 
encouraging appropriate standards of professional behaviour [Rjetribution, a purpose of criminal 
punishment, is no part of the Court's purpose in making an order against a solicitor in the exercise of its 
supervisory jurisdiction. The exercise of the power to remove fi-om the roll, suspend or fine a solicitor is 
directed to protecting the public by ensuring that those unfit to practise do not continue to bold themselves 
out as fit to practise and that high standards are maintained. The maintenance of such standards involves 
deterring the offender from repeating the offence and deterring others who might by tempted to offend '• 
Ibid 27-8. 
'*' [1999] NSWCA 404 (Unreported, Supreme Court of New Soutii Wales, Court of Appeal, Mason P, 
Pnestiey JA and Da vies AJA, 29 October 1999) [77]. 
"^ [1999] 2 Qd R 9, 22, citing Clyne v NSW Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186, 202. Shepherdson J and 
McPherson JA agreed with the comments of Pincus J A. 
'"' Linda Haller, 'Lawyers and the Third Dimension: A Solicitor v The Council of tiie Law Society of New 
South Wales' (2004) 23 University of Queensland Law Journal 211,216. 
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Comments by Moynihan SJA and Atkinson J in Queensland Law Society v Carberry''^^ 
would appear to argue against the possibility of removing a person from practice merely 
to deter, as their Honours mark deterrence as only a subsidiary purpose of discipline: 
It is now trite to say that the primary role of proceedings such as those before the 
Tribunal is to protect the public from persons not fit to be held out as officers of the court 
and as a proper person to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of the 
solicitor As was pointed out in Attomey-General v Bax ... there is a subsidiary 
purpose in the public interest and that is to deter other practitioners who might otherwise 
engage in professional misconduct.''^ 
In other words, their Honours appear to endorse only deterrence which flows naturally as 
a result of disciplinary action taken against those who are foimd unfit to practise.^°° 
In Attomey-General v Clough,^^^ Muir J limited his comments in a similar way,^°^ 
suggesting that, while punishment could not be the primary role, it may be a valid 
secondary role. His comments were echoed in Queensland Law Society v Cummings^^^ 
by McMurdo P,^°^ with whom Davies JA agreed, and Fryberg J.^ *^ ^ McMurdo P was also 
careful to narrow the sense in which she used the term 'punishment', expressing a desire 
that an order of the Tribunal still 'provide an appropriate general and specific 
deterrent.'^"^ 
"* [2000] QCA 450. 
'^ ^ Ibid [38]. 
^°'' Ibid [38]. (emphasis added). 
^°'[2002] lQdR116. 
^°^ Ibid [61] (emphasis added). See also Queensland Law Society v Roche [2004] 2 Qd R 574, 589: '...the 
ultimate objective is not in this case condign severe punishment of the errant practitioner it is the 
protection of the public' 
-°^  [2004] QCA 138. 
^°'Ibid [22]. 
°^^  Ibid [32]. 
^''^Ibid. 
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While the courts generally appear unwilling to remove an otherwise 'fit' person from 
practice permanently, in Qieensland Law Society v Cummings the court assumed it 
was acceptable for the ttibunal to have suspended Cummings for 12 months merely to 
208 
'deter hun and others'. 
Clearly, if a disciplinary decision is to deter otiier lawyers from similar misconduct, it is 
important tiiat other practitioners become aware of the disciplinary decision. This 
requires disciplinary proceedings to be held in public and the results of that disciplinary 
proceeding to be published. '^'^  This has not always been the case in Queensland - an issue 
which I take up in Chapter Eight. 
2.5.3 Retribution 
While the Supreme Court of Queensland endorsed the role of deterrence in protecting the 
public, it denied that another primary element of punishment - retribution - had any 
legitimate role to play in discipline.^'" Retribution looks backward because it aims to 
provide punishment for past misdeeds simply because it is thought 'fair' that they be 
punished. Retribution was explicitiy discounted in Re a Barrister and Solicitor^^^ 
where the Full Court of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory stated that 
-°^ [2004] QCA 138. 
J°^  Ibid [23]. 
- Chapter Eight looks at the issue of publicity in more detail. 
'^ Legal Services Commissioner v Baker [2005] QCA 482, [18]. 
Retribution is discussed in detail above section 1 3 3 
-'-(1972) 20 FLR 234. 
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the object of disciplinary action was 'not to exact retribution, [but to] protect tiie public 
and the reputation of the profession.'^'^ 
English courts are perhaps more ready to acknowledge a retributive element in discipline. 
hi Bolton V Law Society, Sir Thomas Bingham MR, with whom Rose and Waite LJJ 
agreed, distinguished deterrence from other forms of punishment when he said that a 
disciplinary order may be imposed, 
... in order to punish [the solicitor] for what he has done [and] to deter any other solicitor 
tempted to behave in the same way. Those are traditional objects of punishment. But 
often the order is not punitive in intention. 
Despite tiiis apparent endorsement of penal intent, the Master of the Rolls thought that 
most orders of the disciplinary tribunal were made, either to ensure that the offender did 
'not have the opportunity to repeat the offence',^'^ or to 'maintain tiie reputation of the 
solicitors' profession'.^'^ 
There have been occasional comments by members of the Supreme Court of Queensland 
which, on their face, could be construed as an endorsement of retribution. For instance, in 
7 1 ^ 
Attomey-General v Gregory White J agreed with her fellow judges that 'in a case of 
this nature the governing principle for the Tribunal to consider is the protection of the 
-'' Ibid 244 (Fox, Blackburn and Woodward JJ), adopted in Re a Legal Practitioner (1981) 55 FLR 405, 
423 (Supreme Court of tiie Northem Territory); Re a Practitioner [2001] WASCA 154, [10]. 
-'"[1994] 2 All ER 486. 
Ibid 492 (emphasis added), cited with approval in Gupta v General Medical Council [2001] UKPC 61; 
64BMLR56, [21]. 
^'^Ibid. 
-'^Ibid. 
[1998] QCA 409 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, de Jersey CJ, McMurdo 
P and White J, 4 December 1998). 
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public and tiie standing of the profession, not issues of punishment.' But she also 
acknowledged the need for the tribunal to consider public perceptions of disciplinary 
orders imposed by the tiibunal and court: 
rT]he community can rightly be uneasy if an attempt to influence a key witness by one 
who is in a privileged position as an officer of the court, is not treated with the gravity 
which that conduct deserves.'" 
Such a comment, particularly the reference to the freatment which past conduct 
'deserves', is retributive in flavour^^' and could be interpreted to suggest that there may 
be occasions on which a court or tribunal could take purely retributive action for past 
misconduct. Similarly, McMurdo P, with whom Davies JA and Helman J agreed, also 
hinted at retribution in Queensland Law Society v Wright when she stated that serious 
misconduct was 'deserving of condign ptmishment, not only as a deterrent but also to 
reassiu-e the public that such conduct on the part of lawyers will not be tolerated.' 
However, such comments appear only rarely in the cases. Like suggestions that a 
conviction could automatically disqualify a lawyer from the right to practise,^^'' they 
remain obiter dicta as they have not been applied in any case. Instead the courts have 
found that the primary criterion - the need to protect the public - is satisfied, before 
imposing discipline. 
^"Ibid. 
;-;;ibid. 
See discussion of retribution above section 1.3.3. 
---[2001] QCA 58. 
JJ^  Ibid [67]. 
Discussed below section 2.6.3. 
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Retribution is backward-looking, in the sense that it aims only to sanction for past 
misconduct. Therefore, a sfrong denouncement by the High Court of any element of 
retribution in discipline can also be implied from comments of Isaacs J in Southern Law 
77 S 
Society v Westbrook that 'discipline exerted by the Court looks entirely to the 
future',^ ^^ and m Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v Meagher^^^ where his 
Honour again stated that the question in discipline is not the past, but the lawyer's 
'worthiness and reliability for the future.' 
Some judicial statements that professional discipline is not designed to punish have 
occurred in cases in which the practitioner has been struck off or have been explicitly 
limited to stating that strike off orders involve no element of pimishment.^^^ Thus, it could 
be argued that those comments only apply to strike off orders, with other forms of order, 
such as suspensions and fines, still allowed to perform a retributive role. This is an issue 
7in 
which I explore more fially in Chapters Five and Six. 
-J^  (1910) 10 CLR 609. 
Ibid 626 (emphasis added). 
^-'(1909) 9 CLR 655. 
-^^  Ibid 681. 
^ '^ Clyne V New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186, 201-2: 'a disbarring order is in no sense 
punitive in character. When such an order is made, it is made, fi^om the public point of view, for the 
protection of those who require protection, and fix>m the professional point of view, in order that abuse of 
privilege may not lead to loss of privilege'; Re H, A Solicitor [1960] Qd R 407, 414 (Hanger J, with whom 
Townley and Stable JJ agreed): 'The evidence ...shows not only conduct deserving of punishment, but also 
conduct which indicates that in the interest of the public, his name should be removed from the roll of 
solicitors'; Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253, [32]: '[removal of the right to practise is done] 
not by way of punishment but in order to protect the public and maintain public confidence in the 
administration of justice'. Compare Attomey-General v Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350, where, in dismissing 
the Attorney-General's appeal against a fine of $7,500, Thomas JA noted that the 'end objective' of the 
disciplinary system was not punishment of the practitioner but protection of the public (356). 
- ° Chapter Five (Suspensions) and Chapter Six (Fines). 
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til addition, some cases have suggested that, while matters brought under the court's 
inherent jurisdiction are entirely protective and not punitive, a punitive ftmction could 
7"^  1 
exist within the statutory disciplinary framework. In Mellifont v Queensland Law 
Society Inc^^^ Andrews J stated: 
Our concern is not so much to punish as to protect members of the public against 
professional misconduct, although the concept of punishment is retained by the 
Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (as amended) and Rules.^ ^^ 
This view is not supported by a reading of the cases or the legislation. As the earlier 
discussion of the protective emphasis within legislation demonstrates, in the past the 
Supreme Court of Queensland has aligned the purposes of statutory and inherent 
disciplinary processes and made no distinction between the two. 
2.6 REPUTATION 
2.6.1 The Dangers of Reputational Concerns 
The final possible rationale for discipline is the most problematic - the use of discipline 
to protect or enhance the reputation of the legal profession. It is fair to say that tiie proper 
operation of tiie legal system requfres the public to trust tiie legal profession, and that 
trust will be reinforced when the public sees that lawyers are disciplined for misconduct. 
However, there is also a danger that concern about reputation will be misplaced or given 
231 Queensland Law Society Inc v A Solicitor [1989] 2 Qd R 331, 336 (Mc Pherson J, with whom Dowsett J 
agreed). 
-^-[1981]QdR17. 
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too much emphasis, causing disciplinary processes to be used for the purposes of the 
legal profession itself, rather than the public. The danger is illustrated by comments such 
as those in Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association that a disbarment order is made 
at least partly so that the bar does not lose certain privileges^^^ and in New South Wales 
Bar Association v Hamman that: 
In its own interest, the organized Bar simply cannot permit the public to gain the 
impression that its members flout the revenue laws or that it condones or tolerates or 
behttles the seriousness of crimes against the revenue.^ ^^ 
2.6.2 Public Perceptions and 'Holding Out' 
The concept of reputation is a broad one, but it certainly involves the notion of the public 
perception of the legal profession. A distinction can be made between whether a person 
is actually fit to practise, and whether a person can be held out as fit to practise. The 
second variation relates to the perception of fitness rather than actual fitness. It is 
suggested that concern for the public perception of fitness raises the risk of disciplinary 
proceedings being used to protect the reputation of the legal profession. 
hi Queensland Law Society Inc v SmithP^ Thomas JA said the solicitor's conduct was: 
^" Ibid 28 (emphasis added). In Ooi v Medical Board of Queensland [1997] 2 Qd R 176 tiie Queensland 
Court of Appeal discounted any such distinction in disciplinary cases in general (177). 
^ "^(1960) 104 CLR 186. 
-^ ' Ibid 201. Presumably the privilege of self-regulation. 
-^ (^1999) 217 ALR 553. 
^" Ibid 569, quoting Sandford M Stoddard and Cari A Stutsman Jr, 'Income Tax Offences by Lawyers: An 
Ethical Problem', (1972) American Bar Association Journal 842, 845 (emphasis added). These passages 
from Hamman, including the quote fi-om Stoddard and Stutsman, were cited with approval in Barristers' 
Board V Darveniza [2000] QCA 253, [34] (Thomas JA). 
^^^ [2001] IQdR 649. 
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sufficiently serious to require removal of his name from the roll in the interests and 
protection of the public and reveal him to be unfit to be held out to members of the public 
739 
as an officer of the court." 
This wording of the test demonsfrates the point being made here - that perhaps the court 
can consider two alternative bases for discipline: first, where in fact the public must be 
protected from the solicitor and, second, where the damage caused to tiie profession's 
reputation means the solicitor could no longer be held out as an officer of the court. 
The reputation of the profession was clearly a relevant factor for McMurdo P when 
confirming the 12 month suspension imposed in Queensland Law Society v Roche. '^ 
The solicitor had been found guilty of gross overcharging and failing to ensure a client 
gave ftilly informed consent to a fee agreement and Her Honour noted that in such 
circumstances 'substantial penalties will be justified to protect primarily the public but 
also the reputations of the vast majority of decent practitioners to whom such conduct is 
abhorrent.'^'" 
A reference to 'holding out' appears in the case law as early as Re Weare^^^ cited with 
approval by the High Court in Southem Law Society v Westbrook^^^ and appears in a 
Queensland case as early as \93\,mRe a Solicitor.^^ References to public perception, 
in particular whether a person could be 'held out' as fit to practise, continue to appear 
Ibid 654 (emphasis added). McPherson JA and Atkinson J concurred 
J'° [2004] 2 Qd R 574, 588. 
-"' Ibid [57]. See also Baker v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] QCA 145, where Jen^d JA agreed tiiat 
the strike off order should stand, partly because of the shame which Baker had brought upon the profession 
([77]). 
-''-[1893] 2 QB 439. 
-''(1910) 10 CLR 609. 
-''[1932]StRQd33. 
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regularly in pronouncements by judges of the Supreme Court of Queensland,^ '^ ^ 
suggesting that members of that court at least implicitiy acknowledge that public 
perception is a valid consideration when exercising disciplinary powers. What needs to 
be determined is whether perception alone would justify discipline, in other words, 
whether a lawyer who is actually fit to practise, would be disciplined merely because of a 
public perception that he or she is unfit. 
2.6.3 High Court's Attitude to Reputation 
2.6.3.1 Ziems 
The High Court was forced to deal explicitly with the issue of public perception in Ziems 
V Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Ziems had been convicted 
of involuntary manslaughter, involving the death of a motorcyclist. Earlier disciplinary 
appeals to the High Court had arisen from conduct occurring in the course of practice, 
such as through the misuse of trust funds. This matter occurred outside the normal 
conduct of daily practice, so the court had to consider carefiilly if, and why, such a 
conviction meant Ziems was no longer fit to practise, and hence consider the aim of 
professional discipline. 
""' Re Walter, (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Full Court, Shepherdson, Connolly and 
Williams JJ, 22 May 1987) 6-7 (Shepherdson J); Queensland Law Society v Mead [1997] QCA 83 
(Unreported, Fitzgerald P, McPherson JA and Williams J, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, 
22 April 1997); Attorney-General v Bax [1999] 2 Qd R 9; Attomey-General and Minister for Justice v 
Gregory [1998] QCA 409 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, de Jersey CJ, 
McMurdo P and White J, 4 December 1998); Barristers' Board v Pratt [2002] QCA 532, 2; Queensland 
Law Society v Cummings [2004] QCA 138, [22]; Queensland Law Society v Whitman [2003] QCA 438, 
[32], [37]; Queensland Law Society v Wakeling [2004] QCA 42, [27]. Similariy, when deciding whether to 
readmit a solicitor in Janus v Qld Law Society Inc [2001] QCA 180, the court framed the relevant question 
as whether the applicant should he put before the public 'as a fit and proper person', not whether he was a 
fit and proper person: [48], [60], [65] (emphasis added). 
-'^(1957) 97 CLR 279. 
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Even on the worst interpretation of the facts, the death of the motorcyclist arose from an 
isolated instance of drink driving. No participants in the hearing before the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales or tiie appeal to the High Court thought that Ziems as an 
individual was incompetent or lacked tiie personal characteristics necessary for a member 
of the legal profession. But it was argued that he should be removed from the profession 
on the basis that he could not be 'held out' as fit to practise as a lav^er - in other words, 
that he should be removed simply to preserve the reputation of the legal profession. The 
Supreme Court of New South Wales thought Ziems should be struck off simply on the 
basis of the conviction regardless of his actual fitness at the time of tiie disciplinary 
hearing. But tiie High Court, by a majority,^ "*^  disagreed. Fullagar J emphasised that there 
was no question of the court punishing Ziems as the ptmishment had afready been 
imposed by the criminal court.^ "*** The majority emphasised that a disciplinary hearing 
focused on a lawyer's actual fitness to practise at the time of the disciplinary hearing, not 
the time of misconduct or the time of a conviction. Once the majority considered the 
actual conduct which led to Ziems facing a charge of manslaughter and the circumstances 
of his conviction, their Honours were satisfied that he in fact remained fit to practise. The 
most extensive examination of the purpose of disciplinary proceedings was by Kitto J. 
His Honour foreshadowed the possibility that there may be some convictions which 
carried such stigma that a conviction would lead a lawyer to be deemed automatically and 
permanently declared unfit to practise. He stated: 
It is not difficult to see in ... convictions of some kinds of offences, instant demonstration 
of unfitness for the Bar. ... A conviction may of its own force carry such a stigma that 
-'*'' Fullagar, Kitto, Taylor JJ. 
-''^(1957) 97 CLR 279, 289. 
70 
Chapter Two: Lawmakers' Rationales for Discipline 
judges and members of the profession may be expected to find it too much for their self-
respect to share with the person convicted the kind and degree of association which 
membership of the Bar entails. '^*' 
The method is ad hoc, as His Honour made no attempt to identify the types of 
convictions which may demonstrate this instant unfitness. He did not consider the 
conviction in the case before him to meet such criteria, given that the crime was not 
premeditated, did not indicate 'a tendency to vice or violence or any lack of probity' and 
7S0 
had 'neither connexion with nor significance for' Ziem's role as a barrister. The 
majority concluded that Ziems was fit to practise, but ordered that he be suspended from 
practice for the period of his imprisonment, merely because of the 'incongruity' of a 
barrister practising from behind bars. 
2.6.3.2 A Solicitor 
The comments of both Kitto J in Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales^^^and Griffith CJ in Southem Law Society v Westbrook,^^^ relating to 
perceptions of unfitness, were cited with approval by the High Court ui A Solicitor v The 
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales ^^^ in the course of acknowledgmg that an 
'additional [third] dimension' may exist to warrant removal from the roll, apart from 
evidence of professional misconduct or a lack of personal qualities. The case received 
attention because, like Ziems, it brought the purpose of disciplinary proceedings into 
-"' Ibid 298 (Kitto J). 
"° Ziems V The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court ofNSW{\951) 97 CLR 279, 299. 
^''(1957) 97 CLR 279. 
252 (1910) 10 CLR 609. 
-" A Solicitor v The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253, [21], [20]. 
^^ '' A Solicitor v The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253, [20]. 
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sharp focus.^ ^^ It involved a solicitor^ ^^ who had been convicted in February 1998 on four 
counts of aggravated indecent assault involving his stepchildren. He was initially 
sentenced to three months imprisonment but upon appeal the sentence was fijlly 
suspended after he agreed to enter a tiiree year good behaviour bond. 
The impact of this conviction upon the public's trust of lawyers was of concern to the 
New Soutii Wales Court of Appeal. There, Sheller JA (with whom Mason P agreed) 
argued that: 
The reputation and standing of the legal profession must be upheld. ... The legal 
profession cannot permit the public to gain the impression that it condones or tolerates or 
belittles the committing by its members of any serious crime.^" 
However, when the matter went on appeal, the High Court of Australia saw the key issue 
as whether, at the time of the Court of Appeal's decision, the individual solicitor was a fit 
and proper person to practise as a legal practitioner or whether his personal conduct 
demonstrated that he currently possessed the qualities required of a legal practitioner.^^^ 
The High Court failed to discuss the Court of Appeal's concern about the adverse impact 
of the case on the reputation of the legal profession. It is suggested that, by its omission 
to discuss reputational issues, the High Court effectively treated issues of reputation as 
irrelevant to the determination of individual disciplinary cases. 
2.6.4 Use o/Positive Character References 
^"Haller, above n 197. 
-^ ^ The Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s 11 prohibits the naming of the solicitor, as this 
would reveal the identity of the children involved. 
- " Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v A Solicitor [2002] NSWCA 62, [80], 
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There are other indications that issues of reputation should be treated with care by a 
disciplinary tribunal. Consistent with the High Court's disregard of possible evidence of 
an adverse reputation arising from a criminal conviction, the Queensland Court of Appeal 
has cautioned against giving undue weight io positive character references. 
2.6.5 Summary of Current Law on Reputation 
It was noted earlier that Thomas JA's statement of the test in Queensland Law Society 
Inc V Smith^^^ suggested that damage to the reputation of the profession may be a 
sufficient basis for imposing discipline. A survey of the case law would suggest that this 
is not the case. Only obiter dicta in Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales^^^ Southem Law Society v Westbrookr^^ and A Solicitor^'' countenance the 
possibility of removing a lawyer from practice simply on the basis of a conviction. The 
courts have never admitted taking such a course, and when determining indiAridual cases, 
have emphasised that the decision is based on the lawyer's actual fitness at the time of the 
disciplinary hearing.^ ^^ Thus, if we look at the ratio of the case law, the courts have 
indicated that the public is to be protected from actual unfitness rather than only 
"* A Solicitor v The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253, [20]. 
-^' Janus V Queensland Law Society Inc [2001] QCA 180, [12]; Barristers' Board v Young [2001] QCA 
556, [22]; Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Wakeling [2004] QCA 42, [26]. See discussion in 
Mortensen, above n 61, 168-9. See discussion below section 7.4. 
Above section 2.6.2 
-^ ' [2001] 1 Qd R 649, 654: whether conduct was 'sufficiently serious to require removal of his name from 
the roll in the interests and protection of the public and reveal him to be unfit to be held out to members of 
the public as an officer of the court.' 
-"(1957) 97 CLR 279. 
-"(1910) 10 CLR 609. 
^^ ^ A Solicitor V The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253, [20]. 
-" Prothonotary v Del Castillo [2001] NSWCA 75, [71]; Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v P 
[2003] NSWCA 320, [36] (Tobias JA), [17], [30] (Young CJ in Eq, with whom Meagher JA agreed); 
Queensland Law Society v Cummings [2004] QCA 138, [22]. 
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perceptions of unfitness. This means that, while the protection of the reputation of the 
legal profession can be a valid aim of discipline, it can only be a secondary aim. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have sought to demonstrate the rationale for imposing discipluie as stated 
by the courts and the legislature. The preceding discussion has demonsfrated the 
consistent way in which the High Court and Supreme Court of Queensland have 
confirmed that the primary focus of discipluie is to protect the public. While the High 
Court has arguably not had sufficient opportunity or necessity to fully articulate the 
various ways in which tiie public can be protected, the Supreme Court of Queensland has 
embraced the notion of protection through deterrence, although only as a valid secondary 
aim of discipline. 
All Australian courts continue to deny any valid role for retribution, despite the 
occasional judicial comment with a retributive tone. More particularly for the purposes of 
this thesis, the courts, particularly the High Court, has never condoned the use of 
disciplinary proceedings merely to enhance the reputation of the legal profession. This 
has only been acknowledged as a secondary outcome when steps are taken to remove a 
practitioner who has otherwise been shown to be unfit to practise at the time of the 
disciplinary hearing. 
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I have also identified some past tension between judicial and legislative rationales for 
discipline. There have been instances in which the Supreme Court of Queensland applied 
its own, narrower, common law rationale for discipline, despite the fact that it was 
operating within a statutory framework, applying legislation which often had a wider 
understanding of how to protect the public, and from what, than the common law. 1 take 
up possible reasons why the court overlooked or ignored the relevant legislation in 
Chapter Nine. 
In the following chapter I consider (and test) theories which argue that much of what is 
said by lawmakers - be they courts or legislators - as to the purpose of discipline is mere 
rhetoric and bound to fail to protect the public. Instead, such theories argue, disciplinary 
structures are created and proceedings taken primarily to enhance the reputation of the 
legal profession, not to protect the public. 
Although I have discussed the relevant disciplinary legislation in this chapter so as to 
highlight its protective focus, I engage in a more detailed analysis of the legislative 
provisions in Chapter Four. This is done to examine the role played by professional 
bodies in the establishment and evolution of disciplinary bodies. Such an examination is 
useful to the thesis as it can provide insight into the degree to which the professional 
bodies have embraced lawmakers' rationales for discipline and demonstrated a 
commitment to enhancing the protective nature of disciplinary structures and 
proceedings. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEGITIMATION 
3 J INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I established lawmakers' rationales for the discipline of 
lawyers. The High Court has foimd protection of the public as the confrolling reason 
for discipline and the Supreme Court of Queensland states this as at least the 
predominant reason. Legislation has reinforced and extended this protective focus. 
The question then arises whether the establishment of disciplinary structures and the 
imposition of discipline upon lawyers in Queensland have been consistent with those 
rationales. 
A number of issues must be clarified before commencing any meaningftil theoretical 
discussion of whether the discipline of lawyers is likely to be consistent with those 
rationales, and if not, why not. Similar studies have been carried out of disciplinary 
systems in other jurisdictions, ui particular in some states of the United States of 
America. Some of these studies have observed that the disciplinary system 
examined has not protected the public and has concluded, as a necessary corollary, 
that it therefore is being used as a means of legitimating the role and status of the 
' For example, Jerome Carlin, Lawyers' Ethics; a Survey of the New York City Bar (Russell Sage 
Foundation, New York, 1966). 
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legal profession.^ In other words, the options are presented as a simple dichotomy -
if the disciplinary system is not protecting the public then it must be a protectionist 
measure for the profession. Many assumptions underlie such a conclusion. These 
include: 
• that the legal profession confrols professional discipline; 
• that there was a conscious choice within the disciplinary system to favour the 
interests of the profession over the interests of the public; 
• that the actual outcome of disciplinary processes accords with that choice; 
• that public interest and the interests of the profession are incompatible; and 
• that there is a common understanding as to what outcomes will protect the 
public and what will not. 
As will become evident, the above assumptions do not necessarily hold for the 
regulation (including the discipline) of the profession in Queensland. 
An obvious group of theories to consider when seeking to explain why professional 
discipline has or has not protected the public are theories of the professions - ui 
particular those theories which, in their crudest form, suggest that professions are 
motivated primarily by self interest rather than public interest. Lawyers, along with 
medical practitioners, are generally accepted as belonging to an established 
profession and therefore form a large part of the subject matter in writings on 
professions. 
^ For instance, Marks and Cathcart ask whetiier disciphnary policies serve professional interests, with 
tiie underlying assumption that, without convincing argument, tiie profession will resist any change to 
tiiose policies: F Raymond Marks and Darlene Catiicart, 'Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is it 
Self-Regulation?' (1974) 2 University of Illinois Law Forum 193-236, 233. 
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Not all theories of the professions suggest that lawyers primarily pursue self interest. 
Some are consistent with the lawmakers' rationale of protection because they believe 
that professions will effectively self-regulate within the terms of an implicit social 
bargain. Parsons exemplified this school of thought. He greatiy valued the legal 
profession's independence from the state and the unique role lav^ y^ers played in 
society because of their specialist knowledge, although he did also note some 
ambiguous ways in which lawyers appeared to be dependant on the state - including 
the fact that some lawyers practise within organs of the state and that all lawyers are 
described as 'officers of the court.' 
Much of Parson's writing dealt with an ideal type of social structure in which 
lawyers played a central role and he did not seek empirical evidence for his proposed 
model. However, he did acknowledge that there would always be some incompetent 
or dishonest lawyers who needed to be removed from the profession. Parsons did 
not deal with the role of professional discipline within his ideal social structtire 
explicitly but, given his view that only lawyers hold specialist knowledge, he would 
consider the legal profession itself to be in the best position to decide whether a 
fellow member was no longer suitable to perform the important social role of 
lawyers. Similarly, he considered it vital that lawyers remain as independent from the 
state as possible. The more self-regulating a profession, the more independent that 
profession could remain. Hence it is likely that Parsons would advocate sfrong 
powers of self-regulation. Parsons did appear to concede a role for external 
regulation of the legal profession when it came to the ultimate form of discipline -
Talcott Parsons, 'A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession' in Parsons T, Essays in Sociological 
Theory, revised edition (Free Press, New York, 1954) 374. 
^ Ibid 381. 
^ Ibid 377. 381. 
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disbarment - as he assumed this will always be 'an act of the political authority', and 
cited the political act of disbarment as one example of the ways in which the 
profession appeared dependent on the state. 
Parson's approach has been heavily criticised by later writers as merely a statement 
as to what professions such as medicine and law claim to do. Later writers were more 
interested in examining what doctors and lawyers actually do. Their examination of 
the conduct of lawyers and other professional groups led some of these later writers 
to the conclusion that lawyers, as well as other professional groups, were motivated 
primarily by self-interest and so could not play the central role in society which 
Parsons advocated. 
Influential among these writers is Larson. She denied any altruistic motivation and 
believed members of the legal profession, like members of all professions, were 
driven by a desire to improve their social position by reducing competition from 
other potential providers of legal services and by restricting the numbers and type of 
individuals admitted to the profession. She was sceptical of the 'service ideal' held 
out by the professions themselves and adopted Freidson's argument that it was 
incorrect to assume that the attitudes of individual professionals accord with 
attributes as published by professional organisations in by-laws, codes of conduct 
and formal definitions of malpractice.^ Both authors lamented the lack of empirical 
^ Ibid 374. In Australia, lawyers are disbarred (also descn"bed as being 'struck off or 'removed from 
the roll') not by the state but by the Supreme Court of their home state of practice. Sometimes the state 
has granted a similar power to statutory tribunals which have often been controlled by professional 
bodies. See below Chapter Four. 
^ Magali Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (University of Califomia Press, 
Berkeley, 1977). 
^ Ehot Freidson, Profession of Medicine (Harper & Row, New York, 1970) 81. 
Larson, above n 7, 59, 244. 
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data as to how many professionals followed a service ideal, and to what extent. They 
also noted a lack of comparative data - for instance, if a service ideal was more 
widespread among professionals than among other workers.'° 
In an apparent attempt to respond to critics such as Larson and Freidson, Halliday 
used empirical evidence concerning the Chicago Bar Association to show that 
professions could behave altinistically." However, as will be demonsfrated later,'^ 
while Halliday did provide cogent evidence that the Chicago Bar Association assisted 
the state in many aspects of governance, in regard to professional discipline, Halliday 
would probably agree with Larson that self-interest will necessarily impede the 
process. 
3.2 'PROFESSIONAL PROJECT' 
Larson examined the actual conduct of a number of professions, in both England and 
the United States, and came to the conclusion that professions engage in a 
'professional project'. Although a term such as 'professional project' would suggest 
a planned and conscious undertaking by lawyers, Larson claimed to use the term in a 
much less meaningftil way, to mean simply the later discovery of coherence and 
consistency between apparently unconnected acts, which may not even have been a 
deliberate goal of even a subset of members of a profession.^^ Pue has been 
particulariy critical of Larson's use of the term in this abstract way, noting that such 
Ibid 59, citing Freidson, above n 8, 81. 
Terence Halliday, Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers, State Crises, and Professional Empowerment 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987). 
- Below section 3.10.2.1. 
Larson, above n 7, 6. 
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an approach is anathema to history. Certainly, a casual reader of Larson's work on 
the 'professional project' would not expect Larson to have made such a modest claim 
for what she uncovered in her historical examination of professions - the term 
'project' clearly implies conscious, deliberate and planned action by the profession 
itself 
Admittedly, in the example under consideration here - professional discipline - care 
must be taken before ascribing any causal relationship in disciplinary outcomes. 
There may be many reasons why a disciplinary system has or has not protected the 
public. A failure to protect the public may be due to conscious efforts by those in 
confrol of the disciplinary system to use the system for other purposes, which are 
inconsistent with protection of the public. Alternatively, the failure may be due to 
subconscious influences over the disciplinary system - influences which do not 
protect the public. A thfrd possibility is that attempts to reach an outcome which 
protects the public fail, despite the best intentions of those involved in administering 
the disciplinary system. Even Pue, despite his many criticisms of the historical 
inaccuracies in the work of Larson and Abel, has reminded us that professional 
discipline is only one aspect of the many ways in which a profession can control its 
members.'^ He is particularly critical of the assumption that, a lack of formal 
professional discipline necessarily assumes a failure to self-regulate. 
hnportantly, even those who argue that a profession has exercised very strong self-
regulation in the past are not necessarily saying that that self-regulation is always in 
'" W Wesley Pue, 'Trajectories of Professionalism: Legal Professionalism after Abel' (1990) 19 
Manitoba Law Journal 384, 391 note 23. 
'^  Ibid 404. 
'^  Ibid 405. 
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the public interest. Pue himself emphasised this. His point was that the Inns of Court 
had very effectively controlled its members in ways other than discipline, although 
17 
this confrol was used to suppress political dissent. 
Conversely, self-interest and public interest can coincide. Even if disciplinary 
action does appear to enhance the social credit of the legal profession this does not 
necessarily discount any protective intent. Halliday is critical of 'vulgar monopolistic 
theories' because they discount the possibility of multiple causes and motivations: 
one consequence or even intent of professionalism becomes the raison d 'etre of the 
entire professionalization enterprise. The part is taken for the whole. Latent 
consequences become explicit intents; accompanying motives become sole bases of 
action. Results of professionalization are assumed to be the outcome of a 
professional 'project'. In a word, the entire interpretative model is overdetermined.'^  
Halliday is not the only one to have cautioned against assuming a causal relationship 
when a change is noted which may either enhance or detract from the profession's 
position in society or the degree to which the profession serves the needs of the 
public. Lewis argued in similar vein that most change does not occur intentionally. It 
would therefore be wrong to automatically attribute such changes to any 
'professional project'.^° 
While it is dangerous to assume causal relationships, Larson's theory would still be 
useful if it provided cogent evidence that, regardless of the motivations and 
'^  Ibid 404. The focus of the discipline exercised by the Inns of Court has akeady been noted above 
section 2.2.3.5. 
Ira Horowitz, 'The Economic Foundations of Self Regulation in tiie Professions' in Roger Blair and 
Stephen Rubin (eds). Regulating the Professions (Lexington Books, Lexington MA 1980) 9 
'^Halliday, above n 11,350. 
-° Phillip Lewis, 'Comparison and Change m the Study of Legal Professions' in Richard Abel and 
Phillip Lewis (eds). Lawyers in Society, vol 3: Comparative Theories (University of Califomia Press 
Berkeley, 1989)59. 
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intentions of lawyers, it would be inevitable that their efforts would tend towards 
self-interest rather than public interest. 
Just as Larson used the term 'project' in an abstract and ambiguous way, it is equally 
difficult to determine the role which she saw for professional bodies in her 
professional project. She claimed her concept of 'profession' was broader than 
professional associations, but elsewhere appeared to equate a 'profession' with its 
leaders.^^ 
3.3 Two LIMBS 
Larson's 'professional project' had two limbs: market confrol and 'collective 
mobility'. Collective mobility aimed to upgrade the social status of an occupation 
but the improved social status was considered an end in itself- it was not necessarily 
just a means of improving the market position of lawyers. 
Some later writers appear to have believed that writers such as Larson claimed that 
any ills in the legal profession were best dealt with by increasing the level of 
competition^^ and attempted to reftite this claim by pointing to examples of differing 
'^ Larson, above n 7, 5, 69. She also noted that professional bodies usually arise at a point at which a 
'professional project' has matured: at 5. 
^^  Ibid 46: 'Only with the rise of formal training institutions and standardized training can professions 
- or more precisely, the associations or elite groups which act as their spokesmen - begin to assume 
that there is commonality, however minimal, among their members' (emphasis added). 
^^  Ibid 67. 
'^^  Ibid. In this regard it would seem that tiie incentive sought by tiie collective mobility project -
prestige and higher status, is tiie same incentive ascribed to professions by Burrage: Michael Burrage, 
'From a Gentlemen's to a Public Profession: Status and Politics in the History of English Solicitors', 
(1996) 3 International Journal of the Legal Profession 45. 
'^ Christine Parker, 'Competing Images of the Legal Profession: Competing Regulatory Strategies' 
(1997) 25 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 385, 389-90. Burrage refers to tiiis as using 
material self-interest as a way to protect the public interest: Burrage, above n 24, 60. 
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attittides in the profession as to tiie optimal level of competition.^^ While Abel may 
have been guilty of promoting competition as the most effective cure for many ills of 
legal practice,^^ Larson did not think that increased competitiveness alone was the 
solution, because she believed any increase in competition in the past had not 
weakened the hold of the ruling elite within the profession. Instead the pressures 
caused by greater competition fell on lawyers in the lower levels of the profession.^^ 
Any residual effect of competition felt by the elite was diffused by increased 
bureaucratisation^^ and serious, unethical practices within the 'higher' levels of legal 
practice, which dealt with large, corporate clients, remained ignored by the organised 
profession and disciplinary processes. 
Larson's thesis was not only about market control. It was also about social status. For 
this reason, to describe her as a 'market control theorist' understates the breadth of 
her theory. Burrage has provided convincing evidence of the ways in which the legal 
profession in England, Spain, France and the United States actively withdrew from 
areas of the market and depressed demand for their markets,^' and he used this to 
demonstrate that the greater motivating factor for lav^^ yers was the pursuit of honour, 
reputation and status. " Abel himself has acknowledged that his earlier writings 
placed too much emphasis on the economic aspects of Larson's 'professional project' 
and neglected the collective mobility search for social status," but Abel insisted that 
Parker, 'Competing Images of tiie Legal Profession: Competing Regulatory Strategies' above n 25, 
393-4. 
" Richard Abel, 'Between Market and State: tiie Legal Profession in Turmoil' (1989) 52 Modem Law 
Review 285, 302. 
28 
Larson, above n 7, 134-5. 
^^  Ibid 135. 
°^ Ibid 89. 
'^ Burrage, above n 24, 46-48. 
^^  Ibid 48. 
" Richard Abel, Lawyers in Society: An Overview (University of Califomia Press, Berkeley, 1995) 8. 
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others such as Burrage went too far in suggesting that lawyers only sought status. 
34 given that status and wealth are inextricably linked. 
The collective mobility project aimed to establish public trust and prestige - to 
promote an ideology, both within the profession and externally, which saw a 
profession as 'noble' and its members as 'gentiemen'.^^ 
It will be recalled from the previous chapter that, despite isolated obiter dicta, the 
Australian courts have held that the protection of the reputation of the legal 
profession is not a sufficient basis for taking disciplinary action^^ - the disciplinary 
system cannot be used primarily to promote an ideology of 'noble gentleman' 
lawyers - although it is hoped that public trust of lawyers would flow naturally from 
a disciplinary system which is operating effectively. In later chapters I will consider 
whether concern about maintaining the reputation of the legal profession has been a 
motivating factor in some disciplinary cases. 
3.4 EXTERNAL IDEOLOGY AND TRUST 
Larson argued that this 'professional project' required the legal profession to obtain 
the trust of both the state and the general public. To reduce competition, lawyers 
needed to convince the state to outlaw the practice of 'law' by those without certain 
educational qualifications. Because 'law' is an ethereal product, those who sought 
'' Ibid 9. 
Larson, above n 7, 68. 
Above section 2.6.4. 
^^  Chapter Five looks at disciplinary cases in which lawyers were removed from practice and Chapter 
Six looks at cases in which lawyers were fmed. Chapter Seven is also relevant here, as it has 
sometimes been argued that a lawyer's individual reputation is relevant to the disciplinary order that 
should be made: below section 7.4. 
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this monopoly had to maintain control over its definition, which in ttim required 
them to obtain the trust of the state. Larson emphasised the cenfral importance of 
maintaining 'cognitive standardisation' among members of a profession, so that the 
• 5 0 
product - legal service - could be uniformly presented to the public and so that the 
profession itself'coalesces into an effective group'. 
Lawyers also needed to convince the public that other potential suppliers of legal 
services were inferior, which required the trust of that public. This trust was obtained 
through external manifestations of ethicality: that even though lawyers may have 
sought a monopoly confrol over their work, they could be trusted to handle this 
monopoly in the public interest. 
Importantly, Larson believed that it was only in ideology tiiat the profession spoke of 
the trust of 'the public'. In truth, an emerging profession sought social credit from 
that segment of the community with the power to grant the profession the favour it 
sought and so a number of 'publics' existed."*' Similarly, Larson acknowledged that 
various segments of a profession sought the trust of these different 'publics': these 
relevant 'publics' varied from each profession or segment of profession, and were 
themselves stratified in terms of class, race, gender, and culture.'^^ 
'^  Larson, above n 7, 40. 
^'Ibid. 
*" Ibid 57. 
41 Ibid 158. 
-^ Ibid. 
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3 5 INTERNAL IDEOLOGY 
Not only did a profession need to display cohesiveness to the outside world if it was 
to maintain trust and freedom from external competition. Internal cohesiveness must 
also be found to exist in fact. According to Larson, elites in the profession had to be 
able to promote an ideology which struck a chord with members at all levels of the 
profession so that a united voice would be projected externally.'*^ If too much 
external dissonance was displayed, the trust of the public would be undermined and 
the profession's rights of self-determination lost. Much of this internal cohesiveness 
was achieved by promoting a common ideology within the profession. While Larson 
claimed there was little empirical evidence that lawyers abided by a service ideal, the 
profession promoted this as a cenfral tenet of the legal profession and the service 
ideal was internalised by individual lawyers as a work ethic which placed intrinsic 
value on legal practice.** She believed her theory was borne out by evidence that 
professionals reported a higher level of work satisfaction than other occupational 
groups - they believed their work had intrinsic value and had a sense of duty to their 
'calling' as a lawyer and a strong sense of social bond to their fellow lawyers, 
creating an ideology of community within the profession and a sense of 'gentlemanly 
ethics' when dealing with colleagues. 
While others would not necessarily claim that ideology is a tool in the hands of the 
elite to maintain their privileged position, many others would agree with Larson that 
ideology plays a critical role within the legal profession. For instance, Parker referred 
'^ Ibid 40. 
"" Ibid 62. 
'^Ibid. 
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to the belief of lawyers themselves that they did protect the public interest.*^ While 
she noted Croft's caution that such ideology can obscure the realities of legal 
practice,"*^ presumably even from lawyer's themselves, like Croft, Parker was 
optimistic that the aspirational aspect of this ideology could be harnessed to achieve 
• 48 
effective regulation of the legal profession. 
If the disciplinary system is being used to promote an internal ideology - a sense of 
calling and honour among 'gentleman lawyers' - disciplinary outcomes may differ 
from ones where the primary focus was public protection. In particular, it is possible 
that notions of morality and retribution could infuse decision-making. The previous 
chapter argued that, while the courts stated that the protection of the public must be 
the primary reason for discipline, they clung to the notion of 'dishonour and 
disgrace' long after legislation took a broader notion of conduct liable to discipline. 
This suggests that notions of morality and retribution may have been more influential 
in actual disciplinary decisions than conceded by decision makers. I take this issue up 
in more detail in later chapters. 
Christine Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1999)119. 
Ibid, citing Colin Croft, 'Reconceptualising American Legal Professionalism: A Proposal for 
Deliberative Moral Community' (1992) 67 New York University Law Review 1256, 1278. 
Christine Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice, above n 46, 119. 
'^ Chapters Five (incapacitation), Six (fines). Seven (personal factors) and Eight (publicity). 
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3-6 HISTORICALLY CONTINGENT 
3.6.1 Traditional v Modem Legal Professions 
A sfrong element of Larson's work was a belief that the imperatives upon 
professional groups, including lawyers, changed over time. Larson distinguished 
between traditional professions and modem, rising professions. The modem, rising 
profession promoted bureaucratisation, standardised education and competence and 
meritocracy.^° She believed that, while the notion of a profession as a social group 
initially performed an economic fiinction, it later came to play an ideological 
fiinction, but still with the purpose of 'justifying inequality of status and closure of 
access in the occupational order'. 
Larson acknowledged the many variables which could influence the success of any 
professional project. These included the fact that a profession is made up of 
individuals, and the social characteristics which they shared at any particular time 
would determine the direction and extent of the standardisation of knowledge. She 
noted that bodies of knowledge and markets for services vary from country to 
country as well as historically, hence the degree of success of any professional 
project will also vary.^^ The two goals of the professional project (market control and 
collective mobility) 'were pursued at different times by different groups of 
Larson, above n 7, 78. 
' Ibid xviii. 
^Mbid41. 
" Ibid 50. 
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professional reformers, using the resources that were accessible in their specific 
environments.' 
Halliday developed this notion of historical imperative and sought to show that, 
while a legal profession may seek to pursue its own interests when establishing 
professional legitimacy, once established, it would then be willing to look beyond 
self interest to perform a greater civic role. 
It is for this reason that this thesis looks at changes over time - in judicial attitudes to 
discipline,^^ in legislation and in the attitude of professional bodies to disciphnary 
structures and publicity. 
3.6.2 Historical Evidence: England 
Abel was of a similar view to Larson as to what had motivated the legal profession in 
England^^ and the United States of America.^° Both writers emphasised the fact that 
this 'professional project' was not static, but changed over time, and the efforts 
devoted to the project depended largely on pre-existing and current levels of social 
credit held by the profession. Larson cited the experience in England during the 
nineteenth century as an example of the ideal type of professional project.^' It was 
the solicitors who had most to gain from embarking on such a project, so as to gain a 
^Mbidl04. 
" Halliday, above n i l . 
''' Chapter Two. 
^^  Chapter Four. 
*^ Chapter Eight. 
"^^  Richard Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (Blackwell, Oxford, 1988); Richard 
Abel, English Lawyers Between Market and State (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003). 
Richard Abel, American Lawyers (Oxford University Press, New York, 1989). 
'^ Larson, above n 7, 80. 
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similar market power and social prestige to that already held by barristers.^^ Larson 
argued that the membership of the barristers' branch in England aligned with the 
traditional ruling class, while solicitors aligned with the upcoming bourgeoisie.^^ 
English barristers could obtain prestige through 'sponsored mobility', which was not 
so available to solicitors.^ Barristers in the lower ranks of the bar were also easier 
for elites within the bar to control because they were much fewer in number than 
solicitors - solicitors outnumbering barristers 5:1.^^ By contrast, solicitors formed an 
'irregular' and dispersed class of lawyers.^^ It was solicitors, through the leadership 
of the Society of Gentleman Practitioners and then that of the Law Society of 
England and Wales, who embarked on a professional project to obtain a similar 
prestige to that already held by barristers. 
While they disagreed on many pressures within regulation of the legal profession, 
Abel and Burrage appear to have agreed that it was the geographic dispersal of 
solicitors in England - compared with barristers - which required solicitors to seek 
statutory confrol over members.^^ Barristers, being centrally located in London, could 
be more informally controlled by the Inns of Court. However, it is quite likely that 
physical dispersal does not fully explain why the English bar shunned the need for 
statutory confrol over members, while statutory powers were actively sought by the 
solicitors' branch of the profession. Later chapters of this thesis will consider the 
^^  Ibid 85. 
^^  Ibid 83-4: Barristers were most often recruited from tiie upper class, attending one of the top nine 
public schools in England, followed by Oxford or Cambridge and tiien nominated to join one of die 
Inns of Court, all located in London. 
"ibid 102-3. 
^^  Ibid 85. 
^ Ibid 95. 
" Ibid 95. 
** Burrage, above n 24, 56; Abel, Lawyers in Society: An Overview, above n 33, 73. 
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applicability of such an explanation to the regulation of the legal profession in 
Queensland, a geographically dispersed jurisdiction, even for barristers. 
3.6.3 Historical Evidence: United States 
In the United States of America, there is not a similar bifiircation of the legal 
profession between barristers and solicitors - as in England (and Australia) - and yet 
both Larson and Abel considered their theories to be still relevant to describe 
'professional projects' in that country. In the United States, as sources of prestige 
such as sponsored mobility were less available, education became more relevant to 
the professional project than in England.^^ Larson claimed tiiat the American 
Revolution weakened the previous influence of the English structure on the 
American legal profession,^ *^ and the anti-intellectual sentiment of the Jacksonian era 
led to a reduction in the educational prerequisites or period of apprenticeship 
required to be admitted to the bar in the first half of the 1800s.^' But even then, the 
court retained control over who could practise law and, in Larson's view, the 
judiciary maintained homogeneity within the legal profession by requiring applicants 
to prove moral character. This, combined with general social ostracism, had the 
effect of favouring a certain form of applicant for the bar, and excluded the Irish and 
later, Jews, blacks and women.^^ 
Despite these efforts to control entry, Larson argued that greater decentralisation, 
social mobility and religious tolerance in the United States kept the professional 
^' Larson, above n 7, 103. 
™ Ibid 111-112. 
^'Ibid 119. 
^^  Ibid 125, 173. 
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hierarchy more open and fluid than in England. As a result, in the United States 
there was greater reliance on establishing professionalisation through control of the 
market. 
3.7 ONE LEGAL 'PROFESSION' OR MANY? 
Larson and Abel have both been criticised because of an alleged failure to recognise 
the segmented nature of the legal profession. Pue has been highly critical of the 
historical statements made in the work of Abel and to a lesser extent, Larson, as to 
the history of lawyers in both England and the Ututed States.^^ He argued that the 
histories were much more complex and the forces at play within and upon the legal 
profession much more diverse than conceded by either Larson or Abel. Examples 
given of the segmented nature of the profession include disputes between English 
barristers and solicitors over whether solicitors would be given the right to appear in 
court and between Ausfralian barristers and solicitors as to the desirability of fusing 
the two branches of the profession. However, both Larson and Abel did 
acknowledge the different interests of barristers and solicitors, describing the 
solicitors as the lower branch of the legal profession, and claiming that, within the 
English legal profession, it was the solicitors who embarked on a professional 
project, so as to attain the status already enjoyed by English barristers.^^ 
"Ibid 13, 112. 
'"Ibid 113. 
75 
Pue, above n 14. 
'^ Ibid 384. 
" Christine Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice, above n 46, 115-6. 
'* Larson, above n 7, 85, 95-96; Richard Abel, 'England and Wales: A Comparison of tiie Professional 
Projects of Barristers and Solicitors' in Richard Abel and Philip Lewis (eds). Lawyers in Society, vol 
1: the Common Law World, (1988) 62. 
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While Larson did concede tiie fragmented nature of the legal profession, at least in 
the United States,^^ she believed there continued to be extensive homogeneity at the 
elite levels of the profession, due to the successful efforts of those elite to maintain 
'brutal selectivity' in legal education, lineage and style. 
3.8 THE PLACE OF DISCIPLINE WITHIN ANY 'PROFESSIONAL PROJECT' 
Larson had very little to say about professional discipline. For her, barriers to 
education and qualification, and monopolies over areas of legal practice, formed the 
most important elements in establishing and maintaining social credit. Similarly, 
the key measures to socialise new members into the profession occurred prior to 
admission to law school, through the very exclusiveness of the method for selecting 
students. During law school and following admission, socialisation occurred through 
the imperative of mirroring the values of the professional elite to help improve one's 
position within the hierarchy of the profession. Therefore, care must be taken not to 
overstate the importance that Larson would place on professional discipline, either in 
relation to efforts by the legal profession to create ethical codes and disciplinary 
structures, or in the day to day enforcement of those codes. 
It is telling that, in her 244 page monograph, Larson's most extensive discussion of 
professional discipline is contained in a footnote. Throughout the book she focused 
closely on controls upon entry into the legal profession, particulariy through 
educational limitations. She did refer to controls exercised through registration and 
' ' Larson, above n 7, 175. 
"^ Ibid 177. 
*'lbid 17,45. 
^' Ibid 67. 
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licensing,^^ but with the implication that these were filters which were also applied at 
the point of entry into legal practice, and only at the point of entry. She described 
registration and licensing as the 'heteronomous means by which the modem legal 
profession seeks to obtain professional prestige'^"* - heteronomous because 
registration and licensing were 'institutionally located in the [sjtate.'^^ But 
importantiy, she presumed that the profession itself would still determine the 
standards to be applied by law schools and by licensing boards.''*'' 
Implicit in Larson's emphasis on entry controls and her almost complete failure to 
discuss confrols on practising lawyers, is her apparent acceptance that professions 
treated fitness to practise as a static concept, applied only at the point of initial 
regisfration and licensing. Marks and Cathcart found evidence of this static 
assumption of fitness to practise in their study of disciplinary agencies in the United 
87 
States. They claimed that 
disciplinary agencies presume that lawyers who have passed the bar examination, 
even years ago, and who have been exposed to the original character and fitness 
screening, are entitled to the benefit of any doubt. Indeed, the disciplinary agencies 
treat the license as a vested right. 
Larson's purpose was to explain how occupational groups went about achieving and 
entrenching professional status. Larson appeared to suggest that this purpose 
permeated most, if not all, aspects of the profession's conduct, emphasising that 
the variable and diffuse ideological mechanisms which recognize a profession's 
fiinctions as "noble", "progressive", or "socially useftil" cannot be located in any one 
[means or source of professional prestige]; rather ideology colors the effectiveness of 
^^  Ibid 52, 68. 
*' Ibid 68. 
«^Ibid. 
*^ Ibid 52. 
*^  Marks and Cathcart, above n 2. 
Ibid 225. 
m 
Chapter Three: Legitimation 
every set of means available to a profession in its mobility project, because it 
ultimately determines the public trust and prestige which a profession "serves".*^ 
Hence, if significant segments of a profession did spend time on issues relating to 
professional discipline, presumably Larson would need to concede that this was 
because discipline did play a role in the professional project. 
At least some sections of the legal professions which Larson studied, ui England and 
the United States, do at least appear to have devoted some energy to the issue of 
professional discipline, either in designing disciplinary systems and processes, 
investigating complaints or sitting on disciplinary tribunals. Their virtual omission 
from her analysis is tiierefore surprising. One explanation may be that professional 
discipline is one (perhaps the only) aspect of the activities undertaken by professional 
groups which does not form part of the professionalism project. Alternatively, 
evidence of energy actually expended by some members of the profession on issues 
relating to professional discipline may be beyond the explanatory power of her 
theory, and so weaken it. 
While Larson remained largely silent on the matter, Abel dealt with professional 
discipline explicitly, seeing it as playing a role in the professional project of 
solicitors. While he believed solicitors actively sought statutory powers to seek 
similar status to barristers, those powers were exercised very leniently in favour of 
Larson, above n 7, 68 (emphasis added). 
•^  Richard Abel, Lawyers in Society: An Ox'erview, above n 33, 74; Richard Abel, English Lawyers 
Bet^veen Market and State, above n 59, 488-491. 
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solicitors and action to reform disciplinary systems only taken in response to 
periods of intense public criticism 92 
There are some apparent confradictions in Abel's criticisms of lawyers' performance 
in self-regulation: while he criticised the profession for promoting conciliation of 
complaints against them he suggested that clients would be happy with a simple 
apology - presumably a key component of any conciliation. While he claimed that 
lawyers had resisted steps to implement 'in firm' complaint procedures which could 
'alleviate the burden on formal disciplinary procedures', he criticised such 'in firm' 
controls as a means of delaying, or 'cooling-out', client grievances.^^ 
3.9 Two ROLES FOR PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE IN THE 'PROFESSIONAL PROJECT' 
3.9.1 An External and an Internal Role 
If Larson was asked to explain the amount of energy which some lawyers and 
professional bodies have put into the design, construction and operation of 
disciplinary systems for lawyers, it would be consistent with her theory to view the 
professional disciplinary system as playing two roles in the 'professional project'. 
First, a professional disciplinary system could be used to display to the public the 
ethicality of the profession, that while the profession concedes that the occasional 
black sheep may slip through the controls of education and admission, the public can 
be assured that they will be identified and expelled from the profession. 
" Richard Abel, Lawyers in Society: An Overview, above n 33, 75. 
'^ Ibid 77. 
'^ Richard Abel, English Lawyers Between Market and State, above n 59, 489. 
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Second, it could play a role in tiie professional project which would be consistent 
with Larson's overall thesis - it could be used by the elites of the profession to 
maintain internal control of that group, to foster professional socialisation, to define 
the 'professional self. Like other more informal efforts to raise the level of 
'professionalism' among lawyers, the disciplinary system could be used by the elite 
members of the profession to control those at the lower levels of the profession by 
imposing a professional ideology - as constructed by the elite - upon those 
members. 
3.9.2 Larson Emphasised 'Front End' Controls 
Larson believed that control over members was 'a matter of structure much more 
than a matter of obedience to an association's code of ethics.' The structural 
controls that she referred to were the subtle and informal structures which created 
hierarchies within educational institutions and within the legal profession itself. She 
did not appear to turn her mind to what role, if any, disciplinary structures played in 
the profession's control over members of the profession, let alone the use, or 
otherwise, of those disciplinary structures. It is clear from her argument, and lack of 
discussion of discipline, that Larson placed very little importance on the day to day 
enforcement of ethical standards as a means of maintaining internal cohesion. This is 
not to say she would deny any role at all for the disciplinary system as a means of 
securing 'social credit', of demonstrating to the public the continuing 'ethicality' of 
the profession and the well-placed trust of the public. 
94 See discussion in Robert Nelson, David Trubek and Rayman Solomon, Lawyers' Ideals/ Lawyers 
Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession (Cornell, Itiiaca, 1992) 17, citing from 
Larson, above n 7, 227; Parker, 'Competing Images of the Legal Profession: Competing Regulatory 
Strategies' above n 25, 389. 
^ Larson, above n 7, 72. 
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In her writing, Larson returned repeatedly to the importance of controls which 
limited those who entered legal education, controls applied during education and 
fiirther filters applied before a person was considered of the right moral character to 
be admitted to the legal profession. It would seem that she was satisfied that these 
checks and filters did effectively limit the degree of divergence and dissent among 
those who were successfiil in being admitted to the legal profession - her degree of 
satisfaction is demonstrated by the almost negligible attention she gave to the role 
played by professional discipline in the professional project. This control over 
divergence and dissent does not necessarily equate with what is best in the public 
interest, which depends on the profession's view of a 'good lawyer' equating with 
the public's best interests. 
3-9-3 Larson's Reference to 'BackEnd' Controls 
Implications about professional discipline can be drawn from the importance Larson 
placed on the barriers to entry into the legal profession. Speaking of the effect that 
the costs of these onerous entry controls and long years of education have on the 
individual's ideology of self, Larson believed this led the person to identify strongly 
with their role and to see it as their life's vocation,^^ with little thought given to 
changing to another occupation because of the investment afready made to join the 
Q7 
current profession or simply because of inertia. It was also a powerful force for 
conformity with the views of the elites of the profession 98 
^ Ibid 229. 
'^  Ibid 229. 
'' Ibid. 
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Larson also suggested that this 'heavy investment' led individual lawyers, as well as 
others around them, to see a lifetime attachment to their professional role - a feature 
which Larson believed distinguished professionals from other occupational groups. 
She cited popular novels, films and TV serials as reinforcing this permanent 
identification of a professional with their role, leading Larson to comment: 'you 
cannot really unfrock a priest, unmake a doctor, or disbar a lawyer.'^^ 
Surprisingly, given the amount of energy which the profession at least appears to 
devote to professional discipline, it is only in a footnote to her almost flippant 
comment that you 'can't really' disbar lawyers that Larson began to explore the 
implications which this supposed identification with, and commitment to, the role of 
lawyer had for the professional colleagues of a person facing discipline. Larson's 
footnote read as follows: 
Incidentally, the same notion of "heavy investment" tends to weaken colleague 
control. Freidson's studies of medicine show that colleagues tend to encourage the 
culprit to "resign from their company" - to bar him, that is, from the informal 
networks, rather than expel him from the profession. The latter is the last recourse, 
forced by publicity given to a gross offense.'°" 
Her placement of the comment in a footnote and her description of it as only 
'incidental' to her main argument, again suggests the littie importance she placed on 
professional discipline in the 'professional project'.'°' 
In later chapters of this thesis 1 attempt to test aspects of these comments by Larson -
in particular, her claim about the relationship between discipline and publicity. For 
instance, in Chapter Eight 1 consider whether it is true that strike off orders are more 
Ibid (emphasis in original). 
'°° Ibid, note 49. 
'»' Ibid. 
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likely in Queensland cases which have already received publicity. Larson's comment 
also distinguishes between informal bans from practice and expulsion from the 
profession, suggesting that, in the absence of publicity, colleagues prefer the matter 
to be dealt with in an informal way, but which still incapacitates the individual. In 
Chapter Five I look at the various ways - both formal and informal - in which 
Queensland lawyers have been incapacitated. 
Although not discussed by Larson, it could also be the case that lawyers may be 
reluctant to expel a colleague from their profession because they, in the sense of the 
legal profession as a whole, have invested heavily, at least ideologically, in the 
process of selecting those considered fit to join them in the legal profession. This 
could lead to a reluctance by colleagues to admit that their irutial assessment of the 
person's character or competence was wrong. 
Larson's explanation of why colleagues would resist moves to remove a lawyer from 
the profession presumed that tiiose colleagues, and those who may later judge the 
actions of those colleagues, apply a static concept of the person's fitness to practise 
as a lawyer. Larson's assumption of a static approach reflects the findings of Marks 
and Cathcart referred to earlier.'°^ In the eyes of professional colleagues, an 
individual's moral character may play a primary role in determining that person's 
suitability for legal practice and technical competencies a very minor role. The static 
approach also emphasises the view that a person is bom of a certain character, that 
moral character does not necessarily vary greatly over one's lifetime. 
'°^ Marks and Catiicart, above n 2, discussed above section 3.8. 
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This has consequences for those involved in regulation of the legal profession. If a 
lawyer faces disciplinary proceedings because of evidence that the lawyer has 
behaved dishonestly, or has otiierwise demonstrated weak moral character, many 
lawyers would assume that those character traits were present at the time of 
admission. Therefore, the revelation in disciplinary proceedings of the misconduct is 
a reflection, not only on tiie individual lawyer, but also on those professional 
colleagues who certified him or her to be of suitable moral fibre to join the ranks of 
the legal profession. Later chapters of this thesis will attempt to determine whether 
such a static interpretation of 'fitness to practise', or a more dynamic interpretation, 
is applied in Queensland. 
3.9.4 'Heavy Investment' 
Professional discipline clearly plays a cenfral role, ideologically if not practically, in 
the regulation of lawyers, at least in the United Kingdom, United States and 
Australia. For that reason, it is disappointing that Larson did not devote more 
attention to the role, if any, which discipline plays in the professional project. She did 
assume that the legal profession itself was reluctant to remove colleagues from the 
profession, but the only explanation for this reluctance which she offered, in the 
footnote referred to eariier, was that this was due to the 'heavy investment' the 
person was presumed to have made to become a member of the profession. Even if 
there does appear to be reluctance by lawyers to exercise disciplinary powers, or at 
least exercise the ultimate form of discipline - the removal of a colleague from 
practice - there could be many reasons for this reluctance. Apart from this assumed 
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'heavy investinent', reasons could also include fiiendship, empathy, compassion, 
fear, diffidence or apathy. 
One way of reconciling the reasons for reluctance to discipline colleagues is to read 
Larson's 'heavy investment' very broadly. In other words, she may have used this 
term to encompass intangible forms of ideological investment - that is, the 
colleagues themselves identified strongly with the predicament of the individual 
lawyer and, should that individual lawyer's fitness to practise be brought into 
question, then the 'cognitive reality' of other lawyers was also brought into question. 
This is likely to threaten lawyers' own image of themselves as lawyers where it is 
suggested that neither lawyers nor the general public could rely on the admission 
process as a guarantee of the moral character or techrucal expertise needed for the 
whole term of practice throughout a professional career. 
Important to Larson's theory is the sense of community within a profession: while 
she referred to the central, and 'brutal' role of selecting only appropriate candidates 
to join the profession,'*^^ once those candidates had successfiilly joined the ranks of 
the profession, she believed the profession emphasised 'inclusion'.'*^'' This suggests a 
natural bias within the profession against excluding those members tiie profession 
had once exercised judgment to consider of the requisite competence and character to 
enter tiie profession. Nevertheless, suggestions also appear in her work that, if any 
member is to face discipline, at least public discipline, it is most likely to be a lawyer 
in a smaller practice, with a lower income. This is because Larson considered 
Larson, above n 7, 55. 
"'nbid55. 
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competition for clients to be much greater in the middle and lower levels of private 
legal practice'^^ and it was this competition and partisan loyalty to the client which 
generate the kind of violation of ethics that is publicly deplored by the organized 
profession. The stereotypes of the "ambulance chaser" and of the lawyer who 
espouses the unethical business practices of his clients contain no reference to the 
subtle or, at least, hidden violations of law and public interest that occur in corporate 
legal practice. Where the volume of legal practice and the amount of fees are both 
substantial and secure, professional solidarity and at least the appearance of 
professional behaviour are easier to maintain. 
Larson also thought the internal ideology of competence within a profession created 
a natural reluctance to challenge the competence of eminent colleagues, at least in 
public, because 'it is hard on [a profession's] unity toward the outside world to 
denounce altogether an "eminenf [colleague] as a fraud or a quack.''°'' 
3.10 THE PLACE OF DISCIPLINE WITHIN MEASURES TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC 
3.10-1 The Wider Context 
As I noted briefly in Chapter One,'"** professional discipline is only one aspect of the 
regulation of lawyers. This is amply demonstrated by Wilkins who, when considering 
who should regulate lawyers,'^^ gave as much attention to issues of insurance against 
malpractice as to the issue of professional discipline. Parker has noted that even 
Wilkins' analysis excluded other important forms of regulation, including intemal 
'"' Ibid 175 
'°^lbid 176-7. 
107 iDia 'tD. see also later disciis«inn nf imK.^ t^ ^r ^^„„t.^, —;„u. ^i . . .__.• • , r-
more Ibid 45. See also later discussion of impact of greater weight given to testimonials from 
eminent colleagues: below section 7.4. 
Above section 1.6. 
109 
David Wilkins, 'Who Should Regulate Lawyers?' (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 801. 
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law firm regulation and legislative control by general regulators."^ Historically, 
these other forms of regulation appear to have played a much greater role than 
professional discipline in regulating the conduct of lawyers. For instance, in Australia 
as well as in England and the United States, the number of claims of substandard 
conduct handled each year by a professional indemnity insurer may well be much 
greater than the number of matters that are dealt with by a disciplinary tribunal. 
Therefore, it cannot be presumed that a failure actively to pursue measures to protect 
the public through professional discipline necessarily indicates a lack of commitment 
to public protection. It may indicate a belief that, in the particular circumstances, 
another form of regulation can more effectively protect the public. This is a point 
made sfrongly by Pue, in criticising the assumption that a lack of formal disciplinary 
hearings by the Inns of Court necessarily meant that the Inns were ineffective in 
controlling members."' WTiile he did not denounce the value of professional 
discipline, he pointed out that the Irms had other, very effective and more subtle ways 
of suppressing dissent than through formal disciplinary hearings. 
3-10.2 Discipline as Legitimation 
3.10.2.1 Disciplinary 'Scaffolding' 
Even when testing the thesis that professional discipline is used to gain external 
legitimacy for the legal profession, an important distinction must be made between 
"° Christine Parker, 'Regulation of the Ethics of Australian Legal Practice: Autonomy and 
Responsiveness' (2002) 25 University of New South Wales Law Journal 676, 676 note 2. An example 
of a general regulator is a Competition and Consumer Commission. 
" 'Pue, above n 14, 404. 
"^ Ibid 404. Similarly, Halliday points out that, although the Chicago Bar Association showed 
decreased interest in professional discipluie, it did increase its interest in continuing legal education, 
tiie licensing of specialist practitioners and office management: Halliday, above n i l , 353. 
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the establishment of disciplinary structtires and the actijal use of those structiires. 
Much insight can be gained from looking at the part played by professional bodies in 
refining disciplinary stinctures and processes to enhance the ability of discipline to 
protect the public. For instance, it is useful to know how active a part the profession 
plays in monitoring the effectiveness of disciplinary systems, how regulariy and 
comprehensively it advocates and facilitates changes to those systems to enhance 
their protective potential and how it responds when government or other interested 
parties suggest changes to the disciplinary scheme. 
A lack of effort by the profession in this regard may suggest that the profession is not 
truly committed to enhancing the protective effect of professional discipline."^ But 
the converse is not necessarily true. For instance, a professional body may want to be 
seen to be taking an active role in refining the protective ability of a disciplinary 
system. This will only subject its members to the risk of greater regulation if the 
greater regulatory machinery is put into action. The professional body may be 
relatively confident that the new structures will not be put into effect. It could hold 
this view for a number of reasons. First, it could believe that funding will be 
inadequate to support the changes properly. ""* Burrage suggested that regulatory 
legislation was sometimes passed primarily 'as an expression of distaste and 
annoyance with little expectation that it would actually deal with the problem of 
unscrupulous and dishonest attorneys.'"^ 
113 Or may consider another form of regulation a more effective means of protecting the public. 
'''' Horowitz, above n 18, 16, citing Richard Posner, 'Theories of Economic Regulation' (1974) 5 Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science 335, 337. 
Burrage, above n 24, 60. 
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Alternatively, professional bodies may support changes which on their face appear to 
place an extremely heavy regulatory burden on their members because they believe 
that those charged with the day to day enforcement of the legislative changes lack 
commitment to implement the changes. These arguments cannot be taken too far or 
lawyers would be correct in arguing that they are 'damned if they do show interest in 
discipline, damned if they don'f - as for instance, Abel's criticisms of lawyers, both 
for resisting and for implementing 'in firm' complaint procedures."^ 
Not every step taken by the profession to implement structural changes to enhance 
the protective impact of professional discipline can be dismissed as an exercise in 
117 
'window-dressing'. However, more indicative of a profession's commitment to 
protecting the public is the way it actually uses these structures. 
3.10.2.2 The Work of Halliday 
Halliday's purpose in writing Beyond Monopoly appears to have been to respond to 
critics of the legal profession such as Larson and Abel, by using empirical evidence 
to show that a profession could act beyond self interest once its position in society 
became stable and its monopoly assured. It is true that writers such as Halliday could 
identify periods in which legal professions assisted the state in broad areas of law 
reform and governance which do not appear to be of any immediate or direct benefit 
to the profession itself. Some writers have taken Halliday to suggest that the 
profession could also act against self-interest, but this is not the case. A close reading 
of his work suggests that he would agree with Larson and Abel that, while a 
profession may exhibit some altruistic endeavour, this did not extend to self-
"^ Richard Abel, English Lawyers Between Market and State, above n 59, 489. 
^" For instance, Richard Abel, 'Why Does the ABA Promulgate Etiiical Rules?' (1981) 59 Texas Law 
Review 639. 
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discipline. Any professional discipline system in the hands of tiie profession would 
be a mere facade, designed for external consumption rather than for true 
effectiveness. 
For instance, Halliday documented the activity of grievance committees and ethics 
committees of the Chicago Bar Association and concluded that the emphasis on these 
committees was only important to the Chicago Bar Association in a fransitory stage 
of its development as a professional association. Notably, he described issues of 
1 I Q 
ethics and grievance as self-interested pursuits, not matters of concern to the 
broader public and thought that, once the profession became more established and its 
market control less open to external attack, it could spend proportionately less time 
11 Q 
on such 'self-interested' matters. Only in times of severe public scrutiny would it 
be necessary for the Association to refocus its energies and funds on disciplinary 
120 
matters. 
Halliday looked at the early history of the committees of the Chicago Bar 
Association as an indicator of the monopolistic concerns of that body.'^' Before its 
monopoly became assured, discipline, fee and education committees were 
established. It could equally be argued that these were merely the public 
manifestations of what the Chicago Bar Association thought they should be seen to 
be interested in. Also relevant would be to know the number of times the discipline, 
fee and education committees met in comparison to otiier committees, and the time 
"^Halliday, above n i l , 352. 
'"Ibid. 
''° Ibid 111. Such a period occurred in Chicago in 1890-1920- Ibid 77 
'^' Ibid 68 
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spent on measures to protect the public rather than issues of primary concern to the 
profession itself 
The examples of Chicago Bar Association activity which Halliday used to show that 
the Chicago Bar Association had gone beyond self-interest do not support his thesis 
as widely as he perhaps claimed. For instance, while Halliday provided extensive 
examples of instances in which the Chicago Bar Association devoted its energies to 
causes in which the profession's own interests did not appear to be at the forefront, 
such as in its 'fearless' pursuit of higher standards within the Illinois judiciary, it 
would seem that the Chicago Bar Association had much greater difficulty in acting 
against its own self-interest. Indeed, despite the many examples he gave of lawyers 
acting beyond their interests, he was unable to provide any examples of the 
Association pursuing high standards among its own members, except as a reaction to 
times of intense external scrutiny. 
Halliday expressed no surprise that, as the privileged position of the legal profession 
in Illinois became more entrenched, the Chicago Bar Association reduced its interest 
in the discipline of its own members. He referred to a reduction in the number of 
committees and in funding to deal with issues such as admission, ethics, fees, 
professional education and discipline as confirmation that the profession's monopoly 
had become assured. Implied by such a correlation is that a demonsfrated interest in 
discipline and ethics merely reflects a concern to establish a monopoly and has no 
intrinsic merit in the eyes of a professional body. This is also suggested by Halliday's 
use of the term 'scaffolding' to refer to professional discipline. He said: 
'^ ^ Ibid 181-9. Occasions on which the professional bodies in Queensland appeared to act in the public 
interest against the interests of members are discussed below paras 4.5.3 and 8.6. 
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A more robust, economically entrenched and bureaucratically stmctured profession, 
with powerful representative associations, may afford itself the luxury of dispensing 
with some of the expensive and elaborate scaffolding erected in formative years. The 
partial extemalization of lawyer discipline from bar associations represents a case in 
point. The appearance of lay members of the public on previously restricted panels 
of lawyers for discipline, legal aid, and the delivery of legal services represents yet 
other instances. 
The word 'scaffolding' has about it the sense of structure regardless of content - that 
the Chicago Bar Association wanted to be able to point to the structures it had put in 
place, regardless of the actual effectiveness of those structures. Halliday clearly 
suggested that a profession will jettison self-regulation once its monopoly becomes 
assured. The word also connotes a temporary framework used to build something 
but which is then dismantied when the 'project' is completed. 
3.10.2.3 Powell Confirms Halliday's Findings 
Powell also examined the experience of the Chicago Bar Association.' His study is 
useftil because, while in other jurisdictions the state had taken disciplinary control 
from professional bodies compulsorily, in this case the Chicago Bar Association 
asked to be relieved of responsibility for discipline. Like Halliday, Powell's work is 
sometimes cited as an example of research which demonsfrates that professional 
bodies can be activated by more than self-interest.'^^ Powell confirmed Halliday's 
thesis that direct control of discipline was only considered valid by the Chicago Bar 
Association in the early period of legitimation. If the primary concern of the 
Association was to ensure a disciplinary structure which could best protect the 
interests of the public, its handing over of control would provide clear evidence of a 
'^ ^ Ibid 355. 
124 Michael Powell, 'Professional Divestiture: The Cession of Responsibility for Lawyer Disciphne' 
(1986) American Bar Foundation Research Journal 31. 
See, for instance, discussion in Christine Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice 
aboven46, 118-9. 
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profession subsuming its interests to those of the public. But this was not the case. 
Powell believed self discipline had become a source of embarrassment to the 
profession. By handing over control to a court run system, the Chicago Bar 
Association was able to avoid a system with more legislative or public control.'^^ It 
was more comfortable that the judges would maintain a narrow focus of what lawyer 
discipline entailed, as established many years earlier by the bar associations.'^^ 
Powell himself concluded from his examination of the handing over of responsibility 
for discipline that it was the appearance of discipline that was more important than 
1 28 
the substance. 
Halliday's and Powell's theories of the Chicago Bar Association are further 
discussed in the context of the Queensland legal profession in Chapter Four, which 
looks at the role played by the Bar Association of Queensland and the Queensland 
Law Society in the design of new disciplinary structures. 
3.10.2.4 Disciplinary Action 
Generally speaking, an examination of how disciplinary structures and processes 
actually operate can provide a more effective insight into whether there is a true 
commitment to the use of professional discipline to protect the public than mere 
'tinkering' with ethical rules and structures. However, much more care must be taken 
before applying theories of the professions to this latter analysis if those theories are 
drawn from experience of disciplinary systems which are managed predominantiy by 
the profession itself This is because, as I noted in the introduction to this chapter. 
126 Similar sentiments have been expressed by barristers in Queensland: below section 4.3. 
Powell, above n 124, 53. 
™ Ibid 50. 
Above section 3.1. 
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in many instances the profession has less control over the day-to-day running of 
disciplinary systems than many of those theories assume. 
In some jurisdictions the investigation and prosecution of complaints and the 
imposition of discipline is undertaken by an independent body or by the state, hi such 
circumstances, it is still instinctive to examine the degree to which a professional 
body initiates, supports or in fact ignores or impedes attempts to take disciplinary 
action in individual cases. Care must be taken not to impute disciplinary action 
automatically to the profession itself 
Larson may not have necessarily limited her comments to situations in which the 
profession itself confrolled discipline. For instance, she noted the compulsion of the 
state 'to protect the public by eliminating the incompetent or less competent 
professionals' where the professional market is independent from other markets. 
Perhaps implicit in her statement is an assumption that it will not be the elite of the 
profession who will be found to be 'less competent'. Larson's point was that, while 
state sanction is necessary to remove a person from practice, much of that power will 
be delegated to the profession itself. In particular, it is a central tenet of Larson's 
theory that a successfiil profession will have control over defining competence'^' and 
character standards applied in education and admission. Hence, even though she 
spoke of the state removing the incompetent from practice, Larson would suggest 
Larson, above n 7, 47-8. Notably, she sees this State action as to tiie advantage of the profession: 
'The more independent the professional market from otiier markets, the more tiie state is compelled to 
protect the public by eliminating the incompetent or less competent professionals, the more favourable 
the situation is for the profession.' 
Arguably, Australian admission proceedings place much more emphasis on character than on 
competence, as Australia does not have bar exams as in the United States. Instead, at least in practice, 
tiie holding of an Australian law degree is taken as sufficient certification of competence. This may 
suggest that - in Australia - both admission and disciplinary proceedings focus more heavily on 
character than do jurisdictions in which the profession itself supervises bar exams. 
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that, if the professional project is operating successfully, the authority to determine 
whether a person should or should not be removed from practice would, for all 
practical purposes, reside with the profession itself 
The more distant a profession is from structural design of a disciplinary system and, 
more particularly, its day to day enforcement, the more tenuous theories of the 
professions become for assessing the purpose of discipline. In other words, even if 
lawyers' occupational groups are motivated primarily by self interest this does little 
to explain the dynamics of a system over which they have little influence. 
Larson's theory is useful when analysing disciplinary systems at times when the 
profession has a role to play in discipline. As subsequent chapters will show, the 
solicitors' branch of the profession, through the Queensland Law Society, has had a 
significant role to play, particularly following legislative amendments in 1927. Over 
subsequent years it actively sought, and was granted, even greater powers to regulate 
solicitors in Queensland. In contrast, the Bar Association of Queensland has had a 
very limited role to play in relation to discipline of barristers. It has been ambivalent 
about seeking powers to discipline members. Subsequent chapters of this thesis will 
seek to demonsfrate whether Larson's theory can offer any explanation for the 
1 ^7 
different experience in the discipline of barristers in Queensland. 
Even more problematic in seeking to apply Larson's theory to the professional 
discipline of lawyers in Queensland is the removal of the Queensland Law Society's 
role in professional discipline in 2004, and the parallel exclusion of the Bar 
^ See discussion below section 4.3. 
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Association of Queensland from a professional disciplinary role at the same time. If 
Larson's theory is correct, it should be expected that the removal of the society and 
exclusion of the association from the disciplinary processes would allow those 
processes to ftilfil at last thefr stated purpose of protecting the public. 
However, it may be that, even if the profession does not have direct control over a 
disciplinary system, there is a continuity of influence, if only indfrectiy. Examples 
include where former leaders of professional bodies sit as members of disciplinary 
ttibunals. The discipluiary tribunal may be a separate legal identity, but the attitude 
of a former leader of the profession, now sitting as a member of that tribunal, is 
likely to be informed by his or her ideology and experiences as a leader of the 
profession. The members of a disciplinary tribunal may also be nominated for that 
position by a professional body. In such a case, it is clear that the professional body 
is unlikely to nominate a person if it feels that the person is unlikely to reflect the 
views of the professional body as to the proper role of professional discipline. 
3.11 BY THE PROFESSION OR FOR THE PROFESSION? 
One of the most problematic issues for any theory attempting to explain why a 
disciplinary system has or has not been used to protect the public is the need to 
consider the perceptions of those involved in the disciplinary system as to the role 
and jurisdiction of that system and how that system can best protect the public. In 
other words, some theories necessarily limit their explanatory power by arguing tiiat 
the disciplinary system is used by the profession for certain purposes of the 
profession (and usually, self interest). These theories lose utility the less direct or 
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indirect influence the profession has over that system. A different but equally valid 
question to ask is if the disciplinary system is used/or the profession. It is not only 
currentiy practising lawyers who may seek to promote the interests of the 
profession.'^^ In fact, any regulator may sympathise with the 'plight' of lawyers 
facing strict regulation. Larson would not necessarily concede that her theory loses 
explanatory power if lawyers are not involved in the day to day running of a 
disciplinary system: in the case of education, she claimed it was not critical that 
professions retained confrol over selection of those who entered legal education, 
because she presumed that 'the various units in the system of higher education have 
themselves been relatively standardized and arranged in a recognized system of 
hierarchical prestige.'' If it could be argued that disciplinary structures also 
mirrored the values of the legal profession, then Larson may perhaps have argued 
that the profession's dfrect control of discipline was unnecessary. 
The notions of public protection and the best interests of the profession are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. It could be the case that what is in the best interests 
of the public is also in the best interests of the profession. For instance, there would 
be general agreement that it is in the public interest that a lawyer be removed from 
practice if that lawyer is found to have stolen money from clients on a number of 
occasions. It is also in the interests of the broader legal profession that the lawyer be 
removed, as it provides cogent evidence of the profession supporting action to 
' " For instance, some would argue that judges should be considered to still identify strongly with the 
legal profession, particularly that branch from which most judges are dravra - tiie bar. 
'^ '' This flaw in some scholarship has been noted by Rostain, who criticises the failure of some writers 
to recognise that, while the profession may have some self-interest, external regulators are not without 
interests themselves: 'The unstated premise underlying this scholarship is that 'bad' men represented 
by "bad" lawyers will be prevented from harming tiie legal framework by public-minded, "good" 
regulatory agencies.': Tanina Rostain, 'Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer 
Regulation'(1998) 7 Southem Califomia Law Review 1273, 1314. 
Larson, above n 7, 201. 
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remove individual lawyers who prove a risk to the public, which is consistent with 
any aim of obtaining 'social credit'. 
Just as the public interest and the interests of the profession can coincide, it caimot be 
assumed that, if the disciplinary system is not taking action to protect the public, this 
must be because the disciplinary system is seeking to fiirther the interests of the legal 
profession. 
There is not a simple dichotomy between protecting the public and protecting the 
profession. In other words, there may be evidence that a disciplinary body is not 
implementing a legal imperative to protect the public. Simultaneously, the profession 
may have no direct confrol over disciplinary processes and there may be little 
evidence that the profession has influence over the membership of the disciplinary 
tribunal. Nevertheless, there may be other reasons why the decisions of a disciplinary 
tribunal do not protect the public. It may be that the tribunal misconstrues its role or 
the notion of public protection, or continues to be influenced by outdated notions of 
professional discipline which emphasised public protection less than the current law. 
The previous chapter demonstrated how the Supreme Court of Queensland's view of 
professional discipline appeared to be narrower than the view articulated in 
legislation. Therefore, it should not be surprising to find that a less informed 
tribunal, with members often operating on a voluntary basis, was also applying an 
outdated understanding of its protective jurisdiction. 
'^ ^ Above section 2.4.3.4. 
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Even though they may not be lawyers themselves, those charged with prosecuting 
and imposing discipline upon lawyers may be most likely to use that system/or the 
profession if they consider a legitimate way of protecting the public is by protecting 
the reputation of the legal profession. As is demonstrated in Chapter Two, courts 
have only condoned the pursuit of enhancing the reputation of the legal profession as 
a secondary purpose of professional discipline.'^^ Subsequent chapters of this thesis 
will seek to determine whether this has been misunderstood by disciplinary bodies, 
who may have considered the reputational issue to be sufficient justification for 
taking disciplinary action in a particular case. 
At times when the professional bodies have little control or influence over 
professional discipline, theories about what motivates professional groups become 
much less relevant. Other theories must be considered or developed. Useftil parallels 
can be drawn between professional discipline systems and the regulatory systems 
examined in the work of Carson'^^ and Hawkins.'^^ Carson examined the 
enforcement of strict liability legislation and observed that those charged with 
enforcing the legislation imposed an additional requirement of moral fault. There are 
many elements in Carson's study which assist in understanding the discipline of 
lawyers in Queensland. For example, Carson noted a general animosity, even within 
Law Commissions, to the notion of strict liability crimes, and a tendency to continue 
to infer the need for moral blame before instituting a prosecution, and to limit the 
serious natiire of such offences by referring to them as 'folk crimes'.""^ Hawkins has 
Above section 2.6.4. 
'^ ^ Wesley Carson, 'Some Sociological Aspects Of Strict Liability And The Enforcement Of Factory 
Legislation' (1970) 33 Modern Law Review 396-412. 
'^ ^ Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002). 
'*" Carson, above n 138, 397, 411. 
117 
Chapter Three: Legitimation 
confirmed that regulatory personnel are unlikely to prosecute breaches of legislation 
- whether strict liability or not - without the presence of blame 141 
Similariy, in relation to professional discipline, a difficulty appears in determining 
the relationship between discipline and the criminal law, a matter I take up more 
ftilly in Chapter Six.'"^ An ongoing emphasis, even by the courts, on notions of 
'dishonour and disgrace' when considering professional misconduct, has already 
been noted.'"^ Obviously, any theory which suggests any regulator, either within the 
profession or external, has a tendency to superimpose notions of moral blame before 
prosecuting conduct, must be considered as a potential source of explanatory power. 
This is particularly the case given the limitations and inconsistencies of theories of 
the profession which I have discussed in this chapter. 
An ideological 'time lag' between the purpose of discipline as required by the law 
and the interpretation of the purpose of discipline applied by those charged with the 
day to day enforcement of discipline is more likely to arise if the same group of 
individuals continue to be responsible for the enforcement of discipline after changes 
are implemented. It is possible that enforcement personnel may not internalise the 
changes. I have already noted this in the previous chapter in relation to the Supreme 
Court of Queensland's failure to embrace legislative change in relation to the range 
of conduct liable to discipline.'''^ 
Hawkins, above n 139, 333. 
Marks and Catiicart, above n 2; Linda Haller, 'Disciplinary Fines: Deterrence or Retribution*?' 
(2002) 5 Legal Ethics 152, 158-9. 
''*•' Below section 6.4. 
Above section 2.4.3.3. 
'•^ ^ Above section 2.4.3.4. 
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Marks and Cathcart have warned of the necessity to consider the attitude of 
disciplinary agencies, and their comments are not necessarily limited to disciplinary 
agencies under the control of the legal profession. They pointed out that disciplinary 
agencies in many parts of the United States were established to deal with a particular 
form of substandard performance by lawyers, and resisted any broaderung of their 
jurisdiction because they claimed they were not established to deal with a broader 
range of substandard performance. This resistance to change will be particularly 
true where the same personnel are employed within the disciplinary agency over a 
period of time. 
3.12 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated that, while it may first appear that there is great 
discrepancy between various theories of the professions, if those theories are only 
considered insofar as they relate to the question of professional discipline, there is 
considerable consistency. Theories which appear at first glance to provide evidence 
that a profession can effectively self-regulate must be treated with caution. A close 
reading of these, particularly the work of Halliday, shows in fact that, while lawyers 
as a group may be able to operate 'beyond monopoly' in the public interest once their 
monopoly is enfrenched, the profession is unable to self-regulate properly. In fact, 
Halliday went even ftirther than this, and appeared to suggest that, even when 
'''^  Marks and Cathcart, above n 2, 226. The authors themselves point out tiie circularity of such an 
argument. 
'''^  This conclusion may require further substantiation. Grabosky and Braithwaite have reported that an 
apparent correlation between a lower rate of convictions by regulatory agencies which employed 
higher numbers of staff who had previously worked in the industry which they were regulating 
disappeared when corrected for size of tiie agency: Peter Grabosky and John Braitiiwaite, Of Manners 
Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies (Oxford Urtiversity Press, 
Melbourne, 1986)210,214. 
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seeking external legitimacy to justify a monopoly over the supply of legal services, a 
profession only manifested the indicia of self-regulation, through erecting the 
'elaborate scaffolding' of disciplinary processes. 
My analysis of theories of the professions in this chapter has also pointed to the 
central role which ideology plays within the legal profession. Ideology is as 
important to Larson's professional project as it is to those, such as Croft and Parker, 
who seek to harness the aspirational aspects of professional ideology to achieve 
effective self-regulation. But ideology does not only play a role within the legal 
profession. It can also have an impact on those who deal with the legal profession, 
whether as consumers of legal services, regulators or lawmakers, in later chapters of 
this thesis I will seek to explore the question whether enduring paradigms of what 
makes a 'good lawyer' and as to the proper role of professional discipline may have 
impacted on the ability of professional discipline in Queensland to discharge its 
primary responsibility of protecting the public. 
In the following chapter I look at the role played by professional bodies in 
establishing structures to deal with professional discipline. Such an examination is 
likely to provide some insight into the degree to which those bodies appear to have 
been motivated by self-interest or public interest and whether those structures 
represent simply the ideological 'scaffolding' referred to by Halliday. Perhaps a more 
useftil tool for considering Larson's theory is an examination of the role played by 
professional bodies in using those structiires in taking disciplinary action against 
individual lawyers, and in publishing disciplinary outcomes. These are all matters 
which I take up in subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EVOLUTION OF LEGAL DISCIPLINARY STRUCTURES IN QUEENSLAND 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Three presented theories that suggested professional bodies are only likely to 
participate actively in the creation of new disciplinary structures ('scaffolds') and in 
disciplinary action against their members when those bodies perceive an external 
threat to their legitimacy or reputation. It also noted theories which suggest an 
'ideological time lag' may exist within any regulatory body, particularly if such a 
body is asked to enforce legislation which takes a stricter view of liability than that to 
which the regulator has been accustomed. Subsequent chapters of this thesis will 
consider whether these theories are useful to explain disciplinary action taken against 
Queensland lawyers. This chapter examines the legal framework within which the 
discipline of Queensland barristers and solicitors has operated and the role played by 
professional bodies in the establishment of that framework. Particular attention will be 
paid to evidence of external threats to the legitimacy of the profession (or segments of 
the profession) which may have precipitated the erection of symbolic 'scaffolding'' 
by professional bodies. 
Until 2004 the legal profession in Queensland remained divided at the point of 
admission, and very different disciplinary structures applied to barristers and 
' The terra 'scaffolding' is used in the sense used by Halliday, to describe structures erected at times of 
external pressure, without any necessary concern about how well those structures were utilised: 
Terence Halliday, Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers, State Crises, and Professional Empowerment 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987). See more detailed discussion above section 3.10.2.1. 
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solicitors. It is therefore necessary to consider barristers and solicitors separately. A 
marked difference in the activity of each branch of the profession will be noted. 
4.2 COURT'S INHERENT JURISDICTION 
Since it was first established in 1861^ the Supreme Court of Queensland has held 
inherent jurisdiction over both barristers and solicitors, a jurisdiction that originally 
arose from the Third Charter of Justice? Where a lawyer engaged in misconduct 
within the court, it could initiate action of its own motion, but required lodgement of a 
complaint before it would act on misconduct outside the court. 
Although Queensland separated from New South Wales in 1859, neither solicitors nor 
barristers in the new colony formed any representative body until the Queensland Law 
Society was established in 1873. The report oi Re Batho^ names the applicant as the 
'Law Society of Queensland', but neither the Queensland Law Society nor any other 
professional representative body was in existence at that time. Gregory believes that 
this 'society' in fact referred to an informal group of solicitors working towards 
improved professional standards.^ 
2 
Hon Bruce McPherson, The Supreme Court of Queensland 1859-1960. History Jurisdiction 
Procedure (Butterworths, Sydney, 1989) 27. 
The Supreme Court of Queensland exercises powers inherited from the Third Charter of Justice given 
to New Soutii Wales because tiie area that now comprises Queensland was part of tiie colony of New 
South Wales until 1859. 
" Re Swanwick; ex parte Bain (1882) QLJ, February 1,1883,117,118. 
^(1868)1 QSCR 196. 
^ Helen Gregory, Tlie Queensland Law Society Inc 1928-1988 (Queensland Law Society Brisbane 
1991)17. 
122 
Chapter Fojx: Evolution of Legal Disciplinary Structures in Queensland 
4.3 B A R A S S O C I A T I O N O F Q U E E N S L A N D 
4.3.1 No Statutory Regulation of Barristers 
In 1903, the Bar Association of Queensland came into existence and its committee 
comprised the Attomey-General, the Solicitor-General, all King's Counsel and five 
Other practising barristers, elected armually. As the association itself has since noted, 
'if the motions adopted at this [first] meeting are a guide' the association was formed 
to deal with the 'pereimial issues of unpaid fees and direct briefing'.^ At its initial 
meeting, the association agreed to blacklist solicitors who had failed to pay barristers' 
fees, and to ban holding a brief with a fellow barrister who accepted work directly 
from a client, without an instructing solicitor. Both these matters could only be said 
to be of indirect interest - let alone of benefit - to the public.'^ The evidence suggests 
that, the association's initial aim was to protect the economic interests of members 
rather than to protect the interests of the general public. This accords with predictions 
of market control theorists referred to in the previous chapter." Any - albeit muted -
interest in protecting members of the public more directly came later. 
^ Ross Johnston, History of the Queensland Bar (Bar Association of Qld, Brisbane, 1979) 21. 
^ Bar Association of Queensland, 'Early History of tiie Queensland Bar' 
http://www.qldbar.asn.au/20967.html at 23 February 2005. 
^ Michael White and Stephen Sheaffe, 'A Short Account of tiie Beginnings of the Queensland Bar', 
Supreme Court of Queensland Library, 2003. Arthur Feez, the first president of the association, 
recorded its foundation meeting in his diary as follows: 'Court at 10 ... Game of snooker after lunch 
and I played better. Bar meeting in the AG's chambers when we formed a Bar Association and passed 
certain resolutions. ... ': Ibid. See also Bar Association of Queensland, 'Early History', above n 8. 
'" Altiiough the English case oi Doe d Bennett v Hale (1850) 15 QB 171; 117 ER 423 found that tiie 
need to brief a solicitor was in the public interest, some may argue that an absolute ban on 'direct 
access' clients may be against tiie public interest, by requu-ing clients to pay botii a solicitor and a 
barrister even in the simplest of advocacy matters. A prohibition against direct access to barristers has 
also been criticised as anti-competitive: National Competition Policy Review of the Legal Profession 
Act 1987 para 4.2, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/report%5Clpd_reports.nsf/pages/ncp_4 at 27 April 
2005. 
Above section 3.3. 
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Although the Queensland Law Society sought and achieved stattitory control over all 
Queensland solicitors in 1927,'' that legislation was not extended to cover 
Queensland barristers, except when practising as a solicitor. The omission of 
barristers from the legislative framework was queried in Pariiament during the 
passage of the 1927 Bill,''' but the only explanation given by the Attomey-General 
was that barristers were excluded because 'they do not deal with money matters ... 
they do not handle the money of clients in the same way as solicitors.' During 
debate of the Bill a conveyancer member of Parliament noted the narrowness of this 
response, given that 'a barrister might do something outside of taking money or 
neglecting a trust, and therefore should be under the control of the society.' Yet 
such an argument did not hold sway with Parliament, and barristers were to remain 
1 -7 
outside legislative control until 2004. 
This meant that until 2004 the only legal basis upon which the Bar Association of 
Queensland could exercise any disciplinary power over barristers was on a consensual 
basis, in relation to those barristers who chose to become members. Through the 
Articles of Association, members gave the Committee of the association'^ the power 
to enquire into conduct and, after giving 21 days notice,'^ to hear charges of a breach 
'^  Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld). See discussion later in this chapter. 
'^  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 November 1927, 827. The Legal 
Practitioners Act 1881 (Qld) s 1 permitted a barrister to practise as a solicitor, although it is thought 
that very few chose to do so: Michael White, 'The Development of the Divided Legal Profession in 
Queensland', (2004) 23 University of Queensland Law Journal 296, 314. 
'" Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 November 1927, 826 (William Kelso, 
who described himself as a 'humble conveyancer': Queensland, Parliamentary Debates Legislative 
Assembly, 8 November 1927, 827). 
'^  Ibid 826 (John Mullan, Attomey-General). 
'^  Ibid 828 (William Kelso). 
'^  Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). 
'* The Committee was elected annually by the members and consisted of the President, Vice President 
and 13 ordinary members: Bar Association of Queensland Articles of Association article 52(a) 
'^  Article 76. 
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of etiquette, a breach of the rules of membership, unprofessional conduct, or 
'misconduct of such a nature as to make [the barrister] unsuitable for membership.'^° 
If charges were proved beyond reasonable doubt,^' the association could suspend or 
expel a member from membership and other members were barred from sharing a 
brief during the period of suspension or expulsion.^^ It has been suggested that this 
was a more effective form of control than the General Council of the Bar's degree of 
control over English barristers,^'' but it did little to control those barristers who were 
able to practise without the co-operation of barristers who were members of the 
association. 
The only other available response to misconduct by a barrister was an application to 
the Supreme Court in its inherent jurisdiction. The Bar Association of Queensland has 
always had standing in relation to admission proceedings, which necessarily involve 
non-members. In Clyne v NSW Bar Association the High Court had no doubt that 
the New South Wales Bar Association had standing, not only in admission 
proceedings but also in disciplinary matters involving any member of the bar, not just 
members of that association. The Supreme Court of Queensland has also held that the 
Bar Association of Queensland had standing to prosecute disciplinary matters.^^ 
^^  Article77. 
'^ This is equivalent to a criminal standard of proof and higher than the usual standard of proof in 
disciplinary proceedings, which is the Briginshaw standard. Compare also Legal Profession Act 2004 
(Qld) s 479 which codifies tiie Briginshaw standard. 
^^  Article 78. 
^^  Article 79. 
Johnston, above n 7, 21. 
^^  Bar Association of Queensland v Lamb [1972] ALR 285; as do bar associations elsewhere: 
Wentworth v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 239. 
^^(1960) 104 CLR 186. 
"i?eC/<3«CF(1970)QWN8. 
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In New South Wales, although the Supreme Court acknowledged that it could 
instittite disciplinary proceedings on its own initiative ex mero motu, it encouraged the 
New South Wales Bar Association to prosecute the action as a rule nisi.^^ Bennett 
reports that the association agreed with this proposal. The association's apparent 
reasons made no mention of the public benefit that could accrue from the association 
investigating and prosecuting disciplinary matters but instead focus on the advantages 
to the bar itself, noting that such a proposal was desirable because it would 
[protect] members of the Bar against possible blackmailing proceedings and the 
danger of the Prothonotary's acting on complaints by litigants of unsound mind. ... 
These obligations, sometimes fotmd distastefiil by the Council, were seen on a broad 
view to be for the benefit of the Bar as a whole, as well as protecting individual 
barristers.'" 
Article 82 of the Articles of Association of the Bar Association of Queensland does 
contemplate the association reporting disciplinary matters to the Supreme Court of 
Queensland, and the association has reported an 'involvement' in at least two 
applications to the Queensland Court of Appeal to have a barrister disbarred.^' 
However in recent times it was the Barristers' Board of Queensland^^ which has 
prosecuted any applications to the Queensland Court of Appeal that a barrister be 
disciplined. 
^^  John Bennett (ed), A History of the New South Wales Bar (Law Book Co, Sydney 1969) 170 
^' Ibid. 
J°Ibid. 
' Letter from Daniel O'Connor, Chief Executive, Bar Association of Queensland, to Linda Haller, 13 
December 2002. One of these was Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253, in which'tiie 
applicant was the Barristers' Board but the association was joined as a party on its own application. 
The Barristers' Board was fu-st established in 1866 and was primarily charged with assessing fitness 
to be admitted to practise. It was replaced in 2004 by the Legal Practitioners Admission Board: 
Barristers' Admission Rules 1975 (Qld) (repealed) s 4; Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 489; Bar 
Association of Queensland, From die President, July 2004, 
http://www.qldbar.asn.au/From_Pres 7 04.pdf at 27 April 2004. See below section 4.4. 
" Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253; Barristers' Board v Young [2001] QCA 556; 
Barristers' Board v Pratt [2002] QCA 532. See discussion later in this chapter. 
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Even if the Supreme Court of Queensland had the co-operation of the association in 
the hearing of disciplinary matters against barristers, the range of orders available to 
any court exercising its inherent jurisdiction is necessarily limited '^* and more 
inflexible than the orders available to a statutory disciplinary tribunal, such as the 
tribunal which heard disciplinary matters against solicitors. 
4.3.2 Attitude of Members 
Members of the bar were divided as to whether it was desirable to establish a 
disciplinary tribunal at all, and if so, whether that tribunal should be established under 
Rules of Court or by legislation. Forbes claims that the concept of a statutory 
disciplinary committee for barristers was raised in 1976.^ ^ The following discussion 
demonsfrates that discussion within the association continued, but without any 
material change, until legislation was finally implemented in 2004. 
At the Annual General Meeting of the Bar Association of Queensland held in May 
1983, the members of the association endorsed a proposal that a disciplinary tribunal 
be established.^^ That proposal was criticised by the Editor of Queensland Bar News, 
who commented: 
It is said that when the Falklands War was rumoured as being likely to spread to 
Europe, Italy surrendered just in case. The vote for a disciplinary body smacked of 
the same. It was a funny vote by the younger members whose integrity at the poll 
demonstrated quite clearly the absence of a need for the Body for which they 
ultimately voted. Had they been about for the last 15 years, they would have known 
^ Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253, [37], discussed in Reid Mortensen, 'Lawyers' 
Character, Moral Insight and Etiucal Blindness' (2002) 22 The Queensland Lawyer 166, 171. 
' ' John Forbes, The Divided Legal Profession in Australia: History, Rationalisation and Rationale 
(Law Book Co, Sydney, 1979) 144, note 82. 
^^  C W Pincus, 'From the President' (1983) 6 Queensland Bar News 3. It appears tiiat a similar 
decision was made at a General Meeting on 20 February 1989, and tiiat the tribunal be created pursuant 
to a Rule of Court rather than by statute: Cedric Hampson, 'President's Page', (1997) 53 Refresher 3. 
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that members in the past would not have a bar of it. May the Judge never have to 
pause in his court duties to sit upon that Tribunal. 
The editor's comments suggest that the push for a disciplinary body came from the 
younger members of the association. As was noted in the previous chapter, the 
profession is not an amorphous group.^^ While some may not be surprised at this 
evidence of younger, more junior barristers more willing to embrace change than 
older, more established barristers, it is telling that - despite the outcome of a 
democratic vote of members - the actual establishment of a disciplinary tribunal was 
delayed for many years. Larson would claim that this was because a tribunal was 
against the interests of the elites controlling the association. The subsequent 
examination of the circumstances surrounding the delay in the implementation of the 
disciplinary tribunal suggests other possible explanations: the delay may have been 
simply the result of indecision by the association as to the legal form any such 
tribunal should take. Equally it may have been a result of delays by judges in 
implementing Rules of Court, at times when the bar preferred a tribunal governed by 
Rules of Court. Once again, it is important to avoid the over-determinism against 
which Halliday and Lewis have warned.'' 
In March 1984, at a joint symposium held by the Queensland Law Society and the Bar 
Association of Queensland, the Attomey-General was reported to have called on both 
branches of the profession to include commuruty input into their disciplinary systems 
voluntarily or risk losing self-regulation. He said: 
^^  James Crowley, Editorial (1983) 6 Queensland Bar News 1. 
Above section 3.7. Christine Parker, 'Competing Images of the Legal Profession: Competing 
Regulatory Strategies' (1997) 25 Intemational Journal of the Sociology of Law 385, 392. 
^' Above section 3.5. 
Halliday, above n 1, 350; Phillip Lewis, 'Comparison and Change in the Study of Legal Professions' 
in Richard Abel and Phillip Lewis (eds). Lawyers in Society, vol 3: Comparative Theories (University 
of California Press, Berkeley, 1989) 59. Discussed above section 3.2. 
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the idea of Caesar judging Caesar on matters of professional misconduct and 
negligence no longer attracted community support. ... I would hope that we will not 
reach the position in this state where Government will be forced, by legislation, to 
impose on the profession a government-devised method of management and 
discipline. ... this possibility however should be recognised.'*' 
It does not appear that any more was said publicly about the proposal passed at the 
1983 Annual General Meeting until 1988 when the President informed members that 
a 'new system for investigating and hearing complaints against barristers and of 
punishing misconduct will, I hope, be placed before our next Annual General 
Meeting... 
A reading of the association's Bar News in December 1989"*^  would strongly suggest 
that it did then have the political will to establish a more effective disciplinary system. 
The Editorial of that month's issue suggested that Rules of Court were already in draft 
form to establish a disciplinary tribunal for all barristers in Queensland, whether 
members of the association or not, to be headed by a Supreme Court judge. 
4.3.3 Rules of Court or Legislation ? 
The association's preference for Rules of Court rather tiian legislation accords with 
the finding of Powell that the Chicago Bar Association handed over control of 
discipline to a court run system rather than a system with more legislative or public 
control, because it believed judges would maintain the narrow focus of what lawyer 
discipline entailed, established over many years eariier by bar association led 
'" A Miller, 'Lawyers Risk 'Loss of Public Esteem', Sunday Mail (Bnsbane), 25 March 1984, 2. 
*^  G L Davies, 'From the President' (1988) 26 Queen.sland Bar News 5. 
*^  This was published only a few months after the decision in Hampson, discussed later in this chapter. 
^ Michael White, 'Editorial' (1989) 30 Bar News 3. 
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disciplined^ It is all the more likely that Queensland barristers would trust Queensland 
Supreme Court judges to maintain the bar's understanding of discipline, as all of the 
State's Supreme Court judges were previously members of the bar. None were 
appointed to the bench directiy fi-om the solicitors' branch of the profession. 
However, still no changes occurred and the continuing defects of the system were 
well described by Justice C W Pincus in 1990: 
The disciplinary system we have had has often worked well enough, but in the critical 
cases where something serious was happening, or seemed to have been done, I 
thought the Committee had insufficient legal power. All it had was contracmal power. 
All it could do, short of going to the Supreme Court, was enforce a contract 
constituted by the rules, but that didn't appear to be enough to enable the collection of 
proper evidence and to enable proper penalties. Forttmately, ethical standards here 
have been good, despite some deficiency in the mechanism of enforcement."* 
In September 1991, the President blamed the lack of any progress towards a new 
disciplinary tribunal on a lack of finding, "^^ although he hoped to have the tribunal in 
place by the end of that year. In the President's Armual Report two years later, in 
1993, the decision at the 1983 Armual General Meeting to establish a disciplinary 
tribunal was alluded to, but the continuing delay was again blamed upon a lack of 
finding and apparent delays in the approval of Rules of Court. However the political 
resolve in 1993 did appear to be stronger, with the President stating: 
The Committee feels strongly that as a responsible profession the Bar has hesitated 
too long in implementing a professional disciplinary tribunal. It has decided to 
recommend that there be a Barristers' Disciplinary Board to which substantiated 
matters of complaint concerning a barrister's conduct would be referred. The Board, 
45 Michael Powell, 'Professional Divestiture: The Cession of Responsibility for Lawyer Discipline' 
(1986) American Bar Foundation Research Joumal 31, 53. Discussed in more detail above section 
3.10.2.3. 
Hon C W Pincus, 'Ethical Conduct at the Bar', Speech delivered to Bar Association of Queensland 
pupils 21 September 1990 and pubhshed (1990) 34 Bar News 17, 24. 
^'^ D Drummond, 'Why the Bar Association?' Speech at the Pupils Dinner 19 July 1991 and reported in 
(1991) 37 Queensland Bar News 5, 6. 
*^ Ibid 7. 
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which would include lay persons, would have powers to suspend or cancel practising 
certificates'*^ where the case warranted it. Funding for the Board would come from 
annual practising certificates. 
A great deal of work has gone into drafting the proposed rules and after much 
discussion it was decided that it would have to be implemented in the form of 
legislation rather than Rules of Court, otherwise we may be waiting a further five or 
ten years before the Disciplinary Board was up and running. A final draft will be 
available in the near ftiture and circulated to members for comment before being 
50 
submitted to the Attorney. 
4.3.4 A Quiet, but Slow-paced, Resolve? 
There is much that can be said about the President's comments. First, as with much of 
the association's deliberations, this discussion took place among members and was 
published only to members through the association's own joumal. There was no 
public grandstanding in the mass media about the association's plans to instigate 
changes so as to weed out any 'bad apple' barristers. Grandstanding by the 
Queensland Law Society was more common.^ The association's quieter approach 
makes it difficult to argue that the association was putting its energies into the design 
of new disciplinary structures so as to obtain public legitimacy - it does not appear as 
if the Queensland public would even have been aware of the association's efforts. 
Second, the President claimed that it could be five or ten years before the judges of 
the Supreme Court of Queensland would have agreed to disciplinary structures 
govemed by Rules of Court - hence the association's decision to seek legislative 
powers. This would suggest that the association was keener to obtain the power to 
remove a barrister's right to practise than were the judges to grant that power. Why 
*^ It should be noted tiiat any proposal to create a power to cancel or suspend practising certificates 
would fu-st have required all barristers to hold practising certificates: tins did not occur until 2004, with 
the passing of tiie Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). 
^^  R R Douglas, 'President's Page', (1993) 44 Refresher 6. 
See below section 4.5. 
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might the judges have delayed taking more direct responsibility for the disciplinary 
structtires to govern barristers? All judges were once lawyers, and all of them had 
been barristers. Larson would suggest that judges would continue to identify strongly 
as barristers, despite their elevation to the bench.^l It is nevertheless difficult to know 
the true reasons for the delay. 
While the bar may have vacillated as to whetiier it should place its 'disciplinary trust' 
in the judges of the Supreme Court, tiirough Rules of Court, or risk the greater 
uncertainties of legislative regulation, the bar appeared united in the need to remain a 
distinct branch of the profession. The same article which reported the association's 
finstration with delays in the implementation of Rules of Court noted that care was 
being taken to ensure that any legislation did not 'introduce fusion [injto the 
Government's agenda'. 
The Bar Association of Queensland reports that it conducted a comprehensive review 
of its Rules of Conduct in 1994,^ "^  but by 1997 the bar remained without a disciplinary 
tribunal. And it appeared that indecision about whether the restructure should be 
through Rules of Court or legislation continued. The prospect of a legislative 
fi'amework was reconsidered, with the President of the association stating that the 
Disciplinary Tribunal would be constituted [by Rules of Court] rather than by 
stattite.^^ 
^^  Magali Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (University of Califomia Press, 
Berkeley, 1977) 229. Discussed in more detail above section 3.9. 
53 -
54 
" Ibid 7. 
Bar Association of Queensland, Submission to Queensland Attorney-General on Discussion Paper 
on Legal Profession Reform in Queensland, December 1998, 5. 
" Cedric Hampson, 'President's Page', (1997) 53 Refresher 3. 
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In 1998 the association lodged a submission in response to the State Government's 
Discussion Paper on Legal Profession Reform. In that submission, the association 
claimed to have 'urged for many years now that a more comprehensive disciplinary 
regime be introduced'.^^ The association acknowledged the current deficiencies of the 
limited range of disciplinary responses available when dealing with members of the 
association, and the even fewer disciplinary responses available in relation to 
barristers who were not members of the association. It advocated that Queensland 
follow the New South Wales model, whereby complaints were first received by an 
independent body and then referred to the professional body for investigation and 
hearing.^^ It also recommended that one lay member sit with two barrister members 
on a barristers' disciplinary tribunal.^^ The lay member could ensure 'openness, 
transparency and impartiality.' 
hi its response to the Green Paper on Legal Professional Reform in June 1999, the 
association reiterated arguments made during the passing of the Queensland Law 
Society Act in 1927, emphasising that 
...the very nature and number of complaints against barristers as a whole is quite 
different from that of the solicitors' branch. The costs associated with extensive 
investigation and hearing, as with tmst account defalcations, are not a feature of 
practice of a barrister and therefore do not produce the same funding implications.^' 
56 Bar Association of Queensland, above n 54, 19. 
"Ibid. 
^Mbidl6. 
^'Ibid 19. 
*Ibid. 
*' Bar Association of Queensland, Response to the Green Paper on Legal Professional Reform, June 
1999,6. 
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This is not a strong argument as to why barristers should be subject to a separate 
disciplinary system to that which applied to solicitors. It is true to say that, in the past, 
the Queensland disciplinary system was used primarily to discipline solicitors for 
breach of trust account obligations, with 46% of disciplinary cases against solicitors 
in 1930-2000 relating to trust account matters.^^ But that is not to say that regulators 
should prioritise trust account matters or that, had barristers been brought within a 
statutory disciplinary regime, the focus of the regulator would have remained on trust 
account matters. 
In summary, while on a number of occasions members of the Bar Association of 
Queensland discussed the possibility of a more formal disciplinary tribunal, 
established either under Rules of Court or pursuant to legislation, the position 
remained unchanged until 2004: the only powers of discipline were contractual in 
nature, arising out of the contract of membership. Therefore, the most onerous 
discipline that the association could impose was to revoke or suspend that 
membership of the association and, given that a barrister did not need to be a member 
of the association to practise as a barrister in Queensland, it had no power to 
incapacitate any barrister, and no powers whatsoever in relation to non-members. The 
lack of statutory control also meant that the association's powers of investigation and 
adjudication were limited: it did not have the same immunities fi-om suit granted to 
the Queensland Law Society, witnesses and disciplinary tribunal members in 
disciplinary matters involving solicitors,^^ nor the power to require the attendance of 
62 Linda Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis' 
(2001) 13 Bond Law Review 1-45, 18. 
*' Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6Q, s 49 (repealed). 
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witnesses.^ It was generally accepted that the regulation of barristers was 
unsatisfactory 65 
4.3.5 Barristers and the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) 
The position became vastly different with the passing of the Legal Profession Act 
2004 (Qld). The Act gave statutory power to the Bar Association of Queensland for 
the first time, but in relation to practising certificates and investigations, and not 
discipline. These powers extend to all barristers wanting to practise in Queensland, 
not just barristers who are members.^ All complaints against a Queensland legal 
practitioner, whether solicitor or barrister, are received by the Legal Services 
Commissioner, who can investigate the complaint himself or refer it to the 
Queensland Law Society or Bar Association of Queensland for investigation. The 
association has coercive powers for the first time and, if asked to investigate a 
complaint, can now demand that a barrister provide explanations of conduct, attend 
interviews or supply documents to the association. Although the decision whether to 
institute a discipline application will be that of the Legal Services Commissioner, 
" Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6M (repealed). 
*' Bar Association of Queensland, above n 54, 19; Response of the Judges of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland to the Queensland Government Green Paper on 'Legal Profession Reform', September 
1999, 3; Pincus, above n 46, 24. 
^ In addition to the complaints and discipline powers discussed here, the association has extensive 
statutory powers in relation to practising certificates, show cause events and healtii assessments. 
^^  Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 256. 
^^  Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 265 (2). 
^^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 269. The barrister is excused from supplying an explanation if this 
would incriminate tiie barrister or contravene the terms of professional indemnity insurance. 
™ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 273. 
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the association must include a recommendation whether or not to prosecute with the 
report of any investigation it undertakes. 71 
The legislation had been anticipated for many years,^^ and no one was surprised to see 
a Bill which included provision for the statutory regulation of barristers - least of all 
barristers, who had managed to avoid statutory regulation for 76 years longer than 
solicitors. The association has not publicly criticised the Act but has noted that only 
'modest' Government fiinding is available to defi-ay the substantial cost of statutory 
regulation, requiring the balance to be passed on to members. 
4,4 BARRISTERS' BOARD 
While the Bar Association of Queensland took little action in regard to discipline, 
another body, the Barristers' Board, appeared much more active, even though 
discipline appears to have been beyond its purpose and powers. The Barristers' Board 
was first established in 1866 and was primarily charged with assessing an appticant's 
fitness to be admitted to practice.'''^ Its formal disciplinary powers, as eventually 
stated in the Barristers Admission Rules 1975 (Qld), were limited to applications for 
the disbarment of a barrister convicted of an indictable offence.^^ The Supreme Court 
of Queensland conceded that the board also had an interest in applications for removal 
'^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 268(4)(b). 
Chief Justice Paul de Jersey, 'The Supreme Court under tiie Legal Profession Act 2004' (2004) 23 
University of Queensland Law Joumal 281, 286. 
Bar Association of Queensland, From the President, May 2004, number 2, 
http://www.qldbar.asn.auyFrom Pres Mav 2 04.pdf at 28 April 2004. 
'^ Barristers' Admission Rules 1975 (Qld) (repealed) s 4; Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 489; Bar 
Association of Queensland, From tiie President, July 2004, 
http://www.qldbar.asn.au/From_Pres 7 04.pdf at 27 April 2004. 
Rules Relating to the Admission of Barristers of the Supreme Court of Queensland 1975 (Qld) as 
amended by Barristers' Admission Rules (no 1) 1995 (Qld) r 42A. This power was in addition to its 
power to enquire into the fitness of applicants for admission and of current students-at-law: Barristers' 
Admission Rules (no 1) 1995 (Qld), rr 36, 42B, 44. 
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where a fraud on the board had been alleged, for instance a failure to disclose relevant 
information to the board prior to admission.^^ But the board also became the de facto 
prosecutor in disciplinary cases, and there appeared to be general acceptance that the 
board had the power to investigate complaints and to prosecute discipline. The 
Attomey-General sometimes received complaints about barristers and referred these 
to the board for investigation. The most likely party to challenge the standing of the 
board was the barrister facing discipline, but no barrister mounted a challenge.^^ 
When the board was disbanded in July 2004,^° the President of the Bar Association of 
Queensland appeared to have no doubt as to the central role it had played in the 
discipline of barristers, thanking members of the board for the 'significant amount of 
time' spent investigating complaints made to the board about barristers and for the 
'vital' role played by the board in disciplinary cases which had come before the 
Supreme Court. 
It is difficult to discem why the board took on a prosecutorial role, given that there is 
no evidence that this was its purpose or that it had power to do so. It also is 
interesting to compare the attitude of the Supreme Court in 2000-2002 when the board 
was the prosecutor in all three discipline applications to the court that related to 
barristers during that period and so presumed to be the appropriate prosecuting 
*^ Re Watson [ 1941 ] St R Qd 231; Barristers' Board v Khan [2001 ] QCA 92. 
" Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253; Barristers' Board v Young [2001] QCA 556; 
Barristers' Board v Pratt [2002] QCA 532. 
^^  Personal communication, Marshall Cooke QC, Chair of Barristers' Board, 26 June 2003. Some of 
these complainants may have already complained to the Bar Association of Queensland before 
complaining to the Attomey-General but been dissatisfied with the association's response, which may 
explain why the Attomey-General referred the complaints to the Barristers' Board rather than back to 
the association. 
™ Ibid. 
*" It was replaced by the Legal Practitioners Admission Board. 
*' Glenn Martin, Bar Association of Queensland, From the President, July 2004, 
http://www.qldbar.asn.au/From Pres_7 04.pdf at 27 April 2005. 
137 
Chapter Four: Evolution of Legal Disciplinary Structures ii^)ueensland 
83 body,*^ to the sittiation 30 years eariier, in Re Clancy, hi that case the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court rebuffed any suggestion of a role for the board in the discipline of 
a practising barrister except to redress a fi-aud practised on the board in the course of 
admission, and confirmed that 'the current practice is for the Bar Association of 
Queensland to move' a disbarment.^ "* Although no reason for the change in practice 
since 1970 has been articulated by the court, a few possible reasons are hazarded. 
First, the available records suggest that the Bar Association of Queensland was 
unwilling to undertake a disciplinary role within its ovni ranks, had not exercised 
strong discipline, and so was unfamiliar with disciplinary processes.^^ Second, the 
Barristers' Board was established pursuant to the Supreme Court Act 1921 (Qld) and 
had its offices within the Supreme Court building, so could be viewed by the court as 
more closely aligned with the court than the association.^^ And yet this second 
possible explanation for the role granted to the board seems incongruous in light of 
the fact that tiie association's disciplinary impotence appeared at least partly due to 
procrastination by the judges of the Supreme Court in implementing Rules of Court.^^ 
82 
Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253; Barristers' Board v Young [2001] QCA 556; 
Barristers' Board v Pratt [2002] QCA 532. 
^^  Re Clancy (1970) QWN 8. 
Ibid. It is unclear from tiie report whether Clancy was a member of the Bar Association of 
Queensland at tiie time. 
85 
Australian Commercial Research and Development Ltd v Hampson [1991] 1 Qd R 508 provides a 
rare insight into tiie handling of a complaint lodged with tiie Bar Association of Queensland. The 
matter only came to light because the complainant subsequently sought an injunction in tiie Supreme 
Court. The case report indicates that tiie members of the association committee considering the 
complaint declmed to view all of tiie material sent by tiie complainant, for fear tiiat this would disclose 
confidential information to them and so disqualify tiiem from accepting certain work as barristers in the 
fiiture. This provides a shaip contrast with the situation in relation to complaints against solicitors as 
the Queensland Law Society was required by law to investigate all wntten complaints: Queensland 
Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 5F( 1) (repealed). 
^^  Although this would not explain the court's reluctance to acknowledge a disciplinary role for the 
Barristers' Board in Re Clancy (1970) QWN 8. 
Above section 4.3.3. 
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4.5 Q U E E N S L A N D L A W S O C I E T Y 
4.5.1 The Years Until 1938 
A strong contrast is provided by the level of disciplinary control imposed upon 
solicitors in Queensland. Although Queensland separated fi-om New South Wales in 
1859, neither solicitors nor barristers formed any representative body until the 
Queensland Law Society was established for solicitors in 1873. It included among its 
initial aims the protection of the public through the 'rigorous prosecution of 
dishonourable practices', advising the legislature on proposed legislation and assisting 
in the 'amicable resolution of professional differences between practitioners' so as to 
'present a dignified image to the public'. But support for the society waned. The 
tension between the regulatory and representative roles of the society was already 
becoming apparent, as at least one solicitor blamed the demise of the society on its 
zeal in 'preying on' solicitors rather than promoting their interests. Despite lack of 
solicitor support for the society, a few solicitors joined to form the Queensland Law 
Association in 1883. Reports in the late 1800s show that the association brought some 
disciplinary prosecutions before the Supreme Court of C^eensland, despite the fact 
that it was a voluntary body with no statutory powers or responsibilities.'^" Yet it 
apparently declined to prosecute other matters on the basis that it lacked the power to 
do so.^' 
Gregory, above n 6, 22. 
*^  See (1883) Queensland Law Joumal p civ, cited in McPherson, above n 2, 233. 
^^  Re Chubb (1887) 3 Qld LJ 35; Re Perske (1896) Qld LJ 73 (barrister practising as a solicitor, at a 
time when the practice of law was fused). 
' ' Gregory, above n 6, 66, where she reports tiiat tiie association rejected Justice Department requests to 
prosecute a solicitor for breaches of the Trusts Account Act 1923 (Qld) because it claimed it could not 
do tins until it was incorporated. The Law Society of New South Wales appears to have been active in 
a number of disciplinary applications to the court, even at a time when it had no statutory role in 
discipline: John Bennett, A History of Solicitors in New South Wales (Legal Books, Sydney, 1984) 345-
6. 
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Any doubts about the power of the solicitors' professional body to receive and 
investigate complaints and prosecute discipline were dispelled in 1927 with the 
passing of the Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld).'*^ The Act established the 
Queensland Law Society as an incorporated body and provided for all members and 
assets of the association to be taken over by the society. The first council of the new 
society were to be the members of the council of the former association. So, in many 
ways, the Queensland Law Society was a continuation of the Queensland Law 
Association, but now with statutory powers and protection. 
The 1927 Act established a statutory disciplinary tribunal to hear charges against 
solicitors,^^ with all the powers of the Supreme Court of Queensland, including the 
power to strike a solicitor's name Irom the roll. It was also given the same protections 
as a commission of inquiry.^^ The Act originally required members of the tribunal to 
be closely aligned with the leadership of the solicitor's branch, as past members of the 
Q7 
council of the Queensland Law Society. 
The Queensland Law Society's handling of its first case^^ after being given these 
extensive powers led to strong criticism by a Supreme Court judge, Macrossan SPJ, 
and to the resignation of the Statutory Committee's first chairman, EH Macartney. 
92 The only solicitor member of Parliament at the time that the statutory powers were finally granted, 
noted tiiat tiie professional body had been seeking such powers since 1884: Queensland Parliamentary 
Debates, 8 November 1927, 826. 
Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) ss 3( 1 )(a), 3(4). 93 
•^^  Queensland Law Society Act 7927 (Qld) s 4{1). 
'^  Queensland Law Society Act 7927 (Qld). 
96 
97 
98 
Queensland Law Society Act 7927 (Qld) s 5(2)(h). 
Queensland Law Society Act 7927 (Qld) s 5(1 )(b), (c). 
The involved Robert McCowan. On his first appearance before the disciplinary tribunal he was 
merely censured. He continued in practice and, by the time he was again brought before tiie 
disciplinary tribunal - in May 1930 - clients had abeady lost over £20,000. 
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Both claimed the Queensland Law Society failed to act eariier and more strongly 
against the solicitor, Robert McCowan, because he was 'well-known and socially 
prominent'.^^ Clients lost over £20,000 as a result of his misconduct. Although 
Macrossan SPJ wrote to the Attomey-General suggesting the society's powers be 
removed, the Government adopted the society's suggested response of establishing a 
fidelity fiind''^^ to reimburse a person for pecuniary losses suffered through the 
stealing or fi-audulent misappropriation of money or other property entrusted to a 
solicitor. 
It would have been surprising if the Government had agreed with the opposition that 
its legislation was unworkable so soon after the legislation had been enacted. 
Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that the fidelity fund and changes to the 
disciplinary system should not have been seen as alternative responses to the situation 
- arguably, action against individual lawyers to protect fiiture clients and 
compensation for past clients were both needed. Lunney has also examined the period 
leading up to the society's stewardship of the fidelity fund legislation and come to the 
same conclusion - that the society was reacting to a period of moral panic, rather than 
pursuing more altruistic concerns. 
'^  Gregory, above n 6, 70-1. Rv McCowan [1931] St R Qd 149, 154, citing comments by tiie trial judge 
Macrossan SPJ; 'Solicitors' Honesty', Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 14 March 1930, 14; '14 Years' 
Gaol - Robert McCowan Sentence - Judge Denounces Conduct', Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 14 
March 1930, 16; 'McCowan Ca.se - Failure to Act - Judge Admonishes Law Society', Brisbane 
Courier (Brisbane), 15 March 1930, 16; 'McCowan Case - Law Society's Statement - Reply to Mr 
Justice Macrossan', Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 21 March 1930, 16. 
""^  Gregory, above n 6, 70-2; 'Fidelity Fund - Law Society's Proposal - Security Against Exploitation', 
Brisbane Cowner (Brisbane), 12 March 1930, 16. 
'"' Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Guarantee Fund: Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 24; Re 
Queensland Law Society (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Ryan J, 14 October 1992). 
'"^  Mark Lunney, 'The Solicitor and the Bookmaker - tiie Foundation of the Solicitors' Compensation 
Fund' (1996) 26 Queensland Law Society Joumal 35-48. 
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Rather than remove the Queensland Law Society's powers, in 1938 the jurisdiction of 
the Stattitory Committee was widened from hearing charges relating to merely 'illegal 
or professional misconduct' to include hearing charges of 'malpractice, professional 
misconduct or unprofessional conduct or practice.''^^ This arguably sought to extend 
the committee's charter into issues of incompetence rather than merely dishonest 
conduct. 
The 1938 Act also widened the range of potential regulators. The Minister for Justice 
was also given the power to appeal a decision of the disciplinary tribunal, a power 
previously held only by the Queensland Law Society and the relevant practitioner. 
Despite misgivings held by the Attomey-General that the Statutory Committee had 
been imposing orders which were too lenient,'°^ the 1938 amendments also gave the 
society greater control over who would be nominated for membership of that 
committee. 
4.5.2 A Period of Relative Calm: 1938 - Early 1970s 
Between 1938 and the early 1970s, the legislation remained virtually unaltered, apart 
from amendments to the subordinate legislation in 1948, requiring solicitors to 
107 
respond to Queensland Law Society enquiries about their conduct. This was partly 
due to other matters monopolising the concern of Federal and State governments, 
'"^  Queensland Law Society Amendment Act 1938 (Qld) s 2, amending s 5(1 )(a). 
See fiirther discussion of the changes to the definition of conduct liable to discipline above section 
2.4.3.4. 
'° ' Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 7 September 1938, 318 (John Mullan). 
'"'' Ibid. 
'°^ Rules of Queensland Law Society Inc Rule 76. This was tiien stated in the Queensland Law Society 
Act 1952 (Qld) ss 5G, 5H. The 1948 amendments also required solicitors to report fellow practitioners 
who they suspected of trust account breaches (Rule 77). 
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such as the Second Worid War. The war also greatiy depleted the number of lawyers 
in practice in Queensland and hence the number of solicitors against whom 
complaints could be lodged and discipline instigated.'"** Subsequentiy the profession -
like the rest of the community - enjoyed a more buoyant economy, and there was little 
public discussion of lawyer discipline. The only legislative change worth noting was a 
renaming of the Act from the Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) to the 
Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld), as part of a 1952 consolidation of all 
Queensland legislation. 
However, the credibility of the Queensland Law Society's role in self-regulation was 
damaged by some large trust account defalcations and disciplinary proceedings in 
mid-1972,'°^ which led State Parliament to pass the Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) 
which imposed tighter regulation upon solicitors' trust accounts than that imposed 
already by the Trust Accounts Act 1923 (Qld). The society appeared to play only a 
minimal role in the drafting of the Act: most members of the government's 
consultative committee were accountants or auditors, and only some society 
suggestions were incorporated into the Act. 
It is unportant to reflect on the place of discipline in the wider regulatory context."* 
The Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) provides criminal liability for solicitors who 
'"^  Thirty-eight disciplinary cases were heard in the five years 1935-1940. As few as eleven cases were 
heard in subsequent years, and hearings did not surpass 38 in a five year period until 1985-1990: 
Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis', above n 
62, 26, Table 7. 
'"^  SC 182, 22 May 1972: $109,940.00; SC 183, 4 July 1972: $33,274.00; SC 184, 4 July 1972: 
$162,873.92. 
"° P Crouch, Presidential Address delivered at 46''' Annual General Meeting of tiie Queensland Law 
Society, 8 June 1973, and reported in Queensland Law Society Joumal, July 1973, 124, 125. 
See above section 3.10.1. 
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breach the Act - including imprisonment.'*' If the government was fi^strated by the 
apparent inability of the society to detect the impending trust account frauds and 
avoid the magnittide of the losses to clients, it may have been equally doubtfiil that an 
amendment of disciplinary legislation was the most effective response, as this would 
still leave the society in charge of investigations and prosecutions. The tightening of 
the trust accounts legislation which led to criminal sanctions provided the government 
with a much more direct and powerftil deterrent. It also increased the possibility of a 
lawyer being incapacitated from practice through imprisonment rather than through 
disciplinary proceedings. 
Although it seemed that the society had been excluded from the design of trust 
account legislation the previous year, by 1974 it seems the society was taking some 
initiative itself, by asking the State Government to amend the Queensland Law 
Society Act 1952 (Qld) to give it greater power to confrol trust accounts and to refiise 
practising certificates."^ The society also asked that its officers and council members 
be indemnified from any personal liability in relation to their statutory duties, and 
suggested that the number of members"^ of the disciplinary tribunal be increased to 
deal with a greater volume and complexity of disciplinary hearings."^ The 
government appeared to accept the society's requests without reservation." In fact, 
the Attomey-General went to great lengths in Parliament to defend the Queensland 
legal profession in the face of criticism by some members of the Opposition 
"^ Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) s 7(4)(b). 
"^ Queensland Law Society Act Amendment Act 1974 (Qld) s 19 replacing Queensland Law Society Act 
1952 (Qld) s 4land s 7, and amending Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 10. 
"* Queensland Law Society Act Amendment Act 1974 (Qld) s 22 inserting Queensland Law Society Act 
7952 (Qld) s 49. 
"^ These members sat on the tribunal on a voluntary basis. 
"^ Queensland Law Society Act Amendment Act 1974 (Qld) s 5 amending Queensland Law Society Act 
1952 (Qld) s 6. 
"^ Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 15 March 1974, 2945 (William Knox, 
Minister for Justice and Attomey-General). 
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backbench."^ In contrast to his own backbenchers, the Leader of the Opposition 
expressed support for the Queensland Law Society and agreed to give it the greater 
regulatory power requested. While he emphasised that defalcating solicitors must be 
dealt with harshly and queried whetiier there was sometimes undue delay in dealing 
with complaints, the Opposition Leader's tone was generally conciliatory. Although 
mixing his metaphors, he noted the difficult role of the society - the profession had 
'its black sheep ...[but] there is always the bad apple in every barrel . . . '"^ who must 
be'weeded out'.' '° 
In 1977, the society rejected claims that the disciplinary system for solicitors required 
greater scrutiny by claiming that 'Queensland had some of the toughest enforcement 
powers in Australia and planned to tighten its enforcement process even further'.''' 
However, there is independent evidence that during the late 1970s the disciplinary 
tribunal was at its most leiuent: in the five years 1976-1980 it imposed fines in 66.7% 
of cases - the highest use of fines in its history. It only struck ofif solicitors in 20.8% of 
cases, and suspended solicitors in another 8.3% of cases.'^^ The fines averaged 
$663.00. During the late 1970s, the Queensland Law Society was also less likely to 
allege trust account fraud.'^"^ In addition, after a high use of charges of statutory 
professional misconduct in the early 1970s, the number of cases alleging statutory 
"^ Ibid 2946. 
Ibid (Keith Wright, Leader of the Opposition). 
'^ " Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 March 1974, 2988 (Keith Wright, 
Leader of the Opposition). The use of the metaphors of 'bad apples' and 'black sheep' is common and 
suggests a simple dichotomy of good lawyers and bad lawyers, good character and bad character, of 
individuals who deserve to be members of the profession and those who should be expelled. 
121 
Gregory, above n 6, 204. 
'^ ^ Linda Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis', 
above n 62, 25, Figure 3. 
'"ibid 33-34, Table 11. 
'^ ^ Ibid, 29, Figure 4. 
'^ ^ A failure to respond to Queensland Law Society requests for explanations was deemed to be 
professional misconduct by Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qlds 5H) (repealed). 
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126 professional misconduct fell markedly in the latter half of the 1970s. Of course, 
there may have been less need for the Stattitory Committee to act harshly during this 
period. Certainly, it did not hear cases involving trust account defalcations of such 
high amounts as it had heard in mid-1972,'^^ suggesting that there may not have been 
the same level of external pressure on the society to act harshly as during the large 
trust account defalcations of the eariy 1970s. 
At the same time as the disciplinary system appeared to be more lenient in regulating 
lawyers, the society was focusing its attention on the establishment of a compulsory 
professional indemnity insurance scheme. In May 1978, amending legislation gave 
the society substantial power to regulate the proposed scheme of professional 
indemnity insurance.'"** Generally speaking, if a lawyer holds professional indemnity 
insurance, this will assist a legitimacy project, as it could be presumed that a client 
who has been adequately compensated for any losses that he or she has suffered is 
less likely to be as persistent in pursuing a complaint against the lawyer. By ensuring 
that all solicitors held professional indemnity insurance, the profession could reduce 
the number of disgruntled clients who would take their dissatisfaction into the public 
arena.'^^ This was the same rationale which saw the establishment of a fidelity fiind in 
'^ ^ Linda Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis', 
above n 62, 29, Figure 4. 
' " Whereas the tribunal heard two cases in 1972 involving defalcations of over $100,000, in the second 
half of the same decade, the tribunal heard only two cases involving tmst account defalcations, and 
these involved amounts of only $22,000.00 (SC 223, 5 December 1978) and $11,092.28 (SC 211, 19 
September 1977). 
'"* Queensland Law Society Act Amendment Act 1978 (Qld) s 3. 
If the end purpose is to protect the public from lawyers, then litigation should be perceived as just 
one potential form of regulation. However, Wilkins questions the effectiveness of litigation as a form 
of control: David Wilkins, 'Who Should Regulate Lawyers?' (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 801, 
848. 
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1930,'^° but extended the coverage of client compensation from instances of 
dishonesty or fraud. 
A scheme of professional indemnity insurance increases the degree to which some 
members of the public are protected, as previous clients are compensated for a loss 
caused by a solicitor's breach of duty, but this may sometimes be at the expense of 
future clients, as the blanket insurance coverage increases the likelihood of the 
incompetent remaining in practice. Insurance policies usually exclude indemnity 
where the claim has been brought about by fraud or other dishonest conduct,'^^ but 
many instances of loss in such circumstances were already at least partly dealt with by 
the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Guarantee Fund, established in 1930.*^^ While the 
State Government did need to place pressure on the Queensland Law Society to 
investigate the insurance issue'^^ - this was not an initiative of the society itself- the 
society, with the support particularly of its younger members,'^'' then appeared to 
embrace the concept, although there appeared to be some reluctance in regional areas 
of the State by members who were concerned about the cost.* ^  
'^ ° Gregory, The Queensland Law Society Inc 1928-1988 above n 6, 70-2; 'Fidelity Fund - Law 
Society's Proposal - Security Against Exploitation', Brisbane Courier (Brisbane), 12 March 1930, 16. 
'^' For instance, clause 5 (e)(v) of the Queensland Law Society's Solicitors' Professional Indemnity 
Certificate of Insurance for the year 2004-2005 excluded indemnity where the liability was 'directly or 
indirectly brought about by the dishonest or fraudulent act of omission of the Assured'. See also Crowe 
v Wheeler & Reynolds (a firm) [1988] 1 Qd R 40, where the exclusion was upheld. 
'^ ^ A person who suffered loss due to fraud other than the stealing or fraudulent misappropriation of 
money or other property entmsted to a solicitor remained without the protection of the fidelity fund or 
professional indemnity insurance. 
Gregory, above n 6, 197 note 34. 
'^' Ibid 197. 
'^ ^ Ibid 198. 
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4.5.3 1983-1997 
The following discussion demonstrates how, during the period 1983-1985 it seems 
that the Queensland Law Society was claiming publicly that the disciplinary system 
for solicitors was working well, but was preparing privately for an inevitable 
tightening of the regulatory scheme. It also seems that, while there was some public 
criticism of the society, not only did the society appear to play an important role in 
drafting amendments in the mid 1980s,'^^ the effect of the amendments was to 
increase, rather than decrease, the society's powers. 
Although the tribunal generally experienced stable, long term membership, there was 
a radical change to the membership of the tribunal on the 17 June 1983, with only one 
member retained and six new members appointed. Within three months the 
Queensland Law Society lodged its first ever appeal against a decision of the 
Statutory Committee, although this appeal was withdrawn the following month, 
suggesting there may have some intemal upheaval in the relationship between the 
Queensland Law Society and the Statutory Committee at this time. Nevertheless, in 
the same month the society told its members that the existing disciplinary system was 
not only effective but also 'efficient and economical.''^^ 
But, as mentioned previously,'"^^ in March 1984 the Attomey-General was reported to 
have called on both the Queensland Law Society and the Bar Association of 
'^ ^ Denis Byrne, President's Introduction, Queensland Law Society Annual Report 1985-86, 1. 
' " Ex parte The Queensland Law Society Incorporated [ 1984] 1 Qd R 166, Supreme Court file. Appeal 
75 of 1983, lodged 6 September 1983. 
''* 7 October 1983. 
™ 'Self-Regulation and How it Works' The Proctor, Newsletter of tiie Queensland Law Society, 
October 1983, 1,2. 
Above section 4.3. 
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Queensland to include community input into their disciplinary systems.''*' At the same 
time, the society decided to create a Professional Standards Department and appoint 
more staff to its Law Claims, accounting and audit sections as well as appoint a 
Public Relations Officer. Criticism of the society by the State Opposition 
continued''''* but the then President of the society, Geoff Gargett, denied the need for 
change, arguing that the presence of only council members sitting on the Complaints 
Committee'''^ indicated the seriousness with which the society dealt with 
complaints.' This is capable of an alternative interpretation - the presence of only 
council members may suggest that the elite of the solicitors' branch were exercising 
too much control over the prosecution of discipline. The input of lay members into 
deciding which matters should be prosecuted may have been a better indicator of the 
society's commitment to the protection of the public. 
But six months later, in October 1984, it was reported that 'wide-ranging' discussions 
had been underway between the Attomey-General and the Queensland Law Society 
for 'some time' with a view to implementing changes to the disciplinary system so as 
to include lay people.'''^ It is quite likely that these discussions were a response to 
external threats to the legitimacy of the society, as they coincided with extensive press 
coverage of criminal proceedings against Yvon Wigley, a Warwick solicitor who had 
'"' A Miller, 'Lawyers Risk Loss of Pubhc Esteem' ,Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 25 March 1984, 2. 
'''^  The Law Claims Department of the Law Society was primarily concemed with competence issues 
such as negligence and other civil actions against solicitors, including supervision of the Professional 
Indemnity Insurance Scheme. In 1984 it reported that it was increasing its focus on daims prevention: 
Queensland Law Society, 56th Annual Repori 1983-1984, Brisbane, Queensland Law Society, 1984, 9. 
''' Ibid 2. 
"" I Miller, 'Call for Eagle Eye on Legal Eagles', Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 8 April 1984, 15. 
''*' This committee determined what complaints would be prosecuted before the disciplinary tribunal. 
'^ ^ Miller, above n 144. 
'"^  Glenn Milne, 'Sohcitors -Tribunal Plan, Telegraph (Brisbane), 5 October 1984, 5. The same article 
also noted that Queensland was the last Australian State to be without community involvement within 
its disciplinary system. 
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taken over $500,000 from her trust account. Wigley had been struck off by the 
disciplinary tribunal in 1981.'"'" Gregory claims that the Queensland Law Society was 
criticised by the national press for its treatment of Wigley, as the press 'took a gentler 
view of her defalcations','^*^ but it is likely that the prominence of these criminal 
proceedings in the press during late 1984 did not aid the society in its bid to avoid 
changes to its disciplinary processes. 
In a paper presented in March 1985, the then President, Jim Carey, admitted to 
members that the current disciplinary procedures had not kept pace with changes in 
legal practice. He said; 
Your Council has been considering this problem since 1977 and its interest was 
quickened by the report in 1979 of the Royal Commission on Legal Services in 
England. The Queensland Minister for Justice began to take an interest in our 
disciplinary procedures In 1983, the Leader of the Opposition was quoted as 
saying The Law Society itself had better get its house in order or a Labor government 
will do it for them.' Arising, therefore, out of its own initiatives, from the two 
Commissions referred to and in the light of interest expressed by the Queensland 
government, our Council has engaged in a very close scrutiny of our procedures, to 
find more modem and effective ways of enforcing ethical and disciplinary 
standards.'^' 
148 B McKean, 'Solicitor Guilty on $500,000 Loss', Courier Mail (Brisbane, 3 November 1984, 10 
(noting that she worked for 'Warwick's oldest and most respected legal firm'); R Allen, '"Fussy" 
Banker Nipped $1/2 M Fraud in the Bud', Sunday Mail (Brisbane)4 November 1984, 3 (giving full 
credit to a banker for uncovering the fraud, of which the bank then notified the Law Society); Ian 
Eckersley, 'Dolls Took Over Life, Solicitor Trial Told' Courier Mail (Brisbane), 6 November 1984, 12 
(reporting that the total value of claims was $2.1 million, of which tiie Law Society had recovered $1.4 
miUion, with a shortfall of $200,000 expected); P Gregory, 'Sohcitor Gets 6 Years - Court Told of 
"Evil Minds'", Telegraph (Brisbane), 7 November 1984, 5; D Fagan, 'Livewire Sohcitor Became a 
$500,000 "Robin Hood'", Courier Mail (Brisbane), 8 November 1984, 3; D Fagan, 'Dispute Over 
Tmst Payouts', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 8 November 1984, 3 (noting that tiie Law Society had paid 
$2.1 milhon to 197 people 'in tiie biggest legal pup-up in Queensland history'); D Fagan, 'Law Society 
Promises to Pay Claims', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 9 November 1984, 13 ( in which the President of 
tiie Law Society, Jim Carey, reassured tiie public that $3 million remained in tiie fidelity fund, that the 
society went to 'great pains to ensure that clients affected by defaults were compensated' and pointing 
out that the society had devoted substantial resources over a number of years to resolve tibe Wigley 
defalcation). 
'^^Re Wigley (1981) 11 QLSJ 319, SC 239, 22 July 1981. 
'^ ° Gregory, above n 6, 206. 
Jim Carey, 'Self Regulation - Changes in Disciplinary Procedures', Paper presented to a Legal 
Symposium in March 1985 and published August 1985, 15 Queensland Law Society Joumal in. 
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The Queensland Law Society drafted proposed amendments to the legislation and 
submitted them to the Attomey-General for consideration in eariy 1985.'^^ 
As was the experience in 1974, in 1985 the Opposition was again relatively subdued 
in criticising the Queensland Law Society's role in discipline. In fact the Opposition 
Labor Party and the Liberal Party proposed an amendment to the Bill which would 
have increased the society's control over the disciplinary tribunal. The suggested 
amendment would have required the society to supply only a list of nine names as 
potential members of the disciplinary tribunal, rather than 18 names, to the Attomey-
General. Such an amendment would have given the society fiill control over which 
practitioner members would sit on the tribunal. It was argued by Angus Irmes, Leader 
of the Liberal Party, in favour of such an amendment, that: 
... to suggest that a body that has invited and co-operated with self-regulation should 
be required to put forward the names of 18 persons to have nine selected by 
somebody else is an unnecessary imposition. It is also an unnecessary affront to the 
Law Society's record of self-determination and the bold step that it took to permit the 
participation of others in its disciplinary stmcture. 
This motion was defeated,'^ "* but demonstrates the degree of bi-partisan support for 
the Queensland Law Society's role and past performance in the self-regulation of 
solicitors. It is important to note however, that both Innes, and the Opposition 
spokesman on justice at the time, Wayne Goss,'^^ had been practising lawyers before 
'^ ^ D Byrne, President's Introduction, Queensland Law Society Annual Repori 1985-86, 1. 
' " Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 4 December 1985, 3322 (Angus Innes. 
Interestingly, Innes was a barrister). 
'^ Queensland Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 4 and 5 December 1985, 3329. The 
issue of how members would be appointed to tiie disciplinary tribunal was also tiie one issue on which 
Victorian legislation varied from the Victorian Attorney-General's initial draft: Christine Parker, Just 
Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice (1999) 136. 
'^ ^ Opposition spokesman on Justice May 1985 - March 1988, when he became opposition leader, and 
then Premier in December 1989: 
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/view/historical/documents/memberBio/Gossw.htni at 31 March 
2006. He is likely to have had a strong influence in relation to the Opposition's position on tiie 1985 
amendments. 
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entenng Pariiament. Some would argue that it was inevitable that they would have 
internalised the ideology of professional 'self-determination' and self-regulation 
during their time in the legal profession, had formed a lifetime identification with 
their role as lawyers'^^ and so carried this with them even when elected to Pariiament. 
The Bill passed with the support of both sides of the House. In the course of 
supporting the Bill, both Labor and Liberal speakers praised the tiack record of the 
society in maintairung high standards within the profession. Thus the general message 
from both sides of the House was that there was not in fact any problem in the 
disciplinary system but that public scepticism remained: lay membership on the 
disciplinary tribunal would provide accountability and reassure the public of the 
legitimacy of the disciplinary process. 
The 1985 amendments created a second, lower level tribunal, the Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal. The creation of the tribunal had many of the hallmarks of 
symbolic 'scaffolding' erected to give the appearance of tougher discipline, but not 
necessarily concemed with content or effectiveness.'^^ This tribunal consisted of 12 
persons. Nine were practitioner members, selected by the Minister from a list of 18 
provided by the Queensland Law Society. The remaining three members were lay 
persons, appointed by the Minister.'^^ Hearings would be before not less than three 
members, one of whom must be a lay member.'^° 
Larson,above n 46, 229. Discussed in more detail above section 3.9. 
' " s 6A Queensland Law Society Act Amendment Act 1985 (Qld). 
The term 'scaffolding' is used in tiie sense used by Halliday, to describe stmctures erected at times 
of external pressure, without any necessary concem about how well tiiose stmctures were utilised: 
Halliday, above n 1. See more detailed discussion above section 3.10.2.1. 
S 6A(2)(b). "lay person' was defmed as a person who was not a practitioner or a public servant" s 
6A(7). 
'"^  Section 6D. 
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While the new Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal could hear charges of professional 
misconduct or unprofessional conduct on the part of a practitioner,'^' it could not 
strike off or suspend a solicitor: this power remained solely with the Statutory 
Committee.'^^ The President of the Queensland Law Society told his members that 
this second body was needed to 
provide the Society with a body which can discipline practitioners in a more 
constmctive and positive role when the occasion so demands. In particular ... to order 
remedial action to be undertaken by the practitioner concemed, including attendance 
at lecture programmes conducted by the Society.'^ ^ 
There are strong arguments that there was no need to create a second body as the 
existing Statutory Committee aheady had the power to order such remedial action.'^'' 
Nevertheless, the records suggest that the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal did not take 
up the invitation to order remedial action to the extent envisaged by the President. 
From a total of 33 hearings for which records are available, further education was 
ordered in only three cases; audits, reporting or document inspection in two; and 
counselling in only one. 
'^' Section 6F, as mserted by Queensland Law Society Act Amendment Act 1985 (Qld), s7. 
'^ ^ The powers of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal were set out in s 6J of the Act. 
'^' Denis Byrne, '1985 Amendments to the Law Society Act Introduce Widespread Changes in the 
Society's Disciplinary Procedures' (1986) 16 Queensland Law Society Joumal 1,1. 
'** From its inception in 1927, tiie Statutory Committee had been given powers as broad as those held 
by tiie court: Section 5(3)(a) of tiie Act of 1927 stated tiiat tiie Statutory Committee had 
... power after hearing the case to make any such order as to striking off the roll or suspending 
from practice either conditionally or otiierwise, tiie practitioner to whom such application 
relates or as to the payment by any party of costs or otherwise, in relation to the case as 
before the commencement of the Act the court would have had power to make in accordance 
with the authority and practice of the courf (emphasis added). 
Therefore, for guidance on tiie extent of its OWTI powers, the Statutory Committee need only look to the 
court's inherent powers to discipluie practitioners. In Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman 
(1994) 34 NSWLR 408, Kirby J had no doubt tiiat the Court of Appeal in New Soutii Wales, in 
exercising its inherent jurisdiction, could frame quite novel orders to fiilfil its protective role. He called 
on courts to be 'more creative' in fashioning orders 'apt to tiie misconduct found'. 
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The President also promised members that the less formal style of the Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal would provide a 'less awesome' prosecution process'^^ and the 
Attomey-General told Pariiament that this new tiibunal would be less formal, and 
therefore more efficient, than the Statutory Committee.'^^ This reminds us that - even 
if the new arrangements did constitute mere 'scaffolding' - the society still had to 
convince its members that it was navigating a safe path between its regulatory and 
representative roles. 
It is questionable whether the new tribunal was less formal than the Statutory 
Committee. It is true that proceedings before the new, lower level tribunal were more 
private because it was not required to report its hearings — as was the Statutory 
Committee — and sat in private until 1993. Closed hearings may encourage 
greater co-operation'^^ and hence more 'efficient' hearings, but any perceived 
advantage was lost once proceedings were opened to the public in 1993. Perhaps it is 
just a coincidence that the only record of senior counsel appearing on behalf of a 
solicitor before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal occurs in a case heard after such 
hearings were opened to the public (and the media). While it is unclear whether the 
QC was briefed to appear because the hearing was to be in public, his presence itself 
attests to the fact that proceedings before tiie Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal were not 
necessarily less formal than those before the Stattitory Committee. It remains difficult 
Byme,above n 163. 
Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 28 November 1985, 3046-3047 
(Neville Harper). The changes were supported by tiie opposition, witii tiie Leader of tiie Opposition 
noting that 'for a long time a need for greater flexibility has existed': Queensland, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Assembly, 4 December 1985, 3316 (Wayne Goss). 
1^ '^ Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6(3)(b), relocated to s 6W (repealed). 
Linda Haller, 'Dirty Linen — The Public Shaming of Lawyers' (2003) 10 Intemational Joumal of 
the Legal Profession 281-313,295. 
'^'Ibid 298-9. 
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to know how the President of the Queensland Law Society and the Attomey-General 
expected them to be. 
It was not only the society which may have felt the need to 'sell' these changes to 
solicitors. Parliament also seemed willing to include a sweetener in the legislation: the 
bitter pill was made more palatable by the inclusion of provisions to allow for more 
money to become available for legal aid work, through interest on solicitor's trust 
accounts.'^° This held the promise of more work for solicitors, particularly those who 
practised in family or criminal law. The prospect of more legal aid becoming 
available was also attractive to the general public and, contained in a package of 
reforms, also reduced the likelihood that the general public would be critical of the 
legislative amendments. 
While members of the Queensland Law Society were told by their President that the 
changes were being implemented to provide more remedial outcomes in disciplinary 
cases, different reasons were given in very brief press reports which announced the 
amendments. One press report quoted the Attomey-General as saying that the new 
Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 'should end public concem about the self-regulatory 
role of the Queensland Law Society in dealing with complaints against members. 
Suggestions of secret deliberations would no longer be valid.''^' This is a surprising 
claim, as it was intended that the new tribunal would hold private hearings and it was 
not required to report its findings. The press report went on to explain how three of 
the 12 members of the tribunal would be non-lawyers. 
'™ Queensland Law Society Act Amendment Act 1985 (Qld) s 28, inserting new Part 3A into the Act 
which established a 'General Tm.st Accounts' Contribution Fund and Grants Fund'. Previously, the 
banks had not been required to pay any interest on monies held in solicitors' general tmst accounts. 
'^ ' Mr Neville Harper, Attomey-General, cited in 'State Tribunal To Hear Complaints About 
Solicitors' Courier Mail (Bhshane), 30 November 1985, 11. 
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The article in fact focused on the new source of legal aid fiinding provided by the 
package of amendments, rather than on the changes to the disciplinary structtire.'^^ 
The only other press report of the amendments was equally brief, and made only 
passing reference to the changes to the disciplinary structure.'^'' histead the article 
emphasised the increased power to protect the public that the amendments gave to the 
Queensland Law Society, by allowing the society to refiise to issue a practising 
certificate'''^ or by insisting on continuing legal education. The article also noted that 
clients would be more ftilly compensated from the fidelity fund than they had been in 
the past,'''^ and concluded with a quote from the President of the Queensland Law 
Society which claimed that the amendment was a society initiative, acted upon by the 
State Government. 
The lack of media coverage may suggest that the Queensland Law Society was 
quietly putting in place a structure which would facilitate its protective role, whereas, 
if the society was pursuing an agenda of legitimation, it would have courted much 
greater media coverage. This aspect of the 1985 changes suggests the society was 
acting against the interests of its members'^^ and may undermine an analysis of 
Queensland's professional disciplinary structure which saw it purely in terms of 
legitimation by professional bodies. However, more questions arise in relation to the 
productive nature of certain aspects of the amendments, in particular the provisions 
Ibid, more tiian half of the brief (320 word) article explained how legal aid would receive 40% of $3 
million which had been formerly 'frozen'. 
"^ 240 words. 
"" 'Legal Changes Welcomed' Sunday Mail {Brisbane) 1 December 1985, 3. 
'^ ^ Queensland Law Society Act Amendment Act 1985 (Qld) ss 32-35, amending ss 40-4 IB. 
The article also noted the greater powers given to a receiver of a solicitor's tmst account: sl3, 
amending s 1 lA. 
Above section 3.10.2.1. 
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which introduced a lower level tribunal to hear disciplinary cases behind closed doors 
and was not required to report on its decisions, and the amendments which provided a 
forum in which lay members could participate, but only in a very limited way. 
The establishment of a lower level tribunal meant that the Queensland Law Society 
avoided the need to appoint a lay member to hear more serious disciplinary charges, a 
position which was not to change until the creation of the Solicitors Complaints 
Tribunal in 1997, 12 years later.'^^ Members of the legal profession had been 
reluctant to give lay persons the power to determine whether they could practise or 
not. Under this new stmcture, the society could assure its members that more serious 
matters in which there was a risk of being suspended or struck off would continue to 
be heard only by their fellow practitioners, in the Statutory Committee. 
The infroduction of the lower level Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal was not a success. 
The reasons for its demise may be many, but notably it was the prosecutor, the 
Queensland Law Society, which appears to have finally lost faith in a two-tier system 
well before it was formally removed by legislation. The society did not refer any 
matters to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal after December 1994 and instead 
brought all matters before the Statutory Committee. Although it had no more work to 
do, the tribunal remained part of the disciplinary framework in Queensland until it 
was formally disbanded by legislation in 1997, along with the Statutory Committee, 
1 7Q 
and replaced by one tribunal, the Solicitors Complaints Tribunal. 
™ Queensland Law Society Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Qld). 
'™ Queensland Law Society Amendment Act 1997 (Qld). 
157 
r-^,^pw Fnnr-^Fvoluti^^ Disciplmary Stmctures i^K)ueenslaDd 
4.5.4 1997-2004 
The Solicitors Complaints Tribunal sat with one lay member and two practitioner 
members. Its powers were otherwise quite similar to those of the Statutory Committee 
- it had the power to strike off, suspend from practice, fine up to $100,000 or impose 
one of the numerous orders set out in section 6R. 
Disciplinary cases against solicitors continued to atfract adverse attention from the 
press despite the 1997 amendments.'^° The Queensland Law Society was also 
criticised for its failure to ensure that clients who lost a total of $6 million to a 
1 Q 1 
solicitor, Harry Smith, were ftilly compensated by the fidelity fund. Despite the 
damage to the society's public credibility caused by this crisis, the greatest damage 
following the 1997 amendments to the society's claim to continue to regulate 
solicitors was an investigation by the Courier Mail newspaper into claims that the 
Queensland Law Society had not properly handled numerous complaints it had 
received about a particular law firm. Baker Johnson.' ^ The pressure applied by the 
print media was intense and led to the establishment of two inquiries - one by retired 
District Court judge Patrick Shanahan QC, and the other by the Legal Ombudsman, 
'*° Paul Whittaker, 'Lawyer Fined $15,000 For False Papers', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 30 July 1997 at 
11; C Taylor, 'My Lawyer Put Me Behind Bars', Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 29 August 1999, 23; Chris 
Griffith, 'Solicitor Accused of Ripping Off Client', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 23 Febmary 2000, 5; 
Chris Griffith, 'Client Accuses Lawyer of Not Playing Ball' Courier Mail (Brisbane), 24 Febmary 
2000, 8; Chris Griffith, 'Lawyers' Tribunal Confiising for Public, Says Reform Group', Courier Mail, 
15 March 2000, 10; Chris Griffith, 'Judge Slams Solicitors' Watchdog', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 4 
November 2000, 16; 
'*' Adrian Evans, 'Queensland Fidelity Compensation 1990-2004: The End of the Money Tree' (2004) 
23 University of Queensland Law Joumal 397, 402-3. 
Typical of at least 16 articles which appeared in the Courier Mail (Brisbane) between 9-14 August 
2002 is Hedley Thomas, 'Charge! Law of the Jungle', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 10 August 2002. A 
partner of the firm was later stmck off: Baker v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] QCA 145. 
Pat Shanahan, Independent Review of the Queensland Law Society's Complaints Process (2002), 
announced by the Law Society on 13 August 2002. 
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Jack Nimmo.'^^ Their findings were reported in late 2002 and both agreed that the 
Queensland Law Society's handling of complaints had been inadequate. 
4.6 LEGAL PROFESSION A CT 2004 (QLD) 
Given the discontentment with the performance of the Queensland Law Society, 
crystallising in the Nimmo and Shanahan reports, it was not surprising that the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (Qld) totally removed the role of the Queensland Law Society in 
receiving complaints and in prosecuting discipline applications. An office of Legal 
Services Commissioner was established to oversee all complaints and disciplinary 
matters involving Queensland lawyers - both solicitors and barristers. All complaints 
are channelled through the Legal Services Commissioner. While the Legal Services 
Commissioner can ask the Queensland Law Society to investigate a complaint, the 
decision whether to institute a prosecution against a solicitor is made by the 
Commissioner. 
Surprisingly, the two tier system which collapsed in the mid 1990s was resurrected by 
the 2004 amendments. Now a Legal Practice Tribunal hears more serious matters and 
a Legal Practice Committee hears less serious matters. The source of the idea to 
reintroduce a two-tier disciplinary system in 2004 is obscure. Although both the 
Queensland Law Society and Attomey-General promoted the introduction of a two-
'^ ^ Legal Ombudsman, The Queensland Law Society and Baker Johnson Lawyers (2002). 
'^ ^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 256. 
'*^  Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 273. The Queensland Law Society or Bar Association of 
Queensland must include a recommendation whether or not to prosecute with the report of any 
investigation the commissioner has requested that tiiey undertake: s 268(4)(b). 
'*^  Arguably, there is some ambiguity as to the jurisdiction of each of tiiese disciplinary tribunals: 
Linda Haller, 'Imperfect Practice under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), 2004) 23 University of 
Queensland Law Joumal 411 -434, 425-6. 
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tier system in 1985, since its demise in 1994, neither the Government nor either of the 
professional bodies has championed its reintroduction. hi its response to the State 
Government's Discussion Paper on Legal Profession Reform in December 1998, 
the Bar Association of Queensland recommended the introduction of a single 
disciplinary body, as was then operating in New South Wales.'^^ In June 1999 the 
Government issued a Green Paper which proposed the introduction of a single 
disciplinary body,'^° and while both the Bar Association of Queensland'^' and 
Queensland Law Society'^^ had a number of criticisms of the model proposed in the 
Green Paper, neither suggested a two-tier system. 
The Government did not provide any reasons for creating two (rather than one) 
disciplinary bodies when tabling the 2004 amendments. Even though a professed aim 
of the 2004 reforms is to increase the consistency with existing or proposed 
disciplinary stmctures in other Australian jurisdictions,'^^ a two-tier system in 
Queensland appears contrary to the national trend. In May 2004, the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General agreed to work towards the implementation of 
National Legal Profession Model Laws''^ '^  and those Model Laws contemplate only a 
188 Queensland Department of Justice and Attomey-General, Legal Profession Discussion Paper {\99S) 
<http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/ouriaws/papers/legah-eform.htm> at 21 September 2004 {'Discussion 
Paper'). 
I on 
Bar Association of Queensland, above n 54, 19. 
Queensland Department of Justice, Green Paper — Legal Profession Reform (1999) 10 
<http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/ouriaws/papers/legrefrm.pdf> at 21 September 2004 ('Green Paper'). 
Bar Association of Queensland, above n 61, 4-6. 
Queensland Law Society, Response to the Green Paper on Legal Profession Reform, August 1999, 
8. The Law Society's main criticism of tiie proposed new Disciplinary Board was tiiat it would not be 
able to award compensation, as could the Solicitors Complaints Tribunal: 1.2.6. Later in its submission, 
tiie Law Society did say that 'Allegation of professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct could 
be referred for hearing to tiie tribunal or disciplinary board ... ' (1.5.6), but it is suggested tiiat the Law 
Society was providing alternate terminology rather tiian suggesting two separate bodies, particularly as 
two bodies are not suggested anywhere else in its response. 
Explanatory Memorandum, Legal Profession Bill 2004 (Qld), 2. 
Law Council of Australia, 'National Practice - The Model Laws Project', 
http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/natpractice/modellawproiect.html at 12 Januarv 2005 
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single disciplinary body.' ^ Similariy, New South Wales and Victoria have only a 
single-tier disciplinary tribunal to hear matters at first instance. 196 
While the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal may have constituted mere 'scaffold' when 
introduced in 1985, it is difficult to sustain a similar argument in relation to the Legal 
Practice Committee. Although the Act does not require findings of the committee to 
be published, the decision whether to publish is now that of the Legal Services 
Commissioner not the society. ' In addition, unlike the Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal, the Legal Practice Committee is required to sit in public.'^^ Rather than 
suggesting that the two tier system was reintroduced as part of any deliberate 
'project', '^^ ^ it is more likely the result of a lack of knowledge or understanding of 
Queensland's previous experience of a two tier system. 
The C^eensland Law Society has much less influence over the composition of the 
disciplinary tribunal than before. Since 1927, practising solicitors comprised the 
majority of members sitting on any disciplinary tribunal, but the members of the 
Legal Practice Tribunal are the current judges of the Supreme Court and the tribunal 
is constituted by one of those judges.^ * '^ Solicitors still have a part to play, but only as 
' ' ' National Legal Profession Model Laws Part 11, Division 9, ss 1137-1152. 
'^ ^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 551; Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 4.4.15. 
^"^ This is because the committee only has jurisdiction in relation to unsatisfactory professional conduct 
and the discipline register only needs to record findings of professional misconduct: Legal Profession 
Act2004 {Q\d) sm,296{\). 
"* The commissioner has decided to report decisions of the committee: Legal Services Commissioner, 
Discipline Register, http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/searchReg.htm at 31 March 2006. 
'^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 474. 
"^^  See more detailed discussion above section 3.10.2.1. 
^°' Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 429. 
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members of advisory panels to sit with the tribunal and 'help the tribunal in hearing 
202 
and deciding a discipline application'. 
Nor will solicitors necessarily comprise a majority of the members of the lower level 
Legal Practice Committee. Although one solicitor will sit on any discipline 
application involving a solicitor, so too will a lay member and the chairperson of the 
Committee, who can be drawn fi-om either branch of the profession. 
4.7 SOLICITORS' BOARD 
The active role played by the Barristers' Board in the discipline of barristers^ * '^* can be 
contrasted with the role played by the Solicitors' Board. Like the Barristers' 
Admission Rules, there is nothing in the Solicitors' Admission Rules to suggest that 
the Solicitors' Board should take an interest in disciplinary matters and the 
Solicitors Board confined itself to the fiinction stated expressly in the Rules, only 
becoming a party to Supreme Court proceedings which involved matters relating to 
admission '^^ ^ - and not discipline. 
4.8 LEGAL OMBUDSMAN 
The Queensland Law Society resisted calls for an independent overseer of the 
discipline of solicitors for some time. When the Premier, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, 
"^^  Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) ss 437(3), 444(2). A barrister member will assist in relation to 
matters involving barristers and a solicitor in matters involving solicitors: s 444(3)(b) 
^°^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 452(2). The section merely requires tiiat the chairperson have 
'high level experience and knowledge of tiie legal system and legal practice.' 
See above section 4.4. 
205 
206 
Rules Relating to the Admission of Solicitors of the Supreme Court of Queensland 1968 (Qld). 
^°'' Solicitors Board v Hope [1996] 2 Qd R 25; Fursey v Solicitors Board [2001] QCA 53. 
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argued in favour of the appointment of a legal ombudsman in 1977,^ "^ the society 
claimed this was unnecessary.^"^ In 1984 the Opposition again called for a legal 
ombudsman or observer to be appointed but the society continued to resist.^°^ 
Eventtially the society's objections were overmled and in 1985 a statutory office to 
oversee the disciplinary system for solicitors was established - the office of Lay 
Observer. The observer had no jurisdiction over barristers, but in relation to 
solicitors, was required to monitor written complaints received by the Queensland 
Law Society^" and could observe disciplinary hearings, attend meetings of the 
Complaints Committee of the society and attend society council meetings, but could 
not vote in any of these fomms.^'^ He or she could also demand access to society 
records of complaints and investigations.^'^ The appointment of the individual who 
would assume the office of Lay Observer was on the recommendation of the Minister 
for Justice.'''^ 
Amendments in 1997 renamed this office the Legal Ombudsman.^'^ Although 
barristers remained outside the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman was 
given more extensive powers in relation to solicitors, including a power to bring 
charges against a solicitor before the disciplinary tribunal and appeal a decision of the 
tiibunal.^'^ 
°^^  Minutes of Law Society Council 29 September 1977, 27 October 1977, Council minutes, vol 12, 
cited in Gregory, above n 6, 204, footnote 66. 
208 
Gregory, above n 6, 204. 
•^^  I Miller, above n 144. 
'^^  Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 60, inserted by Queensland Law Society Act Amendment 
Act 1985 (Qld). 
^" Section 6S(1). 
'^^  Sections 6S (3)(a) and 6S(3)(b). 
'^^  Section 6S (3) (c ). 
'^^  Section 60(1). 
'^^  Queensland Law Society Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Qld) s 9. 
'^^  Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6AI (1), inserted by Queensland Law Society Legislation 
Amendment Act 1997 (Qld) s 9. 
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While there appeared to be little consideration given to extending the Ombudsman's 
jurisdiction to include barristers, in 1998 the Bar Association of Queensland accepted 
the need for an ombudsman to oversee the discipline of barristers as well as 
solicitors.^'^ tt saw no impediment to a lawyer acting as Legal Ombudsman, as a 
lawyer was 'more likely than most unqualified people to understand best practice in 
the profession and to expect high standards.' 
Despite the concessions made by the Bar Association of Queensland in 1998, 
barristers remained outside the purview of the Legal Ombudsman until the radical 
overhaul of the complaints and disciplinary structure in 2004, through the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (Qld). The functions of the Legal Ombudsman were then 
absorbed into the larger regulatory functions of the Legal Services Commissioner.'^'^ 
Not only does the Commissioner have regulatory powers to deal with both barristers 
and solicitors, he now receives all complaints about any solicitor or barrister or legal 
practice employee and prosecutes all discipline applications filed against a 
Queensland legal practitioner.^^' 
717 
Bar Association of Queensland,above n 54. 
Ibid 21. This contrasts witii tiie actual practice in relation to tiie legal ombudsman in Queensland. 
Since that position was introduced in 1985, it has been required tiiat the incumbent never have been 
qualified to practise law: Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) (repealed) s 6AE(2), previously 
s60(2). The current legislation does not exclude a lawyer fi-om eligibility. It simply requires tiie Legal 
Services Commissioner to be 'famihar with the nature of the legal system and legal practice and posses 
appropnate qualities of independence, fairness and integrity: {Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 
414(2)), and need not be an Australian lawyer (s 414(3)). 
^'^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) ss 412-427. 
Legal Profes.sion Act 2004 (Qld) s 256. 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 273. 
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4.9 CONCLUSION 
The preceding survey of the evolution of disciplinary structures for Queensland 
lawyers shows a strong divergence between the two branches of the legal profession. 
Within the barristers' branch of the profession there were times at which the leaders 
of the bar professed a desire for greater statutory regulation of barristers, yet the 
impetus appeared to falter over whether sfrengthened Rules of Court would be 
preferable to legislation. There also appeared to be some obstmction or indecision on 
the part of the judges of the Supreme Court of Queensland in implementing Rules of 
Court. There is no evidence that the bar was subject to the same external pressure as 
the solicitors' branch to reform its intemal regulation and early moves to bring 
barristers within the reach of the Queensland Law Society Act in 1927 were quickly 
dispelled as unnecessary. Nor did the Bar Association of Queensland often exercise 
its power to prosecute disciplinary matters before the Supreme Court, instead leaving 
this to the Barristers Board, which arguably had less standing to prosecute discipline 
than the association - if it had any standing at all. 
Some may argue that the likelihood of a barrister requiring discipline is less than a 
solicitor - an issue which is taken up in the fmal chapter. The evidence is clear that 
from time to time there have been barristers in Queensland who should have been 
brought before a disciplinary body with sufficient power to remove them from 
practice -Darveniza and Young are two recent examples which have come to light. 
Yet in both these cases no action was taken by the association and prosecutions taken 
instead by the Barristers Board.^ ^^ The evidence appears strong that the organised 
^^ ^ Tara Young was not a member of the Bar Association of Queensland so it could not bring its own 
discipline application agauist her. But the association had standing to move tiie Supreme Court and yet 
left this to the Barristers Board. 
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bar, through the Bar Association of Queensland, has not effectively sought to 
establish structtires to enhance its ability to protect the public, and has not even been 
inclined to use its standing before the court to initiate those mechanisms which were 
available for discipline. 
In comparison, the Queensland Law Society has had stattitory powers and 
responsibilities in relation to discipline since 1927. Subsequentiy, the society has been 
subject to periods of intense criticism. Sometimes this criticism was due to its failure 
to avert large losses of client fimds in solicitors' trust accounts, as in the eariy 
I930s,^^^ in 1984,^ "^* and in 1999.^ ^^ In more recent times the society has been heavily 
criticised for its poor handling of complaints.^^^ The society's response to these 
periods of crisis have varied: in 1930 it responded by obtaining the State 
Government's assistance to establish a fidelity fimd, in the late 1970s it embraced the 
State Government's proposal for compulsory professional indemnity insurance and, 
while it was given very little role to play in the drafting of the Trust Accounts Act 
1973 (Qld), in 1985 it appears to have played a leading role in drafting amendments to 
the Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) which strengthened its own disciplinary 
powers. 
While the Queensland Law Society has been the subject of more public criticism than 
the Bar Association of Queensland, it is interesting to note that, within Parliament, the 
society often appeared to have bipartisan support for the role that it played, and the 
response to public criticism of the society was for Parliament to increase, not 
^^ ^ Above section 4 5.1. 
224 
225 
Above section 4.5.3, discussing Yvonne Wigley defalcation. 
Above section 4. 5.4, discussing Harry Smith defalcation. 
^^ ^ Above section 4.5.4. 
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decrease, its disciplinary powers. This approach changed dramatically in the drafting 
of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). The Queensland Law Society was given very 
little opportunity to provide input into, or comment on, the Bill - a Bill which also 
greatly reduced the disciplinary powers of the society.^^'' 
While there have been periods when the Queensland Law Society appears to have 
taken steps to increase the protection of the public from substandard conduct by 
solicitors, the sustained nature of the scrutiny to which the society has been subject 
makes it difficult to determine whether such steps would have been taken without 
such scmtiny - in other words whether the society's conduct was prompted primarily 
by altmistic or legitimating motives. 
In the following two chapters I shift the focus of the thesis from disciplinary 
stmctures to disciplinary outcomes - not only disciplinary action which removes a 
person from legal practice (Chapter Five) but action which imposes a fine while 
leaving the individual in practice (Chapter Six). 
* * * * 
227 
Above section 4.6. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
iNCAPACnATION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I consider those cases in which the disciplmary tribunal incapacitates a 
practitioner. Incapacitation can take many forms. One method is for a disciplinary 
tribunal to order that a person's name be removed from the roll of legal practitioners.' 
This is also described as disbarment or striking off This method will usually be described 
in this chapter as 'striking off. As practitioners must be on the roll of legal practitioners 
and hold a practising certificate before they can practise law, practitioners can also be 
incapacitated in a more temporary way, by the tribunal ordering that their practising 
certificate be suspended.^ Here, I will refer to the 'suspension' of a practitioner. 
In Chapter Two I looked at the emphasis which lawmakers placed on the need for 
discipline to protect the public. In Chapter Three I discussed theories which suggest that 
all activities of a disciplinary tribunal are likely to serve a legitimating function for the 
benefit of the legal profession. I will argue in this chapter that strike off orders are more 
' Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 280(2)(a). Lawyers can also be stmck off by a court exercising its 
inherent jurisdiction. See above paras 1.8, 4.2. 
' Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) ss 6, 24. 
^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 280(2)(b). 
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likely to fulfil a legitimating function than are orders which suspend or fine'* a 
practitioner. 
Orders striking a practitioner from the roll will simultaneously protect the public in most 
cases, as any risk at all of further misconduct is removed. The only exception to this 
argument would be if the removal of the practitioner from practice reduced public access 
to competent legal assistance, but this is likely to be rare.^ Therefore, the protective and 
any legitimating functions are likely to be most aligned where a strike off order is made. 
After looking at strike off orders, I will examine the use of orders by which the 
practitioner is only suspended from practice for a period of time. The use of suspensions 
is problematic, from the point of view of both the protective and legitimating function. 
Finally, I will explore powers in relation to practising certificates. Admission to the roll 
of legal practitioners is not sufficient to practise law. Queensland solicitors and - more 
recently - barristers must also hold a current practising certificate. These are issued by the 
Queensland Law Society and Bar Association of Queensland, which have extensive 
powers to refuse, cancel or suspend certificates, including on grounds sunilar to those 
relevant to professional discipline.^ A practising certificate can be cancelled in a much 
Fines are discussed in Chapter Six. 
^ For instance, the argument of Kirby P in Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman (1994) 34 NSWLR 
408, that the public would be better protected if Foreman - the sohcitor being disciplined - was required to 
donate her 'talent and experience' through supervised work at a community legal service, rather than if she 
was 'expelled from the profession (420). Kirby P was in the minority and the majority ordered that 
Foreman's name be removed from the roll. 
^ Such as where tiie Queensland Law Society or Bar Association of Queensland believes tiie holder of the 
certificate is 'no longer a fit and proper person to hold the certificate': Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 
46(2). 
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less conspicuous way than disciplinary proceedings can be taken. Therefore, any 
discussion of why disciplinary proceedings may have been used to remove a person from 
legal practice is incomplete without also considering this alternative method of 
incapacitation. 
5.2 STRIKE OFF ORDERS 
5.2.1 The Legal Basis of Strike Off Orders 
There are two methods by which a lawyer's name can be removed from the roll of legal 
practitioners. The first is through the exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction, which 
arises from the court's common law power to admit person's name to the roll. Until 
2004, this was the only method by which barristers could be stmck from the roll. Since 
1927 for solicitors (and since 2004 for barristers) there has also been a statutory method 
of removing a lawyer's name from the roll. 
5.2.2 How Strike Off Orders May Legitimate 
If the disciplinary system is being used by the legal profession as a tool for external 
legitimacy, an order striking a practitioner from the roll would most enhance this 
legitimating fiinction. Here, the offending practitioner is cast out of the profession. The 
profession is 'cleansed'. From the perspective of external legitimation, the expulsion of a 
Above section 4.2. 
* Initially contained in Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) and now contained in Legal Profession Act 
2004 (Qld) s 280(2)(a). 
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person from the ranks of the profession has tiie advantage that the profession no longer 
has to justify or trivialise the practitioner's misconduct. The misconduct has been 
uncovered and dealt with harshly. In most sittiations a strike off order will be seen as a 
measure which unequivocally protects the public, regardless of the consequences for the 
practitioner involved. The individual practitioner has been quickly marginalised and 
ostracised. The public is protected from the risk of any fiiture transgressions by that 
individual and the profession gains external legitimacy by showing that it can turn 
fiercely upon one of its own when ethical standards are transgressed. Such strong action 
will clearly demonstrate to the public that the profession can be tmsted to regulate itself 
Strike off orders also provide the greatest 'fit' with the rhetoric often used in relation to 
professional discipline, which treats the issue as a simple dichotomy between those who 
are and those who are not 'fit to practise', of the need for discipline to cleanse the 
profession by removing the 'bad apples'.^ Other orders - such as suspensions and fines -
do not fit the rhetoric as well because the making of the order itself acknowledges that the 
individual engaged in misconduct but the nature of the order allows them to remain 
within the profession. 
' Below section 8.5.3. The rhetoric of expelling 'bad apples' is commonly used by professional bodies. For 
instance, the president of the Queensland Law Society said in 2002: '[W]hat's in it for the profession to 
self-regulate? It is to maintain the highest standards for Queensland solicitors, which means getting rid of 
the bad apples': Perspectives Piece by Queensland Law Society President Tom Sullivan (Press Release, 30 
August 2002). The Queensland Legal Services Commissioner has also observed the frequent reference to 
'bad apples' in the context of professional discipline: John Briton, Legal Services Commissioner, 'The 
System for Dealing with Complaints: the Commission's Approach' (Paper presented at the Bar Association 
of Queensland Annual Conference, Sanctuary Cove, Queensland, 5 March 2006) 
httD://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/speeches/BAO050306.pdfat 13 March 2006, 4-5. 
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As explained in Chapter Three,'" if tiie disciplinary system is being used for legitimation 
purposes, those matters which will proceed to a public hearing will be carefully chosen to 
provide maximum legitimisation for the profession. It would therefore be expected, that 
orders striking a practitioner from the roll would be the most common type of order made 
by the tribunal when that tribunal sits in public. 
Given the dangers which publicity poses for any legitimation project," it could be 
expected that orders striking a practitioner from the roll would be utilised where the 
nature of the client's complaint or pre-existing adverse publicity meant it could not be 
dealt with in a more private manner.'^ 
The clearest example of a complaint which is unlikely to be dealt with in a private 
manner is any instance of fi-aud. A client will be unable to claim against the lawyer's 
professional indemnity insurance where there has been fraud, as fraud is a standard basis 
of exclusion on professional indemnity insurance policies. The client can make a claim 
on the fidelity fund, but the fund does not protect against all instances of fi^ud.'^ The 
Above section 3.9. 
" Below section 8.4.1. 
" The legitimation theory would also suggest that the more publicity that has been attracted, the more 
severe the sanction generally. Cariin argued that the visibility of tiie offence had greater effect on the 
severity of the sanction than the naUire of the offence itself: Jerome Carlin, Lawryers' Ethics; a Survey of 
the New York City Bar (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1966) 161 -2. The impact of the media on the 
type of sanction imposed by the disciplinary tribunal in Queensland is considered in Chapter Eight. 
'^  Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 162(1) allows a person to make a claim against tiie Legal 
Practitioner' Fidelity Guarantee Fund if they have 'suffered a pecuniary loss through stealing or fraudulent 
misappropriation (s 145)....of any money or otiier tmst property entmsted to the practising practitioner...', 
this requires monies or other property to have been entmsted to the solicitor it does not protect from all 
instances of fi^ud. In addition, this is a fund of last resort (s 172) and payments are usually capped (s 182). 
Until 2004 the legally available cap was $60,000, but it was never imposed. Further, the legislation 
prohibited the corpus of the ftind accumulating above $5 million. As a result of paying all proven claims in 
frill from a limited corpus, tiie fund experienced a long period of financial difficulty. In 1999-2000 it had a 
deficit of $2.8 million: Queensland Law Society Inc 72"'' Annual Report 1999-2000, 77. 
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client may also want more than financial recompense. A client who does not feel 
adequately compensated or vindicated is likely to be more vocal in calling for action, 
perhaps witii the aid of the media. 
Even if a client is adequately compensated by the fidelity fund, there may still be pressure 
from elsewhere to take disciplinary action. If fraud is involved, criminal proceedings are 
likely to follow,'"* and these are likely to attract media attention and public calls to 
remove the person from practice. The pressure to take disciplinary action may also come 
from within the profession. Fidelity fiinds are financed by members of the profession, 
who will be angry that the claim has depleted the fund. The legal obligation of solicitors 
to reimburse the fimd if its balance is too low may, in turn, threaten the financial viability 
of smaller practices.'^ Other practitioners will simply be angry that the fraud has 
tarnished the reputation of the profession as a whole. It is therefore highly likely that 
members will demand that disciplinary action be taken to remove the person responsible 
from the profession. In this case, members may be less concemed with the need to protect 
the public than with their own desire for retribution. In discharging its responsibility to 
represent the interests of members - and legitimate itself to members - a professional 
body which is also responsible for discipline may have difficulty keeping public 
protection - not retribution - in its sights. 
"* In 1997, the Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) was amended so as to require the Queensland Law 
Society to report any suspected offence to the Commissioner of Police: s 50A, inserted by Queensland Law 
Society Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Qld) s 11 A. 
'^  This is likely to be particulariy tme in jurisdictions, such as Queensland, where practitioners have been 
required to pay additional levies as a result of substantial claims against the fund. In 1998, the Queensland 
Law Society increased the findelity fund levy to $650 to cover a shortfall due to some large claims: Adrian 
Evans, 'Queensland Fidelity Compensation 1990-2004: The End of the Money Tree' (2004) 23 University 
of Queensland Law Joumal 397-410, 402. 
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5.2.3 Strike Off Orders as a Self-fulfilling Prophecy 
In cases where the conduct is more ambiguous and may m fact be forgiven by the 
community, a tribunal pursuing an agenda of legitimation may be less inclined to strike 
the practitioner from the roll because such an action then confirms that tiiis member has 
been involved in misconduct of the most serious kind. This is a self-fulfillmg prophecy: 
it is the order striking the member from the roll which itself casts shame upon the 
individual practitioner, rather than the underlying conduct which led to such an order. In 
cases in which the general public may not understand or be concemed about the risk of 
the practitioner's conduct, the message from the imposition of a suspension, fine or 
censure could then be that the conduct was not serious and the risk of adverse publicity is 
lessened. 
It could therefore be expected that strike offs will be used where the nature of the 
misconduct is clear, where it is tantamount to criminal conduct, such as tmst account 
fraud or other dishonest conduct. Where the 'wrongness' of the behaviour is more 
ambiguous, the tribunal may fmd itself in a bind. A strike off will label this conduct as of 
the worst kind, it will necessarily require notification of existing clients and will possibly 
draw media attention to the case. It could therefore be expected that in cases relating to 
charges other than tmst account fraud and dishonesty, other factors may come into play 
in influencing the tribunal's decision and therefore the outcome will be less predictable.'^ 
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5.3 SUSPENSIONS 
5.3.1 The Ambiguity of Suspensions 
If the disciplinary tribunal decides to order that a practitioner be suspended from practice 
for a certain period, this is more problematic, both for protective purposes and for any 
legitimation project, than an order striking the person from the roll. The real advantage of 
sttiking a member from the roll is that they have been permanently removed. The 
profession has permanently distanced itself from the conduct of the individual 
practitioner in question. A strike off order has completely forsaken the interests of the 
individual lawyer to the interests of the public. The public has been protected in the most 
uncompromising of ways. 
But when a practitioner is not struck off but merely suspended from practice for a certain 
period, they remain part of the profession, with the attendant risk that their presence, 
'waiting in the wings' of the profession, will continue to taint the image of that 
profession. Thus, when a member is suspended, the message to the public is ambiguous. 
While lawmakers - both judicial and legislative - have determined that professional 
discipline must aim to protect the public,'^ and while the conduct of this practitioner has 
been foimd to be serious enough to question thefr fitness to practise, the public in this 
case has not been protected at all costs. Instead, the individual practitioner will remain a 
'^  An example would include conflicts of interest (acmal and potential). It could be expected that the 
prosecuting body, if the legitimisation theory is correct, will avoid the dilemma of what sanction the 
tribunal should impose by not bringing such charges before the tribunal. 
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member of the profession and be given an opportunity to reform. Inevitably this will be 
seen by the public, if members of the public become aware of the suspension order,'^ as 
exposing them to some risk, certainly more risk than had the practitioner been simply 
expelled from the profession tiirough a strike off order. 
5.3.2 Suspensions May Encourage Appeals 
If the disciplinary system has played a role in any legitimation project, it would be 
expected that suspensions would be ordered much more rarely than a strike off order. 
Appeals against disciplinary decisions which allege that the tribunal has been too lenient 
are also coimter-productive to any legitimation project. It would be expected that the 
tribunal would seek to avoid decisions which invite appeals. As suspension orders tend to 
invite appeals (as explained below), this is another reason why the number of suspensions 
would be expected to be low. 
It could be expected that the tribunal will want to avoid appeals which allege that it has 
dealt too leniently with a practitioner. An appeal by a practitioner which argues that the 
tribunal has been too harsh may well enhance the legitimation project as such an appeal 
portrays tiie tribunal as able to act harshly against members of the profession. However, 
an appeal suggesting tiiat the tribunal has acted too leniently is more problematic. The 
publicity given to an appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal is likely to be much 
See discussion in Chapter Two. 
The publication of disciplinary orders is discussed in more detail below section 8.3. 
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greater than the publicity given to a tribunal decision.'^ If an appeal is lodged, this 
increases public scmtiny of, and pressure upon, the disciplinary process and could pose 
grave danger for any legitimation project. If the tribunal imposes a suspension in 
disregard of the legal constraints imposed by prior case law, it faces the risk that an 
appeal will be lodged by the prosecuting body or Attomey-General.^° This chapter will 
now explore the reasons why any appeal against a suspension order has a high chance of 
success. 
5.3.3 Legal Constraints on Power to Suspend 
5.3.3.1 High Court of Australia 
Particularly since the early 1980s, the High Court and Supreme Courts in New South 
Wales and Queensland have restricted the circumstances in which the court considers a 
suspension to be an appropriate manner in which to dispose of disciplinary proceedings. 
The disciplinary tribunals in the two States are bound by these decisions. Until 2004, all 
members of the Queensland tribimal except the lay member were legally trained and most 
7 1 
served on the tribimal for extended periods of time. It could therefore be presumed that 
these members were aware of court decisions and the need for the tribunal to follow court 
See further discussion below section 8.2. 
°^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 292(1 )(b). Until that Act came into force, the Queensland Law Society 
also had a right of appeal: Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6Z(6). 
'^ In the words of Gregory, 'there was a strong tradition of continuity in Statutory Committee membership': 
Helen Gregory, The Queensland Law Society Inc 1928-1988, (1991) 205. Mr ER Cuppaidge served on the 
committee from 1952 until 1977, a period of 25 years. Mr WP Rowland served from 1940 untti 1961. Sir 
Douglas Wadley was a member from 1960 until 1981 and RR Stephens from 1970 until 1983. Sir John 
Rowell served from 1973 until 1983. In more recent times, GA Murphy and TM Treston both served on tiie 
tribunal from 1983 - 2000, a period of 17 years. Mr JSP O'Keefe, appointed in 1983, sat on the tribunal 
until the eariy 2000s. 
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decisions. It could fiirther be expected that the number of suspensions ordered by the 
tribunal would have decreased over time, in accordance with the more restrictive mlings 
of the courts, as to the circumstances in which a suspension is an appropriate method of 
disposing of disciplinary charges. 
The leading case on the issue of suspensions was a decision of the High Court of 
Australia in Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW in which the court 
was required to determine whether a barrister should be disbarred as a consequence of his 
conviction for manslaughter following a motor vehicle accident. The court had some 
concem about the conduct of the manslaughter trial of Ziems and divided on whether the 
conviction itself automatically proved that Ziems was unfit to practise. 
Dixon CJ thought that the conviction spoke for itself and made Ziems unfit to practise.^'' 
His Honour then dealt with the issue of particular interest here, namely, whether it was 
more appropriate to suspend or to strike Ziems from the roll of barristers. His Honour 
thought that it would be preferable in most such cases to strike the practitioner from the 
roll, allowing him to seek readmission at a later time. At the readmission hearing, the 
applicant could 'offer positive evidence of the grounds upon which he then claims to be 
re-admitted.' McTieman J was of a similar view to Dixon CJ, referring to the 
(1957) 97 CLR 279. 
The facts 
(1957)97 
Ibid 286. 
  are discussed in more detail above section 2 6 3 1 
-'( )  CLR 279, 285-6. 
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opportunity to re-apply for admission once Ziems' 'good fame and worthiness to be a 
barrister have been re-established.'^^ 
However, the majority thought that Ziems was in fact fit to practise, despite the 
conviction.^^ The natural conclusion from this was that the barrister's right to practise 
should be left intact.^^ But the majority also thought that it would be 'incongmous' for a 
person to be held out to the public as fit to practise as a barrister while serving a prison 
sentence.^' It was only on this basis that Fullagar J agreed to an order for suspension.^° 
Kitto J agreed that Ziems was fit to practise and, like Fullagar J, expressed some disquiet 
about the justification for a suspension order. He commented: 
If it were not that the members of the Court who think with me that he should not be 
disbarred are in favour of tiie proposed suspension, I should be against it. If the 
appellant's conviction and imprisonment are held not to disqualify him from the Bar, it 
seems to me, vrith respect, that logically that should be the end of the case. There can be 
no question of imposing a punishment additional to the imprisonment, and as far as I can 
see there is no purpose to be served by adding a de jure suspension to the de facto 
suspension which the appellant's incarceration produces while it lasts. However, even if I 
am right in thinking that suspension is inappropriate, it can do no harm, and I am 
prepared to assent to it so that an order may be made. 
It can therefore be seen that, despite the fact that both Fullagar and Kitto JJ agreed to an 
order suspending Ziems from practice for the period of his imprisonment, both indicated 
J^  Ibid 287. 
•^  Fullagar J believed that a grave misdirection by the trial judge at the manslaughter hearing meant the 
court was entitied to look behind his conviction in determining whether or not Ziems was fit to practise. His 
Honour felt that it was 'impossible to say that the conviction justifies a finding that the appellant is not a fit 
and proper person to practise at the Bar' (296). 
r Ibid. 
•' Ibid 297. A similar argument based on 'incongruity' in relation to a practitioner was upheld in Re B 
[1986] VR 695, 705-6 (Brooking J). 
'° (1957) 97 CLR 279, 297. 
'^ Ibid 300. Taylor J was more confident in his view that, despite the fact that Ziems was in fact fit to 
practise, he should not be able to hold himself out as permitted to practise while serving a prison sentence 
for such a serious offence as manslaughter (308), so thought that he should be suspended for the period of 
his imprisonment. The court went on to make such an order. 
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tiiat suspension is normally only justified if a practitioner is unfit to practise, hi contrast, 
those in tiie minority, Dixon CJ and McTieman J, thought it much more desfreable to 
strike off practitioners shown to be unfit to practise rather than merely suspend them. 
Practitioners could then reapply for admission when they could lead positive evidence to 
show that they were once again fit to practise. The necessary implication of these 
comments ui Ziems is that the High Court saw very little room for the operation of 
suspension orders. If a person remains fit to practise the right to practise should not be 
impugned, by either a suspension order or a strike off order. Once shown to be unfit to 
practise, a strike off was usually the most appropriate order. 
In New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt, the High Court narrowed the role of 
suspensions even further, overturning the two year suspension of a barrister who had 
engaged in a scheme of charging 'extortionate and grossly excessive fees'.^^ The High 
Court ordered that he be disbarred, notwithstanding his youth and his lack of 
understanding, stating that his 'failure to understand the error of his ways of itself 
demonstrates his unfitness'.^'' 
5.3.3.2. Early Queensland Cases 
Apart from the restricted approach to suspension orders afforded by the High Court in 
Ziems and Evatt, case law in Queensland also suggests that suspensions are not 
appropriate where there is evidence of dishonest conduct by a practitioner. In such 
circumstances tiie practitioner should be struck off. 
-^(1968) 117 CLR 177. 
"ibid 182. 
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In cases in the 1930s, the Full Court of the Supreme Court did allow a number of 
suspensions to stand, despite the fact that there was evidence of dishonesty.^^ These 
appeals were brought by the practitioner alleging that the penalty imposed, a suspension, 
was excessive. It would seem that in the 1930s, fines were routinely ordered, even in 
cases of misappropriation from the tinst account.^^ At this time, the Attomey-General had 
no power to appeal decisions of the Statutory Committee, and the Queensland Law 
Society, while having the power to appeal,^^ did not exercise it until 1983. But once the 
-50 
Attomey-General was given power, an appeal by him saw a three year suspension for 
misappropriation overturned and the solicitor stmck off ^^  During the subsequent 40 year 
period, 1940-1980, no appeals were heard in relation to the adequacy of the sanction 
imposed and so the court did not have another opportunity to comment upon its attitude 
to suspensions until Mellifont v The Queensland Law Society Inc'" in 1980. 
'" Ibid 184. This aspect of the case is discussed in more detail above section 2.3.1. 
" / fe5 [1938] St R Qd 361; i?e M [1938] St R Qd 454, 457; Re G (1939) QWN 39. 
^^  Re B [1938] St R Qd 361; Re M [1938] St R Qd 454, 457; Re G (1939) QWN 39. In Re M, Webb J 
expressed no surprise that there was then a bill before Parliament giving the Attomey-General the power to 
appeal, given the very lenient punishments imposed by the tribunal at the time: Re M [1938] St R Qd 454, 
457. The court's lenient approach to trust account matters is discussed in more detail above section 2.4.3.3. 
^^  Queensland Law Society Act of 1927 (Qld) s 5(4). 
^^  Queensland Law Society Act of 1927 (Qld) s 5(4), as amended by Queensland Law Society Acts 
Amendment Act 19381 Geo 6 No 6. 
^' In re G, A Solicitor (1940) QWN 7. Macrossan SPJ, with whom RJ Douglas J and Philp J agreed, stated 
that, unless exceptional circumstances appeared, a solicitor who has stolen monies from his client should be 
struck off (10). In another appeal by the Attomey-General, arguing that a two year suspension was too 
lenient and heard six months after In re G, the court dismissed the appeal, confirming that stealing required 
proof of more than wrongfiil conversion. In the circumstances, die two year suspension was adequate: Re 
NEG {1940) QWN 25. 
'*" The number of appeals during this period were few and related to the procedural powers of the tribunal: 
Re a Solicitor [1953] St R Qd 149 (appeal on the validity of Rule 76 which deemed a failure to respond to a 
Law Society request for information to be professional misconduct); R v Queensland Law Society, Ex parte 
a Practitioner [1958] Qd R 394 (writ of prohibition sought to stop prima facie case being found on 
affidavit material alone); Re H, A Solicitor [1961] Qd R 407 (appeal on the validity of Rule 76); Hally v 
Queensland Law Society (I960) 105 CLR 286 (appeal on the validity of Rule 76); Re H, A Solicitor [1962] 
Qd R I (taxation of costs of disciplinary hearing). 
^ ' [1981]QdR17. 
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5.3.3.3 1980- 2001: The Mellifont Years 
In 1980 a solicitor by the name of Mellifont appealed against a tribunal order suspending 
him for five years.''^ He argued tiiat such an order was too harsh in tiie circumstances. 
The tribunal had found that Mellifont had acted fraudulently in seeking to hide errors in 
the tmst account. He had made false tmst account entries, fabricated a letter to explain a 
payment from the tmst account and had lied to the Law Society. He also perjured himself 
in his evidence before the tribunal. 
The leading judgement in Mellifont was that of Andrews J, who cited with approval the 
decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Law Society of New South Wales v 
McNamara,^^ in which Reynolds JA had said that the disciplinary tribunal must not 
impose a suspension unless confident that, at the end of the suspension, the practitioner 
would be fit to practise. It would be unlikely that the tribunal could often be confident of 
this if tiie practitioner before it was presentiy unfit,"^ "* as the tribunal would need to be sure 
that a transformation of character would occur before the suspension ended."*^  Andrews J 
went on to say that,"^ given tiie deceit, dishonesty and dishonour of Mellifont's conduct, a 
" Mellifont v The Queensland Law Society Inc [1981] Qd R 17 
"•^  (1980) 47 NSWLR 72. 
(1980) 47 NSWLR 72, 76, cited in Mellifont v The Queensland Law Society Inc [1981] Qd R 17, 31 
(Andrews J). 
The difficulties of assessing fitness to practise at the end of a period of suspension had been 
foreshadowed in ^e M [ 1938] St R Qd 454 where Graham AJ said: 
During the hearing of the appeal I considered the advisableness, in the interests botii of tiie public 
and the offender, of suggesting a change in tiie form of the punishment so as to make the 
possibility of tiie appellant's return to acttial practice conditional upon proof of penitence and good 
behaviour during tiie term of suspension (463). 
However, his Honour finally agreed to the usual, unconditional, rettim to practice at the end of tiie three 
year period of suspension ordered in that case. 
Mellifont v The Queensland Law Society Inc [1981] Qd R 17, 31. 
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fine was not appropriate and nor was a suspension, given that the court could not be 
satisfied that Mellifont would be again fit to practise at tiie end of any period of 
suspension. The court ordered that he be stmck from the roll. 
In at least eight cases heard after Mellifont, the Supreme Court contmued to indicate the 
very narrow range of cases in which a suspension order would be appropriate."*^ But as 
'^'^ Mellifont had been before the tribunal on three prior occasions for failing to respond to Queensland Law 
Society investigations. On each occasion he had been fined: SC 175, 6 July 1970 ($150); SC 191, 27 April 
1973 ($100); SC 207, 29 October 1975 ($600). 
** 1. Re Walter (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Full Court, Connolly, Shepherdson, 
Williams JJ, 22 May 1987). The tribunal had imposed a 12 month suspension for lying under oath and 
giving misleading information to the Queensland Law Society (SC 285, 20 August 1986). On appeal by the 
society, the suspension was overturned and the practitioner struck from the roll. The court queried the 
legitimacy of a suspension order where dishonesty was involved (12, Wilhams J). The practitioner 
subsequentiy appealed to the High Court, which found there was inadequate evidence of dishonesty and 
remitted the matter to the Statutory Committee: Walter v Council of Queensland Law Society Inc [1988] 62 
ALJR 153. However, the success of the appeal by Walter does not affect the argument here which relates to 
the court's view of the proper penalty where dishonesty has been found. 
2. Attomey-General v Brown [1992] QCA 241 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of 
Appeal, Fitzgerald P, Davies JA, Demack J, 11 June 1993). The practitioner had knowingly participated in 
the backdating of documents and the preparation and filing of false affidavits to assist his clients. In 
deciding to suspend Brown for 21 months, the tribunal (SC 339, 6 October 1992) had made reference to his 
'28 years of unblemished practice and the strong testimonial produced on his behalf, but it was common 
ground in an appeal by the Attomey-General that these were not valid personal mitigating factors in 
disciplinary proceedings as they did not address the issue of the practitioner's fitness to practise. The 
practitioner therefore sought to argue that the tribunal had taken account of a number of other, valid, 
mitigating factors in determining the appropriate penalty. He was greatly hampered by the tribunal's failure 
to give reasons for its decision, even five months later: Brown v Minister for Justice and AG (Unreported, 
Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, 31 March 1993, Fitzgerald P, Pincus JA, Shepherdson 
J)(application by practitioner for the Statutory Committee to provide reasons for the penalty imposed). The 
court thought that it was 'impossible to conclude that a period of suspension affords adequate protection to 
the public' (6) given the respondent's deliberate and sustained course of grave misconduct designed to 
mislead the court, and his lack of remorse. The decision of the Statutory Committee was set aside and the 
practitioner stmck off 
3,. Queensland Law Society v Mead [ 1997] QCA 83. The tribunal had suspended Mead for 3 3 months 
despite the fact that he had been before the tribunal only 18 months eariier and fined $10,000 {ReX{\995) 
25 QLSJ 493, SC 365, 28 March 1995). Ten days after that eariier tribunal hearing he had again transferred 
trust monies to his general account without authority. There had been no restitution or indication of remorse 
and die court refused to accept an argument that Mead would be fit to practise by the end of the period of 
suspension (7). 
4. Queensland Law Society v Henry William Smith (unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, Appeal 
10787 of 1997, orders by consent, 29 April 1998). The Attomey-General appealed a decision of the tribunal 
(SC 384, 11 November 1997) that the practitioner be suspended 'until such time as he is able to satisfy the 
Council of tiie Queensland Law Society Inc that he is a fit and proper person to hold a practising 
certificate', but the matter did not go to a full hearing as Smith consented to an order that he be stmck from 
the roll. 
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later discussion shows,^'' the disciplinary tribunal appeared to disregard the court's 
consistent and sttengthening caution regarding suspension orders. In fact, the disciplinary 
tribunal used suspension orders more often after Mellifont than before.^ 
5. Attorney-General v Bax [1999] 2 Qd R 9. The ttibunal had ordered the practitioner to pay a fine of 
$15,000 (SC 393, 29 July 1997). On appeal, the Attomey-General argued that the practitioner should be 
stmck from the roll and in its simultaneous appeal, the Queensland Law Society argued that the practitioner 
should be suspended. The facts in Bax were quite similar to those in Attomey-General v Brown 
(Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, Fitzgerald P, Davies JA, Demack J, 11 June 
1993): the practitioner had backdated documents to seek an advantage for his client by removing property 
from the reach of creditors should the client become bankmpt. Also, as in Brown, Bax had continued this 
deception by evasive comments in the Federal Court, during the investigation of complaints against him 
and before the tribunal. Pincus JA thought that the substantial nature of the deception over a period of time 
required that Bax be removed from the roll as it showed he was not fit to practise. His Honour then 
considered, as a secondary matter, whether the removal should be permanent or temporary, by way of a 
period of suspension and decided that it was Bax's lack of remorse which foreclosed the possibility of a 
suspension order (22, Pincus J). Shepherdson J (25) and McPherson JA (14) also placed great weight on the 
practitioner's lack of remorse and agreed that the appropriate order was one striking the practitioner from 
the roll. 
6. Attomey-General v Gregory. [1998] QCA 409. Gregory had been convicted of contempt of court 
and fined $4,000 in the District Court for attempting to influence a witness to change her evidence to make 
it more favourable to his client. The disciplinary tribunal had suspended him for two years {Re Gregory 
(1998) 3 Disciplinary Action Report 13, SCT 6174, 13 May 1998). On appeal by the Attomey-General, the 
court acknowledged that the misconduct comprised an isolated, unpremeditated incident for which the 
Gregory had shown remorse. But de Jersey CJ thought the conduct demonstrated the absence of 'critically 
important qualities' (4) requiring Gregory to be stmck from the roll. He would need to demonstrate he had 
'redeveloped' those qualities before he could be readmitted. White J also thought that the appropriate 
course was to strike Gregory from the roll, allowing him to apply for readmission at a later time when he 
could prove his fitness to practise (17). Gregory's subsequent application for readmission was 
unsucce.ssfiil: Greg Gregory v QLS Inc [2001] QCA 499. 
7. Queensland Law Society v Carberry [2000] QCA 450. The tribunal had found Carberry guilty of 
professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for 12 months {Re Carberry (2000) 6 
Disciplinary Action Report 17, SCT 6196, 6 March 2000). Both the Attomey-General and Queensland Law 
Society appealed and argued that Carberry should be stmck off. The most serious charge against the 
practitioner related to a conflict of interest which Carberry chose to ignore [34] (Moynihan SJA and 
Atkinson J). Pincus JA thought that it was 'no accident' that the practitioner had preferred the interests of 
his business associate to those of his chent ([5]). Moynihan SJA and Atkinson J were doubtfiil as to 
Carberry's level of remorse([37]), suggesting he would not be fit to practise by the end of any period of 
suspension ([41], Moynihan SJA and Atkinson J). Pincus JA agreed that the misconduct was 'bad enough 
to force one to the unpleasant conclusion that mere suspension is insufficient' ([7]). 
8. Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Wakeling [2004] QCA 42. The ttibunal had 
suspended Wakeling for two years, and then not practise as a sole practitioner for a fiirther five years (SCT 
110, 26 August 2003). The court held that the multiple findings of dishonest conduct meant tiiat the court 
could not 'confidently present the respondent as someone on whom the client and the court may rely' 
([27]). Nor could the court have confidence tiiat he would regain fitness to practise before tiie two year 
period of suspension expired. 
See discu.ssion below section 5.3.5. 
'° Linda Haller, 'Waiting in die Wings: the Suspension of Queensland Lawyers' (2003) 3 QUTLaw and 
Justice Journal 397-421, 409, Table 1. 
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The series of cases, which started with Mellifont v Queensland Law Society^^ in 1981, 
make it clear that tiie Supreme Court expected suspensions to be used only where there 
was clear evidence that the practitioner would be fit to practise again at the end of a fixed 
period of suspension. But, there is fairiy clear evidence that the tribunal paid very little 
heed to tiiese mlings of tiie court, arguably imposing suspensions in a number of cases 
where a suspension was not the most appropriate way of protecting the public.^^ The 
question arises as to why tiie court's attitude to suspensions appears to have been ignored 
by the tribunal. 
5.3.4 Cases in Which Supreme Court Has Considered Suspension Appropriate 
5.3.4.1 Two Exceptions 1990-2001 
While, generally speaking, the court disallowed all suspension orders after Mellifont, in 
the period 1990-2001, there were two exceptions. The first was Adamson v Queensland 
Law Society Inc.^^ The tribunal had ordered that Adamson be stmck from the roll, but the 
court replaced this with a more lenient order - that he be suspended from practice for 12 
months and pay one third of the society's costs before the tribunal. This was on the basis 
that the costs of a three day hearing with senior counsel on both sides amounted to 'an 
immense fine'^ anyway, only limited misconduct had been found, and there was no 
^'[1981]QdR17. 
' Below section 5.3.7.2. 
" [1990] 1 Qd R 498. He had shared receipts with an unqualified person (his secretary) and lied to the 
Queensland Law Society about their arrangement. 
^^  [1990] IQdR 498, 508. 
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evidence of client dissatisfaction or failure to supervise the work of the person with 
whom the practitioner was sharing receipts 55 
The second case in which the Supreme Court of Queensland allowed a suspension to 
stand in the period 1990-2001 was Re Wheeler.^^ By tiie time of hearing, the Queensland 
Law Society had abandoned its appeal and the court was only left to decide on the 
practitioner's cross appeal that the three year suspension was too harsh. This - combined 
with the delay in the hearing of the appeal" - is likely to explain why the court chose not 
to interfere with the suspension order. 
In both Adamson^^ and Wheeler^^, the court did not impose harsher sentences than those 
imposed by the tribunal. But these were cases where it was the practitioner who had 
appealed. The previous discussion has shown that, as the 1990s progressed, the Attomey-
General appealed more decisions, as did the Queensland Law Society. By the mid to late 
1990s, where the tribunal imposed a suspension, it became more common for either the 
society or Attomey-General to lodge an appeal. There was also an increased likelihood 
that those appeals would be successful. On the hearing of these appeals, the court 
generally took a harsher approach, overturning a number of suspensions and substituting 
them with an order that the practitioner be stmck from the roll. 
' [1990] 1 Qd R 498, 508. The court may have replaced the strike off order with a fine had it been aware 
tiiis was an option available to it: below section 5.3.7. 
' ' '[1992]2QdR690. 
" The suspension had been imposed by the tribunal on 12 March 1987 and by the time of the Full Court's 
decision - 26 April 1991 - Dowsett J (with whom Macrossan CJ and Ryan J agreed) commented that 'it 
would seem that tiie appellant has already served his period of suspension and no point will be served by 
"fine-tuning" at this stage' (703). 
'* Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [ 1990] 1 Qd R 498. 
^' Re Wheeler [1992] 2 Qd R 690, decided 26 April 1991. 
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5.3.4.2 Suspension Renaissance in 2000s? 
Having not allowed any suspension imposed by the tribunal to stand since Re Wheeler^^ 
in 1991, between 2002 and 2006 the court then dismissed five appeals in which the 
Attomey General or Queensland Law Society argued that individuals who had been 
suspended should have been stmck off '^ The general approach of the court in these later 
cases was to state that a finding of lack of character or tmstworthiness was necessary 
^°[1992]2QdR690. 
'^ 1. Attorney-General v Clough [2002] 1 Qd R 116 was the first such case. The tribunal had ordered 
that tiie practitioner be suspended for 12 montiis {Re Practitioner X {1999) 5 Disciplinary Action Report 
15, SCT 6204, 24 August 1999.). The practitioner appealed against both findings and order, and tiie 
Queensland Law Society cross-appealed against the order and argued that the practitioner should be stmck 
off. The Attomey-General also appealed against the suspension order and sought a strike off order. 
Although Pincus JA thought tiie tribunal's findings had been 'tiie most charitable which could be adopted' 
(119), tiie case proceeded on the basis that the practitioner's conduct amounted to incompetence rather than 
a dishonest attempt to ftirther his client's case. Altiiough the court did hold that even the incompetent could 
be stmck from the roll (120, 132), the court appeared reluctant to strike off Clough without a direct finding 
of dishonesty. Although 'not without reservations' (139), the court allowed his 12 month suspension to 
stand. 
2. Attomey-General v Priddle [2002] QCA 297 suggests a more definitive embrace of suspension 
orders by the court. The Attomey-General appealed a 12 month suspension imposed by the ttibunal {Re 
Priddle 9 [2002] Disciplinary Action Report 14, SCT 54, 30 October 2001). The practitioner was found 
guilty of unprofessional conduct for failing to keep proper records of tmst monies as required by tiie Trust 
Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) and of failing to provide accounts of the tmst assets to the client or the 
Queensland Law Society when requested. The tribunal had given no reasons why it was imposing a 
suspension but the Queensland Court of Appeal referred to a number of personal circumstances which 
'helped provide some explanation for the respondent's grossly unsatisfactory conduct', ([13]) and noted 
that tiiere was no evidence of dishonesty or deceit in an isolated lapse ([12]) and tiiat excellent character 
references had been tendered ([13]). The court dismissed the Attomey-General's appeal, determining that 
there was no evidence that tiie suspension order was manifestiy inadequate ([14]). 
3. Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Whitman [2003] QCA 438: tiie Queensland Court of 
Appeal expressed concem ([42]) tiiat tiie disciplinary ttibunal {Re Whitman SCT 83, 12 Febmary 2003, 7, 
unreported) had suspended a solicitor for nine months, even though the solicitor 'gives tiie appearance of 
still not believing he has done anything wrong and is likely therefore to re-offend'. The court also noted 
Whittnan's 'combative stance' in tiie ttibunal but allowed tiie suspension to stand. 
4. Council of the Queensland Law Society v Roche [2003] QCA 469: tiie appeal court agam deferred 
to the tribunal's ability to observe at first hand whetiier a solicitor was hkely to develop insight into their 
misconduct so as to become fit to practise before a period of suspension expired. The court refiised to 
interf-ere with a 12 montii suspension because it felt the solicitor would 'undoubtedly [learn a lesson] from 
tiie substantial period of suspension imposed upon him' and his 'basic honesty, integrity and intelligence' 
would ensure there would be no fiirther misconduct on his rettim to practice. 
5. Council of the Queensland Law Society v Cummings [2004] QCA 138: tiie court allowed a 12 
month suspension to stand, accepting that the ttibunal had found the solicitor to be fit and proper at the ttme 
of the hearing but had imposed the suspension as a special and general deteirent ([23]). See discussion 
above section 2.5.2. 
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before a person would be stmck off, but arguably tiiis overiooks the degree to which law 
required the public to be protected from the honestly incompetent, not just the 
dishonest. 
Regardless of whether or not these decisions suggest the appellate court is becoming 
more tolerant of suspension orders or deciding to interfere less often in the tribunal's 
exercise of discretion more generally, this does not affect the evidence tiiat, between 
1957 and 2002, when the court was clearly discouraging the use of suspensions, the 
tribunal appeared to disregard the court's preference. The attitude of the courts since 
Ziems^^ in 1957 had been to restrict the circumstances in which a suspension order would 
adequately protect the public. If the tribunal was ignoring the attitude of the appellate 
court, this may indicate that the tribunal was not operating according to law. More 
importantly for the thesis raised here, it may also show that the tribunal was risking the 
success of any legitimation project and failing to protect the public. 
5.3.5 The Evidence: Suspensions Imposed by the Tribunal 
The earlier parts of this chapter have explained why the use of suspensions is problematic 
from the point of view of any legitimation project, and also because the courts have 
greatly constrained the circumstances in which suspensions should be used. The chapter 
will now look at general trends in the use of suspensions by the tribunal. It will then 
" See discussion above section 2.4.3.4. 
" Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW {1957) 97 CLR 279. 
188 
Chapter Five: Incapacitation 
examine some cases in which the tribunal has suspended a practitioner and seek 
explanations for the imposition of such an order. 
The decision in Ziems was handed down in July 1957. As was discussed previously, in 
that decision the High Court greatly narrowed the circumstances in which suspensions 
were justified. If not fit to practise, a practitioner should normally be stmck off If fit to 
practise, the practitioner should be allowed to remain in practice. 
What impact did that decision have upon the practice of the disciplinary tribunal in 
Queensland? Although the rate of suspensions did decrease after Ziems, from 21% of 
cases at the time oi Ziems to only 5% of cases in the first half of the 1960s,^ suspensions 
then became much more popular with the tribimal, which imposed them in 30 percent of 
cases heard in the latter half of the 1960s. This comprises the highest rate of suspensions 
since the late 1930s.^ ^ However, suspensions were then used less often, comprising only 
11% of orders in 1971-1975 and 8% in 1976-1980.^^ 
hi October 1980, in Mellifont v Queensland Law Society Inc^^ the Supreme Court of 
Queensland limited the circumstances in which suspensions were appropriate, using the 
^^  Linda Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis' (2001) 
13 Bond Law Review 1-45, 25, Figure 3. 
" N=10. Period = 1966-1970. The low number of disciplinary hearings during this period is also cause for 
concem: Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis', 
above n 64, 26, Table 7. This reinforces tiie point made in Chapter One tiiat disciphnary hearings form only 
the tip of the iceberg and to understand the whole picture it is not sufficient to focus only on types of 
disciplinary outcomes or even disciplinary hearings. Investigation is also required as to which complaints 
are filtered out of the system before a formal hearing. 
" This period ended on 30 April 1980: Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: 
A Statistical Analysis', above n 64, 10. 
"[1981]QdR17. 
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most unambiguous language in its mlmg.'' It could therefore be expected that fewer 
practitioners would be suspended by the disciplinary tribunal after Mellifont. However, 
this does not appear to have been the case. During the five year period 1981-1985, 13 
percent of practitioners were suspended.^^ Throughout the 10 year period 1986-1994, the 
number of suspensions increased to well over 20 percent,^" despite the warnings in the 
cases discussed earlier in this chapter.^' It is possible tiiat, just as Chapter Two noted that 
Queensland judges appear to not necessarily have kept abreast of the relevant 
legislation,^^ tiie tribunal did not necessarily closely follow the legislation or court 
decisions. 
Interestingly, as the Supreme Court of Queensland has allowed more suspensions to stand 
since Clough, the tribunal appears to have become even bolder in its use of suspensions: 
the Legal Services Commissioner reports^^ tiiat in 2002-2003 eight practitioners were 
suspended, representing 33%) of the orders imposed that year - as high a proportion as it 
has ever been. 
It will often be inappropriate to suspend a practitioner who has already appeared before 
the disciplinary tribunal, as their reappearance suggests that they are not able to leam 
from their mistakes and are likely to remain unfit to practise. Suspensions become even 
less appropriate the greater the number of previous appearances. And yet, the tribunal has 
*^ See discussion above section 5.3.3. 
^' Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis', above n 64, 
25, Figure 3. 
70 
71 
™ 1986-1990=24.5%, 1991-1995=23.4%. Ibid. 
The number of suspensions then reduced to 17.5% of all orders in 1995-2000. Ibid. 
"^ Above section 2.4.3.4. 
^^  Queensland Legal Services Commissioner, Annual Report 2004-2005, 31, Table 1.1. 
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imposed suspensions on practitioners who have appeared previously. In the period 
between the decision in Mellifont and 28 March 2003,'''' at least 46 practitioners were 
suspended. Thirteen (28%) of them appear to have been before the tribunal on at least one 
prior occasion.^ ^ These included practitioners who had already received a period of 
^^  Being the date at which this analysis of suspensions was undertaken. 
''^l. Re Zakrjevsky (1985) 15 QLSJ 41 (SC258, 29 August 1984 (su.spended for three years for failing 
to supervise an articled clerk, failing to adequately protect the interests of clients, failing to ensure that 
lenders were told of his articled clerk's personal relationship with various borrowers, and for various 
breaches of the Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) and Regulations). This practitioner had appeared on two 
prior occasions: SC 215, 20 Febmary 1978 fined $200 and censured for unprofessional conduct and SC 
221, 27 November 1978 fined $500 for failing to respond to Law Society enquiries); 
2. Re Brown (1989) 19 QLSJ 76, SC 301, 12 April 1988 (suspended 26 months after being found 
guilty of unprofessional conduct due to applying trust monies of $587.60 to his own use, failing to pay 
$300 received for Counsel's fees into tmst, while acting for lessor and lessee, charging the lessee $387.00 
for stamp duty when the tme amount was $38.55, borrowing $5,000 from his client in breach of Rule 68E, 
which loan was not secured and not repaid). The practitioner had previously been suspended for 13 months, 
nearly 30 years eariier SC 133, 8 December 1959 
3. Re Willcox, unreported, SC 318, 5 December 1989 (by majority, suspended for 19 months for 
advertising his business. Property Transfer Co, in two Brisbane newspapers, in breach of Rule 81(1), which 
prohibited the unfair attraction of business). He had already been suspended on an eariier occasion: Re 
Willcox (1988) 18 QLSJ 411, 417; SC 298, 1 December 1987 (suspended for 19 months for preparing and 
sending a false bill of costs to the Legal Services Commission of NSW to mislead the Commission into 
believing that he had charged the client $3,750 when in fact he had charged the client $13,750, preparing a 
false mortgage document to mislead Defence Service Home Corporation into believing that his client had 
received bridging finance, and by making a false statement to that corporation, transferring monies from the 
trust account into his general account without authority on a number of occasions). 
4. Re Simotas, unreported, SC 337, 3 September 1992 (suspended for 15 months for failing to 
respond to Law Society enquiries). He had appeared before the lower level Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 
on an eariier occasion: SDT 3016, 21 March 1990 (fined $4,000 for failing to respond to Law Society 
enquiries). He also appeared in SDT 3016, 21 March 1990, when the Sohcitors Disciplinary Tribunal 
referred the matter to the higher level Statutory Committee, leading to the present proceedings. 
5. Re Tunn (1993) 13 QLSJ 190, SC 340, 4 November 1992 (suspended for 14 months after being 
found guilty of five breaches of Rule 83 Queensland Law Society Rules 1987 (Qld) and four charges of 
touting for business in breach of Rule 81(1), two charges of failing to register transfer documents, failing to 
deposit monies with the Queensland Law Society, failing to reconcile his trust account and failing to follow 
various advice from the society). He had previously been fmed: Re a Practitioner, (1985) 15 QLSJ 407, SC 
279 (fined $3,000 for wrongfiil conversion of $2,637.19 to pay his own rent, failing to keep proper tmst 
accounting records, failing to advise a client that tiie client's appeal had been listed and that the practitioner 
intended to seek leave to witiidraw, and failing to advise the client that the appeal was likely to be 
dismissed if tiie client was not legally represented). He was later suspended again: Re Tunn (1995) 25 QLSJ 
208, SC 354 28 September 1994 (suspended for 12 months for failmg to reveal to his clients, tiie purchasers 
of certain land, that he was a director and shareholder of the vendor company, acting witiiout instmctions, 
practising without a practising certificate and criminal conviction on two counts of sodomy). 
6. Re Graeme John Delaney (1993) 23 QLSJ 190, SC 344, 15 Febmary 1993 (suspended for 28 
months after failing to pay a professional indemnity insurance premium, acting as a solicitor without a 
practising certificate and failing to pay $500 into his tmst account). He had previou.sly appeared before the 
tiibunal in 1985 and fined $1,000 for preferring the interests of one client over the interests of another by 
failing to lodge a mortgage or caveat to secure a loan and, in relation to another loan, also preferred tiie 
interests of one client over the interests of another by failing to advise the client lender that the loan was to 
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suspension. One practitioner was fined^^ and then suspended for 14 months, before 
being suspended for a ftirther period of 12 months on his tiiird appearance.^^ He was later 
be used to pay outstanding indebtedness of tiie borrower client or otherwise protect the interests of the 
lender. ReX{l985) 15 QLSJ 353. 
7. Re Revell (1994) 24 QLSJ 380, SC 352, 22 Febmary 1994. (suspended for three years for 
numerous tmst account breaches, misleading the Law Society and misleading the ttibunal). He had been 
censured and ordered to arrange a management audit and attend LawCare in 1993 by the Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal after failing to respond to Law Society requests for information: Re X (1993) 23 
Queensland Law Society Joumal 295, SDT 40, 9 Febmary 1993. 
8 Re Tunn (again) (1995) 25 QLSJ 208, SC 354 28 September 1994 (suspended for 12 months for 
failing to reveal to his clients, tiie purchasers of certain land, that he was a director and shareholder of the 
vendor company, acting witiiout instmctions, practising without a practising certificate and criminal 
conviction on two counts of sodomy). Previously fined and suspended: Re Tunn (1993) 13 QLSJ 190, SC 
340, 4 November 1992 (suspended for 14 months after being found guilty of five breaches of Rule 83 
Queensland Law Society Rules 1987 (Qld) and four charges of touting for business in breach of Rule 81(1), 
two charges of failing to register tt^sfer documents, failing to deposit monies with the Queensland Law 
Society, failing to reconcile his ttxist account and failing to follow various advice from the society); Re a 
Practitioner, (1985) 15 QLSJ 407, SC 279 (fined $3,000 for wrongful conversion of $2,637.19 to pay his 
own rent, failing to keep proper ttiist accounting records, failing to advise a client that the client's appeal 
had been listed and that the practitioner intended to seek leave to withdraw, and failing to advise the client 
that the appeal was likely to be dismissed if the client was not legally represented). 
9 Re Mead (1997) 1 Disciplinary Action Report 4, SC 378, 18 September 1996. This suspension 
was set aside on appeal and the practitioner stmck off: Queensland Law Society Inc v Mead [1997] QCA 83 
(22 April 1997). 
10. Re Webster (1999) 4 Disciplinary Action Report 9, SCT 6, 3 July 1998 (suspended for one year 
for failing to respond to Law Society requests for information and for failing to supply a bill of costs). He 
had previously been fined $10,000 by the tribunal for borrowing from a client and for sending a misleading 
letter to the Law Society: Re X {1993) 23 QLSJ 90. This prior appearance is not referred to in the latter 
report. 
11. Re Carberry (2000) 6 Disciplinary Action Report 17, SCT 31, 6 March 2000 (su-spended for 12 
months). He had previously appeared before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in 1992 and was fined 
$400 for failing to respond to Law Society requests for information. This suspension was overtumed on 
appeal. 
12. Re Nettleton, SCT 42, 21 November 2000. 
13. Re DaCosta (2003) 11 Disciplinary Action Report 39, SCT 82, 22 October 2002 (suspended for 
two years for practising without a certificate). In 1997 he had been fined $2,500 by the tribunal for 
borrowing from a client (Rule 86), acting for both parties in relation to an excluded mortgage (Rule 85) and 
acting in a conflict of interest: SC385, 27 Febmary 1997, unreported. 
'"' Re a Practitioner, (1985) 15 QLSJ 407, SC 279 (fined $3,000 for wrongfiil conversion of $2,637.19 to 
pay his own rent, failing to keep proper tmst accounting records, failing to advise a client that the client's 
appeal had been listed and that the practitioner intended to seek leave to withdraw, and failing to advise the 
client that the appeal was likely to be dismissed if the client was not legally represented). 
" Re Tunn (1993) 13 QLSJ 190, SC 340, 4 November 1992 (suspended for 14 months after being found 
guilty of five breaches of Rule 83 Queensland Law Society Rules 1987 (Qld) and four charges of touting 
for business in breach of Rule 81(1), two charges of failing to register transfer documents, failing to deposit 
monies with the Queensland Law Society, failing to reconcile his trust account and failing to follow various 
advice from the society). 
'^ Re Tunn (1995) 25 QLSJ 208, SC 354 28 September 1994 (suspended for 12 months for failing to reveal 
to his clients, the purchasers of certain land, that he was a director and shareholder of the vendor company, 
acting without instmctions, practising without a practising certificate and criminal conviction on two counts 
of sodomy). 
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stmck off^ ^ Another solicitor was suspended for 19 months^^ before being later 
suspended for another period of 19 months^' and subsequently stmck off^ ^ It is 
surprising that the tribunal appeared so willing to use suspensions rather than strike off 
orders when previous appearances before the tribunal raise serious doubts as to fitness -
and particularly when a previous period of suspension has not been effective in 
improving a practitioner's standards of conduct. 
5.3.6 Broader Range of Orders Available in Australia 
Under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), and the Queensland Law Society Act 1952 
(Qld) before it, the tribunal had a wide range of orders available to it. There was no need 
for the tribunal to impose a suspension where doubt existed. Also, in Queensland, a 
suspension is quite distinct from a strike off order. By comparison, when practitioners are 
suspended ui most States of the United States, they do not have an automatic right to 
™ Tunn's fourth appearance before the ttibunal was in July 2004: Re Tunn SCT 124, 1 July 2004. (by 
majority, sttnck from the roll for serious neglect and failing to maintain reasonable standards of 
competence or diligence, failing to respond to society requests for explanations of his conduct). The 
practitioner member in the minority did not consider a strike off order appropriate in the absence of any 
finding of fraud and would have preferred to fine the solicitor $30,000. Periiaps surprisingly, given his long 
history before tiie ttibunal, Tunn appealed tiiis decision: Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Tunn 
[2004] QCA 412. The court dismissed the appeal on the basis that Tunn did not appear to have leamt from 
his previous tiiree appearances before tiie ttibunal ([21]). Tunn may represent the exttemes to which a 
'merely' incompetent lawyer must go before tiiey will be sttuck from the roll. 
^^  Re Willcox (1988) 18 QLSJ 411, 417; SC 298, 1 December 1987 (suspended for 19 montiis for preparing 
and sending a false bill of costs to the Legal Services Commission of NSW to mislead the Commission into 
believing that he had charged tiie client $3,750 when in fact he had charged the client $13,750, preparing a 
false mortgage document to mislead Defence Service Home Corporation into believing tiiat his client had 
received bridging finance, and by making a false statement to tiiat corporation, transferring monies from tiie 
tmst account into his general account without authority on a number of occasions). 
*' Re Willcox, unreported, SC 318, 5 December 1989 (by majority, suspended for 19 montiis for advertising 
his business, Property Transfer Co, in two Brisbane newspapers, in breach of Rule 81(1), which prohibited 
the unfair attraction of business). 
*^  Re Willcox, unreported, SC 321, 6 December 1990 (stmck ofif for practising as a solicitor while under 
suspension). 
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recommence practice at the end of the period of suspension, as they would in 
Queensland. They must attend a hearing to show that they are fit to practise again.^ ^ hi 
Queensland, the right to recommence practice at the end of the period of suspension is 
automatic. The practitioner can quietly serve out the period of suspension and then re-
enter the profession without any ftirther publicity necessary. Therefore, the nature of a 
suspension order in Queensland is more distinct from a strike off order than it is in the 
United States. The automatic right to recommence practice at tiie end of the period of 
suspension means that suspensions have a less harsh effect than they have in the United 
States. 
American theorists who discuss the preferred options of disciplinary tribunals do not 
countenance the different regime of sanctions available to the tribunals in Queensland. 
In the United States, a suspension order is often likely to be ordered by default when the 
tribunal does not want to disbar an attomey from the roll but a censure or reprimand 
would appear to the public to be an inadequate response to the misconduct. Suspensions 
do not need to play the same role in Queensland, given that the option to fine up to 
For instance in Florida the disciplinary mles state that a practitioner suspended for more than 90 days, 
shall not be allowed to recommence practice without proof of rehabilitation and may be required to resit all 
or part of the Florida Bar examination: Florida Bar, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, mle 2.3 
(updated July 2000) The concems about the protective effect of a suspension are discussed in the 
commentary at page 13: 
http://www.fioridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/18F7IB077A612FB785256DFE00664509/ 
$FILE/lawversanctions03.pdf.>Open£lement at 3April 2006. 
^ For example, Stephen Bene, 'Why Not Fine Attomeys?: An Economic Approach to Lawyer Disciplinary 
Sanctions' (1991) Stanford Law Review 907-941; Leslie Levin, 'The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales 
About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions' (1998) 48 American University Law 
Review 1. 
194 
Chapter Five: Incapacitation 
$100,000 exists, if necessary.^^ If the tribunal does not want to strike off a practitioner, it 
can impose a fine. 
Given that in Queensland, the tribunal has a wide range of other options available to it 
and that the court has queried tiie circumstances in which a suspension will adequately 
protect the public, a low rate of suspension orders could be expected if the tribunal is 
pursuing its protective role. The imposition of a suspension may also risk an appeal by 
the Attomey-General. Such appeals are likely to be damaging to any legitimation project. 
The option of seeking readmission has some small chance of success in Queensland. ^ ^ 
This should therefore not be a factor inhibiting the tribunal's use of the strike off power. 
5.3.7 Suspensions as Deterrence or Retribution? The Court's Attitude 
It will be recalled that the High Court suspended the practitioner in Ziems v Prothonotary 
of the Supreme Court of New South Wales^^ for the period that he remained in prison, 
even though the majority of the court accepted that Ziems remamed fit to practise.**** As 
well as protecting the public from the 'incongmity' of a barrister practising from prison, 
there was arguably a deterrent element in the court's decision. But such a finding is 
unusual. It was earlier suggested that the courts usually fmd that the person appearing 
85 
86 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 280(4)(a), previously Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6R 
(l)(c). Fines in the disciplinary context are considered in Chapter Six. 
** Applications for readmission were successful in Re Bell, Supreme Court of Queensland, Full Court, 
622/1991, 6 December 1991, Thomas, Williams, Derrington JJ, unreported, and in Re Taylor [1997] 1 Qd 
R 533. Unsuccessful applications for readmission were made in Re Currie Supreme Court of Queensland, 
Full Court, 417/1990 8 March 1991, Williams, Ryan, Dowsett JJ, unreported, Janus v Qld Law Society Inc 
[2001] QCA 180 and Gregory v Queensland Law Society Inc [2001] QCA 499 (13 November 2001). 
*'(1957) 97 CLR 279. 
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before tiiem is unfit to practise before speaking of the deterrent effect of stiike offs and 
suspensions. 
This chapter will now discuss the few cases in which, despite a finding that a practitioner 
was fit to practise at the date of the tribunal hearing, the court imposed a suspension 
order. The question is whether the aim of the suspension was to deter such conduct, either 
by that practitioner (special deterrence) or by fellow practitioners (general deterrence) or 
whether it was imposed as rehibution for past misconduct. Deterrence is consistent with 
the protective role of the tribunal. However, general deterrence requires the knowledge of 
the order to be disseminated to tiie wider legal community - an issue taken up in Chapter 
Eight. As noted in Chapter Two,*^ " the courts have generally denied that disciplinary 
proceedings should contain any element of retribution. A closer look at the cases in 
which a suspension order was ordered despite current fitness to practise may help to 
illuminate this question whether retribution may in fact exist. 
In two of the three Queensland cases in which 'fit' practitioners were suspended, they 
were appealing from tribunal decisions that they be stmck from the roll and so a 
suspension order represented a more favourable outcome. The first of these cases is Re a 
Solicitor,''^ decided in 1932. There, a strike off order was set aside and the practitioner 
suspended for 18 months despite a finding that he was fit to practise at the time of the 
The case is discussed in more detail above section 2.6.3.1. 
^'^ Above section 2.5.2. Prothonotary v Del Castillo [2001] NSWCA 75, [71]; Prothonotary of the Supreme 
Court ofNSWvP [2003] NSWCA 320, [36] (Tobias JA), [17], [30] (Young CJ in Eq, with whom Meagher 
J A agreed). 
Above section 2.5.3. 
(1932) St R Qd 33. The practitioner had appealed from a tribunal order that he be stmck from the roll. 
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hearing.^ ^ It is possible that the court imposed the suspension order to punish the 
practitioner as it was not until 1938, in Re M^^ that the Supreme Court of Queensland 
first acknowledged that discipline was designed to protect not punish.^ "^  This is supported 
by the numerous references to 'punishment' in the judgment ^ and by the comment of 
Blair CJ and Webb J that, despite the solicitor's current fitness to practise, a 'strong mark 
96 
of disapproval' was required. 
Although the court was much more practised in the 'protect not punish' mantra by the 
time it heard the second practitioner appeal in Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc, 
no unfitness to practise was found by the court in that case, and yet the court suspended 
Adamson for 12 months. This was also an appeal by a practitioner against an order 
striking him from the roll and so a suspension constituted a more favourable outcome for 
Adamson. While notmg that Adamson's conduct did not warrant an order striking him 
from tiie roll,^ ^ Thomas J did not explain why he considered a 12 month suspension to be 
'- The practitioner had led a client mortgagee to believe a property was worth 2,250 pounds by withholding 
a valuation prepared by his own employee which valued the property at only 2,000 pounds. The court 
found tiiat the practitioner knew or should have known that the security for another mortgage was 'grossly 
inadequate' (41). The court declined to find that fraud had been proved (47) and felt that the practitioner 
was fit to practise (41). 
''[1938] St RQd 454. 
''' Discussed above section 2.4.1. 
'^  Re a Solicitor (1932) St R Qd 33. 
'* Ibid 41. EA Douglas J agreed tiiat the appropriate order was a suspension of 18 months (47). 
' ' [1990] 1 Qd R 498, discussed in more detail above section 5.3.6. 
'* Thomas J, witii whom Connolly and Ambrose JJ agreed, considered tiiat tiie tribunal's order striking tiie 
practitioner from the roll was not sustainable having regard to the 'limited basis upon which the finding of 
professional misconduct' had been sustained before tiie court (508). There was a 'failure to find any breach 
of tiie duty of supervision, the absence of any disservice to clients' (506). Only two of the six charges 
against the practitioner were upheld upon appeal, namely that that practitioner had knowingly breached 
Rule 67 of the Solicitors' Handbook by sharing receipts with an unqualified person. Thomas J noted that 
Rule 67 as contained in the Solicitors Handbook did not expressly prohibit the sharing of receipts (501). 
Nor did the Rule have the stattis of law, there being no evidence that it had been approved by the Govemor 
in Council (501-2). It was more an indication by the profession tiiat it considered the sharing of receipts, 
without prior express approval by the Queensland Law Society, to be unacceptable (501). Thus his Honour 
did not consider this to be a serious example of misconduct. 
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the most appropriate substitute order. However, comments earlier in his judgment suggest 
he may have been unaware that fines could be imposed.^^ Had he been aware of this, the 
court may have taken that opportunity, given strong indications in the case tiiat the court 
considered Adamson still fit to practise. 
The reason for the suspension in the third case - Council of the Queensland Law Society v 
Cummings^'^^ - is much clearer. There, the court stated categorically that the tribunal had 
found the practitioner fit to practise at the time of hearing, and the court endorsed his 
suspension, as a deterrent for both himself and other practitioners. 101 
In summary, only tiiree Queensland cases have suspended practitioners while noting their 
current fitness to practise. Two of these replaced sttike off orders witii suspensions, 
one"^ ^ predating Queensland's adoption of the 'protect not punish' purpose of discipline 
and the other indicating'^^ that the court may have imposed a fine had it been aware of 
that option. It is only in tiie third case that the court clearly endorsed the use of 
suspensions as deterrence. 
[1990] 1 Qd R 498, 506. This aspect of the case is discussed in more detail below section 6.6. 
'°° [2004] QCA 138. 
'°' Ibid [23]. See above section 2.5.2. 
'°- J?e a 5o//c/7or (1932) St R Qd 33. 
'"' Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498. 
'""^  Council of the Queensland Law Society v Cummings [2004] QCA 138. 
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5.3.8 Barristers 
It is rare to find examples of the suspension of barristers. The suspension imposed by the 
High Court in Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW^^'^ has been 
referred to earlier.'^^ But it would seem that the only reason Ziems was suspended was 
because of his imprisonment and it was only for the period of his imprisonment. 
Until the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), any suspension of Queensland barristers, as 
with any disbarment, could only be imposed by the Supreme Court of Queensland in its 
inherent jurisdiction.'°^ A barrister was suspended by the court in R v Byrne; in re 
Swanwick.^^^ Although a barrister was also suspended in Re Perske, he was practising 
as a solicitor at the time, and the proceedings were instituted by the Queensland Law 
Association, the professional organisation representing solicitors at the time. 
No barrister has been suspended in Queensland since that time.'" A reading of the cases 
at first suggests that the court may not have countenanced tiie option of suspending a 
'"'(1957) 97 CLR 279. 
Above section 5.3.3.1. 
'"^  See above section 4.2. The Statutory Committee did suspend a barrister for three years in 1932 during a 
period when the legal profession in Queensland was ftised: SC 13, 29 Febmary 1932. For tiie history of the 
divided profession in Queensland, see John Forbes, The Divided Legal Profession in Australia: History, 
Rationalisation and Rationale (Law Book Co, Sydney, 1979). 
'™ (1882) 1 May 1882, Queensland Law Joumal 66. 
'"'(1896) 7 QLJ 73. 
"° The association was replaced by the Queensland Law Society in 1927: above sectton 4.5.1. 
'" Of course, no barristers have ever been suspended by their professional body, the Bar Association of 
Queensland, as it had no statutory, only contractual, powers over tiiose barristers who chose to become 
members. AJthough tiie Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) gave it some stattitory powers, tiiese relate only to 
practising certificates not the imposition of discipline. Practising certificates are discussed in the following 
section. 
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barrister. However, obiter dicta comments in Barristers' Board v Darveniza^^^ do 
suggest otherwise. There, Thomas J A " ^ closely examined the types of disciplinary order 
that could be imposed upon a barrister. He analysed cases involving not only barristers 
but also solicitors,""* and cited a South Australian decision involving a solicitor - In Re a 
Practitioner^ ^ ^ - for tiie proposition that suspensions were not appropriate where a 
practitioner had shown tiiat he or she 'lacks tiie qualities of character and 
tmstwortiiiness'."^ His Honour then catalogued the evidence that Darveniza had 'an easy 
familiarity with the dmg scene'"^ and an 'utter disrespect for the law.'"^ Combined with 
his recent convictions for tiie supply of methyl amphetamines and his opportunistic 
conduct, tins demonstt-ated a character tiiat was unsuitable for legal practice,"^ and the 
court ordered that his name be removed from the roll. 
The disciplinary options available to the court were also canvassed by some members of 
the court in Barristers' Board v Young.^^^ De Jersey CJ'^' only mentioned in passing that 
Young would no doubt prefer to be suspended than stmck off,'^ ^ but Mackenzie J 
discussed the option of suspension in greater detail, adopting Thomas J's statement from 
Darveniza as to the appropriate circumstances requfred before a suspension could be 
imposed.'^^ However, Mackenzie J concluded that, although Young may be 'well thought 
"-[2000] QCA 253. 
"^ With whom McMurdo P and White J agreed. 
"'' Linda Haller, 'Disciplinary Fines: Deterrence or Retribution?' (2003) 5 Legal Ethics 152-178, 155. 
"^ (1984) 36 SASR 590, 593 (King J). 
"^ Ibid 593 (King CJ), cited Darveniza [38]. 
' " [2000] QCA 253, [46]. 
"* Ibid [48]. 
';'lbid. 
'-° [2001] QCA 556. Discussed in more detail below section 7.2.5. 
'•' With whom Davies JA agreed. 
'"Ibid [19]. 
'-^ Ibid [44]-[45]. 
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of by friends and workmates and has innate qualities upon which she could build . . . ' j ' ^ '* 
her conduct before the Shepherdson inquiry showed flaws of character. Therefore, a 
suspension order would not be sufficient to protect the public.'^^ 
Thus, while very few disciplinary cases are brought against barristers, those which do 
come before the court are much more likely to lead to a strike off order than to a 
suspension or fine. The dearth of cases in which barristers have been suspended by the 
courts when imposing discipline within their inherent jurisdiction is consistent with the 
court's general dislike of suspensions when dealing with appeals against suspensions 
imposed upon solicitors. However, the distinction between solicitors and barristers in the 
applicability of suspensions may be even greater, as the survey of the case law suggests 
that tiie courts may treat the conduct of barristers m a more absolute way, whereas a 
range of disciplinary responses is recognised in relation to solicitors. In other words, it 
may be tiiat the court applies the 'fit-unfit', 'good character-bad character' dichotomy 
more readily to barristers than it does to solicitors. Alternatively, it may be tiiat a broader 
range of disciplinary responses is anticipated by both the courts and legislature in relation 
to solicitors simply because solicitors engage in a much broader range of legal practice -
and hence misconduct - than barristers. While technically, the court has the power to 
fashion a broad range of orders in its mherent jurisdiction,'^^ it does not have the same 
degree of administrative support to supervise orders as has gradually developed within 
'-* Ibid [48] 
'^ ^ Ibid [49] 
'^' Note tiie range of orders available witiiin the court's inherent jurisdiction, as anticipated by Kirby P in 
Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman (1994) 34 NSWLR 408, 420. 
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tiie solicitor's branch of the profession.'^^ Much of this support is ftinded by practising 
certificate fees and, within tiie barristers' branch of tiie profession, such fees were only 
introduced in 2004.''' This may be a practical reason why tiie court has been less mclined 
to consider suspensions or fines when disciplining hamsters. Finally, it may simply be 
that only tiie most serious cases have been brought to the court in its inherent jurisdiction, 
making a strike off order almost inevitable - whether against a solicitor or barrister. 
5.4 PRACTISING CERTIFICATES 
5.4.1 The Relevance of Practising Certificates 
Chapter Three documented the dearth of discussion of professional discipline in the work 
of Larson.^ ^^ In her footnote discussion of discipline,'^° Larson adopted Freidson's 
observation from the medical profession'^' that discipline became a necessity only in the 
most egregious cases of misconduct which had already caught public attention. In other 
cases, 
colleagues tend to encourage the culprit to "resign from their company" - to bar him, that 
is, from the informal networks, rather than expel him from the profession.'^ ^ 
'•^ ^ Examples include the collection of fines, supervision of suspension, reporting, education and 
counselling. All of these orders have been managed by the Queensland Law Society since 1927. See Reid 
Mortensen, 'Lawyers' Character, Moral Insight and Ethical Blindness', (2002) 22 The Queensland Lawyer 
166-179, 171. While the support is usually provided to orders made by the statutory tribunal, there is no 
reason why the society would not have offered similar support if required by the court. It remains unclear 
whether the Legal Services Commission or the professional bodies will take simtiar administrative 
responsibility under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), given that the Act clearly excludes tiiose bodies 
from any disciplinary role. 
'-* Practising certificates for barristers were introduced by tiie Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). 
'"'' Magali Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (University of Califomia Press, 
Berkeley, 1977), discussed above section 3.8. 
"° Ibid 229, note 49. 
' ' ' Eliot Freidson, Doctoring Together: a Study of Professional Social Control (Elsevier, New York, 1975). 
'^ - Larson, above n 129, 229 note 49. 
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The cancellation or suspension of a lawyer's practising certificate can be seen as a more 
informal way of dealing with allegations of misconduct than is discipline. There have 
been such extensive changes in disciplinary stmctures that it is now difficult to argue that 
professional bodies control discipline.'" In contrast, professional bodies have extensive 
powers in relation to practising certificates which give them great practical control -
short of removal from the profession itself- as to who will, or will not, be able to practise 
law.'^'' In order to assess whether professional bodies devote most of their energy to 
pursuing a 'professional project,'^^ an examination of how those bodies have used their 
powers in relation to practising certificates is necessary. 
5.4.2 Extent of the Practising Certificate Powers 
Since the Queensland Law Society Act was first introduced in 1927, the Queensland Law 
Society has had some power in relation to the right of solicitors to practise law and over 
tiie years, those powers have increased.'^^ The Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) extended 
' " Above section 4.6. 
'^ "^  Linda Haller, 'Discipline v Regulation: Lessons fi-om the Collapse of Tasmania's Legal Profession 
Reform Bill 2004' (2005) 12 E Law - Murdoch University Electronic Joumal of Law, 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/vl2nl 2/Hallerl2 l.html at 1 March 2006. 
'^ ^ Above section 3.8. 
"^ Although tiie Act of 1927 gave the society the power to prescribe an annual practising fee (s 4(9)(i)(g)), 
much more extensive powers were granted by amendments in 1930, making it an offence to practise 
without a practising certificate (s 26), and giving the society the power to refuse a certificate if the applicant 
was an undischarged bankrupt, in prison, in breach of ttust account obligations, in default of the Act, 
refusing to explain his conduct, or sharing receipts with an unqualified person (s 29). Further amendments 
in 1938 allowed tiie society to refuse to issue a practising certificate to a practitioner who was in default of 
an order of the disciplinary tribunal, had practised witiiout a certificate in the past or who had not 
reimbursed monies paid fi-om tiie fidelity fund (s 9).Amendments in 1974 gave the society the power to 
cancel or refuse to issue a practising certificate if 'infiraiity, injury or illness (whetiier mental or physical)' 
made a practitioner 'unfit to carry on and conduct his practice' and if it was 'in tiie interests of his clients or 
of tiie public' that the certificate be cancelled or refiised (s 41 A). The society could also suspend a 
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tiie practising certificate powers of the Queensland Law Society even fiirther, and granted 
similar powers to tiie Bar Association of Queensland for tiie first time.'" As well as 
having the power to impose any condition which is 'reasonable and relevant','^^ the 
professional bodies can now reftise, cancel, suspend or amend a local practising 
certificate after giving the certificate holder 28 days to respond to a 'show cause' 
notice,'^^ or mimediately if necessary in tiie public interest.''^^ 
5.4.3 Discipline and Certification: Effectiveness 
What relevance do these certification powers have for tiie current thesis about 
disciplinary proceedings? The protection of the public is not necessarily concemed with 
how an individual lawyer is removed from practice, whether by the judicial means of 
discipline or by the administrative act of cancelling a practising certificate. 
Nevertheless, the exercise of practising certificate powers caimot play the symbolic, 
demonstrative role that disciplinary proceedings can play.'"*^ A professional body's 
practising certificate if the Council had decided to lay disciplinary charges'^* or had taken control of the 
practitioner's tmst account,'^ ^ where there were tmst account irregularities or where the practitioner had 
been convicted upon indictment or convicted of an offence which involved moral turpitude or fraud (s 
4IB). In 1985, the society's powers to refiise a certificate were further extended to situations where the 
applicant had taken advantage of the bankmptcy laws, was in default of an order of the disciplinary tribunal 
or had failed to comply with a condition on a previous practising certificate (s 41). 
' " Reid Mortensen, 'Becoming a Lawyer: From Admission to Practice under the Legal Profession Act 
2004 (Qld)' (2004) 23 University of Queensland Law Joumal 319-346, 321-322; Linda Haller, 'Imperfect 
Practice under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld)' (2004) 23 University of Queensland Law Journal 411-
434,415. 
'^ * Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 53(1). 
'^' Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 68. 
'*" Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 79. 
''" It is likely to be cheaper to remove a person's right to practise by cancelling their practising certificate 
through administrative action than by convening a disciplinary hearing to achieve the same result. 
Administrative action can also respond more rapidly to concems about a legal practitioner's suitability to 
practise than can disciplinary action. 
*" Many forms of prosecution serve an important symbolic role, which can outweigh any instmmental role: 
Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002) 416. 
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choice between exercising practising certificate powers or disciplinary powers may also 
provide usefril insights into the degree to which that body is pursuing an agenda of 
legitimation rather than public protection. 
Some of these powers also demonstrate an area in which disciplinary proceedings have 
developed a limited ability to protect the public. The particular powers of interest are 
those which allow the professional bodies to deal with unfitness arising from ill-health. It 
has afready been noted that the Supreme Court took a narrower view of the type of 
conduct liable to discipline than did Parliament''*^ - usually requiring 'dishonour or 
disgrace' or defects in character before removing a person from practice through a strike 
off order. Later discussion will demonstrate in more detail how the court's approach 
made a disciplinary response to mental illness problematic. Amendments to practising 
certificate powers in 1974'"*^  show that there was no doubt - at least within Parliament -
by that time that ill health could lead to unfitness to practise. But discipline carried 
overtones of moral turpitude which limited its protective ability. The extension of powers 
in relation to practising certificates had the same practical effect as disciplinary 
proceedings: an individual who it was thought was no longer fit to practise was removed 
from practice. But this was done, not through establishuig their 'dishonourable or 
disgraceful misconduct' but by cancellation or suspension of thefr practising certificate, a 
process which did not have the same moral overtones as discipline. 
Above section 2.4. 
Below section 7.2. 
"*' Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 41A. 
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This raises the question of why - in other types of cases - disciplinary proceedings are 
used in preference to practising certificate procedures that are likely to be quicker and 
cheaper? It is suggested tiiat the issue is not seen as simply tiie removal of an individual 
lawyer from practice; disciplinary proceedings play a symbolic role that practising 
certificate powers cannot. This explanation is also supported by noting the number of 
individuals brought before a disciplinary tribunal even tiiough they were no longer 
practising law - as many as 22%.'"^^ This strengthens the argument that much of the role 
of disciplinary proceedings is a demonstrative and symbolic one rather than a practical, 
instrumental one.'"*^ It could be that the proceedings were taken to deter other 
practitioners from similar misconduct, which is consistent with the protective role. 
Altematively, the proceedfrigs could be playing a role in a legitimation project. 
What evidence do we have as to the choices that professional bodies have made? If up to 
22% of solicitors were no longer practising law when they were brought before the 
disciplinary tribunal, up to 78% of cases the society allowed an individual to continue to 
practise pending the disciplinary hearing. Any comparison of choices made by the society 
is only valid for the period when the society had the power to prosecute discipline as well 
as powers in relation to practising certificates. The society no longer has any prosecution 
role.'"*^ Similarly, the Bar Association of Queensland has never had a statutory 
' In the period 1977-2000, 22% of solicitors were no longer practising at the time of their appearance 
before the Queensland disciplinary tribunal: Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-
2000: A Statistical Analysis', above n 64, 16. This figure does not distinguish between those practitioners 
who had voluntarily resigned from practice and those who had been refiised a practising certificate by the 
Queensland Law Society. 
'*^  Hawkins, above n 142, 416. 
''^ ^ This was removed by Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). 
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prosecution role and has only recently been given powers in relation to practising 
certificates. 
Despite the potential power in relation to practising certificates, very little information is 
available as to how often the Queensland Law Society used that power. Unlike the 
extensive reporting required in relation to discipline, very little recording in relation to 
practising certificates has been required or provided.'"*^ Evidence of the suspension or 
cancellation of practising certificates may only come to light if the practitioner challenges 
the cancellation in court, and this has been rare.'^° If the society has exercised its powers 
in relation to practising certificates less often than anticipated by the legislation, it could 
be argued that it has abrogated the protective function allocated to it. But conversely, 
these certification powers have the potential to assist a legitimation project, by allowing 
matters to be handled behind closed doors and forestalling the need for the profession to 
afr its dirty linen in public. It is difficult to criticise the society if it chose instead to bring 
"" The Queensland Law Society annual reports advise on the number of certificates issued each year, but 
not the number refiised, suspended or cancelled. Clues as to the frequency with which the powers are used 
are rare. The 2000-2001 Annual Report noted that the practising certificate of two of six solicitors awaiting 
disciplinary hearing in relation to tmst account matters had been suspended: Queensland Law Society, 73"^ 
Annual Report 2000-2001, 47. This is the only reference to numbers of suspensions or cancellation in 
annual reports between 2000 and 2005. 
''° One reported case is Cheney v (Queensland Law Society Inc [2001] QSC 338, where the certificate had 
been cancelled by the society after an audit by the society revealed a number of breaches of the Trust 
Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) and a shortfall of $9,399.50 in her ttust account. She was subsequentiy stmck off: 
SCT55, 30 April 2002. The only other reported case is Jensen v Queensland Law Society Inc [2006] QSC 
27. Evidence that the society cancelled or suspended a soHcitor's practising certificate can arise through 
otiier means, as in Barristers Board v Khan [2001] QCA 92: in an application to strike the name of a 
barrister fi-om the roll, it was noted tiiat, when he had previously practised as a solicitor, the society had 
suspended his practising certificate after he improperiy deposited $35,000 mto his general account. He was 
fined $1,000 by the disciplinary ttibunal in 1997 for failing to respond to requests for information: SC 390, 
15 July 1997. 
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public disciplinary proceedings. These questions cannot be answered without more 
information about tiie use of certification powers 151 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to explain why a theory of legitimation would suggest that, once 
a matter reaches a disciplmary tribunal or court, it is likely tiiat the practitioner will be 
stiiick off, rather than suspended or fined. The chapter has also sought to demonstrate that 
the use of suspensions poses difficulties from a protective point of view, because tiie 
courts have indicated the very limited circumstances m which a suspension is a valid 
protective order. 
The chapter has also noted that disciplinary proceedings were brought in 22% of cases, 
despite the fact that the individual was not practising law at the time of the hearing. 
Was discipline necessary in such cases, given that any danger to the public had been 
effectively removed? Disciplinary proceedings were still necessary if they play a 
demonstrative - rather than a practical - role. What of, potentially, the 78% of cases in 
which the solicitor was still practising at the time of the disciplinary hearing? In a number 
of these cases, the society (as prosecutor) may have submitted to the tribunal that the 
solicitor was unfit to practise. Why then did the society allow them to continue to practise 
pending the disciplinary hearing? Many of those who have appeared before the solicitors' 
'^' As noted above section 3.10.2.1. 
' Above section 5.4.3. It is not known how many of these had chosen not to practise and how many had 
had their practising certificates cancelled. 
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disciplinary tribunal in the past have been sole practitioners, and the courts have 
wamed against exercising administiative intervention powers against sole practitioners, 
except in tiie most extieme circumstances,'^ "* given it will effectively destroy their 
practice.'^ ^ This is likely to have been a consideration. Even if there were partners to 
keep a practice alive, the society may have been reticent to fully exercise its practising 
certificate powers. If an individual was to be denied the right to practise, this would be 
decided by a statutory tribunal, not by the professional body itself 
Once the matter has been brought before the disciplinary tribunal, it would be expected 
that strike off orders would play the clearest demonstrative role. Instead the chapter has 
provided evidence to show that the tribunal which disciplines solicitors has continued to 
impose suspensions at a higher rate than would be expected, even to the point of defying 
court mlings. The high rate of suspensions challenges the effectiveness of any 
demonstrative role and questions the explanatory power of a legitimation theory, because 
suspensions send ambiguous messages to the public and risk a damagmg appeal. 
Why then are suspensions used so commonly by the tribunal in preference to strike off 
orders? One explanation is tiiat tiie tribunal has operated under a more retributive model 
than has been previously conceded.'^^ In otiier words, in cases in which the tiibunal 
would otherwise strike a lawyer from the roll, the tribunal has taken personal mitigating 
factors into account to spare the individual the greater shame of being stmck off The 
' " Between 1977 and 2000, 60% of practitioners who were still practising at the time of the tribunal 
hearing were sole practitioners: Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A 
Statistical Analysis', above n 64, 16. 
" ' Sheikh V The Law Society [2005] EWHC 1409 (Ch). 
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tribunal may hope that the lawyer will choose to retire from practice voluntarily 
following tiie suspension, hi addition, given the high rate of sole practitioner solicitors 
who have appeared before tiie tiibunal,'^^ the tribunal may have believed that the 
practical effect of the suspension order would be to remove the lawyer from practice, as 
it may be difficult for a sole practitioner solicitor to resurrect thefr practice after their 
period of suspension.'^ ** Although it is unknown how many suspended lawyers did 
resume practice, if a number of them do voluntarily retfre from practice, a suspension 
order may be of greater protective effect than first thought. This is particularly tme when 
combined with the fact that the Queensland Law Society'^ '^  has had extensive statutory 
powers to refuse practising certificates, even when a period of suspension imposed in 
disciplinary proceedfrigs had been completed. Therefore, m practical terms, a decision as 
to whether an individual would or would not be allowed to practise becomes an 
administrative rather than a judicial decision, and the disciplinary tribunal plays more of a 
demonstrative rather than a practical role. 
Most of this chapter has considered the suspension of Queensland solicitors. Only one 
Queensland barrister has ever been suspended in disciplinary proceedings, and that was 
in 1882.'^ ° Those Queensland barristers who have faced formal disciplinary proceedings 
have usually been struck off. The obvious explanation for this would be that only the 
'"Ibid [9]. 
'^ * See discussion of retribution above section 1.3.3. 
' " Between 1977 and 2000, 60% of practitioners who were still practising at the time of the tribunal 
hearing were sole practitioners: Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A 
Statistical Analysis', above n 64, 16. 
'^ ^ Sheikh V The Law Society [2005] EWHC 1409, [9]. 
'^' And since 2004, the Bar Association of Queensland. 
'^ ° ./? V Byrne; in re Swanwick (1882) 1 May 1882, Queensland Law Joumal 66, discussed above section 
5.3.13. 
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most serious disciplinary matters involving barristers have been brought before the court, 
lessening the likelihood of a suspension order. Another reason why the court did not 
suspend barristers could be the absence of practising certificates for barristers until 2004. 
In other words, there was no 'second line of defence' as there was in relation to solicitors. 
In addition, it must be noted that it has been the solicitors' disciplmary tribunal which has 
imposed suspensions while the Supreme Court has generally discouraged their use. 
Queensland barristers had no equivalent tribunal which may have been sunilarly inclined 
to order suspensions. 
Equally, the court may have been loath to extend the same 'mercy' to barristers as it 
appeared to have sometimes extended to solicitors. There could be a number of reasons 
for this. It could be that the court only saw the most serious cases mvolving barristers, felt 
that the bluntness of the inherent jurisdiction limited its disciplinary choices, applied a 
different standard to barristers,'^' or saw the conduct of barristers in a simpler, two 
dimensional way. All of these reasons may explain why, in relation to barristers, there 
often seemed to be a much simpler disciplinary choice - between striking off or not 
striking ofif 
I will take up the issues of 'mercy' and retribution more fully in the next chapter, in the 
context of disciplinary fines, and in Chapter Seven, where I discuss the relevance of 
personal factors. 
'^ ' The vast majority of judges were once barristers tiiemselves, not solicitors. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCIPLINARY FINES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter One I noted the mix of features present in criminal sentencing, where a court 
can aim to censure, protect and rehabilitate simultaneously. In Chapter Two 1 
documented the courts' insistence that the primary aim of discipline is to protect, not 
punish. The previous chapter is the first chapter in which I question the degree to which 
disciplinary outcomes have been consistent with the courts' pronouncements. In 
particular, I looked at orders which incapacitated lawyers from practising law and 
presented evidence as to the frequency with which suspension orders have been used by 
the solicitors' disciplinary tribunal. This result would be surprising both to lawmakers 
and from the perspective of theories of legitimation, given that a suspension order does 
not categorically and permanently remove a person from legal practice. I raised the 
possibility that retributive forces may have been at work in the disciplinary system more 
often than has been previously conceded - hence the high rate of suspensions. I look at 
another form of disciplinary outcome - fines - in this chapter. Again, I question whether 
the use of fines has been consistent with the 'protect not punish' mantra. Given that 
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disciplinary fines leave an individual in practice, their protective function becomes more 
tenuous - fines could only protect through deterrence. This leaves more room for 
retribution to play a role. 
As I cautioned in Chapter Three, it is not suggested that the members of the tribunal are 
necessarily making conscious choices in pursuing a particular mix of protection and 
retribution hi making any one order.^ Those members are no better trained in criminology 
than the newly appointed judges referred to by Hart,^  and it is notoriously difficult to 
establish causal relationships in matters involving as many actors as are involved in 
disciplinary proceedings. However, this is not to deny the usefulness of looking for 
pattems in the approach of the disciplinary tribunal and at least considering possible 
explanations for any pattems found. 
6.2 POWER TO IMPOSE DI SCIPLINARY FINES 
6.2.1 Solicitors 
Fines are not new in tiie discipline of Queensland lawyers - at least in relation to 
solicitors. The Supreme Court of Queensland has tiie power to impose fines in tiie 
' Above section 1.3.2. This is also the case for financial penalties in many regulatory settings: Karen 
Yeung, 'Quantifying Regulatory Penalties: Australian Competition Law Penalties in Perspective' (1999) 18 
Melbourne University Law Review 440-475. 
Above section 3.2. 
HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1968) 168-9 
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exercise of its inherent power to discipline practitioners. The disciplinary tribunal 
established in 1927 for the discipline of solicitors was given extremely broad powers in 
regard to the order which it could make. The Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) 
stated that the disciplinary tribunal had 
... subject to Rules of Court made under the authority of the Act, ... power after hearing 
the case to make any such order as to striking off the roll or suspending from practice 
either conditionally or otherwise, die practitioner to whom such application relates or as 
to the payment by any party of costs or othenvise, in relation to the case as before the 
commencement of the Act the court would have had power to make in accordance with 
the authority and practice of the court. 
Therefore, the tribunal had the power to make the same range of orders as the court 
within the court's inherent jurisdiction.^ However, Rules of Court were introduced by the 
Supreme Court of Queensland in 1928 to fix the maximum fine at £100. hi 1979, the 
court mles were again amended to increase the maximum fine from $1,000 to $5,000. 
The legislation governing the lower level disciplinary tribunal, the Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal, which operated from 1985-97, gave the tribunal the power to 'order the 
"* Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498, 505 (Thomas J, with whom Connolly and 
Ambrose JJ agreed), citing two cases from New South Wales: Re Heydon (1901) 1 SR (NSW) 81 and Re 
Fankcr (1913) 30 WN (NSW) 39. The Supreme Court of Queensland exercised its inherent power to 
impose disciplinary fines upon legal practitioners in two cases decided before the introduction of the 
statutory tribunal for solicitors: Re Godfrey [1879] BCR 30 May (£20) and Re Cooper (1890) 4 QLJ 49 
(fined £50 and suspended for 12 months). The Court of Appeal has recentiy confirmed that the court has 
the power to impose a fine within its inherent jurisdiction: Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253, 
37 (Thomas J, with whom McMurdo P and White J agreed). The barrister in that case was struck off. 
^ Section 5(3)(a). The subsequent legislation retained this wording, merely renumbering the section: 
Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6(3). 
^ The Supreme Court retains this inherent jurisdiction: Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 579. However, 
the court has indicated that it would prefer most disciplinary matters against solicitors to be brought within 
the statutory framework: Queensland Law Society Inc v Smith [2001] 1 Qd R 649, 651 (Thomas J A, with 
whom McPherson JA and Atkinson J agreed). England has a similar preference that parties avoid invoking 
the inherent jurisdiction: Solicitors Act 1974 (UK) s50. 
^ Rules of Court Made in Pursuance of 'The Queensland Law Society Act of I927\ Queensland 
Government Gazette, 20 October 1928, 1380. The fine was to be in lieu of a strike off or suspension order. 
The power of the Council of the Queensland Law Society to make rules with the status of subordinate 
legislation was contained in Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 5A(1) and (2). The introduction of 
these rules is discussed in more detail above section 4.5.3. 
* Rule 26, Rules of Court, Queensland Government Gazette H March 1979, 1223. 
214 
Chapter Six: Disciplinary Fines 
practitioner to pay to the Society such sum not exceeding $5,000 as the Tribunal thinks 
fit'/ 
In September 1987, the Rules of the Supreme Court of Queensland were amended to 
increase the maximum amount that the higher level disciplinary tribunal, the Statutory 
Committee, could impose to $100,000, a twenty fold increase from the former limit. The 
committee was given quite a bit of flexibility in relation to the fine: it could be imposed 
m addition to a strike off or suspension order and the committee could order any amount 
of it to be paid 'to any person aggrieved'.'° In other words, the committee could treat the 
fine as either punishment or compensation to clients. 
Rules of Court are made by the Govemor on the advice of the Executive Council, but 
only following a recommendation by the Judges of the Supreme Court of Queensland -
themselves former lawyers, and to date always barristers. It is fascinating to consider why 
Queensland judges decided in 1987 that it was necessary to increase the maximum 
amount that solicitors could be fined from $5,000 to $100,000, an amount sigiuficantly 
higher than the maximum amounts that apply to lawyers in New South Wales'' and 
Victoria,'^ even today.'^ It is also notable that''* there was no suggestion that barristers 
' Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6J(l)(c)(ii), (repealed), inserted by Queensland Law Society Act 
Amendment Act 1985 (Qld) s 7. 
'° Section 26. Queensland Government Gazette September 1987. 
" $75,000: Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 562(7)(b). 
'- $50,000: Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 4.4.19(b). 
" In 1988 the Statutory Committee was given express statutory power to 'order the practitioner to pay to 
the society such sum, not exceeding the amount fixed by the Rules of Court, as the Statutory Committee 
thinks fit': Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6(3)(ab)(i) (repealed), inserted by Queensland Law 
Society Act and Another Act Amendment Act 1988 (Qld) s 5. From 1997 the Queensland Law Society Act 
1952 (Qld) itself indicated that $100,000 was the maximum fine which the tribunal could impose. 
However, the Act did not refer to this amount as a 'fine' or as a 'sum' but stated that the tribunal could 
make an order that 'the practitioner pay ^. penalty of not more than $100,000 to the [Legal Practitioners' 
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should be subject to a similar regime - barristers were rarely fined even small amounts. 
What possible triggers could there have been for the judges to increase the maximum fine 
applicable to solicitors so dramatically? It does not seem likely that tiiis was due to any 
request from the Statutory Committee itself after the committee found its pre-existing 
limit of $5,000 inadequate, as the committee had ortiy imposed the maximum fine on 
three occasions'^ prior to the frnplementation of the increase, and was imposing fines 
averaging only $1,725.00 in the period leading up to the change.'^ It could be suggested 
that the increase to the maximum fine was designed to deal with particular problematic 
cases. For instance, in December 1987, a front page story m the mass media had reported 
that 13 Queensland solicitors were under police investigation for alleged tmst account 
fraud totaling $1.5 million.'^ However, this does not seem to be a plausible explanation 
for why the judges of the Supreme Court saw fit to increase the maximum fine for 
solicitors from $5,000 to $100,000, as any solicitor found guilty of tmst account fraud 
was much more likely to be stmck off than fined. Much more plausible is the suggestion 
that judges recommended that the maximum fine be increased as a general deterrent 
against any form of fiiture misconduct by solicitors, during the severe econonuc recession 
of the late 1980s.'^ As discussed later in this chapter,'^ while the technical possibility of a 
Fidelity Guarantee Fund': Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s6R(l)(c), inserted by Queensland Law 
Society Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Qld) s9 (emphasis added). The language of 'penalty' has been 
retained in Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 280(4)(a) and the maximum fine retained at $100,000. 
''* See below section 6.2.2. 
'^  SC 235, 20 Februaiy 1981; SC 250 10 June 1983; SC 292 3 March 1987. 
'^  Linda Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis', 
(2001) 13 Bond Law Review 1-45, 33-4, Table 11. Period = 1981- 1985. The figure given is the mean. The 
median fine was much lower: $575.00. During the period in which the increase came into force - 1985-
1990 - the mean fine was only slightiy higher: $2,112.50 (median = $1,500.00). The relevant table is 
reproduced below section 6.8.1. 
" L Rowett, 'Solicitors Face Fraud Squad on $1.5M Loss', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 31 December 1987, 1. 
'^  The worid stock market crashed, and the Australian share market followed on 19 October 1987. The 
president of the Queensland Law Society reported in 1986-87 that members were feeling the full impact of 
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fine as high as $100,000 may have deterred some solicitors, the disciplinary tribunal 
never imposed fines of anywhere near that amount, with average fines remaining well 
below $10,000.^ *^  It is suggested tiiat it is more likely to be the practice of the tribunal, 
rather than maximum fines 'on the books', which would send the strongest signals of 
deterrence, or otherwise, to solicitors facing temptation. The 20-fold increase in 
maximum fines therefore demonstrates an occasion on which the disciplinary 'scaffold'^' 
was significantly strengthened against solicitors (but not barristers). 
6.2.2 Barristers 
Fines have not formed part of the armoury used in the discipline of Queensland barristers. 
Article 78 of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Bar Association of 
Queensland listed the powers of a committee of enquiry upon finding that charges against 
a member of the association had been found proved beyond reasonable doubt. The 
committee could record that the charge was found to be proved, caution the member, 
reprimand the member, suspend the member for a stated term or upon a condition, or 
expel the member.^^ The association had no power to unpose a fine upon a member found 
guilty of misconduct or unprofessional conduct. However, fri 1994, - seven years after 
solicitors became liable to fines of up to $100,000 - the association was reported to be 
advocating the introduction of a new disciplinary system for barristers with provision for 
the economic recession and tiie council of tiie society had had to make some hard decisions during the year: 
Queensland Law Society Annual Report 1986-87, 1. 
" See Table One below section 6.8.1. 
> . d . 
"' See discussion of disciplinary scaffolding above section 3.10.2.1. 
^-Article 77. 
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fines of up to $6,000.^ ^ fri 1999, in its response to the Queensland State Government's 
Green Paper on Legal Professional Reform, the association suggested that a stattitory 
disciplinary tribunal be established, with the power to unpose fines of up to $50,000.^ "^  
The Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) - which makes solicitors and barristers amenable to 
the same range of disciplinary orders for the first time - provides for fines of up to 
$100,000.^^ Thus, while the disciplinary financial liability of solicitors increased 
dramatically in 1987 with the sponsorship of the judges of the Supreme Court and has 
since remained static, the liability of barristers increased from nil to $100,000 in 2004. 
Although the Supreme Court could discipline a barrister or solicitor by way of a fme in 
its inherent jurisdiction,^^ the court has only rarely endorsed the use of fines in the 
77 
disciplinary context, as later discussion shows. 
6.3 PROTECTIVE EFFECT OF FINES 
It is in relation to the imposition of fines that retribution is most likely to be apparent. A 
fine does not have a direct protective effect as when a practitioner is removed from 
contact with clients. A fine does not expel a practitioner from the profession 
unequivocally as does a strike off order. Nor does a fine even temporarily incapacitate a 
"^  James Woods, 'Barristers Face Work Penalties for Misconduct' Courier Mail, 2 June 1994, 20. 
Bar Association of Queensland, Response of the Bar Association of Queensland to the Green Paper on 
Legal Professional Reform, June 1999. 
26 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 280(4)(a). 
Barristers ' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253 at [37] per Thomas JA, citing Adamson v Queensland 
Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498, 505. The Supreme Court of Queensland has imposed fines in Re 
Godfrey [1879] BCR 30 May and in Re Cooper (1890) 4 QLJ 49 (FC). Although botii of these latter cases 
involved a solicitor, the court's inherent powers are the same for both branches of the profession. 
" See discussion below section 6.6. 
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practitioner in the same way as an order which suspends from practice. When a fine is 
imposed, the practitioner can continue to practise. If a tribunal finds that a practitioner's 
past conduct has transgressed professional standards, but allows them to remain in 
practice with only a fine, then the tribunal must have found that the individual did not 
pose any ftiture risk to the public, despite the past transgression. Any protective effect of 
a fine must therefore be indirect, through deterrence. More contestable may be a claim 
that retribution can protect. 
It is generally thought that fines carry less stigma than a strike off or even a suspension 
order, fri particular, for many years^^it was the practice of the Queensland Law Society 
not to name practitioners who had only been fined, so the degree of public shame 
attached to a fine was much less tiian in the case of a strike off order or suspension, as 
both of these latter orders must necessarily be publicised.^^ Therefore, a fine usually only 
deterred ui an economic sense. 
hi addition, it could be argued that the imposition of a fine merely duplicates tiie 
economic sanctions that can be imposed upon a lawyer in otiier regulatory contexts, such 
as tiirough court orders against lawyers for wasted costs,^^ civil actions to recover 
^^  On tiie issue of shame, or stigma, see Nigel Walker, Punishment, Danger and Stigma: the Morality of 
Criminal Justice (Barnes & Noble, Totowa, 1980) 142-163; William Simoa The Practice of Justice: A 
Theory of Lawyers' Ethics (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1998) 203. 
-^  See below section 8.3.2.3 regarding the society's policy regarding the naming of solicitors. 
^° See generally discussion in Chapter Eight regarding publicity. 
'^ Posner argues that fines do not generally have the moral stigma tiiat they may once have had: Richard 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, (5* ed, Aspen, New York, 1998) 247. Arguably a fine cames more 
deterrence value, in the sense of shame, than a censure. Censures are very rare, having been ordered in only 
28 of tiie 473 cases heard between 1930 and 2000: Haller, above n 16, 24. 
'' Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282; Harley v McDonald (New Zealand) [2001] UKPC 20 (10 April 2001; 
Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) P/L (1999) FCA 773. 
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damages for negligence '^^  or for breach of confidence^^ and fines imposed by a criminal 
court.^ ^ By comparison, the disciplinary system is unique in its ability to strike off or 
suspend, to censure or to make remedial orders, such as for ftirther legal education, 
supervision or counseling. Arguably, these are strengths of the disciplinary system, which 
it could exploit. As I discussed in Chapter One,^ ^ lawyers are subject to a number of 
forms of regulation, each with its own strengths and weaknesses and it is important that 
the disciplinary system recognise and exploit its most advantageous features rather than 
simply mimic other forms of control.^^ It is for these reasons that the use of fmes in the 
disciplinary context should be subjected to close scmtiny. 
It is most likely tiiat the frnposition of fines in the disciplinary context will mfrnic the 
punishment imposed by the criminal law. There have been court decisions m which 
judges have explicitly stated that tiiey consider fines to be a form of punishment. In Law 
Society of New South Wales v Moulton,^^ Hutiey J said: 
The issue which faced the Stamtory Committee when it decided not to remove the 
respondent from the roll was not how to punish him, for this order is not a punishment (as 
is a fine or a reprimand), but whether he was fit to be held out by the court as a 
solicitor. 
" Arthur JS Hall & Co v Simons [2000]3 WLR 543; Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539. 
'" Barber v Stone [1881] 50 U QB 2,; Colborne Capital Corp. v. 542775 Alberta Ltd. No 9301-12382 
Calgary, Alberta Queen's Bench, 1995 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 49248; 1995 A.C.W.S.J. 634629; 55 A.C.W.S. 
(3d) 746 (Virtue J). 
^^  Such as fines for contempt of court, such as the $4,000 fine imposed by the District Court for contempt 
by a solicitor, who was struck off in later disciplinary proceedings: A-G v Gregory [1998] QCA 409 (4 
December 1998). 
^^  Above section 1.6. 
" This is a theme explored in great detail in David Wilkins, 'Who Should Regulate Lawyers?' (1992) 105 
Harvard Law Review 801. 
*^ [1981] 2 NSWLR 736. 
^'Ibid 751. 
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In the course of questioning submissions made in Walsh v Law Society of New South 
Wales, Kirby J said: 
A fine can only be a punishment, really, can it not, unless you are thinking of it 
conceptually as being for protection of the public but it is hard to see how the fine which 
goes into the coffers of the Law Society, I suppose, is for the protection of tiie public.'*^ 
Similarly, although in the context of discipline of medical practitioners, after citing 
passages from Clyne v NSW Bar Association that a disbarring order 'is in no sense 
punitive'"*^ and from New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt^^ that the discipline of 
barristers is 'entirely protective''^'*, Dowsett J of the Supreme Court of Queensland has 
said in relation to fines and suspensions: 
I must confess to some doubts conceming the proposition in light of the range of 
alternative orders available under the Act. While it may be said that erasure is protective, 
it is difficult to say the same about suspension or a fine. Each of these orders may have a 
protective effect in that each may be expected to discourage practitioners from falling 
short of an appropriate standard of professional conduct, however that sounds very much 
like the deterrent aspect of punishment. Fortunately, neither party submitted that I should 
consider any aspect other than the protection of the public. 
The protective aim of discipline comes into sharper focus in relation to fines than in 
relation to incapacitative orders, fri the above statements, both Hutiey J and Kirby J 
describe fines, unlike strike offs and suspensions, as a form of punishment. 
''° Transcript of proceedings, Walsh v Law Society of New South Wales (High Court of Austt^lia, Gleeson 
CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan JJ, 3 March 1999). 
^'(1960) 104 CLR 186. 
"^  Ibid 201-2. 
"^(1968) 117 CLR 177. 
"" Ibid 183-4. 
'^  Re a Medical Practitioner [1995] 2 Qd R 154, 164-5. 
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On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court of Queensland has only referred to strike 
off orders when referring to the protective aim of discipline.'^ ^ Fines have either been 
omitted from the examples given, or when mentioned, some disquiet has been expressed 
as to thefr protective fimction. A narrow reading of such statements may leave room for 
fines - but not strike off orders - having a retributive role. A deeper analysis of the role of 
fines in the discipline of lawyers is therefore warranted. 
6.4 CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS? 
Related to the question of whether discipline aims to punish, is the question whether 
disciplinary proceedings are criminal in nature or not. Strictly speaking, once a 
disciplinary tribunal is given power to impose fines, then those proceedings are criminal 
in nature. Proceedings are considered 'criminal' if the statute allows imprisonment, even 
as a last resort.'*^ A Queensland lawyer who does not pay a disciplinary fine can be dealt 
with under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld), which allows for imprisonment for non-
payment of 'penalties'. 
*^ Clyne V New South Wales Bar Association {\960) 104 CLR 186,201-2: 'a disbarring order is in no sense 
punitive in character. When such an order is made, it is made, fi^om the public point of view, for the 
protection of those who require protection, and from the professional point of view, in order that abuse of 
privilege may not lead to loss of privilege'; Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253, [32]: 
'[removal of the right to practise is done] not by way of punishment but in order to protect the public and 
maintain public confidence in the administration of justice'. 
Queensland Law Society Inc v A Solicitor [1989] 2 Qd R 331, 336 (McPherson J, with whom Dowsett J 
agreed). 
*^ Ibid. McPherson J relied on s 8 (later s 5L) and s 47 of the Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (repealed). 
Section 8 said: 
Subject to any rules made in that behalf, all fees, subscriptions, fines, and dues payable under tiie 
rules and by-laws of the society or of the council or under this Act may be sued for and recovered 
in a summary way under the provisions of the Justices Act 1886... [emphasis added] 
Given the initial proviso, it would therefore seem that s 8 needed to be read subject to Rules of the 
Queensland Law Society Inc 1987 s 124 (formeriy Rule 109 Rules of Qld Law Society Inc 1948) which 
read: 
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Disciplinary systems in the United States do not impose fines^° because they see 
problems in the analogy to criminal sanctions. Disciplinary agencies in the United States 
believe that, if they were to consider imposing any form of monetary penalty upon a 
practitioner, this would be tantamount to a criminal penalty, thereby entitling the 
practitioner to a level of due process which is not required while the range of sanctions is 
limited to the right to practise and censures. 
Rule 124: Any person contravening any provision of these Rules shall be guilty of an offence, 
which, save and except where the Statutory Committee or Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal is 
empowered to deal therewith, may be prosecuted summarily under the provisions of the Justices 
Act 1886-1987 and shall be liable (where no other punishment is provided) to a penalty not 
exceeding one thousand dollars.' [emphasis added] 
It is argued that r 124 only applied to breaches of the Rules, thus the exclusion of matters within the 
jurisdiction of the Statutory Committee or Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal did not act to exclude fines 
imposed under s 6 for malpractice, professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct rather than for 
breach of a specific rule. Justice Thomas in Adamson confirmed that proceedings before a magistrate 
brought under r 124 were criminal in nature: Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498, 
506. 
Even if it was thought that r 124 acted to limit the possible imprisonment for non-payment of disciplinary 
fines, s 47 of the Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) provided additional powers to proceed under the 
Justices Act 1886. Section 47 (repealed) read: 
In addition to any other right, remedy, or power vested in the Society, Council, or secretary, whether by this 
Act or otherwise, any sum of money whatsoever payable under this Act may be recovered either in a 
summary manner under the provisions of the Justices Act 1886 or by action for a civil debt due to the 
Society' [emphasis added]. 
That imprisonment was the ultimate sanction for non-payment of a fine was also implied by Queensland 
Statutory Committee Rules 1987 (Qld), s 37 (repealed) which specifically stated that no person could be 
imprisoned for non-payment of costs in relation to a disciplinary hearing. The Rules were silent on the 
consequences for non-payment of fines. The enforcement of costs is no longer dealt with as a separate issue 
in either the Act or the Rules and therefore costs are now recoverable in the same manner as the fine: 
Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 160. 
''^  Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 161, 163 A. See also Qld Law Society Inc v A Solicitor [ 1989] 2 Qd R 331, 336, 
citing Michel v Medical Board of Qld [1942] St R Qd 1, 33. The amount payable under the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (Qld) is still described as a 'penalty': s 280(4)(a). Although in Ooi v Medical Board of 
Queensland [1997] 2 Qd R 176 the Queensland Court of Appeal held tiiat proceedings before the Medical 
Assessment Tribunal were not criminal proceedings, the court did not expressly state its view on the impact 
of a power to impose fines. 
°^ The range of available sanctions in use throughout the United States are set out in American Bar 
Association, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyers Sanctions, 
http://www.'abanet.org/cpr/regulation/standards sanctions.pdf at 15 March 2006. 
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hi the words of an American Bar Association guideline on appropriate dispositions in 
lawyer discipline: 
Fines are punitive and criminal in nature and should be avoided. The use of fines in 
discipline might be deemed to imply that the proceedings are criminal and require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, trial by jury, and other standards of criminal due process.^ ' 
Bene has argued that fines should be introduced into the disciplinary system m the United 
States.^ ^ He suggested that fmes are particularly appropriate given that much of lawyer 
misconduct is economic in nature rather than a 'crime of passion', that lawyers are 
more risk averse than the 'average criminal'^ "^ and that lawyers are 'wealthier than most 
other criminals'.^^ However, implicit in Bene's argument is the assumption that the 
disciplinary system deals with 'criminals' and is therefore an appendage of the criminal 
justice system. 
The wisdom of, and juristic basis for, copying the criminal justice system is debatable. 
Bene has argued that the public can be protected through deterrence. Fines have the 
potential to deter. However, empirical evidence discussed later in this chapter^^ questions 
the effectiveness of fines as a form of deterrence. 
Much of the debate in Queensland as to whether disciplinary proceedings are criminal in 
nature has arisen from a need to determine the procedural protections to be afforded to 
National Center for Professional Responsibility for the Joint Committee on Professional Discipline, 
American Bar Association, Professional Discipline for Lawyers and Judges, ABA, Chicago, 1979, 112. 
" Stephen Bene, 'Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions' 
(1991) Stanford Law Review 907. 
" Ibid 924. 
^^ Ibid 925. 
" Ibid. 
^^  See below 6.6.2.1 (specific deterrence) and 6.6.2.2 (general deterrence). 
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the practitioner: in Michel v Medical Board of Queensland,^^ the debate took place 
because tiie practitioner would not be entitied to a retrial if the proceedings were criminal 
in nature. He was denied a retrial. In Queensland Law Society Inc v A Solicitor,^^ the 
court needed to determine whether the Attomey-General could appeal against a dismissal 
of disciplinary charges. It was decided that no appeal lay, as the dismissal was 
tantamount to a criminal acquittal. In Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc^^ and in 
Ooi V Medical Board of Queenslana a discussion of the nature of disciplinary 
proceedings was necessary to determine the appropriate standard of proof Both cases 
determined that the Briginshaw^^ standard of proof, not the criminal standard of proof 
applied. No procedural issue was in issue in Council of the Queensland Law Society v 
Whitman,^^ but the court stated categorically that the proceedings were not criminal in 
nature but dfrected towards protection of the public. This meant the respondent's lack of 
cooperation was much less acceptable than had he been a criminal defendant.^ In 
summary, while some earlier cases saw an analogy between criminal and disciplinary 
proceedings, more recent cases have discounted this, reducing any possible role for 
retribution in discipline. 
The particular question being considered now is the reason why a disciplinary tribunal 
may impose fines. Any protective function of fines is unclear, given that the practitioner 
"[1942]StRQd 1. 
^^  [1989] 2 Qd R 331. This case was not cited in Adamson v Qld Law Soc Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498, decided 
six months later. 
" That is, whether this was akin to an acquittal in criminal proceedings, where no such right of appeal lies. 
"[1990] lQdR498. 
^'[1997]2QdR176. 
" Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 
"[2003] QCA 438. 
^^  Ibid [36]. See also Law Society of New South Wales v Mc Namara (1980) 47 NSWLR 72, 78. 
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remains in practice. Any argument that fines afford protection through deterrence is also 
tenuous, if little publicity is given to cases in which fines have been imposed. Until 
recentiy, this was the case.^ ^ It could be that, despite denials, the tribunal has applied 
fines as a form of retributive punishment. Such an argument is not weakened by the cases 
referred to above which have argued that disciplinary proceedings are not criminal in 
nature, as those cases were dealing with different issues, such as tiie appropriate standard 
of proof and rights of retrial and appeal. A disciplinary order can seek retribution, 
whether or not the proceedings in which such an order was made are described as 
criminal or not. The term 'criminal', like the term 'punishment' - given that some 
punishment can protect through deterrence - may cloud the issue under consideration 
here. 
6.5 FINES CAN SERVE ONLY A LIMITED LEGITIMATING FUNCTION 
6.5.1 Fines Appear Analogous to Criminal Sanctions 
It is suggested that it is difficult to see how fines serve an effective protective fimction if 
the case in which a fine has been imposed is given little publicity.^^ The imposition of 
disciplinary fines may also not effectively serve any legitimation project,^ ^ should such a 
project exist. There are two reasons for this. First, fines bear too close an analogy to 
^^  See below section 8.3.2.5. 
*^ Publicity is considered in more detail in Chapter Eight. 
See discussion above section 3.10.2.2 conceming the theory of Magali Larson, The Rise of 
Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (University of Califomia Press, Berkeley, 1977). 
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criminal sanctions. Second, and as will be discussed shortly,^ *^ if the disciplinary tribunal 
imposes a large fme, it risks an appeal by the Attomey-General, and poor publicity for 
the legal profession and its disciplinary system may result. 
From the point of view of any legitimation project, what is most important is the 
impression given to the public of disciplinary proceedings. The profession is seeking the 
tmst of the public. The profession will gain that tmst when a practitioner is stmck from 
the roll, because that individual is no longer a member of the legal profession and the 
profession has thereby unambiguously protected the public from that former member. 
While a suspension order does still incapacitate a solicitor, this is only for a temporary 
period, so suspension orders send ambiguous messages, as discussed more fully in the 
previous chapter. Fines hold even greater perceptual difficulty. It is even more difficult 
for the public to see how the imposition of a fine will protect them. From the point of 
view of public impression, the use of fines in professional discipline may not be 
consistent with a legitimation project. 
hi addition, any analogy with criminal proceedings may be thought to be undesfrable for 
a legitimation project which may be expected to seek to increase the distance between 
discipline and other legal controls on lawyer behaviour, m particular the criminal law, so 
as to give the aura tiiat professional discipline is a form of self-control which is much 
more stringent than any contiols unposed upon the general populace.^^ The danger for 
68 See below section 6.5.3. 
See above section 3.4. 
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any legitimation project would therefore be that, when a lawyer is fined, their conduct is 
viewed as analogous to that of the petty thief or tiie drink driver who is fined. 
But only rarely does the public become aware that a lawyer has been fmed by the 
disciplmary tribunal.™ Fines may be imposed in disciplinary cases for other reasons. The 
unposition of a fine may avoid drawing any attention to the case. As was argued in 
relation to orders which remove a lawyer's right to practise,'' a legitimation project 
would be best served by demonstrating that very few lawyers need to be disciplined, but 
when some discipline becomes unavoidable, a legitimation project would require that 
discipline to be severe. 
6.5.2 Fines as Retribution 
The preceding discussion explained why it is often difficult to see how fines will protect 
or serve a legitimation project. It is possible that notions of retribution played a greater 
role m the use of a fine. The tribunal may have sensed that the public would be appeased 
to see individual retribution. The public may be more satisfied with a fine than an order 
which did not punish the practitioner but, for instance, required simply that the 
practitioner work under the supervision for a period of time. While the latter form of 
supervisory order may in fact protect the public more than the mere imposition of the 
fine, it is arguable that the fine leaves the public with a greater sense of justice and 
Discussed more fully below section 8.3.23. 
' See above section 5.2.1. 
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vindication in the individual case, as it involves greater censure.'^ However, the public's 
impression of the legal profession overall may remain diminished by its knowledge that 
the misconduct occurred at all, and by the profession's failure to strike the practitioner off 
the roll. And of course, this sense of mdividual retribution requires the public to have 
been aware that the individual had been punished.''^ The discussion of publicity in 
Chapter Eight shows that this has not normally been the case in Queensland.'"* 
6.5.3 The Risk of Appeal 
The frnposition of a fine is also risky for the primary disciplinary tribunal as there is a 
chance of an appeal being lodged against its decision. This would be damaging to any 
legitimation project because the appeal will bring the matter into open court and give the 
court an opportunity to criticise the tribunal for being too lenient. 
An appeal against the imposition of a fine would rarely be lodged by the practitioner as a 
fine allows them to remain in practice and, under Queensland Law Society pohcy until 
July 2002,'^ they were not publicly named. It would be unlikely that a practitioner would 
risk the publicity and costs of an appeal against the imposition of a fine and in fact no 
practitioner in Queensland has ever so appealed, even when the fine was as large as 
$25,000 or $40,000.'^ Any appeals upon the basis that a fine was an inappropriate order 
11 
" Above section 1.3.4. 
Above section 1.3.5. 
Below section 8.3. 
See below section 8.3.2.3. 
'^  The appellant in Re a Solicitor [1953] St R Qd 149 was fined £5 by the Statutory Committee. His appeal 
was not against tiie order made but against tiie finding of professional misconduct. The appeal was 
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in tiie circumstances of tiie case have been lodged by the Attomey-General,'' by both the 
Attomey-General and Queensland Law Society'^ or by the society alone.'^ 
6.6 COURT'S ATTITUDE TO DISCIPLINARY FINES 
The lack of appeals against fines means that tiie Supreme Court has not been required to 
mle on tiie appropriateness of fines as often as it has in relation to suspensions and strike 
off orders. However, there is evidence to suggest that the court does not consider fmes to 
be an appropriate method for disposing of disciplinary matters. 
It is not only in appeals against tiie imposition of a fine that the court has an opportunity 
to comment on their appropriateness. In any case in which the court considers an order 
suspending a practitioner or striking a practitioner from the roll to be inappropriate, it is 
free to replace it with any other order, including an order fming a practitioner. This is 
successfiil, on the basis that a letter sent pursuant to Rule 76 (later s 5G and now Legal Profession Act 2004 
(Qld) s 269) was sent without proper authority. 
^^  Attomey-General v Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350; Attomey-General v Delaney [2000] QCA 504. It was only 
in 1938 that the Attomey General was given the power to appeal a decision of the Statutory Committee: 
Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) s 5(4) as amended by Queensland Law Society Amendment Act of 
1938 (Qld) s 2(iv). The appeal power was later moved to s 6Z and is now contained in Legal Profession Act 
2004 (Qld) s 292(1). The 1938 amendment would appear to have been in response to a number of cases 
before the Statutory Committee in which only small fines were imposed despite large misappropriations: 
ReM. A Solicitor [1938] St R Qd 454, 457, where Webb J commented: 
The heavier punishments recently inflicted can safely be assigned to action in Parliament, and to nothing else. 
Indeed the statement prepared by the Registrar [of all punishments imposed by the Statutory Committee in 
the previous three years] shows convincingly that the clemency of the Committee was extended without 
discrimination, and no doubt it would have reached the appellant M had he been dealt with before action in 
Parliament had been taken or foreshadowed. 
Between 1935 and 1940, the tribunal had become more lenient, with the rate of strike offs dropping from 
46% to 26% of all orders made and average fines dropping from £24 to £21: Haller, above n 16, 28, 36. 
In addition to giving the Attomey-General a right of appeal, the 1938 amendments also required a copy of 
all orders of the Statutory Committee to be given to the Attomey-General, widened the definition of 
actionable conduct from 'illegal or professional misconduct' to 'malpractice, professional misconduct or 
unprofessional conduct or practice' and increased the powers of auditors. See above section 2.4.3.4. 
*^ Attorney-General v Bax [1999] 2 Qd R 9. 
''^  Council of the Queensland Law Society v Lowes [2003] QCA 201. 
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because on appeal, tiie court has all the powers of the tribunal.^° Therefore, the court will 
have suggested an aversion to fines simply by its disinclination to impose a fine upon 
appeal and by its omission to even discuss fines as an option available to it. 
Prior to the creation of a statutory framework for the discipline of solicitors in 
Queensland, the Supreme Court did impose fines for professional misconduct when 
exercising its inherent jurisdiction. But following the introduction of the statutory 
framework in 1927, on an appeal by any interested party against a tribunal decision in 
Queensland, it has been very rare for the court to allow the payment of a fine to stand, and 
this has only occurred in relatively recent cases. The court has never substituted an order 
that the practitioner pay a fine for any altemative order imposed by the tribunal. In 
disciplinary matters which have come before the court in Queensland and where the court 
has been satisfied that tiiere was some conduct requfring discipluie, the court has preferred 
to rely on orders which incapacitate the practitioner - in other words, orders which strike 
off or suspend rather than fine the practitioner. This makes the judges' sponsorship of the 
amendment of the Rules of Court in 1987, increasing the maximum fine to which a 
solicitor was exposed from $5,000 to $100, 000, all tiie more cunous. 
^° Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 580( 1). 
*' The court, in its inherent jurisdiction, has imposed fines upon solicitors: Re Godfrey (1879) BCR May 30 
(FC), (20 pound fine, imposed 50 years before tiie statutory disciplinary fi^mework); Re Cooper (1890) 4 
QLJ 49 (EC), (fined £50 and suspended). The Supreme Court of Queensland has indicated tiiat the court 
could also impose fines upon barristers: Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253, 37 (Thomas J), 
with whom McMurdo P and White J agreed, although this does not have appeared to have ever been done 
in Queensland within the court's inherent jurisdiction. 
'^ A-G V Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350 ($7,500 fine upheld); A-G v Delaney [2000] QCA 504 ($15,000 fine 
upheld). The court also refused to interfere with a $15,000 fine imposed in Queensland Law Society Inc v 
Lowes [2003] QCA 201, but the issue in that case was whether tiiere was evidence of dishonesty or not. 
The court concluded there was not. 
See above section 6.2. 
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A typical example of the court's attittide to fines can be seen in Adamson v Qld Law 
Society Inc.^^ The case received attention because of the court's apparent conflation of the 
tests for professional misconduct and unprofessional conduct.^^ Adamson had been stmck 
from the roll by the Statutory Committee for sharing receipts with an unqualified person. 
One issue for the court's determination was the standard of proof required in disciplinary 
proceedings. The court considered tiie types of orders which a statutory disciplinary body 
could make. If the disciplinary body could impose a fine in tiie nature of a crimmal 
penalty, then the criminal standard of proof would need to be satisfied. Chapter Two 
documented examples in which it appeared that at least some members of the court were 
unfamiliar with the legislation tiiey were applying.^^ Adamson v Qld Law Society Inc^^ 
provides another example of this. The court seemed unaware tiiat, under the Queensland 
Statutory Rules 1987 (Qld), the Statutory Committee could fine a practitioner up to 
$100,000.^^ Justice Thomas stated tiiat 'the Statutory Committee has no power to impose a 
pecuniary penalty'.^ This may explain why, in setting aside tiie order of the Statutory 
Committee striking the practitioner from the roll, the court did not appear to look beyond 
the option of a 12 month suspension. It is interesting to surmise whether the court may 
have imposed a different order had it been aware of the power to fine, as the court did 
note as a mitigating factor that the risk to the public appeared minimal. 
'^*[1990] 1 QdR498. 
^^  David Searies, 'Professional Misconduct - Unprofessional Conduct: Is There a Difference?' (1992) 
Queensland Law Society Joumal 239. 
^^  Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 
^'See 2.4.3.4. 
^^[1990] 1 QdR498. 
*' The imposition of a fine could be in addition to an order striking off or suspending a practitioner: Rule 
24. 
'" Adamson v Qld Law Soc Inc [1990] 1 QdR 498 at 506 per Thomas J (with whom Connolly and Ambrose 
JJ agreed). 
' ' Justice Thomas noted that there was 'a failure to find any breach of the duty of supervision [and an] 
absence of any disservice to clients: Adamson v Qld Law Soc Inc [1990] 1 QdR 498 at 508 per Thomas J, 
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In Re Wheeler^^ the tribunal had suspended the practitioner for three years.^^ The 
Queensland Law Society appealed against that order and the practitioner lodged a cross-
appeal against both findings and orders. While Dowsett j'^'* found that three findings of 
professional misconduct could not be sustained, he still considered the three year 
suspension to be an appropriate order, given the findings which were sustainable. It is not 
surprising that His Honour did not discuss altemative orders, such as fines, given that the 
period of suspension had already been served. 
In A-G V Bax, ^^ upon appeal by the Attomey-General, the Queensland Court of Appeal 
overtumed a fine of $15,000 imposed by the tribunal and ordered that the practitioner be 
stmck from the roll. The practitioner had been found guilty by the disciplinary tribunal of 
backdating a document and misleading a creditors' meeting. Once the court determined 
that these actions were taken with dishonest intent and occurred over a period of time, it 
is not surprising that it found him unfit to practise and stmck him from the roll. The 
court thereby implied that a fine, even at the maximum of $100,000, was inappropriate in 
such circumstances. The decision in Bax suggests that the court did not believe that fines 
could protect the public as adequately as some other forms of orders. Accordingly, it is 
with whom Connolly and Ambrose JJ agreed. Most telling against the practitioner were misleading 
statements made in the course of tiie Law Society investigation. 
'-[1992] 2 QdR690. 
' 'SC 291, 12 March 1987. 
'" With whom Macrossan CJ and Ryan J agreed. 
'^[1999] 2 QdR9. 
'^  .Re ^(1997) 2 Disciplinaiy Action Reports 6, SCT 393, 29 July 1997. 
'^  Shepherdson J hinted that, had Bax pleaded guilty and shown 'genuine remorse and contrition,' he may 
not have been stmck off, although his Honour stressed that the result would not have been 'necessarily 
different' in such a case: [1999] 2 Qd R 9, 25 
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difficult to imagine in what circumstances the court would consider a $100,000 fine to be 
the right order. 
It is only in more recent times that tiie Court of Appeal has allowed fines to stand. In 
Attomey-General v Kehoe^^ the tribunal had fined the practitioner $7,500 for 
unprofessional conduct. The practitioner was found to have failed to supervise his 
secretary which led to the secretary deceiving a client as to a large discrepancy between a 
valuation and the contract price. The Attomey-General argued that tiie practitioner should 
be suspended, so as to deter other practitioners from failing to 'control their practices'.^^ 
However, the court did allow tiie fine of $7,500 to stand, on the basis tiiat the practitioner 
had not shown any 'moral turpitude',^ *^ *^  the error was quickly remedied, no actual harm 
resulted, there was no harm to the public, and the practitioner had been seriously affected 
by the event, had suffered ignominy and had shown remorse.'^' While this was the first 
appellate decision in which the Supreme Court allowed a fine to stand, the court did not 
take the opportunity to discuss the proper role of fines as a disciplinary measure. Thomas 
JA did note that strong elements of disgrace were attached to orders striking off or 
suspending a practitioner,'^^ again allowing the inference that a fine of any magnitude did 
not involve the same degree of shame. 
In a case related to Kehoe, Attomey-General v Delaney,^'^^ the tribunal had imposed a 
fine of $15,000 and ordered the practitioner to pay compensation of $7,000 to each of 
'* [2001] 2 QdR 350. 
''^  Ibid [28]. 
'°° Ibid [27]. 
'°' [2000] QCA 222, [27], [29] (Thomas JA, with whom de Jersey CJ and Ambrose J agreed). 
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tiiree complainants. Upon appeal, the Attomey-General argued that Delaney should be 
stmck off while the Queensland Law Society argued that either a heavy fine or a 
suspension should be imposed. Byrne J, with whom Davies JA agreed, thought that the 
conduct was 'most unsatisfactory'. However, he was unwilling to consider the penalty to 
be 'manifestiy inadequate' and described the $15,000 fine imposed by the tribunal as 
'substantial''°'* given that no 'moral turpitude' was involved, the practitioner had 
practised for almost 30 years without a complaint to the Queensland Law Society, had a 
number of character references, was remorseful, had agreed not to do any ftirther 
contributory mortgage work, had co-operated with the society investigation and had 
'apologised to the profession'.'°^ McMurdo P, in agreeing to the order and reasons of 
Byrne J, also noted that 'the penalty imposed protected the public from any fiirther risk 
from the respondent's mismanagement of mortgage loans.' 
The third case in which the court allowed a disciplinary fine to stand was Council of the 
Queensland Law Society Inc v Lowes,^^^ but there the court felt unable to interfere with 
1 OS 
the tribunal's order given the lack of information about the tribunal's reasons. The case 
was not an appropriate vehicle for a discussion of the proper role of disciplinary fines. 
'°^ Ibid [28]. 
' " [2000] QCA 504. 
'"'' Ibid [35]. This is well below the statutory maximum of $100,000. 
'"^  Ibid [35-37]. 
'°^ Ibid [12]. Her Honour does not appear to be claiming that the fine would protect tiie public. Instead, she 
appeared to be referring to the undertaking by the practitioner to not engage in any fiirther contributory 
mortgage work. 
'"^[2003] QCA 201. 
'"^  Ibid [21]. The court went on to criticise the court for the lack of reasons: at [23] - [25]. 
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In summary, no appeal against the imposition of a fine was heard by the Supreme Court 
until Attomey-General v Bax''' in 1998, despite the fact that fines have been the most 
common form of order imposed by the tribunal in its 76 year history."° Even in appeals 
in which the court considered it necessary to set aside an order made by the tribunal, the 
court avoided tiie use of fines. The court imposed fines on at least two occasions when 
exercising its inherent jurisdiction,'" but both of tiiese cases were decided well before the 
Australian courts clearly distinguished the protective aim of disciplinary proceedings 
from the punitive aim of criminal proceedings."^ There is some evidence tiiat a fine was 
not utilised in at least one stattitory appeal because the court did not seem to be aware 
tiiat fmes were an available option."^ Otiier evidence suggests that the court may not 
have believed tiiat a fine adequately protected the public, at least in tiie cases which came 
before it. 
6.7 THE ROLE OF LARGE FINES 
Given the proceeding analysis of the Supreme Court's attitude to fines in general, and 
that previous cases cited involved maximum fines of $15,000, it is difficult to see what 
role the option of large fines could play other than as regulatory scaffolding. The larger 
the fme imposed by the tribunal in a case, the harder it is to argue that the order can be 
perceived as serving a protective or legitimating ftmction. A large fme indicates how 
'°^ [1999] 2 QdR9. 
"° See the more detailed discussion of the tribunal's use of fmes below section 6.8. 
' " i?e Godfrey [1879] BCR 30 May (£20); Re Cooper (1890) 4 QLJ 49 (fined £50 and suspended for 12 
months). 
" ' See discussion above section 2.3.2; 2.5.1. 
^^^ Adamson V Queensland Law Society Inc [\990] 1 Qd R 498, 506 (Thomas J). 
''" Re Wheeler [1992] 2 Qd R 690; A-G v Bax [1999] 2 Qd R 9. 
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seriously the tribunal viewed the conduct. The larger the fine, the more serious the 
misconduct and, accordingly, the more likely tiiat issues of fitness to practise would seem 
to be relevant. A large fine at least raises the question whether that lawyer is less fit to 
continue to practise than is a lawyer who receives a smaller fine. Therefore, a large fine 
would seem more likely to risk adverse attention from the Attomey-General or Legal 
Services Commissioner. An appeal would be disadvantageous for any legitimation 
project as it is more likely to attract adverse publicity than the original tribunal hearing 
and gives the Supreme Court the opportunity publicly to air concems about standards in 
the profession. Given that the Queensland Court of Appeal has generally shown an 
aversion to the use of fines as a disciplinary response, any appeal by the Attomey-
General or commissioner against a fine is likely to cast the tribunal and profession in an 
unfavourable light. 
Therefore, while the relevant rules of court and legislation have allowed the imposition of 
fines of up to $100,000,"^ it could be expected that the use of large fines would be rare if 
the disciplinary system was being used as part of a legitimation project. 
It was suggested earlier in this chapter"^ that fines rarely protect. Nor does the 
imposition of a fine serve any legitimation project as well as an order which removes a 
lawyer from practice. In some cases it will be the order made by the tribunal which will 
define the seriousness of the conduct, as this cannot always be objectively defined. The 
difficulty of a review body or extemal observer objectively determining the seriousness 
115 The relevant section now is Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) 280(4)(a). 
See above section 6.3. 
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of the conduct of a practitioner who has appeared before the tiibunal and the 
appropriateness of the ttibmial's response was exacerbated by the limited information 
available about a case and the many occasions upon which the tiibunal failed to give 
reasons for its decision."^ The imposition of a small fine increased the likelihood tiiat the 
matter would be kept out of the public arena. Ffrst, tiiere was not tiie same practical need 
to notify existing clients as there would have been if a practitioner was stmck off or 
suspended by the ttibunal. Second, a case in which a small fine has been imposed does 
l i s 
not provide material for sensational media headlines: 'Solicitor Fined $7,500' was not 
as likely to sell newspapers as the headline which read 'Solicitor Stinck Off Roll'." The 
case in which a lawyer received only a small fine is only likely to provide material for 
sensational news if there is objective evidence that the conduct mvolved demanded a 
much stt-onger response from the tribunal, for instance, the headline readfrig: 'Lawyer 
Fined $15,000 For False Papers'.'^° However, if the nature of the conduct appeared more 
ambiguous to the outside observer who did not have access to the details of the case, less 
sensational headlines would be generated, for instance headlines such as 'Solicitor Fined 
Over Biir.'^' A journalist may have attended the discipluiary hearing to obtain details 
about the case beyond those published in the Findings and Orders lodged at the Supreme 
Court of Queensland, or in any published disciplinary reports. Otherwise, no 
information would be available to suggest that the fine was inappropriate to the 
circumstances of the case. A good example is provided by a case heard in 1986 in which 
the solicitor was fined $500 after being found guilty of falsely witnessing a memorandum 
"^ See the discussion of publicity below section 8.3.2.2. 
"^ Courier Mail (Brisbane), 8 May 1998, 9. 
"^ Courier Mail {Bnshzine) 15 February 1989, 20. 
'-° Courier Mail (Brisbane), 30 July 1997, 11. 
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of transfer.'^ ^ The lack of information about the case makes it difficult to be sure that a 
fine was inappropriate, but on its face the conduct appears dishonest. Hearings were not 
held ui public at this tune, so no journalist would have been present to cast ftirther, 
independent light on the circumstances of the case or the appropriateness of the small 
fine. 
Media reports of the imposition of fines certainly appear to have been much less common 
than reports of strike offs or suspensions,'^ "* despite the fact that fines were the most 
common order made by the tribunal, comprising 41% of orders made in the period 1930-
2000.'^ ^ This supports the proposition that the media is less likely to report cases in 
which fines, especially small fines, have been imposed, and therefore that - if the 
decision of the tribunal can avoid publicity and close public scmtiny - the imposition of a 
small fine serves the legitimation project. It serves the project by effectively suggesting 
that the vast majority of lawyers are of the highest ethical standard, and that those who 
are not, are expelled from the profession through a strike off order. The implicit message 
is that, apart from strike offs, other matters that come before the disciplinary tribunal are 
only the result of the strict regulatory character of tmst account reportmg obligations of 
'•' James Woods, 'Solicitor Fined Over Bill', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 15 December 1994, 24. 
' " See the discussion of published disciplinary reports at 8.3.2.2. 
'"^  Re X, SC 280, heard 25 March 1986, reported in 'Statutory Committee Proceedings', Queensland Law 
Society Joumal 197. The solicitor was not named, as was the practice at the time. 
'^ '^  Some examples of rare reports of disciplinary fines include: James Woods, 'Solicitors Suspended by 
Misconduct Tribunal', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 16 December 1993, 20: This article referred to cases 
shidies included in the report of tiie Lay Observer (later renamed the Legal Ombudsman and now the Legal 
Services Commissioner) tabled in Queensland Pariiament. As well as cases of strike offs and suspensions, 
it included cases of practitioners fined $10,000 and $5,000 (three practitioners), but importantiy, the 
headline focused on cases in which an incapacitative order was made; James Woods, 'Solicitor Fined Over 
Bill', Courier Mail {Brisbane), 15 December 1994, 24; 'Solicitor Fined $7,500', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 8 
May 1998, 9; 'Society Silent on Coast Solicitor's $15,000 Fine' Gold Coast Bulletin, 17 February 2001, 
13; Paul Whittaker, 'Lawyer Fined $15,000 For False Papers', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 30 July 1997, 11. 
'^ ^ Haller, above n 16, 24. During the same period, 31% of solicitors were struck off and 19% suspended. 
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solicitors or because of trivial complaints by clients. These are represented as giving no 
cause for concem, and do not in any way reflect on the honesty or tiiistworthiness of the 
individuals involved and can be adequately dealt with by a small fine. 
Small fines are also consistent with retribution, given that a rettibutive response will 
usually moderate the order which may have otiierwise been imposed for deterrent 
effect.'^ *^  The protective effect of small fines, except perhaps through specific deterrence, 
is less clear. 
6.8 THE EVIDENCE: FINES IMPOSED BY TRIBUNAL 
6.8.1 Overall Trends 
This section examines the tribunal's use of fines. The section will only look at fmes 
imposed on solicitors because there was no stattitory tribunal with jurisdiction to impose 
fines on barristers until 2004*^^ and barristers in Queensland have never been fmed -
even by the court in its inherent jurisdiction.'^ ** After looking at overall trends, a closer 
examination will be undertaken of cases in which the tribunal imposed tiie largest fines 
on solicitors, to determine how effectively those orders fulfilled the ttibunal's protective 
function (or were merely retributive in character). 
'•^  Although it has been argued that a retributive model can suggest a minimum level of punishment, it is 
generally thought that a retributive model leads to a more moderate order than a pure deterrence model: 
Nigel Morris, 'Desert as a Limiting Principle' in Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth (eds), 
Principled Sentencing (Northeastern University Press, Boston, 1992) 201; Andrew von Hirsch, 'Ordinal 
and Cardinal Desert' in Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth (eds), Principled Sentencing 
(Northeastern University Press, Boston, 1992) 209. 
' " With the introduction oi Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). 
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Fines were the most common type of order made by the tribunal, comprising 41% of 
orders in the period 1930-2000. The preference for fines over other forms of order 
varied over time, comprising only 15.4% of orders made in the five years following the 
establishment of the statutory disciplinary tribunal'^° rising to 54.5% of all orders in the 
early 1950s.'^' In the most recent time period studied statistically - 1996-2000 - fines 
comprised 45.6% of orders made. The high use of fines by the tribunal when dealing 
with solicitors has been maintained: in 2003-2004, 13 of the 25 solicitors who appeared 
before the tribunal were fined, a proportion of 52%.'^^ 
The size of fines also varied over tune, ranging from £4 to £ 150 before decimal currency 
was inttoduced in 1966 and from $25 and $40,000 in the years since then.'^ '* The average 
size of fines has tended to be small, as shown in Table 1 below, even though the 
maximum fine available has been $100,000 since 1987. 
'"* Discussed above section 6.2.2. 
' ' ' Haller, above n 16, 24. Orders striking a solicitor fi-om the roll comprised 31% of orders made and 
suspensions comprised 19% of orders. 
"° Namely, 1930-1935. N=26. Although the tribunal was established in 1927, it did not hear its first case 
until 8 May 1930. 
'^'N=ll. 
''-Haller, above n 16. N=57. 
' " Queensland Legal Services Commissioner, Annual Report 2004-2005 31, Table 1.1. 
""Haller, above n 16, 33-4. 
' ' ' See above section 6.2.1 for discussion of why such a high maximum fine for solicitors may have been 
introduced in Queensland. 
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TABLE 1"* 
Average Size of Fines 
5yrs to 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
Mean 
23.8 
21.0 
38.3 
42.8 
21.7 
46.4 
50.6 
70.0 
182.7 
662.5 
1725.0 
2112.5 
6490.0 
8518.5 
Median 
25.0 
17.9 
25.0 
25.0 
20.0 
25.0 
50.0 
77.5 
150.0 
750.0 
575.0 
1500.0 
3750.0 
5000.0 
Std Dev 
6.3 
11.8 
32.1 
38.2 
14.0 
30.4 
47.3 
31.9 
133.6 
334.4 
1796.8 
1700.9 
7616.6 
9022.9 
Minimum 
15 
10 
15 
21 
5 
25 
4 
25 
25 
100 
200 
100 
400 
500 
Maximum 
30 
50 
75 
100 
40 
100 
150 
100 
500 
1000 
5000 
5000 
25000 
40000 
Count 
4 
12 
3 
4 
6 
7 
7 
4 
13 
16 
16 
16 
30 
27 
Thus it can be seen that, while fmes were often utilised by the tribunal, they tended to be 
small. Small fines are unlikely to play a significant role in general deterrence. Fines may 
play some part in specific deterrence, and presumably, the larger the fine, the greater the 
deterrence, which has the potential to support the protective effect of discipline. However, 
a survey of cases in which the tribunal imposed the largest fines - discussed later in this 
chapter'^^ - shows a high rate of further misconduct, thereby casting doubt on the efficacy 
of fines for specific deterrence. 
It was suggested earlier in this chapter that the imposition of a small fine may serve a 
legitimation project because the size of the fine itself may define the conduct as less 
serious. This is only likely to be possible in cases in which the nature of the conduct is 
'^ ^ Taken from Haller, above n 16, 33-4. 
'''' The figures until 1965 are in pounds (£)and in dotiars ($) thereafter. 
"^ Below section 6.8. 
' ' ' See above section 6.5.4. 
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ambiguous. For instance, a small fine, even if it came to the attention of the mass media, 
could be easily criticised if it had been imposed in relation to the stealing of money from a 
chent. There is no ambiguity in relation to theft.''*^ Areas of professional conduct which 
may appear more ambiguous to those outside the profession include conflict of interest 
and confidentiality. Table 2 indicates the types of misconduct for which various forms of 
orders were imposed in the period 1930-2000. 
TABLE 2 141 
Strike off 
Suspension 
Fine 
Censure 
Rehab 
Costs 
NUMBER 
Orders made by Type of Findings 
Table 2A: Cases With a Single Charge Type 
Trust fund Misleading Conflict Ethics Compliance 
52.3 
14.0 
30.8 
2.8 
0.0 
0.0 
33.3 
28.6 
33.3 
4.1 
0 
D 
0.0 
11.1 
88.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
50.0 
0.0 
18.8 
31.3 
0 
0 
107 21 16 
2.5 
17.5 
66.3 
11.3 
0.0 
0.0 
SO 
Table 2B: All Cases (Not Mutually Exclusive) 
Trust fund Misleading Conflict Ethics Compliance 
Strike off 
Suspension 
Fine 
Censure 
Rehab 
Costs 
NUMBER 
45.9 
20.3 
29.5 
2.9 
1.0 
0,5 
im 
43.0 
27.9 
25.6 
2.3 
0 
0 
16 
21.8 
27.3 
47.3 
1.8 
1.8 
0.0 
55 
39.1 
19.6 
30.4 
10.9 
0 
0 
46 
14.0 
22.8 
52.2 
7,4 
1.5 
0.7 
136 
•^°Chnstine Parker, J«5r lawyer. (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999) 16. 
'^ ' This table fonns part of a separate body of data collected and analysed using fiinds provided by a 
Umversity of Queensland New Staff Research Start Up Grant. Parts of that data analysis have been 
published in: Haller, above n 16. 
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The cases with a single charge type, as shown in Table 2A, provide the most direct 
relationship between the type of charge proved and the penalty imposed. As Table 2A 
shows, between 1930 and 2000, tiie tribunal heard 18 cases in which the only charge 
proved related to a conflict of duty and interest.'"' Of those 18 cases, tiie overwhelming 
majority of solicitors were fined (88.9%). None were stmck off and 11.1% were 
suspended. While some caution must be exercised given the low number of cases 
involved, it could be argued from these figures tiiat a solicitor found guilty of charges 
relating to a conflict of duty and interest in the period 1930-2000 was highly likely to 
receive a fine. 
By comparison, a solicitor who was only found guilty of tmst account breaches was much 
more likely to be stmck off (52.3%).'''^ It could be argued tiiat conflicts of duty and 
interest are more ambiguous to the general public than tmst account issues, which can be 
portrayed as the misuse of client monies. Thus, the high rate of fines to dispose of 
'conflict of interest' charges is consistent with the legitimation argument raised earlier. 
'"*" This group includes: borrowing fi-om a chent (breach of Rule 86 Queensland Law Society Rule 1987 
(Qld)), acting for both borrower and lender where prohibited by Rule 85, preferring the solicitor's own 
interest over the interest of the client or placing oneself in a position of potential conflict of interest or 
conflict of duty. 
'"' This group does not only include trust account fi-aud, but any breach of the Trust Accounts Act 1973 
(Qld), even if inadvertent. 
''^ See above section 6.6.1. It is also interesting to note the low number of conflict of interest charges which 
have been brought before the tribunal: 55 such charges found proved in the period 1930-2000. 
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6.8.2 Large Fines Imposed 
6.8.2.1 Specific Deterrence 
A survey of the six cases in which the tribunal imposed its largest fines, ranging between 
$25,000 and $40,000, casts doubt on the efficacy of fmes as a means of specific 
deterrence. In four of the six cases, the individual practitioner was to later reappear 
before the tribunal, despite the imposition of a large fine.''*^ For instance, in the case in 
which the largest fine was imposed, a fine of $40,000,''^ ^ the practitioner O'Neill 
reappeared before the tribunal three years later on fiirther charges. The charges found 
proved included the misappropriation of monies belonging to various clients - totalling 
more than $500,000.00 - and the knowing preparation of false bills of mortgage and of 
making false representation to clients. On this later occasion he was stmck off'"'^  
Similarly, a practitioner Bailment was fined $25,000 in 1990,'^° but reappeared before 
the tiibunal on two subsequent occasions.'^' When fined $25,000 in 1990, he had already 
appeared before tiie ttibunal on two occasions and been fined.'^^ On his fourth 
" ' Re a Practitioner (1996) 26 QLSJ 615, SC 377, 22 October 1996 ($40,000); SC 314, 17 July 1990 
(unreported, $25,000); Re a Practitioner (1994) 24 QLSJ 281, SC 353, 8 March 1994; Re Practitioner X 
(1999) 5 Disciplinary Action Report 24, SCT 18, 8 September 1999 ($25,000). 
'''* There is no evidence of fiirther misconduct by the practitioners involved in SC 319, 25 July 1990 or in 
J?e^(2001) 8 Disciplinary Action Report 10. 
^''Re a Practitioner {1996) 26 QLSJ 615, SC 377, 22 October 1996. 
'''* Re O'Neill (1999) 5 Disciphnary Action Reports 9. 
' ' ' Ibidl4. 
'^ ° SC 314, 17 July 1990, unreported. 
'^ ' Re a Practitioner (1992) 22 Queensland Law Society Joumal 462, SC 334, 15 May 1992; Re Bailment 
(1998) 2 Disciphnary Action Reports 4, SC 389, 17 June 1997. 
' " He first appeared in SC 267, 20 March 1985. The practitioner admitted tiiat he had failed to respond to 
Queensland Law Society requests for information and was fined $500 The practitioner admitted two 
charges of failing to respond to society requests for information in breach of Rule 82, later relocated to 
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appearance before the ttibunal he was fined again, this time a sum of $5,000. On his 
fifth appearance - again for failing to respond to Queensland Law Society enquiries - the 
ttibunal heard evidence of an 'ongoing problem with procrastination for which the 
practitioner had sought tteattnent'.'^"* Upon Bailment complying witii various 
undertakings,'^^ the tribunal ordered that a five year suspension order be stayed. 
Nor did a fine of $25,000 imposed in 1994'^^ appear to deter the solicitor Wright from 
further misconduct, as she was to reappear before the tribunal in December 1999, when 
she was stmck off for misleading a court, attempting to suborn a witness to swear a false 
affidavit and misleading the Queensland Law Society. 
Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s5G, now contained in Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 269. The 
section deems breach of this mle to be professional misconduct. The nature of the disciplinary proceedings 
brought against him in 1988 is unclear, although they were brought before the lower level tribunal, the 
Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: SDT 4 of 1988, 22 February 1988. Although the details and result of this 
hearing before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal are missing from Queensland Law Society records and 
are not lodged at the Supreme Court of Queensland (there was no requirement under the legislation to lodge 
a copy of the findings and orders of this tribunal), a 1998 article in the Courier Mail (Brisbane) suggests 
that the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal fined the practitioner $1,000 when he appeared before it in 
February 1988. The source of the Courier MaiFs information is unclear. M Fishpool, 'Solicitor's Record of 
Misconduct Revealed', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 4 March 1998, 3. While the society was pubhshing 
detailed reports of Statutory Committee decisions in the Queensland Law Society Joumal in 1988, it did not 
begin to publish Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal decisions in the joumal until October of that year. 
' " Re a Practitioner (1992) 22 Queensland Law Society Joumal 462, SC 334, 15 May 1992. He was found 
to have again failed to respond to Law Society requests for information. 
'^ ^ Re Bailment (1998) 2 Disciplinary Action Reports 4, 5. 
^ These undertakings included a requirement that the practitioner cease working as a principal and not 
seek to work again as a principal until 30 June 2002. The practitioner was also required to supply a 
psychiatrist or psychologist report to the Queensland Law Society before seeking a principal's practising 
certificate in the future. He also undertook to notify any employer of the disciplinary proceedings. If the 
practitioner sought employment as a solicitor in private practice, his employer was to supply the society 
with an undertaking to supervise his work, such undertaking to be approved by the Council of the society. 
^'^Rea Practitioner {1994) 24 QLSJ 281, SC 353, 8 March 1994. 
' " Re Wright (2000) 6 Disciplinary Action Report 7, Charge 29, 22 December 1999. An appeal by the 
practitioner to the Court of Appeal was dismissed: Council of Qld Law Society Inc v Wright [2001] QCA 
58. 
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The fourth of the practitioners to reappear before the tribunal despite the fact that they 
1 CQ 
received one of the six largest fines imposed by the tribunal was Nettleton. He was to 
reappear in November 2000 for failing to comply with an earlier undertaking and was 
suspended indefinitely. 
It would seem that the two remaining practitioners with the largest fines were deterred: 
there is no record of a reappearance by the practitioner fined $25,000 fri 1990 or the 
practitioner fined $30,000 ui 2001.'^' But a reappearance rate of 66.6% even when large 
fines are imposed, casts serious doubt upon the effectiveness of fines as specific 
deterrence. 
6.8.2.2 General Deterrence 
While large fines could have deterred other practitioners from engaging in similar 
misconduct, the effectiveness of such general deterrence required the disciplinary 
proceedings to be reported in the professional joumals and for those reports to be 
sufficiently detailed to guide the conduct of other practitioners. While it is notoriously 
difficult to determine the effectiveness of general deterrence,'^^ optimal deterrence at 
least requires systematic dissemination of information to the population to be deterred, in 
'^ ^ Re Practitioner X {1999) 5 Disciplinary Action Report 24, SCT 18, 8 September 1999. He had received 
a fine of $25,000 after admitting to charging excessive fees and of unauthorised movement of tmst monies. 
He had appeared before tiie tribunal on an eariier occasion when he had also admitted to the unauthorised 
handling of hiist monies and of making a recklessly false statement to the Law Society. On that occasion he 
had been fined $3,000.00: Re Practitioner X {\99S) 2 Disciplinary Action Reports 3, SC 387, 10 June 
1997. 
' " Re Nettleton (2001) 7 Disciplinary Action Report 18,19. 
'"' SC 319, 25 July 1990, unreported. 
'^' ReX{200\) 8 Disciplinary Action Report 10, SCT 40, 7 March 2001. 
' " Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth (eds), Principled Sentencing (Northeastern University Press, 
Boston, 1992) 57. 
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this case tiie Queensland legal profession. This survey of the six largest fmes suggests 
that the impact of these fmes in deterring other practitioners was likely to vary widely, as 
it was largely dependent upon whether or not that decision was published in professional 
joumals and upon tiie detail of any such published report. The degree of publication 
varied widely from case to case. For instance, two of the cases were not reported to 
fellow solicitors at all,'^^ and other cases were only briefly reported, sometimes in only 
half of a page of the professional joumal. '^ "^  On other occasions the nature of charges was 
only reported in summary form, making it difficult for other practitioners to fiilly grasp 
degrees of acceptable and unacceptable conduct. 
The potential of these large fines to deter other practitioners was also limited by a 
common failure by the tribunal to give reasons for the imposition of the fine. When the 
' " SC 314, 17 July 1990 ($25,000); SC 319, 25 July 1990 ($25,000). No disciplinary decisions were 
reported in the Queensland Law Society Joumal during 1990 and 1991. 
' '" Re a Practitioner (1994) 24 QLSJ 281, SC 353, 8 March 1994. 
' " For example. Re a Practitioner (1996) 26 QLSJ 615, SC 377, 22 October 1996, in which the solicitor 
received a fine of $40,000, the largest fine ever imposed, the charges are greatiy summarised in the one and 
a half page report, as: 
1 Twenty charges of breach of Rule 82; 
t Eleven charges of breach of Rule 83; 
i Charges relating to 5 separate client matters where the practitioner failed to attend to his clients' 
affairs in a timely manner and was, on occasions, responsible for gross and unexplained delay. 
Further, the practitioner failed to keep his clients sufficientiy informed in relation to the matters and 
failed or refused, to receive or altematively respond to enquiries written or oral from clients in 
relation to matters; 
4' One charge of communicating inaccurate information to the Society which was made recklessly 
made, uncaring as to its accuracy; and 
S< One charge of false communication to a client knowing it was false or misleading. 
' The disciplinary tribunal in Queensland has been criticised on a number of occasions for failing to give 
reasons: Walter v Council of Queensland Law Society (1988) 62 ALJR 153 at 157; Adamson v Queensland 
Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498 at 508; Attomey-General v Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350, [22-26] (Thomas 
J), [3-4] (de Jersey CJ, with whom Ambrose J agreed); QLS v Carberry [2000] QCA 450, [6] (Pincus JA). 
The need to state findings on questions of fact has been contained in the Act since its inception in 1927: 
first contained in Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s6(3)(b), then Queensland Law Society Act 1952 
(Qld) s 6V(l)(b). The need to provide reasons for the particular order made, in addition to giving findings 
on questions of fact was stated explicitiy in the subordinate legislation; Queensland Law Society (Solicitors 
Complaints Tribunal) Rule 1997 (Qld) s 14(h). Surprisingly, the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) has 
removed any express statutory requirement to provide reasons. This will require the courts and tribunals to 
revert to the common law: Cypressvale Pty Ltd v Retail Shop Lease Tribunal [1996] 2 Qd R 462, 476-477, 
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public is protected directly by an order which incapacitates a practitioner, such as a strike 
off or suspension order, a failure to give reasons may be partly excused. However, fines 
can only protect through deterrence. Practitioners cannot understand what they are to be 
deterred from and when they are more likely to be fined than dealt with in another way 
unless the ttibunal gives reasons. Presumably, the larger the fine, the greater deterrence 
intended. Thus, in these six cases in which the largest fines were imposed, it is difficult to 
understand any failure to give reasons, if the tribunal was seeking to deter. And yet no 
reasons were given to fellow practitioners, simply by the failure to publish two of the 
decisions in which large fines were imposed.'^^ Of published decisions, some contained 
no reasons at all for the imposition of a fine rather than a suspension or a strike off 
order,'^ ^ and only brief reasons were given in other reported cases involving large fines. 
For instance, a fine of $30,000 was imposed in March 2001 '^ ^ because of 
... the practitioner's long period of unblemished practice, the references provided and the 
fact that there is no real evidence of fraudulent behaviour or attempting to profit from his 
behaviour. 
Similarly, a fine of $25,000 rather than a suspension was imposed in September 1999 
because a 'suspension could result in the inability of the practitioner to repay tiie persons 
adversely affected' by his overcharging. 
482-484, cited with approval in A-G v Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350, [22] (Thomas JA). See also Queensland 
Law Society Inc v Carberry [2000] QCA 450, [36] and Council of the Queensland Law Society v Lowes 
[2003] QCA 201, discussed above section 6.6. 
' " SC 314, 17 July 1990; SC 319, 25 July 1990. 
" ' Re a Practitioner {1994) 24 QLSJ 281, SC 353, 8 March 1994. 
'^' ReX{200\) 8 Disciplinary Action Report 10, SCT 40, 7 March 2001. This sohator was not identified as 
the Queensland Law Society did not name practitioners who were 'only' fined until later: see discussion 
below section 8.3.2.4. 
'™ Ibid 21 (emphasis added). 
'^' Re Practitioner X (1999) 5 Disciplinary Action Report 24, 26. While it could be argued that tius 
moderation of the order was designed to protect those members of the public who were owed money by the 
solicitor, arguably it fails to take account of the need to protect the public more broadly, in tiie guise of 
future clients. The tribunal also noted undertakings by the practitioner to repay the amounts overcharged. 
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The lack of detail, combined with tiie ttibunal's reticence to give reasons for its decisions, 
limited tiie potential for tiiese large fines to provide general deterrence. 
I suggested at the beginning of tiiis chapter that if the tribunal was serving a legitimating 
fiinction it would avoid the imposition of large fines as these would increase the 
possibility of an appeal. However, no appeal was lodged in any of the six cases in which 
the largest fines were imposed.'^^ The low rate of appeals by the Attomey-General 
suggests that, even if the tribunal was serving a legitimating fiinction, fear of an appeal 
by the Attomey-General was urtiikely to have been a factor inhibiting the tribunal's use 
of large fmes. This is contrary to the argument proposed at the beginnmg of this chapter, 
that large fines would attract appeals by the Attomey-General or Legal Services 
Commissioner, which would detract from any legitimation project. 
6.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter began with a consideration of the existence of the power to impose fines in 
the disciplinary 'scaffold':'^^ the potential to impose large fines on solicitors has existed 
for many years in relation to solicitors but was only introduced into the disciplinary 
framework for barristers in 2004. Although it was the judges of the Supreme Court of 
which totalled $46,420, to be supervised by a senior practitioner, to consult with his psychiatrist monthly, 
for monthly reports from the psychiatrist to be provided to the Queensland Law Society and for the 
practitioner to attend a Practice Management Course. 
'^ " Appeals were lodged in Attomey-General v Bax [1999] 2 Qd R 9 by both the Queensland Law Society 
and the Attomey-General against the imposition of a fine of $15,000. At the time that the tribunal imposed 
that fine (29 July 1997), it was the seventh largest fine imposed by the tribunal (since the introduction of 
decimal currency in 1966). 
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Queensland who sponsored the introduction of fines of up to $ 100,000 for solicitors, the 
court has only rarely endorsed the use of fines in the cases which have come before it. In 
contrast, the solicitors' disciplinary tribunal has continued to favour the use of fines -
despite the challenge they present to either a protective or legitimation purpose for 
discipline - but has imposed fines of amounts much lower than the statutory maximum. I 
considered the six cases in which the tribunal imposed the largest fines, to see whether 
the fines could have protected the public through deterrence. The evidence casts severe 
doubt upon both the general and specific deterrence of fmes in the disciplinary context. 
Of all the disciplinary orders available, fines are the most analogous to criminal 
punishment and so require close scmtiny in the disciplinary context. These results 
suggest that the tribunal has operated under a more retributive model than the tribunal 
itself would concede. This can be more cleariy demonstrated by a closer examination of 
personal 'mitigatmg' factors in disciplinary proceedings, which I explore in the following 
chapter. 
•I* •!* "P "t* 
'^ ^ See discussion of 'scaffolding' above section 3.10.2.1. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PERSONAL FACTORS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the two preceding chapters 1 considered cases in which the tribunal suspended or fined 
practitioners. The circumstances of some of those cases suggested that the tribunal may 
have considered taking more serious action against the practitioner had it not been for 
factors personal to the practitioner, such as poor health, reputation, financial pressures or 
inexperience. Traditionally, the courts have stated that the protective nature of 
disciplinary proceedings meant that a practitioner could not rely on personal, mitigating 
factors to the same degree as in criminal proceedings.' 
The fact that a practitioner suffered from some personal adversity, such as poor mental 
health or financial pressure, at the time of misconduct may sometimes be relevant to the 
tribunal or court's protective role. However, this depends on the nature of the misconduct 
and whether these factors are likely to recur in the fiiture. These issues will be explored in 
more detail throughout this chapter. The chapter will note occasions on which 
disciplinary courts or tribunals do not appear to have distinguished between future risk 
Above section 2.3.3. 
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and moral blame for past misconduct, and so appear to have been at least partly 
influenced by retribution, and not simply protection. 
It should be noted at the outset that any assessment of the appropriateness of tribunal 
orders is hampered by the dearth of tribunal reasons and lack of information as to 
submissions on penalty.^ In addition, the tribunal often fails to provide adequate factual 
detail in relation to individual charges. It should also be noted that some personal factors 
are treated with more privacy than others. For uistance, even if mental illness has been 
disclosed by a practitioner and used as a mitigating factor by the tribunal, the tribunal 
may choose not to refer to it in their reasons, or refer to it in an oblique way, such as 'the 
practitioner's health problems', which could apply equally to a broken leg or mental ill-
health.^  Thus, for all these reasons, while the tribunal may have given too much weight to 
personal factors, this will not always be apparent from the face of the record. 
After looking at the attittide of the High Court and Supreme Court of Queensland to the 
question of personal factors, I consider some personal factors in more detail. I focus 
primarily on reputation, acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the proceedings, mental 
illness, and client loss/practitioner gain, as these are common but problematic factors in 
disciplinary proceedings against lav^ers. The way in which the tribunal deals with these 
factors may provide some insight into whether the tribunal is pursuing protective, 
legitimating or retributive objectives. 
^ The court decisions in which tiie tribunal was repeatedly criticised for failing to give reasons are listed 
below section 8.3.2.2. 
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7.2 ATTITUDE OF THE HIGH COURT 
As early as 1947, in Re Davis,^ tiie High Court stated that sympathy for mdividual 
misfortune was 'no reason whatever for impairing in [that practitioner's] interests the 
standards of a profession which plays so indispensable a part m the administration of 
justice.'^ Similarly, in New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt the High Court 
overtumed a two year suspension of a barrister and ordered that he be disbarred 
notwithstanding his youth and his lack of understanding, as his 'failure to understand the 
error of his ways of itself demonstrates his unfitness','' and confirmed there was little or 
no room for 'mercy' given that disciplinary proceedings contained 'no element of 
punishment' and were 'entirely protective'. 
Those earlier cases can be compared with the High Court's more recent decision ui A 
Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales^ A reading of the case may 
suggest to some that the court was willing to overturn the sttike off order of the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal because it thought the solicitor had already 'suffered' 
' In Re Wakeling SCT 110, 26 August 2003, the tribunal ordered tiiat evidence regarding a medical report 
not be published, although it did require that the solicitor not be allowed to practise until certified fit to 
practise by a psychiatrist. 
"* (1947) 75 CLR 409. 
^ Ibid 426 (Davis J). Although these comments were made in relation to a barrister seeking readmission 
rather than in disciplinary proceedings, it is suggested the principles are the same. 
^(1968) 117 CLR 177. 
^ Ibid 184. 
^ Ibid 183. The position is the same in England: Re a Solicitor [1959] 103 Solicitors Joumal 875; Re H, a 
Solicitor [1940] QWN 8; Bolton v Law Society [1994] 2 All ER 486, 492-3; A Cordery, Cordery's Law 
Relating to Solicitors, 8* ed, (1988) 322. See also Law Society of NSW v Moulton [1981] 2 NSWLR 736, 
750.. 
' (2004) 216 CLR 253. Discussed above section 2.6.3.2 in relation to the relevance of the damage the 
conduct may have on the reputation of the legal profession. 
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enough - in other words, that the High Court was adopting a retributive approach. The 
High Court did say a strike off order was not appropriate given the 'powerful subjective 
case' made on the solicitor's behalf'° Unfortunately, the court did not identify the 
subjective factors it was placing weight on, or the relative weight it gave to each. 
However, the court had been told that, at the time of the conduct in question, the 
solicitor had been made redundant and was suffering depression, and his father was dying 
from mesothelioma. After questions were raised about his conduct, the solicitor left a 
'promising' career in the Army Reserve and ceased practising as a solicitor. In the 
criminal proceedings which followed, both retribution and protection were highly 
relevant to sentencing. In deciding to impose a three year good behaviour bond rather 
than a period of imprisormient, the appellate court accepted there was little risk of any 
fiirther offending, the defendant was under extreme personal stress at the time of the 
12 
offence and had not caused serious harm. 
But how should the solicitor's personal circumstances be treated in disciplinary 
proceedings? While the High Court did not explicitly deny bemg mfluenced by any 
sympathy it felt for tiie solicitor's predicament, it indicated that its decision to allow the 
solicitor to remain in practice was because it could not find miy future risk to the public, 
given tiie solicitor's fiill rehabilitation.'^ So, despite the degree to which both the New 
'° (2004) 216 CLR 253, 275. 
" Aggravated indecent assault on two daughters of his defacto wife. He was later convicted. 
'* The sentencing judge in the criminal proceedings, Luland J, had said: 'The assaults upon tiie children 
were not in my view the most serious examples of indecent assaults that one unfortunately sees all too often 
in these courts. ...There is material before me where the children tiiemselves seem to have suffered no 
psychological harm, ... In fact they ... want the continuance of [the opponent] in their life as the father 
figure tiiat he was before this all occurred.' : [2002] NSWCA 62, 5. 
'^(2004) 216 CLR 253, 275. 
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South Wales Court of Appeal and High Court took account of the personal cfrcumstances 
of tiie solicitor, both at the time of the conduct in question and subsequently, A Solicitor 
cannot be interpreted as condoning a greater retributive approach in disciplmary decision-
making. Nevertheless, the distmction between the relevance of personal factors to 
culpability and to fiiture risk can be a subtle one to make, and it would not be surprising 
if voluntary members of part-time disciplinary tribunals found the reasoning in A 
Solicitor difficult to apply. 
7.3 GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND 
The Supreme Court appears to have sometimes condoned the use of personal factors 
which prior case law may have considered irrelevant. Chapters Five and Six documented 
the many disciplinary appeals ui which the Supreme Court of Queensland has overtumed 
suspensions and fines and ordered that the practitioner be stmck from the roll. In some 
of tiiese cases tiie court had evidence that tiie tribunal had made inappropriate use of 
ye 
personal factors to moderate the decision it would have otherwise made. 
'"* Above sections 5.3.3.3 (suspensions), 6.6 (fines). In some appeals, the tribunal's failure to give reasons 
for its order made it difficult to determine whether the tribunal's order should be set aside: For instance, 
Queensland Law Society v Carberry [2000] QCA 450. The tribunal had found Carberry guilty of 
professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for 12 months The tribunal gave no reasons for 
imposing a suspension order rather than a strike off or any other order. {Re Carberry (2000) 6 Disciplinary 
Action Report 17, SCT 6196, 6 March 2000). Both the Attomey-General and Queensland Law Society 
appealed and argued that Carberry should be struck off. The most serious charge against the practitioner 
related to a conflict of interest which Carberry chose to ignore [34] (Moymhan SJA and Atkinson J). Pincus 
JA thought that it was 'no accident' that the practitioner had preferred the interests of his business associate 
to those of his client ([5]). Moynihan SJA and Atkinson J were doubtful as to Carberry's level of remorse 
([37]), suggesting he would not be fit to practise by the end of any period of suspension ([41], Moynihan 
SJA and Atkinson J). Pincus JA agreed that the misconduct was 'bad enough to force one to the unpleasant 
conclusion that mere suspension is insufficient' ([7]). 
" 1. Attomey-General v Brown [1992] QCA 241 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of 
Appeal, Fitzgerald P, Davies JA, Demack J, 11 June 1993). The practitioner had knowingly participated in 
the backdating of documents and the preparation and filing of false affidavits to assist his clients. In 
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deciding to suspend Brown for 21 months, the tribunal (SC 339, 6 October 1992) had made reference to his 
'28 years of unblemished practice and the strong testimonials produced on his behalf, but it was common 
ground in an appeal by the Attomey-General that tiiese were not valid personal mitigating factors in 
disciplinary proceedings as they did not address the issue of the practitioner's fitness to practise. 
2. Queensland Law Society v Mead [1997] QCA 83. The tribunal (SC 378, 18 September 1996) had 
suspended Mead for 33 months despite the fact that he had been before the tribunal only 18 months eariier 
and fined $10,000 {Re X (1995) 25 QLSJ 493, SC 365, 28 March 1995). The tribunal thought that his 
fitness to practice would be re-established after the period of suspension because he had practised as a 
solicitor in his own business or firm for a substantial period, but this reasorung was rejected by the court 
and he was stmck off (7). 
3. Queensland Law Society v Henry William Smith (unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, Appeal 
10787 of 1997, orders by consent, 29 April 1998). The tribunal ((1998) 2 Disciplinary Action Report 12, 
SC 384, 11 November 1997) was satisfied that the misconduct was caused by Smith's major depressive 
illness, as his actions were 'naive at a time when he was not in financial need' (14). The tribunal ordered 
tiiat he be suspended 'until such time as he is able to satisfy the Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc 
tiiat he is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate'. On appeal by the Attomey-General, the 
matter did not go to a full court hearing as Smith consented to an order that his name be stmck from the 
roll. Unfortunately, the Queensland regulators failed to inform regulators in other States of tiie disciplinary 
proceedings. When forced to cease practice in Queensland, he merely moved into New Soutii Wales: 
Adrian Evans, 'Queensland Fidelity Compensation 1990-2004: The End of the Money Tree' (2004) 23 
University of Queensland Law Joumal 397-410, 407. He was found to have stolen millions of dollars fi-om 
clients in both jurisdictions. 
4. Attorney-General v Bax [1999] 2 Qd R 9. Despite finding that the solicitor had deliberately 
backdated a document and misled a creditor's meeting, the tribunal had ordered tiie practitioner to pay a 
fine of $15,000 ((1998) 2 Disciplinary Action Report 6, SC 393, 29 July 1997). The published report of the 
tribunal's decision did not include any reasons, but the later appeal revealed that the tribunal had taken into 
account his relative inexperience and the fact hat he did not gain personally from die misconduct. The court 
overtumed the order and ordered that his name be removed from the roll, noting in particular, the 
irrelevance of inexperience when there is a finding of dishonesty (13, McPherson J). 
5. Attorney-General v Gregory. [1998] QCA 409. Gregory had been convicted of contempt of court 
and fined $4,000 in the District Court for attempting to influence a witness to change her evidence to make 
it more favourable to his client. The disciplinary tribunal took into account his inexperience, his ignorance, 
and that his judgment was 'clouded and pressured' and suspended him for two years {Re Gregory (1998) 3 
Disciplinary Action Report 13, SCT 6174, 13 May 1998). On appeal by tiie Attomey-General, the court 
acknowledged that the misconduct comprised an isolated, unpremeditated incident for which tiie Gregory 
had shown remorse. But de Jersey CJ tiiought the conduct demonstrated the absence of 'critically important 
qualities' (4), and so Gregory needed to be stmck from the roll. He would need to demonstrate he had 
'redeveloped' tiiose qualities before he could be readmitted. White J also thought tiiat the appropriate 
course was to strike Gregory fi-om tiie roll, allowing him to apply for readmission at a later time when he 
could prove his fitness to practise (17). Gregory's subsequent application for readmission was 
unsuccessfiil: Greg Gregory v QLS Inc [2001] QCA 499. 
6. Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Wakeling [2004] QCA 42. The tribunal had 
suspended Wakeling for two years, and tiien not practise as a sole practitioner for a ftirther five years (SCT 
110, 26 August 2003). It had taken account of traumatic events in his personal life, a significant mental 
illness, his successftil practice, and tiiat his misconduct could only given his client a temporary advantage. 
However, on appeal, the court held that the multiple findings of dishonest conduct meant that the court 
could not 'confidently present the respondent as someone on whom the client and the court may rely' 
([27]). Nor could the court have confidence that he would regain fittiess to practise before the two year 
period of suspension expired. The court ordered that he be stmck off. 
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Since 2000, the view of the Supreme Court has become less clear. The court has allowed 
a number of tribunal decisions to stand, including decisions in which tiie tribunal 
appeared to use personal factors to moderate the order it would otherwise make. 16 
There could be a number of reasons for the change m the court's practice since 2000. The 
court may have modified its attitude to the relevance of personal factors. Equally possible 
is that the court has become more willing to defer to the tribunal's discretion and ability 
to judge the character of the practitioner at first hand. This can be seen in Council of the 
Queensland Law Society v Lowes,^^ where the court was reluctant to second-guess the 
tribunal's assessment of the solicitor's character, given that the tribunal had had the 
advantage of listening and watching the solicitor give evidence and being subjected to 
lengthy cross-examination.^^ Similarly, in Council of the Queensland Law Society v 
Roche^^ the court noted that the tribunal was in a much better position than the court to 
' ^ 1 , In Clough V Queensland Law Society [2002] 1 Qd R 116, the court allowed the 12 month 
suspension to stand partly because Clough's conduct had not caused loss to the other side in the litigation, 
and also because Clough had already suffered the expense of costs orders against him (94). 
2. In Attomey-General and Minister for Justice (Qld) v Priddle [2002] QCA 297 the court thought 
the suspen.sion was appropriate, partly because: 
'[During the period giving rise to complaints] the respondent was held hostage in his city office 
for 15 hours by a disturbed gunman. ... followed by death threats ... He had other financial, health 
and marital difficulties .... Excellent character references were tendered ... It was open to the 
Tribunal to be satisfied that at the expiry of the suspension period, having suffered public disgrace 
and humiliation as well as the economic loss resulting fi-om his inability to practise ..., the 
respondent will have leamt his lesson (13-14).' 
3. In Council of the Queensland Law Society v Roche [2003] QCA 469 the court refiised to interfere 
with a suspension order, partly because '[w]hen it came to the question of penalty the Tribunal had before it 
evidence from two legal practitioners as to the solicitor's standing in the legal community and as to his 
preparedness to act in difficult cases for disadvantaged clients (66).' 
4. The court reftised to interfere with the imposition of a fme in Attorney-General v Kehoe [2001] 2 
Qd R 350, partly because no actual harm had been caused, the practitioner had been seriously affected by 
his conduct, and had suffered ignominy and remorse (27, 29). 
5. A fine was allowed to stand in Attorney-General v Delaney [2000] QCA 504, partly because the 
practitioner had practised for almost 30 years without a complaint to the Queensland Law Society, had a 
number of character references and was remorseful (35-37). 
'^[2003] QCA 201. 
'* Ibid [7], [15]. 
" [2003] QCA 469. 
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judge Roche's character, having observed his demeanour at first hand over a six-day 
hearing. 
There is no doubt that personal factors are consistent with the protective focus of the 
disciplinary court or tribunal if they reflect on the future risk to the public. However, if 
the factors are used to vary the lawyer's culpability, or to show that the practitioner has 
afready suffered enough as the result of the conduct, then retributive elements are playing 
a role in the disciplinary decision-making process. 
A good example of a case in which the tribunal appeared to take into account a number of 
personal factors which related to culpability but not fiiture risk is Re Crowley. The most 
serious finding against him was tiie fraudulent conversion of $19,900. The tribunal 
ordered tiiat he be suspended from practice for six months, fined $5,000 and not practise 
as a principal for three years. The only reasons given for such an order were 'the 
practitioner's relevant youth, the character references provided, ... the pressures to which 
tiie practitioner subjected himself in mnning a sole practice' and the lack of 'immediate 
-° Ibid [38], [39]. The preceding discussion has focused on personal factors which may lead a disciplinary 
court or ttibunal to reduce the severity of the order it would otherwise make. In tiie criminal jurisdiction, 
tiiey would be described as mitigating factors. But personal factors can have the opposite effect. They can 
increase tiie severity of tiie order - (aggravating factors). A practitioner's lack of remorse or insight into 
their misconduct, or failure to acknowledge tiie legitimacy of the investigation into their conduct normally 
will lead to a stronger disciplinary response. Two recent Supreme Court decisions {Council of the 
Queensland La\v Society v Roche [2003] QCA 469, [35], [38], and CouncU of the Queensland Law Society 
Inc V Whitman [2003] QCA 438) raise questions as to whether the Supreme Court is reassessing its view of 
these as aggravatmg factor, as the court chose to not interfere witii tiie ttibunal decision. Altematively, 
these appeals may be simply ftirther evidence tiiat the court has been more ready to defer to the tribunal's 
ability to judge fumre risk at first hand. 
'^ The claim is simply that rettibutive elements have caused a change in the disciplinary order imposed. 
Whether the court or ttibunal is aware of this or not is of less significance. Above section 3.2. 
" (1996) 1 Disciplinary Action Reports 6, SC 383, 10 December 1996. 
^^  (1996) 1 Disciplinary Action Reports 6, 6. The practitioner was also found to have made a false 
representation to a Queensland Law Society auditor, and paid $20,000 from his ttaist account to his general 
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financial gain accming to the practitioner.' All of these factors would reduce his 
culpability in crimmal proceedings, but were irrelevant in disciplinary proceedings unless 
tiie tribunal could explain how they reduced the risk of fiirther fraud in the fiitiire, which 
it failed to do.^ ^ There was no appeal from the tribunal's decision. 
7.4 REPUTATION 
Chapter Two indicated how the courts have consistently stated that the reputation of the 
legal profession as a whole is irrelevant when determining individual disciplinary cases.^ ^ 
Although the admission mles in Queensland used to refer only to 'good fame', the 
Supreme Court wamed agauist giving undue weight to evidence of an individual's good 
reputation.^^ For instance, in Barristers' Board v Young^ de Jersey CJ pointed out that 
the disciplinary tribunal should 'focus on a respondent's intrinsic character, and not be 
unduly distracted by reputed good fame, whether within the legal tradition or the wider 
account when not authorised to do so. He also pleaded guilty to a number of charges relating to breaches of 
Trust Account Regulations 1973 (Qld) and borrowing $25,000 from a cHent in Breach of Rule 86. 
-^_ Ibid 7. 
' ' Presumably, the risk to the public would be less for the three years when he could only practise as an 
employee, not as a principal, and so would be subject to some supervision. 
"^  Above section 2.6. 
" Janus V Queensland Law Society Inc [2001] QCA 180, [12]; Barristers' Board v Young [2001] QCA 
556, [22]; Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Wakeling [2004] QCA 42, [26]. See discussion 
above section 2.6.4 and Reid Mortensen, 'Lawyers' Character, Moral Insight and Ethical Blindness', 
(2002) 22 The Queensland Lawyer 166, 168-9. 
'* [2001] QCA 556. 
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community. The Act now codifies the need to consider character as well as good 
fame.^° 
Equally, in A Solicitor, the High Court of Australia dismissed the relevance of the bad 
reputation that may attach to a criminal conviction.^' Nevertheless, testimonials appear to 
be led routinely on behalf of practitioners appearing before disciplinary courts and 
tribunals, suggesting that evidence of good reputation has been given undue and positive 
weight, despite the stated attitude of the court. It is usually impossible, without reading 
each testimonial, to determine the degree to which these testimonials attest to the 
'intrinsic character' of the person - which is acceptable - and the degree to which they 
merely attest to that person's reputation.^^ However, it can be assumed that it is difficult 
for tiiose writing testimonials to restrict themselves to evidence of character, and that 
evidence of reputation may also be included and influence less experienced tribunal 
members. 
'^ Ibid [22]. While Mackenzie J noted the references which showed that Young was 'well thought of by 
fiiends and workmates and ha[d] innate qualities upon which she could build' he thought that the issue for 
tiie court was the person's 'intrinsic character, not necessarily his or her good fame either within the 
profession or the community at large.' 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 3 l(l)(a). See Reid Mortensen, 'Becoming a Lawyer From Admission 
to Practice under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld)' (2004) 23 University of Queensland Law Journal 
319-346,332-3. 
' ' A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253, discussed above 
section 2.6.3.2. 
^- For instance, even in A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253, 
while ignoring arguments about the bad reputation which would attach to the solicitor's criminal 
conviction, the High Court accepted as relevant the following character references: 
There was also a report from the founder director of tiie Child Abuse Protection Centre who said 
that she regarded the appellant as a man of basically good character who was not a fiature nsk. 
Three barristers and a solicitor gave character evidence in support of the appellant. One of the 
referees, who had distinguished service in tiie army reserve, and retired with the rank of Major-
General', and who had also worked witii tiie appellant in tiie legal profession, described him as a 
person who acted with probity, professionalism and honesty, and said tiiat he would have no 
hesitation in working with him in the fiiture. None of that evidence was challenged (271). 
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The court has said that testimonials will be given little weight unless the deponent shows 
that they were aware of the full circumstances of the matter before the tribunal or court 
and comments upon it." In addition, given that presumably such referees either turned a 
blind eye to the misconduct or were unable to detect it themselves, their more general 
powers of judgment and ability to predict or prevent fiirther misconduct may be 
questionable. '^* Testimonials are valid if they provide evidence that tiiere is little or no 
future risk to clients. This can be demonstiated by showing that the misconduct was an 
isolated aberration which is not likely to recur or, perhaps, if the testimonial amounts to a 
form of undertaking to the court or tribunal that tiie deponent will mentor the practitioner 
before the tribunal, to ensure no fiirther nusconduct occurs. 
Testimonials are fikely to advantage more established members of the profession. 
Testimonials from lay people are usually given less weight than those from lawyers. In 
Re Melvey^^ a solicitor disciplined for profitmg too much from running speculative 
actions had filed over 100 testimonials. Thirty of these were from barristers and 
solicitors, however the remainder were discounted by the court which felt that few of the 
lay referees would be aware of the 'standards of honour and honourable conduct expected 
^^  In the words of Blair CJ in Re Bridgman [1934] St R Qd 1, 7, when presented with testimonials covering 
a period in which the practitioner had admitted ftirther misappropriations of tmst monies: 
Apart from any question as to the weight of such testimonials, we cannot suppose that the 
gentlemen who gave them were aware of the facts now disclosed. If they were, and thought that 
such conduct was right and proper, their opinion is of no value; if, on the other hand, they were 
not, the foundation for their opinion is gone. 
See also Re Melvey (1966) 85 (pt 1)(NSW) 289; Robb v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory 
(1996) 72 FCR 225, 243 per Jenkinson J; Janus v Queensland Law Society Inc [2001] QCA 180, [51]. See 
also Mortensen, above n 27, 169. 
'^* Leslie Levin, 'The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Discipline Sanctions' (1998) 48 American University Law Review 1, 56. 
" (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1)(NSW) 289. 
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from a solicitor'.^^ Similarly, tiie testimonial provided by the client from whom the 
practitioner had borrowed money in Law Society of New South Wales v Moulton was 
given no weight, as this was the client to whom the potential conflict of interest and duty 
had not been explained. The court was also wary of giving much weight to the support of 
TO 
the client in Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Roche. 
If a non-lawyer's opinion of a practitioner before the disciplinary tribunal is discounted 
because of the non-lawyer's lack of understanding of the 'standards of honour and 
honourable conduct' within the legal profession then, similarly, judges and leadings 
members of the profession will normally be considered to be more aware of these 
standards than more junior members. It would seem that - where testimonials are 
considered - this would inevitably lead to more lenient treatment of more senior and 
experienced members of the profession, who will know more senior members of the 
profession and judiciary from whom to seek testimonials. 
Levin has questioned the use of testunonials in disciplinary proceedings and claimed they 
are the most misused of all tiie 'mitigating' factors relied upon in disciplinary systems in 
tiie United States."*^ She believed that, as they are usually provided by highly regarded 
members of the profession, they will be given undue weight by the tribunal."^" She has 
gone so far as to suggest that judges and other leaders of the profession be banned from 
'^  Ibid 298. 
^^[1981] 2 NSWLR 736. 
*^ [2003] QCA 469, [42]. The court thought this may have been influenced by the solicitor's reftmd of 
$147,000 to tiie client and the client's desire that the solicitor continue to act for his other child. 
' ' Leslie Levin, 'The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Discipline Sanctions' (1998) 48 American University Law Review 1, 54. 
'° Ibid 55. 
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providing testimonial evidence, unless tiiey are the lawyer's current employer and their 
evidence cannot be otherwise obtained."*' As testimonials are more likely to advantage 
more experienced members of the profession over more junior or less well-connected 
members who are less able to acquire a wealth of glowing testimonials, they are likely to 
reinforce the ascendancy of the elite within the profession. This would come as no 
surprise to those who believe disciplinary processes serve as a form of legitimation in a 
professional project."*^ The greater weight given to testimonials from tiie elite of tiie 
profession reinforces the elite's control in defuting what makes a 'good lawyer' and the 
'professional self. 
It may be difficult for a court or ttibunal to explain how the public wtil be equally 
protected if two practitioners - one of whom can muster a large number of testimonials 
and the other of whom is less well known within the profession and so cannot - are 
treated differentiy for the same misconduct. Different treatment is not justified on any 
deterrence argument, as all practitioners should be equally deterred from the conduct, 
whatever thefr status. Some may also question the degree to which this approach has 
allowed the profession to define 'fitness to practise' and, perhaps, to introduce notions of 
culpability. Until 2004, to some degree, legislation appeared to condone conduct being 
measured against what fellow lavv^ yers thought or did. The Legal Profession Act 2004 
"" Ibid 58. 
'*" Above section 3.5. 
*^ Above section 3.9.1. 
'^ The legislation did not exhaustively define professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct. The 
common law definition of professional misconduct referred to whether colleagues of good repute and 
competency would consider the conduct disgraceful or dishonourable: above section 2.4.3.3. 
Unprofessional conduct required the conduct to fall substantially short of conduct observed or approved of 
by colleagues of good repute and competency: above section 2.4.3.4. 
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(Qld) formally breaks this nexus, by referring to what members of the public are entitied 
to expect.'*^ Time will tell whether this weakens the influence of testimonials. 
7.5 CHARACTER 
Instead of relying on reputation, the court seeks to determine an individual's actual moral 
character.'*^ The aim is to determme whether - despite the incidence of misconduct - the 
individual has an innate sense of honesty and adequate moral fibre to carry out the 
responsibilities of a legal practitioner. This is not an easy enquiry for tiie court or tribunal 
to undertake, although the court is more practised than a disciplinary tribunal consisting 
of volunteer members. Even when a court or disciplinary tribunal is careful to separate 
character from reputation, there may be a risk of over-simplifying the aspects of 
character. McHugh J, in criminal proceedings before the High Court, wamed of the 
oversimplicity of thinking of a person as one-dimensional, as either of good or bad 
character.'*^ He provided as an example the treatment of a sex-offender as a person of bad 
character in a trial for embezzlement, despite overwhelming evidence of the accused's 
honesty.'*^ The good character - bad character dichotomy also suffers from the same 
logical flaws as the 'moral bookkeeping' discussed below,^ ^ as both fail to acknowledge 
the complexity of human behaviour. There is a risk that retributive elements will enter 
'^^ Section 244. 
46 Janus V Queensland Law Society Inc [2001] QCA 180, [12]; Barristers' Board v Young [2001] QCA 
556, [22]; Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Wakeling [2004] QCA 42, [26]; Council of the 
Queensland Law Society Inc v Whitman [2003] QCA 438, [36]. 
' ' Melboume v R [1999] HCA 32, 34. 
^«lbid. 
"" Below section 7.4. 
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tiie decision-making process because the tribunal does not need to justify its decision 
making process as directly by reference to fiitiire risk. 
7.6 FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE LEGITIMACY OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 
In many disciplinary cases, it is the practitioner's failure to acknowledge the legitimacy 
of the investigation and subsequent disciplinary proceedings which becomes the primary 
concem of the disciplinary tribunal. The importance of this factor has been confirmed in 
numerous court decisions^° and in academic writing.^' There is no doubt that a certain 
degree of cooperation is necessary if the investigators and tribunal are to be able to carry 
out their task, hence the long-standmg inclusion of statutory provisions which deem a 
failure to respond to investigators' requests for information to be professional 
misconduct. ^ ^ But the concem goes deeper than that. Usually the court will argue that, 
without uisight and contrition regarding past misconduct, there is a risk of further 
misconduct. 
It can be extremely difficult to determine the genuineness of insight and contrition. This 
is well demonstrated by the differing views in Re Maidment^^ as to whether the 
practitioner did tmly understand now that what he had done was wrong,^ "* or whether 
there was reason to be sceptical of the timing of his supposed insight.^^ The risk of being 
°^ A Solicitor v CouncU of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253; Gregory v QLS Inc 
[2001] QCA 499; Barristers • Board v Young [2001] QCA 556. 
' ' Mortensen, above n 27. 
^^  Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 269(4). 
^^(1992)23 ATR 629. 
*'* Ibid 651 (OlssonJ). . 
" Ibid 645 (Millhouse J). 
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deceived by a practitioner's ability for mere moral discourse is obvious,^^ as seen in 
Gregory v Queensland Law Society Inc. Gregory was applying for readmission, and 
C O 
was cross examined as to the matters which led to him being stmck off Because he 
agreed that he 'had never really regarded himself as someone who lacked honesty, 
objectivity or respect for the court',^^ counsel for the Queensland Law Society argued 
that this response demonstrated that Gregory had still not accepted that his earlier attempt 
to subom a witness was wrong.^° However, Thomas J A rejected this submission, stating 
that the cross-examination 'was a better test of the applicant's capacity for moral 
discourse than of lack of character'.^' His Honour went on to say that, while the court 
must be satisfied that the applicant has shown sufficient remorse and moral fibre to 
ensure that no further misconduct will occur, 
that is not necessarily measured by an applicant's capacity for abasement or for 
producing the best self-analysis of the namre of his guilt. Such exercises may be a better 
test of intellect than of rehabihtation.^ ^ 
Mortensen believes the court distinguishes between a lack of moral apprehension and a 
failure of will.^ ^ A failure of will is more likely to show permanent unfitness to practise, 
while a lack of moral apprehension can often be corrected through education and 
56 Greg Gregory v Queensland Law Society Inc [2001] QCA 499. 
"[2001] QCA 499. 
*^ Attorney General v Gregory [1998] QCA 409. 
^'[2001] QCA 499, [28]. 
^ Ibid. Counsel for tiie Queensland Law Society also relied on the applicant's insistence that he rely on the 
findings of fact of the District Court judge rather tiian a finding of White J in the Court of Appeal. Justice 
Thomas also refiised to draw any adverse inferences from this insistence: at [15]-[16]. See discussion in 
Mortensen, above n 27. 
'^ Ibid [29]. 
" Ibid. See also Council of Queensland Law Society Inc v Roche [2003] QCA 469, where the practtttoner 
was spirited in his defence of disciplinary charges, leading to prosecution submissions that his lack of 
appreciation of his serious breach of fiduciary duty itself demonstrated his unfitness (38). However, the 
court rejected tiiis and accepted the tribunal's view that Roche would be fit to practise by the end of the 12 
month suspension period, by which time 'the lesson will have been learned'. 
*' Mortensen, above n 27, 171. 
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training.^ However, tiie distinction is a particularly subtle one to make and it is suggested 
that those who do not submit to the authority of the proceedings - though at least feigning 
moral insight - are less likely to be given the opportunity for moral improvement through 
education and training which Mortensen anticipates. 
I would suggest the demand for contrition goes even deeper tiian suggested by 
Mortensen. Regardless of any risk of fiiture misconduct, the court or tribunal requires an 
act of public contrition for past conduct - just as crimmal punishment encourages moral 
reflection.^^ This is further evidence that elements of retribution exist in discipline. 
The argument that notions of retribution arise from the need to acknowledge the unethical 
nature of past misconduct is demonstrated by the admission case of Victorian Lawyers 
RPA Ltd V X.^'' The Supreme Court of Victoria found tiiat, although it did not necessarily 
reflect on her character or reputation,^ ** a failure to deal adequately with 'awkward facts 
from the past'^^ meant the applicant was not a fit and proper person to be admitted. The 
court found she had not yet shown an adequate appreciation of the gravity of the offences 
or the potential distress that such reports could cause to the persons falsely accused and 
their families, and so admission was refused.''^  Given that this insight was not necessarily 
'^ Ibid. 
^^Ibid. 
^^  Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2005)174. 
^^[2001] 3 VR 601. 
*^  Victorian Lawyers RPA Ltd vX [2001] 3 VR 601, 602. 
^^  The applicant had been convicted on six counts of making false reports of sexual assault two years 
earlier. 
°^ The court accepted that this occurred during a dissociative state, but thought that the applicant had some 
conscious awareness at the time of the false report: ibid 610. The court relied on this lack of insight. There 
was no suggestion that the applicant suffered from any mental disorder at the time of the application. 
" Ibid 610. 
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linked to character or reputation, the case suggests that the court required an act of public 
contrition before the applicant could be admitted. This has hallmarks of retribution. 
In similar a vein, it could be argued by those who see disciplinary action as part of a 
77 
professional project which seeks to reinforce intemal ideology, that the need to publicly 
acknowledge the 'wrongness' of conduct promotes a cohesive sense of self within the 
profession.^ ^ More particularly, it reinforces the view of the elite as to 'right' and 'wrong' 
conduct. 
On a retributive model in the criminal context, moral culpability is normally luiked to the 
conduct in question. But Walker has noted that penalties are sometimes reduced because 
of some 'meritorious action' which has little to do with the misconduct or with the risk of 
fiittire offences.^ "* He gives tiie example of the man whose prison term is reduced because 
of a good war record or because he saved a boy from drowning or gave a kidney to his 
sister.^ ^ In Walker's view, such an approach does not fit with the classical rettibutive 
model and can only be explained if the criminal sentence is reaUy imposed for general 
moral worth, rather than for the particular crime, and if we presume tiiat: 
moral worth can be calculated by moral book-keeping of tiiis cmde sort, in which 
spectacular behaviour counts more than unobtrusive decency. 76 
' Above section 3.5. 
'^Ibid. 
*^ Nigel Walker, Punishment, Danger and Stigma: the Morality of Criminal Justice (Barnes & Noble, 
Totowa, 1980) 124. 
"Ibid. 
^^  Ibid. Von Hirsch and Ashworth do not believe this form of 'social accounting' has any role in criminal 
sentencing: von Hirsch and Ashworth, above n 66, 167. 
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It is suggested that there is some evidence of such moral book-keeping in determining 
whether a person is 'fit and proper' to be a member of the legal profession. For example, 
in Ex parte Lenehan^ the High Court took strong account of the applicant's 'fine war 
record'^^ and declared him to be a fit and proper person to be admitted.^' Sunilarly, tiie 
ttibunal in Council of the Queensland Law Society v Roche^^ took account of the 
solicitor's 'admirable contribution to tiie legal profession through his involvement in the 
Austtalian Plaintiff Lawyers Association and other community work'. The ttibunal stated 
that this evidence 'confirms the Tribunal's impression of him .... that he is a person of 
integrity ... 
The attributes of fine soldier, scout leader or commuruty volunteer do not necessarily 
guarantee a person's fitness to practise law. Some may argue tiiat professional discipline 
must be distinguished from crimuial sentencing. Through professional discipline, tiie 
legal profession portrays its members as moral citizens in the broadest sense of the word, 
so that this form of moral book-keeping is justified in tiie disciplinary context. It is tme 
that the proper functioning of our legal system requfres a greater ttaist of lav r^yers than of 
others in the general community. If this moral bookkeeping simply aims to audit levels of 
tmstworthiness, tiien it is justified. But if not, there is a danger that 'spectacular good 
^^  (1948) 77 CLR 403. Although this was an application for admission to practice rather than a disciplinary 
hearing, the issues are the same. 
*^ Ibid 424. 
™ Ibid (by majority, Latham CJ, Dixon and Williams JJ, Stark and Rich JJ dissenting). The decision 
followed earlier refusal to admit due to ongoing improper conduct. See as another example the details of 
the extra-professional service of the eight partners which were used to determine the appropriate discipline 
for tax evasion in Re Milte (1991) 22 ATR 740. Conversely, although evidence was adduced of the 'major 
role played by the barrister in advancing the interests of members of the Aboriginal community', this was 
not sufficient to dissuade the Court of Appeal from disbarring a barrister for swearing a false affidavit in 
Coe V NSW Bar Association [2000] NSWCA 13. 
*° [2003] QCA 469. 
*' Tribunal reasons, cited [2003] QCA 469, [33]. 
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deeds' will emphasise reputation not character. There is the added danger that members 
of the public may overestimate the ability of the disciplinary system to guarantee all 
lawyers as 'paragons of virtue' in all aspects of their life. Not only is such a guarantee 
unnecessary, it is something the system cannot guarantee and may lull the public into a 
82 
false sense of secunty. 
7.7 MENTAL ILLNESS 
7.7.1 Prevalence of Mental Illness in Disciplinary Cases 
It is generally accepted that many lawyers who appear before disciplinary tribunals suffer 
from mental illnesses, such as depression and substance abuse. ^ ^ Some go so far as to 
claim that most attomey disciplinary cases m the United States of America involve 
alcoholism or other substance abuse.^ It is difficult to assess the actual prevalence of 
mental illness among lavv^ers facing professional discipline because the mental illness 
may not be disclosed to the ttibunal, or disclosed to the tribunal but not reported to the 
public by the tribunal. 
That mental illness has only rarely been dealt with in an explicit way by a court is 
demonstrated by the comment of Brooking J as recently as 1986 that 'mental unfittiess to 
'^ Linda Haller, 'Smoke and Mirrors: When Professional Discipline May Cause Harm' (2005) 8 Legal 
Ethics 70-86. 
*^  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Scmtiny of the Legal Profession: Complaints Against 
Lawyers, Report No 70 (1993) [5.16]. 
*" Patricia Heil, 'Tending the Bar in Texas: Alcoholism as a Mitigating Factor in Attomey Discipline' 
(1993) 24 St Mary's Law Joumal 1263, 1265. 
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practise the law does not seem to have formed the basis of any reported application to 
85 Strike off the roll either m England or in Austtalia.' 
The disciplinary tribunal in Queensland has been criticised on a number of occasions for 
Oil 
failing to give reasons for its decisions and for the orders made. There have been 
instances where there is no evidence on the face of the record that the tribunal has taken 
into account any personal factors, but this becomes apparent at a later time. For instance, 
the practitioner in Re Bartlett was suspended indefinitely in 1994 after the tribunal found 
her guilty of wrongful conversion, of forging her client's signature and of making false 
entries in tmst account records.*'' The report of the case suggests that she may have been 
stmck off, but mstead, 'in view of the special circumstances relative to the practitioner's 
medical condition ... and other facts of mitigation', the tribunal ordered that she be 
suspended until she was able to satisfy the Queensland Law Society that she was fit to 
practise.**^ It was not until Re Bartlett was cited in Re Smith^^ in 1997 that it was revealed 
that Bartlett had been suffering from 'severe physiological damage to the brain' which 
^^  Re B (a solicitor) [1986] VR 695, 699. Given the paucity of English or Australian precedent. Brooking J 
relied on cases from New Zealand {Re Shortland (1893) 12 NZLR 137), Canada {McKeown v Law Society 
of Upper Canada (1983) 1 OAC 211) and the United States {Smith v State 9 Tenn (1 Yerg)228 (1829); Re 
Sherman 58 Wash 2d 7 (1961); Re Chipley 254 SC 588 (1970); Re M 59 NJ 304 (1971)). 
^^  Walter v Council of Queensland Law Society (1988) 62 ALJR 153, 157; Adamson v Queensland Law 
Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498, 508; Attorney-General v Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350, [22-26] (Thomas J), [3-
4] (de Jersey CJ, with whom Ambrose J agreed); QLS v Carberry [2000] QCA 450, [6] (Pincus JA). The 
need to state findings on questions of fact has been contained in the Act since its inception in 1927: first 
contained in Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s6(3)(b), then Queensland Law Society Act 1952 
(Qld) s 6V(l)(b). The need to provide reasons for the particular order made, in addition to giving findings 
on questions of fact was stated explicitiy in the subordinate legislation; Queensland Law Society (Solicitors 
Complaints Tribunal) Rule 1997 (Qld) s 14(h). Surprisingly, the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) has 
removed any express statutory requirement to provide reasons. This will require the courts and tribunals to 
revert to the common law: Cypressvale Pty Ltd v Retail Shop Lease Tribunal [1996] 2 Qd R 462, 476-477, 
482-484, cited with approval in A-G v Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350, [22] (Thomas JA). See also Queensland 
Law Society Inc v Carberry [2000] QCA 450, [36] and Council of the Queensland Law Society v Lowes 
[2003] QCA 201. See discussion above section 6.6.2.2. 
*' Re Bartlett (1994) 24 Queensland Law Society Journal 594, SC 360, 31 May 1994. 
^^  Ibid. 
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meant that she 'either did not know what she was doing or was incapable of controlling 
90 what she was doing and was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong'. 
The treatment of mental ill-health in disciplinary proceedings provides an interesting 
contrast to the tteatment of lawyers who fail to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
proceedings against them. It was suggested earlier that part of the reason why an 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing is demanded is that the court or tribunal requires an act 
of public contrition, of moral reflection - a retributive response. In such cases, even 
though the risk of fiiture misconduct by that individual may be low or the individual may 
not uitend to resume practice, disciplinary action will be pursued against the unrepentant, 
so as to demonstrate the legitimacy of the disciplmary process to the profession and the 
public. In contrast, an individual suffering mental ill-health at the time of their 
misconduct is often considered to lack culpability and, provided the public can be 
protected by other means, disciplinary action may be less likely to be taken. One other 
means by which the public can be protected is through the admmi strative act of 
suspending or cancelling a practising certificate.* '^ This removes a person from practice 
without the need for tiiem to face disciplmary proceedings which have traditionally had 
connotations of shame attached. 
There will be times when disciplinary proceedings against the mentally unwell will be 
unavoidable, for instance where clients have lost money and are demanding strong action. 
*' (1998) 2 Disciplinary Action Report 12, SC 384, 11 November 1997. 
'"Ibid 13. 
" See discussion above section 5.4. 
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Even if the tribunal decides that tiie individual is unfit to practise, it may decide to 
dispose of the case in a gentler way with less disgrace attached tiian traditionally attached 
to a strike off order. An obvious example is by the use of a suspension order.*^ ^ The 
option of a confidential health assessment - introduced in 2004'^ '* - is yet another way in 
which private action can be taken to protect the public from the mentally unwell while 
avoiding the shame - and retribution - of disciplinary proceedings. 
7.7.2 Lawmakers' Attitude to Mental Health 
The proper relevance of mental conditions as a basis for varying a disciplinary order tiiat 
may otherwise be unposed has not been as clearly articulated m Austt^ia as fr has in tiie 
United States.''^ None of tiie legislation in Australian States deals explicitly with the 
relevance of personal factors and, until very recently, the courts, when exercising their 
inherent jurisdiction or when hearing an appeal from a disciplmary tribunal, appear to 
have sometimes stmggled with the appropriate response to evidence of mental illness. 
7.7.3 Mental Illness and the Court's Inherent Jurisdiction to Discipline 
Where discipluiary proceedings are brought within the court's friherent jurisdiction, the 
court has the power to strike off a practitioner who is no longer 'fit to practise', as the 
'" Between 1930-2000 the Queensland disciplinary tribunal for solicitors focused on 'disgraceful and 
dishonourable conduct', finding this common law test of professional misconduct established in 63% of 
cases. 
" Above section 5.5. The public will continue to be protected if the Queensland Law Society or Bar 
Assocation of Queensland refuses to issue a practising certificate at tiie end of the period of suspension if 
the person is still unfit. 
'"* Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 533. 
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power to discipline arises from the power to admit^ ^ and the courts refiise admission to 
the profession on the basis of unfitness to practise. 
However, there is some evidence that the court and tribunal have not considered the 
mentally ill to be morally culpable, and may have been reticent to exercise their inherent 
power to strike a practitioner from the roll in the absence of moral culpability, even 
where a practitioner was clearly unfit to practise due to mental illness. On some 
occasions, Austtalian courts have limited thefr jurisdiction to a power to strike off only to 
cases where there has been 'misconduct'.^^ In other words, just as we have seen in 
relation to suspension orders, the court has been preoccupied with notions of 'dishonour 
or disgrace' when exercising its disciplinary powers.^^ 
'^  American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions Rule 9.32(i). 
"^  Re Davis (1947) 75 CLR 409. 
' ' A good example is provided by the Victorian case of Re B (a Solicitor) [1986] VR 695, where the 
practitioner had fired shots at a family of three strangers, injuring the husband and baby. He later told 
police he had been 'driving all around Melboume looking for someone to kill' (696). He was found not 
guilty of charges of shooting with intent to murder and of malicious wounding on the ground of insanity 
and was detained at the Governor's pleasure. In subsequent disciplinary proceedings brought by the Law 
Institute of Victoria, within the court's inherent jurisdiction, tiie judgment of Brooking J shows that His 
Honour had some difficulty in determining the extent of his jurisdiction to deal with a practitioner who was 
mentally ill. Three grounds were suggested by the institute for B's removal from the roll: first that B's 
conduct required his removal, second, the incongruity of B remaining on the roll, or thirdly, the verdict that 
he was not guilty of manslaughter on the grounds of insanity should be taken as showing he remained 
presentiy unfit to practise (698).The Law Institute of Victoria conceded that the finding of in.sanity meant 
that B's conduct was neither 'criminal nor morally reprehen.sible'(702), therefore B could not be removed 
because o/his conduct. Instead the court, ordered that tiie practitioner be suspended for the period of his 
detention at the Governor's pleasure, given the 'incongruity' of an officer of the court being able to practise 
in such circumstances (705). This was tiie same reasoning used in Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279, where tiie court held that, although Ziems was fit, it would 
be incongruous for him to practise from behind prison bars. See discussion above section 2.6.3.1. 
go 
Above section 5.4.3. 
' ' See more detailed discussion of the notion of 'dishonour and disgrace' in disciplinary proceedings above 
section 2.4. 
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7.7.4 Mental Illness within a Statutory Regime 
The courts have sometimes chosen to draw their inherent powers narrowly, even though 
the inherent jurisdiction of the court should more clearly direct the court to a focus on 
fittiess to practise ratiier than on moral tiirpitude. It is less surprising to see the problems 
which have arisen when mental health issues have been raised in a statutory ttibunal with 
more cfrcumscribed powers than a court. 
For instance, in Soutii Australia, the Statutory Committee could refer a matter to the 
Supreme Court of South Australia for disciplmary action where tiie committee was 
100 
satisfied that the practitioner was guilty of 'illegal or unprofessional conduct'. ]n Re a 
Practitioner^^^ it was successfully argued that behaviour that occurred during a 'paranoid 
episode' did not come within such a definition. The tt-ibunal had found that the 
practitioner's conduct made him unfit to practise but, as it occurred during a 'paranoid 
episode', it could not be described as unprofessional conduct.'°^ As a result, the Supreme 
Court considered that it lacked jurisdiction and declined to make any order agamst tiie 
practitioner.'°^ 
'"^  Legal Practitioner Act 1936 (SA), s 51(1). The legislation now allows for disciplinary action to be 
instituted, not only when the practitioner is guilty of unprofessional conduct, but also where he is guilty of 
'unsatisfactory conduct': Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 82(1). Presumably one's conduct can be 
inadvertentiy 'unsatisfactory', in other words, this amendment may have sought to overcome the effect of 
the decision in Re a Practitioner. 
'"' [1960] SASR 178. 
'°^ Ibid 182 (Ross J), 193 (Chamberiain J). 
'°^ Similariy, in Re Harrison (1997) 6 Disciplinary Reports 29, tiie Legal Services Tribunal in New Soutii 
Wales accepted that 'involuntary inertia' had led a barrister to fail to lodge tax returns between 1981 and 
1993 and fail to comply with three court orders requiring the lodgment of outstanding tax returns. Under 
the statutory jurisdiction of the tribunal in New South Wales, personal conduct could form the basis for a 
legal practitioner to be removed from the roll if the practitioner was not of good fame and character or not 
fit and proper to remain on the roll {Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 127(l)(b)). The tribunal held that 
the barrister remained of good fame and character: his good character was not impugned because his 
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In other words, the practitioner was found to be not responsible for his own actions. 
Therefore, there was no misconduct, and no disciplinary response could follow within the 
statutory consttaints then existing. This demonsttates the confusion caused if a statutory 
test requfres evidence of 'disgraceful or dishonourable conduct' before the power to take 
disciplinary action is enlivened, but inherent powers are framed more broadly, simply in 
terms of'unfitness to practise'. This is so even though both jurisdictions supposedly seek 
to achieve the same purpose. This confusion was noted in New South Wales Bar 
Association v Murphy. 
Although no Queensland court has been requfred to decide the same point - whether 
conduct occurring during a paranoid episode is liable to discipline - it is quite possible 
that the Queensland Law Society may have declined to take disciplinary action in similar 
circumstances, given the South Australian precedent. Given the secrecy provisions which 
surround the handling of investigations of misconduct, it is not possible to know if this 
has been the case. Even in the absence of the South Austtalian case, it is suggested that 
there is likely to be reluctance in the disciplinary system to take action agauist individuals 
suffering mental illness. This is partly because of tiie ttaditional, narrow view of 
discipline - that it is a response to dishonourable or disgraceful conduct - which implies 
tiie need for moral culpability to be present. 
actions were not deliberate but were due to a psychological block (31). He also remained of 'good fame' 
because a number of judges and barristers, witii knowledge of his non-payment of tax, testified to tius. The 
tribunal relied on Ziems to also find that tiie practitioner remained fit and proper to practise, as the Council 
of the New South Wales Bar Association had failed to discharge the onus of proving that his psychological 
problems had or could manifest in his professional affairs. 
°^'* (2002) 55 NSWLR 23, 32-3 (Giles JA, with whom Ipp AJA agreed). 
"" Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 592. 
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The Queensland Parliament has sought to deal witii tiie Imiitations caused by the 
ttaditional approach to discipline. The stattitory definition of professional misconduct 
now explicitiy states that conduct can amount to professional misconduct if tiiat conduct 
would justify a finding that a practitioner was not a fit and proper person.''^ ^ The public 
needs to be protected from tiie lawyer who is mentally unfit to practise as well as from 
tiie lawyer who makes a habit of misappropriating tiiist money. Botii need to be removed 
from practice while they remain unfit. However, while there is likely to be extemal and 
107 
intemal pressure for the dishonest lawyer to face discipline and be stmck off, there 
may be a temptation to avoid discipline and use gentler means to protect the public from 
the mentally unfit lawyer. For instance, tiie practismg certificate of the mentally unfit 
lawyer can be cancelled by the administrative act of the professional body which issued 
the certificate, or through the gentier means of a healtii assessment.' In practical terms, 
there is no need for disciplinary proceedings to also take place. 
7.7.5 Mental Health to Vary Disciplinary Orders 
The earlier examples dealt with situations m which a court or tribunal found tiiat no 
conduct liable to discipline existed and hypothesised about situations m which a decision 
might be made to not prosecute discipline agamst an individual with mental health 
problems. Even if disciplinary proceedings are brought, a lack of culpability may 
'°^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 245(l)(b). See also Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 497(l)(b); 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 4.4.3(1 )(b). 
'° ' The reasons for this were explored above section 5.2.2. 
'°* Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 67(a), s 533. 
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moderate the order that would otherwise be made, for instance, leading to a suspension 
order rather than a strike off order."*^ As so many of those who face discipline are sole 
practitioners,''* the practical effect of a suspension will often be the same as a strike off 
order - the practitioner does not have the support of partners to continue the practice 
during the suspension, and will be unable to resurrect their practice at its conclusion. 
However, a suspension will spare the practitioner the greater shame which attaches to a 
112 
strike off order. 
1 will now look more closely at the practice of the courts and tribunals when a lawyer 
claims that tiieir conduct occurred during a period of mental illness. It was suggested 
earlier that, where altemative means exist to protect the public from an uidividual who is 
mentally unfit to practise, disciplinary proceedings are less likely. The approach is 
demonsttated by Brooking J of the Victorian Supreme Court in Re B (a solicitor). His 
Honour noted that the court's power to strike a person from the roll extended beyond 
cases of misconduct, but then went on to say. 
Retired practitioners grow old and may ultimately lose their faculties, becoming unfit to 
practise; they have no intention of practising; no-one would suggest that their incapacity 
requires them to be struck off the roll. There is no need for protection, for they intend 
neither to practise nor to take advantage in any other way of tiie standing which tiiey have 
by reason of their admission. But if a lawyer who is mentally ill intends to practise his 
profession, or to make some indirect use of his status as a person admitted to practise, the 
protective jurisdiction may well have to be invoked against him. 
'°' The ill-health can also be dealt with in a confidential way, as a health assessment, leading to the 
cancellation of a practising certificate - but not discipline: s 537. 
"° See evidence above section 5.3.5.1, of the tribunal's high use of suspension orders, even after 
discouraged by the Supreme Court. 
' " Sixty per cent of respondents were practising as sole practitioners at tiie time of the disciplinary hearing: 
Linda Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciphnary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis', (2001) 
\'i Bond Law Review 1-45, 16. 
"~ Above section 5.5. 
113 [1986] VR 695. 
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Thirteen years later in Victorian Bar Incorporated v Himmelhoch,^^^ O'Bryan J took a 
sunilar view. He accepted medical evidence that the barrister - who had been stalking and 
harassing a person about a fictitious debt - was suffering from Adult Attention Deficit 
Disorder, which was exacerbated by an anxiety and depressive disorder. Despite the 
fact that the barrister had not as yet responded well to treatment, O'Bryan J thought it 'a 
grave step to find a person is not a fit and proper person to practise the law and to remove 
that person's name from tiie roll of practitioners.'"^ By this time, the powers of the Law 
Institute of Victoria to suspend practising certificates when it determined that a 
1 1 R 
practitioner was unfit to practise had been increased. Thus, O'Bryan J was able to 
conclude that the public would be adequately protected by the cancellation of the 
barrister's practising certificate"*^ and seemed less concemed that disciplinary 
proceedings demonstrate to the public that an mdividual had been permanently removed 
from the profession. 
Compare this with the position in South Australia. There, the absence of powers to 
suspend the practising certificate of a mentally unfit practitioner^^* may explain the 
""Ibid 699. 
"^[1999] VSC 222. 
'"^  Ibid 14. 
" ' ibid 25. 
"^ Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s 38(1). The factors relevant to suitability to hold a practising certificate 
are now contained in Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 2.4.4. 
' ; ' lbid26. 
''° Practising certificates are discussed in more detail above section 5.4. 
' Unlike legislation in a number of other States, including Queensland, the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 
(SA) contains no power to cancel or suspend a practising certificate on health grounds. Thus, the only 
effective way to ensure that neither of these practitioners recommenced practice while unwell was to issue 
formal disciplinary proceedings. 
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decision to institute disciplinary action in two cases.'^ "^ In both cases the practitioner had 
ceased to practise and in both cases there was no actual danger to clients. 
What has been the approach in Queensland when dealmg with lawyers with mental health 
problems? The most notorious example was the case involving Henry ('Harry') Smith. 
Even though Smith no longer held a practising certificate, the number and seriousness of 
tiie complaints against him meant there was likely to have been sttong client pressure for 
some form of public airing of thefr complaints, and disciplinary proceedings were the 
most likely fomm.*^ "* The ttibunal accepted medical evidence that Smith had engaged in a 
form of 'professional suicide' while suffering a major depressive illness. Given these 
'special circumstances',*^^ tiie tribunal resisted Queensland Law Society subnussions 
tiiat he be sttiick off and instead ordered tiiat he be suspended from practice until he could 
satisfy tiie society that he was agam fit to hold a practising certificate.'^' On a later appeal 
by tiie society and Attomey-General, he consented to an order tiiat he be stmck from the 
roU.'^ ^ 
''- Law Society of South Australia v Murphy [1999] SASC 83; Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v 
Trueman [2003] SASC 58. In Murphy, although it was argued tiiat the public could be successfiilly 
protected by Murphy undertaking not to practise law and despite the fact that he had not practised since 
1994, the court thought it necessary to remove his name fi-om the roll of practitioners. This was because the 
court'thought it important to 'demonstrate' that a person was 'not fit to remain a member of a profession 
that plays an important part in the administration of justice and in which the public is entitied to place great 
frust' (30), emphasising the need to maintain public confidence in the legal profession (33).Disciplinary 
proceedings were also brought in Trueman despite the fact that he, like Murphy, had ceased practising. 
'-' Re Smith (1998) 2 Disciplinary Action Report 12, SC 384, 11 November 1997. 
'-'' At least 10 clients had complained and it was alleged that $6.2million of client money was missing: 
Evans, above n 15, 402. 
'-^  Re Smith (1998) 2 Disciplinary Action Report 12, 14. 
'-^  Note that the society (representing members?) asked for strong action. Members were to lose large 
amounts of money due to tiie pressure which Smith's misconduct placed on the fidelity fimd: Evans, above 
nl5 407 Smitii was found to have stolen millions ofdollars from clients. 
'-' It was argued on appeal that tiiis was an improper delegation of authority, but as Smith consented to an 
order that his name be removed from the roll, the court was not required to decide the matter. 
'-* Queensland Law Society v Henry William Smith (unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, Appeal 
10787 of 1997, orders by consent, 29 April 1998). 
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Although she was no longer practising and even though her case was not as notorious as 
Smith, it was also likely that disciplinary proceedings were inevitable m a matter 
involving Julie Bartlett.'^^ Five clients had complained about forgery and over $80,000 
was missing from her tmst account. The original and brief report of the tribunal's 
decision simply noted 'the practitioner's medical condition as outlmed by the evidence of 
the medical practitioner and tiie otiier facts of mitigation', and the ttibunal's decision to 
suspend her from practice until she could satisfy the Queensland Law Society that she 
was again fit to hold a practismg certificate.'^° It was not until Re Bartlett was cited in Re 
Smith^^^ in 1997 that more was revealed about her medical condition. She had been 
suffering from 'severe physiological damage to the brain', which meant tiiat she 'either 
did not know what she was doing or was incapable of contt-olling what she was doing and 
was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong'. 132 
Re Smith and Re Bartlett are two cases in which we know that the tribunal chose not to 
strike a practitioner from the roll because of evidence of mental ill-health. Instead, the 
tribunal preferred to suspend the practitioner's practising certificate mdefinitely, leaving 
any decision about a retum to practice to be that of the Queensland Law Society, through 
its certification powers. We can also see from Re Bartlett that the tribunal does not 
always disclose the personal factors on which it relies, and so there may well be other, 
similar cases. Nevertheless, these two cases provide a clear indication that, where mental 
Re Bartlett (1994) 24 Queensland Law Society Joumal 594, SC 360, 31 May 1994. 
'^°Ibid. 
(1998) 2 Disciplinary Action Report 12, SC 384, 11 November 1997. 
•^-Ibid 13. 
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illness has been involved, the tribunal has been reluctant to impose a strike off order, and 
has preferred to defer the fiiture protection of the public to the Queensland Law Society, 
through its practising certificate powers. 
7.8 CLIENT LOSS AND LAWYER GAIN 
7.8.1 Traditional Emphasis on Conduct not Consequences 
The final factor tiiat will be considered in this chapter is the degree to which a 
disciplinary tribunal or court takes mto account whether clients have suffered loss as a 
result of the lawyer's misconduct, or whether tiie lawyer benefited from tiie misconduct. 
Certainly, such factors are of critical importance in the criminal jurisdiction when 
decidmg the appropriate level of retribution, as they reflect the seriousness of the harm 
caused.'^ ^ Whether clients happened to suffer or the defendant happened to benefit from 
past criminal conduct says nothing about tiie risk of further misconduct. It is a retributive 
consideration. 
Unlike criminal sentencing, discipline aims to protect the public by deterring other 
lawyers from similar misconduct in the fiittire. As it may be simply forttiitous whetiier 
past misconduct led to client loss or lawyer profit, the traditional view has been that these 
' " See above section 1.3.3. Hawkins has also reported that many regulators take it into account in decidmg 
which regulatoiy offences to prosecute: Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort (Oxford University Press, New 
York 2002) 362, 274. 
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factors are not relevant when determining the appropriate disciplinary order.'^^ However, 
it is fafrly common to see reference to these factors, even in decisions of tiie High Court. 
For instance, in Walsh v Law Society of New South Wales,^^^ the High Court emphasised 
the family context in which the conduct occurred, and the fact that 'no financial detriment 
to anyone was found to have been intended or caused'. In Queensland, in Attomey-
General V Clough,^^^ Muir J cited tiie lack of material loss as one reason for not unposing 
more than a suspension.'^^ fri deciding on the appropriate order ui Attomey-General v 
Bax,^^^ Pincus J noted two factors tiiat relate more to retribution than to fiiture protection: 
the solicitor had not derived any personal benefit, but the amounts involved were 
considerable.''^° The court also appeared swayed by the lack of client loss or lawyer gam 
in upholding the $7,500 fine m Attomey-General v Kehoe.^"^^ Given that tiie courts 
sometimes take these factors into account, it would not be surprising to find that 
voluntary, part-time tribunal members had followed the lead of the Supreme Court, and 
done the same. 
It is also likely that the pressure to take disciplinary action - either from the public or 
within the profession'"*^ - will vary depending on whether or not clients have lost money 
'^ "^  Re a Solicitor (1959) 103 Solicitors Joumal 875; Law Society of New South Wales v Moulton [1981] 2 
NSWLR 736, 740 Hope JA). 
'"(1999) 198 CLR 73. 
'^ ^ Ibid [76]. 
'"[2002] 1 QdR 116. 
'^ ^ Ibid [94], with whom Douglas J agreed 'generally'. 
"'[1999] 2 QdR9. 
"" Ibid 20. 
'"*' [2001] 2 Qd R 350, 355, 357. A similar approach was taken in Robb v Law Society of the ACT {1997) 72 
FCR 225, 257-9 (Keifel J). 
" Above section 5.2.2. 
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as a result of the lawyer's conduct. This pressure does not reflect a demand for greater 
protection, but for greater retribution. 
7.8.2 Conduct Subsequent to Conduct Leading to Discipline 
What weight, if any, should be given to evidence that the practitioner has reimbursed any 
losses suffered by the client or, more generally, has made amends for their past 
misconduct? Given that the primary aim of discipline is to protect the public, and the 
public is protected by the payment of compensation, it may seem logical that a 
disciplinary tribunal facilitate compensation. The risk of such an approach is that it draws 
'the public' too narrowly, and prefers the interests of past clients over the potential risk 
which may remain for future clients. However, courts and tribunal have regularly taken 
tills into account when determining the appropriate disciplinary order. For instance, in Re 
Roche,^^^ tiie Supreme Court of tiie Australian Capital Territory acknowledged that the 
practitioners' offer of a $150,000 compensation fund was a 'significant mitigatory factor' 
as it mdicated recognition of their 'disgraceful' misconduct in grossly overcharging 
clients.''*^ The Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory immediately applauded the 
court's decision in a press release and claimed that, had the offer of compensation not 
been made, it was 'highly likely' tiiat the two solicitors would have been sttrick off rather 
tiian suspended for 18 months.'"^^ The society also claimed that tiie decision was a 'break 
through' for consumers of legal services as clients would have not been reimbursed if the 
143 [2002] ACTSC 104. 
•'" Ibid 88. 
'"^  Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory, 'Landmark Decision Protects Lawyers' Clients', (Press 
Release, 21 October 2002). 
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solicitors had been sttaick off.'"^ ^ Such comments highlight a tension within the 
disciplinary system between a desire to protect past clients and potential clients. The 
same tension was apparent m tiie Queensland tribunal decision of Re Practitioner X,^^'^ 
where the practitioner was fined $25,000 rather than suspended so as to ensure that past 
clients were repaid amounts which had been overcharged. 
It could be argued that tiie ACT Supreme Court gave too much weight to the 
compensation fimd in Re Roche, especially as the court had otherwise found that the 
client agreements were 'extortionate' and that the two solicitors 'cheated and effectively 
defrauded their chents,''"^^ not in an isolated incident, but in a habittial practice,'''^ which 
was 'an exercise in calculated greed [which deprived] vufrierable mjured persons of many 
thousands of dollars'.'^'^ It could be argued that the disciplinary proceedings were 
compromised by an effort to achieve a compensatory outcome, which would be more 
appropriately addressed in civil proceedmgs by the clients who had been overcharged. 
There is no doubt that the making of amends is a valid consideration if it demonstrates 
ethical insight into tiie dangers of past misconduct, lessens the risk of recurrence and 
shows the individual is again fit to practise. But like conttition, the 'making of amends' is 
given a greater emphasis than this in disciplinary proceedings. It is also used to reduce 
the culpability of tiie person appearing before the tribunal. 
' ^ Ibid. 
"'^  (1999) 5 Disciplinary Action Report 24, 26. The overcharging amounted to $46,420: Linda Haller, 
'Disciplinary Fines: Deterrence or Retribution?' (2002) 5 Legal Ethics 152-178, 175. 
'^ * [2002] ACTSC 104,67. 
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Similar considerations apply where the tribunal notes that the practitioner has 'suffered' 
in other ways as a result of the misconduct, with the inference being that it is less 
necessary for disciplinary proceedings to cause further suffering. Again, such reasoning 
indicates a degree of retribution in disciplinary decision-making. Careful reading of A 
Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales ' is required in this regard. 
The High Court did not elaborate which of the solicitor's 'powerful subjective factors' 
were most influential to its decision, but substantial evidence had been placed before the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal as to the solicitor's subsequent shame, loss of 
employment and economic suffering,'^^ and the relevance of these factors was not 
explicitiy discounted by the High Court. Again, the High Court, like the Supreme Court 
of Queensland, has not provided clear guidance to assist tribunals in properly avoiding 
the retributive elements which can influence any consideration of personal factors. 
7.9 CONCLUSION 
The courts have insisted that the focus of professional discipline remain on protection and 
fiiture risk - not rettibution. In this chapter I have looked at how the courts and tribunals 
have handled testimonials, client loss and gain, and a lawyer's acknowledgment of the 
legitfrnacy of the disciplinary proceedfrigs. All of these factors demonsttate a retributive 
and backward-lookmg approach. They are only consistent with the protective focus of 
discipluie if they can also demonstrate that the risk of fiiture harm is less or, in the case of 
' ' ' Ibid68. 
'^ ^ Ibid 89. 
'^ ' (2004) 216 CLR 253. Discussed above section 2.6.3.2 in relation to the relevance of tiie damage the 
conduct may have on the reputation of the legal profession. 
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the lawo^er's recognition of tiie legitimacy of the disciplinary process, if it assists the 
tribunal in making an accurate judgment as to how the public can be protected, fr will 
often be difficult to show the risk of fiiture harm, particularly in relation to testimonials. 
However, a retributive approach can be reconciled with legitimation if it is endorsed by 
those from whom legitimacy must be sought. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, 
extemal legitimacy is served if clients who have suffered at the hands of a lawyer are 
more satisfied to see the disciplmary system meting out retribution than ensuring future 
protection.'^'* Testimonials and tiie need for a lawyer to submit to the authority of the 
proceedings can also promote intemal legitimacy, by reinforcing the elite's view of the 
'good lawyer', 'good discipline' and its control over the lower levels of the profession 55 
The complex relationship between discipline and mentally unwell lawyers makes it more 
difficult to untangle the threads of protection, legitimation and retribution. Even though 
the lack of culpability will militate against discipluiary action being taken in favour of a 
more gentle method of protectmg the public,'^^ there still will be pressure to take 
disciplinary action against some lav^ y^ers experiencing mental illness, particularly where 
clients or other lawyers have suffered loss at the hands of the lawyer. A suspension order 
can adequately protect the public without the shame of a strike off order - and retribution 
and protection can be reconciled - if care is taken at the 'second line of defence' to ensure 
no practising certificate is issued until the lawyer is again fit to practise, as was the 
' " ibid [37]. 
' " Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v A Solicitor [2002] NSWCA 62. 
'^ "^  Above section 6.5.2. 
' " The extemal and intemal legitimating roles of discipline are discussed above section 3.9.1. 
Such as through the exercise of practising certificate or health assessment powers. Discussed above 
section 7.7.4. 
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intention of the tribunal in Re Smith'^^ and Re Bartlett.^^^ The lack of information 
regarding the society's use of its practising certificate powers makes it difficult to know if 
tiie tribunal's retributive approach - and effective delegation of responsibility to the 
society - has compromised its protective effect. In the following chapter I again pursue 
issues relating to information (and lack thereof). This time, the issue is tiie relationship 
between discipline and publicity. 
T* f* T* •I» 
157 Queensland Law Society v Henry William Smith (unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal Appeal 
10787 of 1997, orders by consent, 29 Apnl 1998). 
I CO * 
Re Bartlett (1994) 24 Queensland Law Society Joumal 594, SC 360, 31 May 1994. As I demonstrated in 
the previous chapter, there are serious doubts as to whether other less shameful orders - such as fines - can 
adequately protect the public. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PUBLICITY 
8J INTRODUCTION 
In earlier chapters, 1 considered the use of incapacitation orders and discipluiary fines and 
the degree to which such orders could be protecting tiie public or serving a project of 
legitimation. If the legal profession expels an individual from the profession without 
public fanfare, it is difficult to see how that profession could be using the expulsion to 
legitimate its position outside tiie profession. Further, there is no doubt that disciplinary 
fmes can protect the public through deterrence, but this also requfres disciplinary 
proceedings to be publicised. Hence the importance of this chapter. 
As I discussed in Chapter Three' and Chapter Five,^ if tiie disciplmary system is being 
used for legitimation purposes, it would be expected that strike off orders would be given 
the greatest publicity by the legal profession, as such an order appears to protect the 
public in the most compromising of ways. The primary aim of this chapter is to examine 
whether the degree of publicity given to disciplinary proceedings in Queensland supports 
an argument that those proceedings were concemed with legitimation rather than public 
protection. The chapter will also seek to demonstrate the divergent approaches to public 
' Above section 3.9. 
' Above section 5.2.1. 
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discipline which existed between the two branches of the legal profession in Queensland. 
The chapter will show that barristers have been subject to much less pressure than 
solicitors to report disciplinary action and to conduct their disciplinary hearings in public. 
Also, the Bar Association of Queensland continued to argue in favour of private 
disciplinary hearings long after this issue was abandoned by the solicitors' branch of the 
profession. After considering arguments as to why disciplinary hearings should or should 
not be subject to the same public hearings as court proceedings, I look at the actual 
reporting of disciplmary outcomes in Queensland and the holding of public disciplinary 
hearings. I also consider whether 'strategic reporting' may have taken place in 
Queensland. 
8.2 COURTS' ATTITUDE TO PUBLIC HEARINGS 
Many arguments have been offered as to why tribunal proceedings are different to court 
proceedings, and should be heard behind closed doors. Courts are reluctant to close their 
hearings except in exceptional circumstances as it is presumed that a public hearing is the 
most effective means of ensuring that justice is done and seen to be done.^ Publicity 
allows for the 'proper scmtiny of the exercise of power and the creation of confidence in 
those who exercise it''* to tiie advantage of tiie participants and the broader community. 
Levels of accountability within lawyer disciplinary systems have mcreased with the 
inclusion of independent observers, variously named Lay Observers, Legal Ombudsmen 
' Scott V Scott [1913] AC 417; McPherson v McPherson [1936] AC 177. 
' Independent Commission Against Corruption v Chaffey (1993) 30 NSWLR 21, 61 (Mahoney JA). 
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or Legal Services Commissioners, charged by statute to oversee the complaints and 
disciplinary system. While their participation provides a valuable independent overview 
of the system, they only report a personal view as to whether the system is operating 
satisfactorily, hi conti-ast, public disciplinary hearings allow members of the public to 
attend individual hearings and form their own views. Public tmst in the system requfres 
justice to be seen to be done directly, not through the opiruon of others. This is also tine 
in the context of court proceedings, where it has not been thought sufficient that a third 
party report to the public that he or she is satisfied that all court hearings in a given 
jurisdiction proceeded in a proper manner. Public tmst requfres open court hearings. Why 
should the same not be tme of disciplinary hearings? 
There may be greater justification to close hearings before bodies other than a court, such 
as a ttibunal established by statute. This will partly depend on the purpose of the tribunal, 
its procedures and powers. For instance, while a court can compel the attendance of 
witoesses, unless a tribunal has similar coercive powers, witnesses may refuse to 
cooperate except behind closed doors.^ As Forbes also notes, participants may be 
intfrnidated by the threat of a defamation action if a tribunal sits in public and if 
legislation does not provide for the proceedings to be privileged. 
A statutory tribunal may not require the express grant of privilege as its proceedings are 
likely to be protected by absolute privilege if the tribunal is acting in a similar maimer to 
^ John Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (Federation Press, Sydney, 2002) 150. 
^Ibid. 
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a court,' but these subtieties of law may be of little comfort to a potential witness, and in 
the case of any residual reluctance, a private hearing may facilitate more candid evidence. 
Even if a tribunal can compel witnesses to attend and can afford them absolute privilege, 
there may be other valid arguments as to why a disciplinary tribunal should be closed to 
the general public more readily than a court. Although some may fear that the evidence 
placed before a disciplinary tribunal may not be as rigorously tested as the evidence 
placed before a court, this should not be a concem as disciplinary tribunals normally 
apply the Briginshaw^ standard of proof, which varies with the seriousness of the 
allegations: the standard of proof is equivalent to the civil standard (balance of 
probabilities) for disciplinary charges which only amount to allegations of civil breaches 
of duty, but increases to the criminal standard (beyond reasonable doubt) if the charges 
allege misconduct which is tantamount to criminal conduct. 
There may be greater justification to hear disciplinary matters behind closed doors if it is 
thought tiiat disciplinary ttibunals have greater potential to damage reputations than other 
ttibunals. Unlike tribunals tiiat determine whether a decision maker has acted witiiin 
power or that hear merits reviews against administrative decisions, a disciplinary tribunal 
is required to focus on a person's 'fittiess' as a lawyer, fri determining this issue, 
allegations of misconduct will often arise, which will require the ttibunal to consider 
'Ibid. 
^ Briginshaw V Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 
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whether the conduct has been 'disgraceful or dishonourable'. Such allegations are likely 
to cause severe damage to an individual lawyer's reputation. 
The arguments in favour of closed disciplinary hearings have not been embraced by the 
courts in Queensland or elsewhere.'^ The Supreme Court of Queensland has also 
maintained that the public interest requires that disciplmary proceedings against solicitors 
be held in public, even though the airing of an allegation of fraud was likely to impact 
upon a solicitor's practice and reputation, and even though the disciplmary charges may 
be ultimately dismissed." The Court did not think that it was likely that tiie public 
interest would be served 'if the tribunal routinely ordered private hearing of, and 
suppressed publication of, material relating to charges imputing disgraceful conduct.' 
Similarly, in Kyle v Legal Practitioners' Complaints Committee^^ the Supreme Court of 
Westem Australia emphasised the importance of open justice, in the course of refusing an 
application to suppress any report of disciplinary proceedings pending the outcome of an 
appeal. Even though the court sympathised with the fact that unsubstantiated allegations 
could thereby be published, it felt that 'the fundamental principle [of open justice] is so 
compelling ... that this prospect of personal or professional embarrassment or damage to 
reputation must be accepted'.'"^ The court went so far as to suggest tiiat the concept of the 
open administration of justice may be of even greater importance 'when this court was 
' Above section 2.4.3.3. 
'° The New Zealand High Court declined to suppress the name of the practitioner or to prohibit a search of 
the court file in Ellis v Auckland District Law Society [1998] 1 NZLR 750 as the public interest required 
fiill publication (759-60). 
" Atkins V Queensland Law Society [1999] QCA 143. 
'- [1999] QCA 143, [12] (Pincus JA and Atkinson J, with whom McMurdo P agreed). 
'^  [1999] WASCA 115. 
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dealing with the professional conduct of one of its own practitioners'.'^ This echoes 
comments made by the Court of Appeal in Allbutt v General Council of Medical 
Education and Registration,^^ emphasising the important public role of the medical 
profession, which justified the publication of information about disciplinary proceedings 
17 
against members of that profession. 
As mentioned throughout this thesis, unlike barristers, Queensland solicitors have been 
heavily regulated by statute since 1927. This regulation has included a requirement that a 
copy of the findings and orders of the disciplinary tribunal be filed at the Supreme Court 
and - since 1994 - a requirement that all disciplinary hearings involving solicitors be in 
public.'^ Until the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) shifted many of its responsibilities to 
the Legal Services Commission,'^ the Queensland Law Society also went beyond its 
statutory obligations by voluntarily reporting most of the disciplinary action that it took 
to its members. The society also sought out the mass media to publicise some, but not all, 
disciplinary action to the broader community. 
After examining tiie law and practice in relation to the publication of disciplinary 
proceedings, tiiis chapter discusses strategic publicity. The term 'sfrategic publicity' is 
used here to refer to the selective reporting of only some disciplmary cases. The term 
presupposes that the cases are chosen in pursuit of a particular strategy - in this case a 
'"ibid [78]. 
'^  Ibid [76]. 
'^(1889) 23 QBD 400. 
"ibid 409. 
'* Below section 8.4.2. 
" Discussed in more detail below section 4.7. 
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legitimation project. The chapter goes on to consider the inherent risks of strategic 
publicity for any legitimation project. 
8.3 REPORTING OF DISCIPLINARY OUTCOMES 
8.3.1 Ex Post Facto Reporting More Easily Controlled 
The reporting of disciplinary decisions provides a measure of public accountability and of 
education to the public and fellow members of the legal profession. 
While a public hearing makes it difficult to control the nature of material which is 
published, the subsequent reporting of disciplinary proceedings held in private can be 
conttolled, and more conscious efforts made to balance tiie privacy of thfrd parties and 
the reputation of the legal practitioner agauist the need for public accountability. The case 
law generally accepts that there are fewer grounds to object to the subsequent publication 
of fmalised proceedings than exist to justify the closure of the hearing. 
An example of the type of information that can be more easily controlled in subsequent 
reporting than in public hearings is the identity of the legal practitioner appearing before 
the disciplinary tribunal. Accountability and tiansparency concems may be addressed if 
the disciplinary proceedings are reported but the practitioner not named. This would be 
•° As in Law Society of New South Wales v M (no 2) [2001] NSWADT 54, where the tribunal was asked to 
consider whether sufficient steps had been taken to protect the identity of the victims of the practitioner's 
criminal offences. The court held that the use of the pseudonym 'M' provided sufficient protection. 
-' Scott V Scott [1913] AC 417, 448 (Eari Lorebum); Dental Board of Queensland v B [200?,] QCA 294, 31. 
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an acceptable practice where disciplinary charges have been dismissed, as the reputation 
of the individual is protected and the wider community informed as to tiie type of conduct 
that the ttibunal considers acceptable. 
Apart from the issue of naming, other information about concluded disciplinary hearings 
which can be controlled mclude whether all disciplinary decisions should be reported or 
only those in which there has been a finding of misconduct or serious discipline imposed. 
Conscious decisions can be made as to where the information should be disseminated and 
whether it should comprise only a summary of disciplinary action taken or be more 
detailed. Issues also arise as to whether legislation should requfre the information to be 
published or whether it should simply provide a statutory immunity from defamation 
actions for the disciplinary ttibunal or other interested body should that body wish to 
publish such information. 
8.3.2 The Queensland Experience 
8.3.2.1 Reporting of Solicitors and Barristers 
As the followmg discussion shows, tiiere is much variation in how these questions have 
been answered in Queensland, where extensive information is available about 
disciplinary action taken against solicitors, but very little available m relation to barristers 
prior to the introduction of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). The following 
discussion documents the history of this fragmented approach in Queensland to 
demonstrate how tiie solicitors' branch of tiie profession has engaged in public shaming -
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sometimes because this was requfred by law but at otiier times voluntarily - while 
Queensland barristers have not. The chapter will consider why such a discrepancy has 
occurred in the law and practice relating to the two branches of the profession, and also 
consider whether the differences can be explained by theories which claim that 
professions are motivated largely by self interest, not tiie public, and why there might be 
such a difference between solicitors and barristers in relation to publicity. 
8.3.2.2 Mandatory Reporting Regarding Queensland Solicitors 
From 1927 until 2004 legislation required every order of the solicitors' disciplinary 
ttibunal,^^ including its findings on questions of fact,^ ^ to be filed witii the Registrar of 
tiie Supreme Court of Queensland.^ '* This file of orders was to be available for inspection 
by any person.^^ From 1997 the legislation also required the tribunal to provide reasons 
for the particular order made.^ ^ The common law also required the statutory tribunal to 
give reasons,^^ although the tribunal often failed to do so.^ ^ Hence tiie Findings and 
Orders, especially in earlier times, sometimes simply recorded a finding of professional 
misconduct and an order that the solicitor be stmck off or censured. Such abbreviated 
~" First called the Statutory Committee, then in 1997 renamed the Solicitors Complaints Tribunal and in 
2004 the Legal Practice Tribunal. 
'^ Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6V(l)(b), relocated from s6(3)(b). 
"'' Initially contained in Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld) s 5(3)(b) and relocated to s 6(3)(b) in 1952 
(repealed). Later contained in Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6W (repealed). The relevant 
provision is now Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) ss 281(2) (tribunal), 283(3) (committee). 
'^ Queensland Law Society Act 7927 (Qld) 5(3Xd), relocated to s 6(3)(d) in 1952 (repealed), then contained 
in s 6X (repealed); Ex parte The Queensland Law Society Inc [1984] 1 Qd R 166. These provisions did not 
apply to the lower level Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. 
" Queensland Law Society (Solicitors Complaints Tribunal) Rule 1997 (Qld) sl4(h). 
'^ Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498, 508. 
" The tribunal has been criticised on numerous occasions by the court for its failure to give reasons: Walter 
V Council of Queensland Law Society (1988) 62 ALJR 153, 157; Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc 
[1990] 1 Qd R 498, 508; Attomey-General v Kehoe [2000] QCA 222, [22-26] (Thomas J), [3-4] (de Jersey 
CJ, witii whom Ambrose J agreed); QLS v Carberry [2000] QCA 450 [6] (Pincus JA); Council of the 
Queensland Law Society Inc v Lowes [2003] QCA 201, [22]-[26] (de Jersey CJ). 
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records provide little opportunity for the public to independentiy assess the performance 
of the disciplinary tiibunal. 
The courts have generally taken the view that they lack any inherent power to restrict the 
publication of the findings and orders of a disciplinary tribunal in the face of a statutory 
requirement that they be published.''^ The Supreme Court of Queensland has taken this 
view even when all charges have been dismissed and even at times when the ttibunal sat 
in private. For instance, in Ex Parte Qld Law Society Inc,^^ the Queensland Law Society 
appealed a decision of the Stattitory Committee dismissing all charges agauist four 
partners m a firm of solicitors. The hearing had been in private, as were all disciplinary 
hearings until 1993. The solicitor respondents to the appeal then sought an order that 
neither the Statutory Committee file or the appeal file be available for inspection, or the 
fact of the appeal or the names of the solicitors be published, fri refusing the application, 
McPherson J considered tiiat it was doubtful whetiier he had any power at all to override 
the provisions of tiie Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld). 
In considering the further question of whether to exercise the court's discretion to limit 
access to the appeal file. His Honour reaffirmed tiiat such an order m relation to 
proceedings of the court would only be made where publication could lead to an unjust 
outcome. Such was not the case, according to His Honour,^' hence the application to 
restrict the inspection of the Statutory Committee and appeal files and the publication of 
tiie names of tiie solicitors was refused. 
-' In re a Solicitor [ 1944] 1 KB 427, 431. 
^"[1984] 1 QdR 166. 
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8.3.2.3 Voluntary Reporting by Queensland Law Society 
For a number of years the C^eensland Law Society went beyond its legal obligations by 
providing additional reporting of disciplinary hearings to its members through its 
professional joumal, although tiiere were periods when publication ceased for no 
apparent reason: decisions whether or not to publish may have varied with tiie attitude of 
various Councils or Presidents or staff of the Professional Standards Department of the 
Law Society or Editor of the Joumal. 
Reporting to members became more extensive in June 1997 when the Queensland Law 
Society began to publish more comprehensive reports, which included not only the 
fmdings of fact and orders of the tribunal, but also the details of the charges laid and 
submissions made on behalf of the practitioner and the society.^ '* In March 2003, the 
disciplinary reports became even more accessible to members as they were posted in full 
on the Queensland Law Society website and in September 2003, were made available on 
the public section of the website. This extensive and detailed reporting to the profession 
and the public had the potential to provide a valuable source of deterrence and education. 
'^ Ibid 170-1. 
^' For instance, no disciplinary proceedings appear to have been reported in the Queensland Law Society 
Joumal between November 1988 and July 1993, apart fi-om very brief statements to advise when a 
solicitor's right to practise was affected (in other words, strike offs and suspensions were noted but not 
fines). 
" A decision to publish would always be subject to any orders made by the tribunal under Queensland Law 
Society Act 1952 (Qld) s6L to prohibit or restrict the publication of evidence given before the tribunal. 
^* These were published in Bi-Annual Reports of Disciplinary Action, produced as a supplement to Proctor, 
the Law Society's monthly magazine. These Bi-Annual reports also contained brief reports of any 
resolutions of the Professional Standards Committee to censure or admonish practitioners. 
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8.3.2.4 Naming of Individual Solicitors 
Until July 2002 the Queensland Law Society had a policy that it would not name 
individual solicitors unless they were stmck off or suspended.^^ Despite this policy, the 
tribunal findings filed at the Supreme Court did contain the names of the individual 
concemed, which could be reported in the mass media, although court records were not 
easy to access without the name of the practitioner concemed.^^ Equally, even when 
hearings became 'public' in the mid 1990s and a joumalist who attended the hearing 
could name the lawyer facing disciplinary charges in a press report, it remained difficult 
for the mass media to receive prior notice of disciplinary hearings. The Legal 
Ombudsman and his predecessor, the Lay Observer, were not as concemed about naming 
as the society and sometimes chose to name solicitors in Aimual Reports, who were 
then sometunes named in the mass media. 
Given tiie society's policy to name only solicitors who had been sttuck off or suspended, 
tiie imposition of a fine usually ensured anonymity, even in relation to fines as large as 
$25,000. Solicitors who were fined or received any other form of discipline were not 
identified by the society, even to fellow members."^" By July 2002 tiie society had had a 
^^  'Self-Regulation and How it Works' (1983) The Proctor: Newsletter of the Queensland Law Society 1, 2. 
^^  Letter fi-om E Kempin, Acting Registrar, Supreme Court of Queensland to Linda Haller, 4 August 1998. 
^^  See below section 8.4.2. 
'^  For instance, the Lay Observer (Qld), Sixth Annual Report of the Lay Observer, for 12 months ended 30 
June 1993, released 1 October 1993. This report named all solicitors against whom an adverse finding was 
made. 
'^ James Woods, 'Solicitors Suspended by Misconduct Tribunal', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 16 December 
1993, 20. 
^ James Woods, Solicitor Fined Over Client Deal', Courier Mail (Bnsbane), 18 August 1994, 20. This 
article was based on a report in the Queensland Law Society Joumal of a case heard in March of that year: 
SC353 8 March 1994, and did not name the solicitor concemed. A solicitor who has only been fined was 
sometimes publicly identified, such as a solicitor fined only $2,000 by the tnbunal: Re X SDT 53, 8 
December 1994, reported but not named in (1995) Queensland Law Society Joumal 210, but named m: 
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change of heart and decided to name any solicitor found guilty of any conduct issue 
whatever disciplinary order was imposed 41 
8.3.2.5 Selective Reporting 
Prior to the wholesale reporting of disciplinary outcomes on its website, the Queensland 
Law Society sometimes sought out the mass media and advise it of some forms of 
discipline unposed by tiie ttibunal. While it advised Queensland newspapers of cases in 
which a solicitor was stmck off or suspended, it did not advise them of any other cases, 
such as where a solicitor was fined or reprimanded,"^^ even though some of tiiese fines 
were substantial."^^ There have been exceptions to the mle, such as a press release by tiie 
society on 15 April 2003 to advise that on the previous day a solicitor had been fined 
$3,000 by the tribunal for failing to restore $2,000 to his tmst account.'^ Botii tiie headuig 
of the press release, 'Brisbane Solicitor Fined After QLS Action' and its tone emphasised 
a proactive stance by the society: the press release ended with the President of the society 
stating that 'solicitors' tmst accounts are protected by law and the Law Society makes no 
apology for taking this action.' Similariy, a society press release on 15 May 2003 
headlined 'QLS Takes Action Against Four Solicitors' detailed tiie imposition of three 
suspensions and a fine of $7,500. 
James Woods, Solicitor Fined Over Client Deal', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 18 August 1994, 20. The source 
of the naming is unclear. 
*' Letter irom Nick Masinello, Director, Professional Standards, Queensland Law Society, to Linda Haller, 
7 August 2002. 
*" 'Self-Regulation and How it Works' (1983) The Proctor: Newsletter of the Queensland Law Society 1, 2. 
'*^  They include a fine of $40,000 in Re A Practitioner (1996) QLSJ 615, SC 377, 22 October 1996 and a 
fine of $25,000 in Re a Practitioner (1994) 24 QLSJ 281, SC 353, 8 March 1994. Two other cases, heard in 
July 1990, in which fines of $25,000 were imposed, were not reported either to the general public or to 
fellow members of the profession through the professional joumal: SC 314, 17 July 1990; SC 319, 25 July 
1990. 
^ Queensland Law Society, 'Brisbane Solicitor Fined After QLS Action' (Press Relea.se, 15 April 2003). 
"^^ Queensland Law Society, 'QLS Takes Action Against Four Solicitors' (Press Release, 15 May 2003). 
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The society issued these press releases to the mass media at about the same time that it 
was under intense pressure in relation to its regulatory role, which would suggest that the 
society was responding to extemal pressure. On 6 May 2003, the Queensland Attomey-
General armounced plans to establish a new 'Legal Profession Watchdog' stating '[t]he 
days of self-regulation by the Queensland Law Society are over, because it's clear 
Queenslanders have no confidence in a system of lawyers judging lawyers'. 
8.3.2.6 Reporting of Discipline of Queensland Barristers 
The practice of the Bar Association of Queensland provides an extreme conttast to the 
level of reporting undertaken voluntarily by the Queensland Law Society. Until 2004,'*'' 
the association was not required to report on disciplinary action taken against a member 
and - although m 1994 it was reported to support public access to information about the 
outcome of disciplmary proceedings'^ ^ - it has only rarely chosen to report any such 
disciplinary action, even to its own members. What information has been published 
appeared in Queensland Bar News,'*'^ tiie official joumal of tiie Bar Association of 
Queensland, distributed to members only. 
^ Department of Justice and Attomey-General (Queensland), 'Government Establishes New Legal 
Profession Watchdog' (Press Release, 6 May 2003). The society finally lost this role in 2004 when the 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) provided for the Legal Services Commissioner to coordinate the receipt 
and investigation of all complaints against lawyers. 
^'^ The Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) now requires findings of professional misconduct against any legal 
practitioner, whetiier practising as a banister or solicitor, to be published on a discipline register, s 296. 
James Woods, 'Barristers Face Work Penalties for Misconduct', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 2 June 1994, 
20.The press report claimed that tiie Bar remained opposed to public hearings. 
"" Queensland Bar News was first published in 1980, and appeared on a quarteriy basis. It was replaced m 
December 1994 by Refresher, which was published until 1998, also on a quarteriy basis. From May 1999 
the association readopted the name Queensland Bar News for a publication which replaced both Refresher 
and the more informal Wig Words. 
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A survey of issues of tiie association's joumal published between 1980 and May 2002 
suggests that only two disciplinary matters were reported tiirough that medium during 
tiiat 22 year period. Both of those reports appeared relatively recently and in neither case 
was the barrister named: in August 1999, Queensland Bar News reported that disciplinary 
ttibunals of tiie association had heard two matters fri the past year, but gave detail only in 
relation to one. °^ The article reported that the barrister involved had admitted that his 
conduct during a ttial, including his allegations of partiality against a trial judge, 
amounted to unprofessional conduct, for which the barrister had apologised to the judge. 
The tribunal found that his comments were 'wilfiilly disrespectftil and calculated to 
offend' but took into account the length and complexity of the proceedings in which the 
conduct arose and otiier (unidentified) pressures on tiie barrister. It reprimanded tiie 
barrister and advised him that he would be suspended unless he undertook to 'report on 
professional matters to Senior Counsel on a monthly basis'. As the member failed to 
provide such an undertaking, he was suspended from membership of the association for 
12 months. 
Early the following year, in April 2000, another reference to a disciplinary hearing 
appeared in Queensland Bar News.^^ The report noted that the disciplinary hearing 
involved a barrister who had falsely told opposing counsel that tiie presiding judge had 
°^ Bar Association of Queensland, Queensland Bar News, August 1999, 23. No information was provided 
as to the other disciplinary hearing heard in the previous 12 months. 
'^ As Queensland barristers were not required to be members of the association, this suspension fi-om 
membership did not affect his right to practise. This may be the same disciplinary matter referred to in a 
newspaper article which noted that, in a facsimile sent on 29 July 1999, members were advised that a 
barrister accused of swearing at a prosecutor had been suspended by the association in relation to another 
matter B Vale, 'Barrister Charges Dropped', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 20 July 1999, 3. Neither source 
indicates when the disciplinary hearing was held. 
" A Wtison, 'Committee News', Queensland Bar News, April 2000, 42. 
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contacted him to discuss the case, which led opposing counsel to ask that the judge 
disqualify himself After hearing medical evidence,^^ the disciplinary tribunal 
reprimanded the member, sought certain undertakings from him "^* and reported the result 
of the hearing to the judge and the relevant court. 
The striking impression gained from reading the official joumal of the Bar Association of 
Queensland is that the association believed that the discipline of members should not be 
referred to, even in its own joumal. This would appear to be the view of the association 
even if the reporting was to be in the most general terms and the individual not named. 
Despite the rarity of disciplinary reports in its regular publications, the association did 
advise members of the outcome of disciplinary hearings by 'fax stteam', as individual 
matters were determined.^^ The individual was only named if expelled or suspended from 
membership of the association. 
The association has not avoided discussion of conduct matters altogether. In 1998, it was 
reported to have said that it was receiving 'two or three complaints a month' but its 
voluntary status meant that it had 'no control over discipline' and was asking the State 
Govemment to give it legislative control over all barristers ui Queensland.^^ 
" The Tribunal accepted medical evidence that the barrister had been suffering from an illness at the time 
of the incident and had subsequently sought treatment, which was successful. 
^^  The undertakings required that, in the event tiie illness became symptomatic to his knowledge, the 
barrister would report it to the committee forthwith and undertake prompt and appropriate medical 
treatment. Secondly, for the ensuing 12 months, the barrister would be subject to monthly supervision and 
counselling fi-om a nonainated senior member of the Bar. 
" Letter from Dan O'Connor, Chief Executive Officer of tiie Bar Association of Queensland, to Linda 
Haller 13 December 2002. The letter also advised that Bar Association of Queensland disciplinary 
tribunals had heard 10 matters against members in the period 1992-2002. . 
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In March 2000, Queensland Bar News began to publish 'Etiucal Rulings'. The president 
of tiie association explained the reasons for tiiis to members as follows: 
We decided to increase awareness of the Association's role in setting and enforcing 
professional conduct standards. Members regulariy approach [us] for advice and ethical 
mlings. Publication of a record of some of these mlings to heighten member's awareness 
of current ethical issues and to stimulate debate in contentious areas is desirable, as is a 
record of the number and experience of counsel seeking advice." 
Whtie such ethical mlings are extremely useful, as they encourage lawyers to seek advice 
before any misconduct occurs, the association still appeared reluctant to leave any lasting 
public record of misconduct which had in fact occurred. The 'fax stream' used to advise 
members immediately of the outcome of individual disciplinary hearings had limited 
deterrent and informational value because facsimiles have a ttansient quality and may be 
discarded. The stronger argument is that proper deterrence and education required a more 
systematic body of information to be available to the profession for pemsal as issues 
arose, such as the body of solicitors' disciplinary reports which have been available for a 
number of years. Yet it would seem that the barristers' branch of tiie profession in 
Queensland did not see that publication of disciplinary proceedings could help promote 
extemal legitimacy, intemal ideology or indeed any other purpose. The bar cleariy 
preferred any dirty linen to be afred behind closed doors. 
It would seem that the bar became finally caught up with the pressure for reform of 
regulation for all lawyers, although largely due to scandal in the solicitors' branch of the 
'^  Fran Metcalf, 'Barristers Face Tougher Rules', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 18 June 1998, 4. 
^^  James Douglas, 'President's Page', (2000) Queensland Bar News 5, 6. 
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profession.^^ For the first time in 76 years, under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), 
Queensland barristers became subject to the same level of public scmtiny as solicitors. 
8.3.2.7 Reporting under Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) 
The Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) potentially restricts the information available about 
Queensland lawyers. The Act adopts a very narrow definition of disciplinary action for 
the purposes of publication, definmg it as meaning only action taken as the result of a 
finding of professional misconduct not unsatisfactory professional conduct. In contrast, 
in New South Wales, disciplinary action is defined much more broadly to include the 
suspension or cancellation of a practising certificate, for whatever reason, and reprimands 
and compensation orders, regardless of whether any such order was accompanied by a 
formal findmg of professional nusconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct. 
This narrow definition is ambiguous as to the power to publicise less serious disciplinary 
action and timidity on behalf of regulatory bodies. For instance, the Act allows the 
commissioner to 'publicise disciplinary action taken against a person in any way the 
commissioner considers appropriate.'^' But, given the narrow statutory definition of 
disciplinary action, this provision does not provide the commissioner with any protection 
for publicising the outcome of disciplinary matters where a lawyer is acquitted or only 
^^  Above section 4.5.4. 
llLegal Profession Act 2004 {0]d)s 295. 
°^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 576. Only cautions are excluded: s 576(d). 
'^ Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 297(1) (emphasis added). 
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unsatisfactory professional conduct is found, even if the tribunal considered it appropriate 
to fine tiie practitioner tiie maximum amount of $100 000. 62 
It seems unlikely that there was a conscious decision to frame the legislation in such a 
narrow way. It is more likely that tiie drafters of the Queensland legislation were simply 
following the wording of the National Legal Profession Model Laws which are equally 
narrow in scope. 
The Queensland Legal Services Commissioner has decided to take a broad view of his 
powers of publication, taking as guidance the fact that the proceedings themselves are 
public (and so could be reported in any event), the broader position m New South Wales, 
and the more liberal reporting practice of the Queensland Law Society which existed 
prior to the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld).^ As well as going beyond tiie Act's 
mandatory reporting requirements, the commissioner has decided to include disciplinary 
action taken against banisters since late 1996, including barristers suspended from 
membership of the Bar Association of Queensland.^^ Yet, only six disciplinary matters 
are recorded on the register for barristers^^ and of these, five relate to barristers disbarred 
by the Queensland Court of Appeal. Only one case in which a barrister was suspended 
^^  Linda Haller, 'Imperfect Practice under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld)' (2004) 23 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 411, 429-430. 
^^  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Legal Profession — Model Laws Project: Model Provisions 
(2004) Attorney-General's Department http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/natpractice/currentstatus.html at 18 
March 2006 {'Model Laws') s 1159. 
^^  Legal Services Commission, Discipline Register (2004), http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/searchReg.htm at 18 
March 2006. 
« Ibid. 
" As at 18 March 2006. 
308 
Chapter Eight: Publicity 
67 from membership from the Bar Association of Queensland is recorded. In 2002 the 
association reported that in tiie previous 10 year period it had held about 10 disciplinary 
hearings.^^ Since 1996, it would seem that all but one disciplinary hearing led to less than 
a suspension or cancellation of membership from the association. Keeping in mind that 
even cancellation of membership of the association did not affect a barrister's right to 
practise, this provides powerful evidence of the association's reticence to take formal 
action against a member - a theme repeated throughout this thesis. 
8.4 PUBLIC OR PRIVATE HEARINGS? 
8.4.1 Dangers of Public Hearings to any Legitimation Project 
For a profession seeking extemal legitimacy, public hearings pose greater concems than 
the mere reporting of disciplinary outcomes. While it is possible to control the 
information which is disclosed m a report of the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, 
there is much less ability to exercise any conttol once the public, including the mass 
media, are able to attend a disciplinary hearing. There is much greater freedom to report 
tiie outcomes of proceedings at which the public is entitled to be present, even in the 
absence of statutory protection, as reports of public hearings attract privilege.^" fri the 
absence of a suppression order by the ttibunal, the identities and evidence of the lawyer 
" This is tiie case discussed above section 8.3.2.6 and reported briefly in Bar Association of Queensland, 
Queensland Bar News, August 1999, 23. 
^^  Letter from Dan O'Connor, Chief Executive Officer of the Bar Association of Queensland, to Linda 
Haller, 13 December 2002. 
*^  See above section 4.3 regarding the association's resistance to the establishment of formal, statutory 
disciplinary strucmres and section 4.4 regarding the association's inaction regarding tiie prosecution of 
discipline in the Supreme Court of Queensland. 
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and any witnesses appearing before the tribunal can be reported by any third party in 
attendance. Such a report will be based on the reporter's own impression of tiie hearing 
ratiier than on careftiUy considered reasons as can be supplied by the tribunal at the 
conclusion of the hearing. 
Hence a public hearing holds greater risk to the legitimation project than does tiie 
reporting of disciplinary outcomes. Admittedly, the risk may be not only to tiie reputation 
of the practitioner or legal profession but also to clients and other thfrd parties. Potential 
witnesses may be more reluctant to give evidence or to give comprehensive evidence if 
the hearing is in pubhc. Similarly, there is a risk of inadvertent disclosure of confidential 
mformation m a pubhc hearing. It is tiierefore valid to be more circumspect about 
opening proceedings to the public than about the official reporting of disciplinary 
outcomes. As well as the greater potential for damage to individuals, public disciplinary 
proceedings also have greater potential to damage the unage of the legal profession as a 
whole. This may be in the form of 'guifr by association' or by the risk that the disclosure 
of misconduct, particularly misconduct which has occurred over a long period of time, 
will raise concems as to the effectiveness of self-regulation. 
Given these considerations, it is not surprising that lawyers have generally resisted calls 
for public hearings. Nevertheless, Queensland solicitors appear to have been subject to 
greater pressure to hold public hearings than have barristers. Not only has the barristers' 
branch been subject to much less pressure to publish disciplinary outcomes or hold public 
70 Chapman v LordEllesmere [1932] 2 KB 431, 475 (RomerLJ). 
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hearings, it also continued to argue in favour of private discipline long after this argument 
was abandoned by Queensland solicitors. Further, not only does the evidence suggest that 
Queensland solicitors have now finally accepted the inevitability of public hearings, it 
also suggests that the Queensland Law Society has sometimes publicly championed 
disciplinary action that it has taken. The position of the two branches of the Queensland 
profession in relation to public hearings is documented below. 
8.4.2 Hearings Involving Queensland Solicitors 
From its establishment in 1927, the Statutory Committee sat in private and fr was not 
until the 1980s that there were serious moves to open its hearings to tiie public. In 1983 
the Queensland Law Society argued that disciplinary hearings should continue to be held 
in private because they 'may be of little interest to and will often not benefit the client 
complamant', and public proceedings could disadvantage tiie client involved as such 
proceedings risked the disclosure of confidential information.^^ It is necessary to protect a 
person who wishes to report misconduct and it is for tiiat reason tiiat the filing of a 
complaint has absolute privilege.^^ Although express stattitory provisions can protect the 
disclosure of confidential information passed to the investigating body,^ ^ such provisions 
'^ Joseph Jaconelli, Open Justice: A Critique of the Public Trial, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 
263. 
''- 'Self-Regulation and How it Works', (1983) The Proctor: NeM'sletter of the Queensland Law Society 1-2. 
^^  Addis V Crocker [1961] 1 QB 11; Hercules v Phease [1994] 2 VR 411. In Lincoln v Daniels [1962] 1 QB 
237, absolute privilege was granted to complaints lodged with the Inns of Court, but not to complaints 
lodged with tiie Bar Council, as tiie court delegated the control of professional conduct to tiie Inns of Court 
whereas tiie authority of the Bar Council to receive complaints was unclear. The privilege attached even 
though proceedings by the Benchers of tiie Inns of Court did not have all the powers of the court. For 
instance, they did not have the power to compel witnesses to attend and evidence was not given on oath: 
Lincoln V Daniels [1962] 1 QB 237, 255. 
^^  Such as the preservation of confidentiality in Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 592. 
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cannot avoid tiie need to disclose confidential information during tiie hearing itself A 
complamant or other wittiess may be less likely to disclose sensitive but relevant 
information if the hearing is a public one which can be reported in the mass media. While 
the tribunal can make suppression orders to prevent disclosure, this may be of less 
assurance to a witness tiian if the hearing took place behind closed doors. Conversely, 
public hearings ensure tiie rigour and reliability of evidence. 
Despite its opposition in 1983, in later years the Queensland Law Society's attitude to 
public hearings appeared to vary with tiie attitude of its uicumbent office bearers, who are 
elected annually. In May 1992, tiie society was reported to be considering opening its 
disciplinary hearings to the public with tiie support of its tiien President.^^ But by the 
following month, this support appeared to waver when the incomfrig President-Elect 
cautioned that complainants may be less likely to come forward if hearings were open to 
the public, and that any move towards public disciplinary hearings was a 'delicate issue' 
If* 
with the potential to cause problems. 
The legal position m relation to solicitors began to change in 1993, when the Queensland 
Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) was amended to requfre hearings before the lower level 
Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal be held in public.^'' Hearings before the higher level 
Statutory Committee, which heard more serious matters, continued to be held in private 
until 1994 when legislative amendments required that hearings be in public unless the 
^^  J Gaghardi, 'Shonky Solicitors May Face Public Hearings' Courier Mail (Brisbane), 13 May 1992, 1. 
^^  J Gagliardi, 'Open Hearings Might Discourage Complaints', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 25 June 1992, 5. 
^^  Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6KA (repealed), introduced by Statute Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1993 (Qld) s 3 sch 1. 
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committee ordered otherwise 'because of the confidential nature of the evidence or other 
matter or for another appropriate reason.' 
Thus the legislation then assumed that any disciplinary hearing involving a solicitor 
would be open unless mdividual cfrcumstances justified its closure. The tribunal has 
generally accepted this approach, only exercising its power to close hearings on rare 
79 
occasions. 
Legislative edict and tribunal co-operation do not automatically lead to public attendance 
at disciplinary proceedings and subsequent damage to reputation: m the years following 
the legislative changes fri 1994, there were a number of practical impediments to public 
observation of disciplinary hearings. Hearings before the Stattatory Conmiittee and the 
Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal were held at Law Society House until the late 1990s, fri 
his 1994 Annual Report, the Lay Observer^' noted that he had never seen a member of 
tiie public attend a hearing of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. He noted that this was 
'probably due to the fact tiiat hearings are not publicly advertised, with tiie only notice of 
hearing bemg one displayed in tiie Law Society building on the day'.^^ According to the 
'^ Queensland Statutory Committee Amendment Rule (No I) 1994 (Qld) s 3 replacing s 17. In 1997 the 
requirement was included in the Act itself: Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6L, mserted by 
Queensland Law Society Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Qld) s 9. 
™ In Re Carberry (2000) 6 Disciplinary Action Report 17, 20, SCT 6196, Charge 31,6 March 2000, the 
tribunal reftised an application by the practitioner that the proceedings be heard in private, altiiough 
proceedings were closed in a case heard tiie following day: Re X {2000) 6 Disciplinary Action Report 22, 
24-5 SCT Charge 25 and 32, 7 March 2000; {Courier Mail (Brisbane), 21 March 2000, 7). 
°^ Botii this higher level tribunal and the lower level Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal were replaced by the 
Solicitors Complaints Tribunal m 1997, which in turn was replaced by the Legal Practice Tribunal in 2004. 
*' The Lay Observer had the statutory obligation of overseeing the disciplinary system. The office was 
renamed the Legal Ombudsman by amendments in 1997: Part 2B inserted by Queensland Law Society 
Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Qld) s 9. These ftmctions were taken over by the Legal Sen/ices 
Commissioner in 2004. ,r^c^A •^•, 
*- Office of the Lay Observer (Queensland), Seventh Annual Report July 1993-June 1994, 21. 
313 
Chapter Eight: Publicity 
Lay Observer, despite the requirement since 1993 that hearings before the Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal be heard in public, the Queensland Law Society had decided 
against publishing notices of hearings in the daily press.^^ hi such circumstances, it is not 
surprising that a member of tiie public had not attended. The Lay Observer appeared to 
approve of the society's approach and perhaps even tiivialised the frnportance of 
disciplinary proceedings, noting that the public could 'observe much more mteresting 
cases in tiie mainstream courts'.^ "* Even if the Lay Observer thought the disciplinary cases 
uninteresting, the mass media had an interest in attending them but reported some 
obstmction by tiie society. In August 1994, tiie Brisbane Courier Mail alleged that the 
society had reftised to inform that newspaper of upcoming hearings. The article 
included a quote from tiie immediate past President of tiie society which implied that, 
without legislative authority, a notification of hearing could not be given to persons other 
than those immediately mterested in the hearing.^^ And yet tiiis would not appear to be in 
accord with the intent of the legislation - that the hearing be 'm public'. 
In subsequent years the Queensland Law Society appeared more willmg to accept that 
disciplinary hearings would be in public. From May 1998 until it was disbanded in 2004, 
the Solicitors Complaints Tribunal sat at tiie Brisbane Magistrates' Court, and the society 
87 
published notices of hearings in the Daily Law List. 
*^  Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s 6KA (repealed) inserted by s3. Schedule 1, Statute Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1993 (Qld). 
^"^ Office of the Lay Observer (Queensland), Seventh Annual Report July 1993-June 1994, 21. 
^^  James Woods, Solicitor Fined Over Client Deal', Courier Mail (Brisbane), 18 August 1994, 20. 
*^  Ibid. 
*^  Letter from Jon Broadley, Clerk to Solicitors Complaints Tribunal to Linda Haller, 19 August 2003. 
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8.4.3 Queensland Barristers 
By contrast to the increasing ttansparency in relation to the discipline of solicitors, until 
the passing of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) the discipline of barristers in 
Queensland ortiy occurred in public when a barrister was disciplined by the Supreme 
Court, in accordance with the court's inherent jurisdiction to discipline both barristers 
and solicitors. Even when the Bar Association of Queensland acted against a member, 
there was no legislation which required any aspect of that discipline to be disclosed. 
Nor did the association choose to make its disciplinary processes more transparent. 
In December 1998, the Queensland Govemment instigated a review of many aspects of 
the Queensland legal profession, including admission to the profession, business 
sttnctures and the handlmg of complaints and discipline.**^ That discussion paper noted 
tiiat a similar review in New South Wales had raised the question whether disciplinary 
proceedings should be heard in public or in private.^ In its response to the discussion 
paper, the Bar Association of Queensland emphasised tiie need for any disciplinary 
ttibunal to have the discretion to close hearings and to restrict publication of tribunal 
decisions. 
88 Barristers are now subject to the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), which requires disciplinary hearings 
involving barristers or solicitors to be in public: s 474. 
^^  Department of Justice and Attomey-General (Queensland), Discussion Paper: Legal Profession Reform 
(1998). 
'° Ibid 15. 
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The association gave a number of reasons for conducting disciplinary hearings in 
private.^' Its argument focused heavily on the damage that a disciplinary hearing could 
cause to the individual barrister before the ttibunal, claiming that: 
• A lower evidentiary standard in disciplinary proceedings may lead to more speculative 
evidence being placed in the public domain; 
• The publicity of the proceedings could be 'devastating' and out of proportion to any 
penalty which the tiibunal chose to impose; and 
• The damage caused to a barrister's reputation may be permanent, even where the conduct 
was vindicated by the tiibunal. 
The association's submission to the Queensland Govemment focused largely on the 
damage to a barrister's reputation that a public hearing could cause. It did not refer at all 
to the damage which public hearings could cause to other participants in the hearing, such 
as the complainant or other witnesses, apart from noting that closed hearings would be 
'shorter', which would benefit complainants by providing them with 'quicker and easier 
redress'. 
In June 1999, in its response to the State Government's Green Paper on Legal Profession 
Reform, the association did not appear to have resiled from its earlier preference for 
closed hearings. It did suggest that Queensland adopt a co-regulatory disciplinary model 
similar to that which operated in New South Wales, where the Legal Services 
Commissioner received all complaints and oversaw the disciplinary system but usually 
referred matters to the Bar Council. The association approved such a model partly 
Bar Association of Queensland, Submission to Queensland Attomey-General on Discussion Paper on 
Legal Reform {199S) 20. 
'-Ibid. 
'' Ibid. 
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because it provided a 'ttansparent and objective review' of disciplinary proceedings, but 
it is arguable that such tt-ansparency and objective review requires open hearings. By 
2002 the association conceded that the lack of control over barristers was unsatisfactory 
and was 'plaiming to review its 1998 submission when draft legislation was tabled in 
Parliament'.^^ However, by the time draft legislation was tabled in State Parliament in 
2003,^ ^ broader difficufries in the legal profession - largely emanating from the 
solicitors' branch^^ - had drawn the bar into an irresistible push for a common regulatory 
fi-amework. Very little time was given for comment on the legislation and it was 
presented as a fait accompli, so it is likely that any suggestion by the bar that it be 
allowed to continue to discipluie behmd closed doors would have fallen on deaf ears. 
The Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) now requires all disciplinary hearings, whether 
involving solicitors or barristers, to be open to the public.'''^  Hearings can be closed if this 
is in tiie public uiterest, but fr is not sufficient tiiat closure would be in the interests of the 
practitioner appearing before tiie tribunal. 
To summarise, it would seem that in Queensland the solicitors' branch of the legal 
profession mitially rejected any calls for public disciplinary hearings, and could even be 
94 Bar Association of Queensland, Submission to Queensland Attomey-General on Green Paper for Legal 
Reform, June 1999, 5. ^^ 
'^  Letter from Dan O'Connor, Chief Executive Officer of tiie Bar Association of Queensland, to Linda 
Haller, 13 December 2002. 
'* The legislation was initially passed as Legal Profession Act 2003 (Qld) and replaced by Legal Profession 
Act 2004 (Qld) The reasons for this are more fully discussed in Reid Mortensen and Linda Haller, 'Legal 
Profession Reform in Queensland', (2004) 23 University of Queensland Law Joumal 280-288, 280. 
" As discussed more fiiUy above section 4.5.4. 
'' Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 474( 1). 
' ' The public interest in closure must relate to the subject matter of the hearing or nature of the evidence: 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 474(2). 
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said to have frustrated the intent of legislation introduced to require public hearings by 
failing to publicise upcoming hearings and by holding hearings at Law Society House. In 
more recent times, the Queensland Law Society demonstrated greater co-operation with 
the spirit of the legislation. By contrast, any discipline of barristers by the Bar 
Association of Queensland remained behind closed doors until a common regulatory 
system was introduced in 2004. 
8.5 ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENCE 
8.5.1 Issues of Cost and Expedition 
The Bar Association of Queensland's argument that closed hearings would provide 
complainants with 'quicker and easier redress' seems surprismg, given that tiie focus of 
disciplinary proceedings is not to compensate a complainant but to protect tiie public. The 
association also argued that a barrister was more likely to admit misconduct to a closed 
hearing, thereby implying that closed hearings could be more efficient and cost 
effective.'°° 
Proceedings are likely to be shorter if a lawyer co-operates by admitting guilt and thereby 
foregoes the need for the prosecution to prove its case. Additionally, a closed hearing 
may mean that fewer steps need to be taken to minimise damage to reputation or 
inhibition of witnesses. This is also likely to lead to shorter hearings. On the other hand. 
'°° Bar Association of Queensland, Submission to Queensland Attomey-General on Discussion Paper on 
Legal Reform {\99^) 5. 
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it would seem that a lawyer accused of misconduct is likely to defend such an allegation 
regardless of whether the proceedings are heard in private or public. 
There is some tentative empirical evidence to support the proposition that a solicitor may 
be more likely to admit misconduct to a closed hearing,'^' although it is interesting to 
consider whether the same would be tme of barristers. In any event, the issue remains 
whether cost considerations should outweigh the benefits of open hearings. 
8.5.2 Information Asymmetry 
As the legal services market becomes more deregulated and open to market forces, it 
could be argued that the consumer should have access to as much mformation as possible 
about the lawyers offering services. Accurate comparative price information needs to be 
available, as part of the protective fimction. Clients may also prefer to select a 
practitioner on the basis of uitegrity and competence,'°^ but will need as much 
information as possible to perform tiiis task, given that competence'°^ and reputation"^ 
can be difficult to assess. 
Some members of the public may be interested to know about cases in which a lawyer 
had been fined or reprimanded so as to draw their ovm conclusions about the seriousness 
'°' Linda Haller, 'Dirty Linen: The Public Shaming of Lawyers', (2003) 10 Intemational Journal of the 
Legal Profession 281-313, 298-9. 
'°' Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (NSW), Submission to the National Competition Policy 
Review of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW), 1998, 19. 
'"' Robert Dingwall and P Fenn, "A Respectable Profession"? Sociological and Economic Perspectives on 
the Regulation of Professional Services, (1987) 7 Intemational Review of Law and Economics 51-64. 
'"'* George Cohen, 'When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility' (1998) 67 Fordham Law 
Review 273, 288. 
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of the misconduct. Although the practice of the Queensland Law Society for a number of 
years was to only identify solicitors who had been stmck ofif or suspended, it could be 
argued that the public has less need to be informed when a lawyer is removed from the 
profession, as that person is of no further risk to potential clients, than when a person has 
been disciplined but remains in practice. A similar argument was alluded to in Allbutt v 
General Council of Medical Education and Registration when the English Court of 
Appeal emphasised that it was important that patients be able to obtam information about 
why a medical practitioner's name had been erased from the register, given that removal 
from the register did not disqualify him from practising, so that those patients could then 
decide whether to continue to employ him. 
Could it be then, that the Queensland Law Society was engagmg in strategic reporting -
an issue more central to the legitimation theories raised in Chapter Three? In other words, 
was the society only publicising those disciplinary cases which most enhanced the image 
of the legal profession, regardless of which cases required publicity so as to protect the 
public? 
8.5.3 Strategic Reporting of Harsh Discipline 
When a professional body oitiy advises the public that a member has been removed from 
the profession, the public could gain the impression that the profession is acting harshly 
to protect the public. The actual practice of the disciplinary tribunal may show 
'"^(1889) 23 QBD 400. 
'°^ Ibid 409. 
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differently, for instance, that fines rather than strike off orders were the most common 
form of order imposed by the tribunal 107 
There are a few possible reasons why a professional body may choose to inform the 
general public of some of the discipline which it has actually imposed upon its members. 
Reporting may enhance the status of lawyers as a group if it can show that the profession 
can act harshly against the odd deviant member who has slipped uito its ranks. While 
in objective terms, a broader range of orders may have greater protective effect than 
simple disbarment, a profession seeking to maintain the privilege of self-regulation 
against a hostile public is more likely to use the public rhetoric of uncompromising public 
protection: harsh action will be taken to cleanse the profession of 'bad apples'. 
Reporting can also cause great damage to the profession, as publicity is a double-edged 
sword. While a profession seeking legitimation needs to show that it can act harshly 
against tiie odd deviant member who has slipped into its ranks, the reporting of too much 
discipline may heighten public concem as to the tme levels of competence within the 
profession. The publicity can be counter-productive. The pomt is well demonstrated by 
an English report that 'record numbers of solicitors are being disciplined for dishonesty' 
and that the Law Society of England and Wales planned to 'name publicly a thousand 
'°^ As has been the case in Queensland: Linda Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 
1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis', (2001) 13 Bond Law Review 1-45, 24. 
'™ Eric Steele and Raymond Nimmer, 'Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regulation' (1976) American 
Bar Foundation Research Journal 919-1019, 1001. 
'°' The rhetoric of expelling 'bad apples' is commonly used in relation to professional discipline. See above 
section 5.2.2. 
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110 
shoddy solicitors to help to build public confidence in lawyers'. No doubt the society's 
intention was to reassure the public of the society's protective endeavour, but public 
confidence is likely to be damaged rather than enhanced by an official acknowledgment 
tiiat at least a thousand 'shoddy' solicitors remained in practice - particularly when the 
society tiien failed to name them as promised. 
Similarly, the image of the profession may be damaged if the public perceives that, 
although lawyers have been disciplined, that discipline has been too lenient. Thus, a 
profession seeking legitimation could be expected to engage in strategic publicity and 
limit publicity to cases in which harsh discipluie has been imposed. The imposition of a 
fme may allow greater control over subsequent publicity, as in this situation there is no 
practical reason why clients need to be informed that their practitioner is no longer in 
practice.'" At least in cases in which the conduct is ambiguous, the imposition of a fme 
may itself define the conduct as less serious and avoid damaging publicity. The past 
policy of the Queensland Law Society to report only strike offs and suspensions to the 
general public through the mass media did have this effect. Yet future clients may require 
more protection from a solicitor fined $40,000 as from a solicitor suspended from 
practice - particularly as the fine leaves the solicitor in practice. In either case, members 
of the public may prefer to be advised of all disciplinary action and draw their own 
conclusions. 
"° Robert Verkaik 'Solicitors Disciplined in Record Numbers', The Independent (London), 26 July 2001, 
9. 
' " Stephen Bene, 'Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions' 
{1991) Stanford Law Review 907-941, 931. 
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The Bar Association of Queensland has been much less inclined to advise the general 
public of disciplinary action taken against a barrister and has generally shunned public 
discussion of disciplinary issues. It may have had little to gain from seeking out such 
publicity as this may have only highlighted its disciplinary impotence."^ Although only 
statute can provide unambiguous protection from liability for defamation, the public 
dissemination of more detailed disciplinary information could have been facilitated if 
members of the association had agreed to amend tiie Articles of Association to provide 
such protection, as occurred in Chapman v Lord Ellesmere.^^"^ But the association did not 
seek out any of these options - any form of publicity of discipline was never a serious 
part of its agenda. 
8.5.4 Possible Reasons for Discrepancies between Barristers and Solicitors 
There may be many reasons why the level of publicity given to disciplinary proceedings 
has varied so greatly between the two branches of the Queensland legal profession. 
The answer may simply be numerical, tiiat tiiere have always been many more solicitors 
tiian barristers in Queensland about whom to complain, and in a small professional group 
the 'grape vine' and general collegiality may provide sufficient information for general 
deterrence and informal sanctions to be effective."^ But by 1991, membership of the Bar 
112 Linda Haller, 'Disciplinaiy Fines: Deterrence or Retribution?' (2002) 5 Legal Ethics 152-178, 168-9. 
See discussion above section 6.5.4. 
" ' Above section 4.4. 
"" [1932] 2 KB 431. Consent is a complete defence to tiie publication of defamatory matenal: Loveday v 
Sun Newspapers Ltd {193S) 59 CLR 503 (523-524, Dixon J). It constitutes a form of volenti nonfit injuria. 
"^ F Raymond Marks and Dariene Cathcart, 'Discipline Witiiin the Legal Profession: Is it Self-
Regulation?' (1974) 2 University of Illinois Law Forum 193-236, 205. 
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Association of Queensland stood at over 450 with another 250 interstate counsel on the 
bar roll"^ and tiie increasing difficulty of the association to enforce standards as the size 
of the bar increased was acknowledged by the president at that time.'^^ Solicitors were 
first subject to statutory discipline when there were fewer than 400 solicitors in practice 
in Queensland."^ Thus the different attitude of solicitors is not simply due to their larger 
number. 
Perhaps the legal profession will only open disciplinary proceedings to the public after 
extemal pressure to do so. As I foreshadowed in Chapter Four, and discuss fiuther in the 
following chapter, there has been less extemal pressure placed on Queensland barristers 
than solicitors. It may also be the case that solicitors and barristers have different 
attitudes to public shaming. Such a view is supported by the work of Abel, who claimed 
that English solicitors used much more visible mecharusms than barristers to gain 
legitimacy. 
i.6 CONCLUSION 
Given that disciplinary proceedings are designed to protect the public, there are strong 
reasons why the outcome of those proceedings should be reported in detail to fellow 
"* Interstate barristers were admitted to the Queensland Bar as a result of the High Court's decision in 
Street v Bar Association of Queensland and Barristers' Board {\9?>9) 168 CLR 461. 
"^ Doug Drummond 'Why the Bar Association?' Speech at the Pupils Dinner 19 July 1991' Queensland 
Bar News 37, 5. 
"^ Helen Gregory, The Queensland Law Society Inc 1928-1988 (Queensland Law Society, Brisbane, 1991) 
74. 
" ' Richard Abel, 'England and Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and 
Solicitors' in Richard Abel and Philip Lewis (eds). Lawyers in Society, vol 1: the Common Law World, 
(University of Califomia Press, Berkeley, 1988) 62. 
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members of the legal profession, to deter and to educate them. Transparency and 
accountability would also suggest that disciplinary proceedings be open to the public and 
fully and freely reported. This is not to suggest that open disciplinary hearings could 
supplant the existing role of an independent auditor of the complaints and disciplinary 
system, such as a Legal Services Commissioner, who has a valuable overview of the 
entire system. The value of public legitimacy gained tiirough both open hearings and an 
independent auditor such as the Legal Services Commissioner is recognised by reforms 
which have simultaneously opened hearings to the public and increased the power of 
commissioners to report to the public as they see fit. 
This chapter has sought to document differing attitudes to the publication of disciplinary 
outcomes and the holding of public disciplinary hearings. While discipline was imposed 
behind closed doors, the Queensland Law Society and Bar Association of Queensland 
had greater control over the information that they released in relation to that discipline 
and could engage in stt^tegic publicity - should they choose to. This is no longer 
possible, as legislation now requires that all proceedings be open to the public, which in 
ttim allows for them to be independently reported ui the mass media. A profession 
seeking legitimacy may be tempted to champion publicly the efforts that it has made in 
regard to discipline. But paradoxically, too much or misdirected publicity may have the 
adverse effect of heightening public anxiety as to the extent of nusconduct and 
incompetence within the profession. 
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Although there is some evidence in Queensland that solicitors have been more willing to 
engage in public shaming tiian barristers, on some occasions this greater willingness may 
have been precipitated by periods of crisis within the solicitors' branch which were not 
experienced by the bar. In the following chapter 1 explore these periods of crisis in more 
detail and consider the degree to which they - or other factors - provide an adequate 
explanation of the different attitudes to publicity and public shaming. 
•t* 'P 'P "F 
326 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis 1 have attempted to untangle the threads of protection, legitimation and 
retribution which appear to mn through the Queensland legal profession's disciplinary 
system. In Chapter Three 1 wamed of the dangers of treating the concepts of 
protection and legitimation as mutually exclusive and of assuming that the legal 
profession actively sought or achieved particular outcomes which enhanced its 
reputation at the expense of the public. Protection and legitimation sometimes coexist, 
and can be mutually supportive purposes of discipline. Occasionally, retribution will 
enhance a legitimation project. It is more difficult to argue how retribution can be 
reconciled to the protective function of discipline, given that their focuses are 
diametrically opposed. 
hi the subsequent discussion in tiiis concluding chapter I will look at disciplinary 
scaffolding (stmctures) and disciplinary action separately, because, while there may 
be great enthusiasm to erect an edifice with the potential to protect the public from 
lawyers, there may be much greater reluctance actually to use those stmctures to take 
action against individual lawyers. 
327 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
9.2 DISCIPLINARY STRUCTURES, OR 'SCAFFOLDING' 
9.2.1 Queensland Law Society 
There is no doubt that the Queensland Law Society has been active for over 70 years 
in establishing disciplinary stmctures to deal with the discipline of Queensland 
solicitors. Over most of that time it had the support of the govemment, and the 
government's usual response to periods of crisis - such as a spate of thefts from tmst 
accounts - was to increase the powers of the society rather than reconsider its 
effectiveness in regulating members. 
Often the society's most active 'constmction periods' followed periods of extemal 
pressure - either from govemment or the mass media - but this was not always the 
case. For instance, there were many occasions when the society put extensive, but 
quiet, energy into designing the legislative changes necessary to enhance its powers, 
which were then adopted in toto by the Parliament and introduced with little or no 
fanfare. 
9.2.2 Bar Association of Queensland 
The Bar Association of Queensland has been much less interested in changing the 
disciplinary stmctures available for barristers. For most of its history the association 
has been satisfied with relying on the inherent powers of the court and its own, 
ineffectual contractual powers over members - even though the disciplinary strength 
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of the English Inns of Court was absent.' During the 1980s, association members 
began to discuss whether a disciplinary tribunal was needed. Younger members were 
apparentiy more enthusiastic than older ones, but were criticised for 'surrendering just 
in case'.^ In retrospect, it seems hard to believe that the debate within the association 
dragged on for so long - at least since 1983 - because of indecision as to whether it 
was preferable to be controlled by legislation or by the judges of the Supreme Court 
through Rules of Court. In Chapter Two I documented the court's reluctance to 
embrace the legislative broadening of conduct liable to discipline. It was probably 
tme that the judges - themselves all once barristers - were also more likely than the 
legislature to draft Rules of Court which were consistent with the narrow, common 
law view of lawyer discipline."^ But the bar finally had the decision made for it, with 
the passing of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). 
9.2.3 The Role of Queensland Judges in Erecting Disciplinary Structures 
While the judges of the Supreme Court did not create the Rules of Court sought by the 
Bar Association of Queensland, they did sponsor an increase in the maximum fine to 
which a solicitor (but not a barrister) was subject from $5,000 to $100,000. No 
similar fines were established for barristers. Why the difference? As barristers - by 
limitations on the nature of their practice - have had none of the temptations of a tmst 
account, and were much less numerous than solicitors,^ the judges may have been 
' Above section 2.2.3.5. 
^ James Crowley, Editorial (1983) 6 Queensland Bar News 1. Above section 4.3.2. 
' As documented above section 2.4. 
^ Michael Powell, 'Professional DivestiUire: The Cession of Responsibility for Lawyer Disciphne' 
(1986) American Bar Foundation Research Joumal 3\, 53, discussed above sections 3.10.2.3,4.3.3. 
^ Above section 6.2.1. 
*ln 1991, four years after the judges increased tiie maximum fme, 3,626 sohcitors held practising 
certificates, but only about 450 barristers were members of tiie Bar Association of Queensland - a ratio 
of 8 solicitors for every one barrister: Doug Dnimmond, 'Why the Bar Association?' Speech at tiie 
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exposed more often to perceived deficiencies in the regulation of solicitors and so felt 
a more pressing need to look for new ways in which to deter tiiem. fri addition, any 
misconduct by a barrister was much less likely to involve money. With the 20-fold 
enhancement of fines for solicitors, the judges may have thought they should be ready 
to fight 'fire with fire', in the hope that solicitors would respond to a range of 
financial disincentives, in a way not even countenanced for barristers. 
9.2.4 Legislature 
In Chapter Four I documented the evolution of disciplinary stmctures in Queensland. 
The legislature appeared unwilling to remove the Queensland Law Society's role in 
regulating solicitors. Although some token extemal control was introduced through 
the granting of powers of appeal to Attorneys-General, the establishment of a Legal 
Ombudman's office and lay membership on disciplinary tribunals, for all practical 
purposes the society remained in control. Even though the Legal Profession Act 2004 
(Qld) has totally removed the society's power to prosecute discipline applications, it 
has retained and strengthened the society's powers in relation to practising certificates. 
For many years there appeared to be a close working relationship between the 
Queensland Law Society and the Queensland govemment. The Parliamentary 
opposition parties were also usually supportive of the society. The society's usual 
response to claims that self-regulation was not working was to request additional 
statutory powers. Until 2004, it was rare for the govemment to deny any such request. 
Pupils Dinner, 19 July 1991, published in Queensland Bar News 37, 5; Queensland Law Society, 
Annual Report 1990-1991, 13. At that time, barristers could practise without being a member, but in 
2002 the association estimated tiiat less than 5% of practising barristers would not be members: Email 
from Dan O'Connor, Chief Executive Officer, Bar Association of Queensland, to Linda Haller, 8 
November 2002. 
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The legislature, usually in cooperation with the society, was extremely active in 
designing, then redesigning, complex stmctures to deal with Queensland solicitors -
introducing the Queensland Law Society Act in 1927 and amending it 42 times since 
then. 
The amount of govemment funding given to support the various forms of statutory 
discipline has been minimal. The stt-uctures have been funded from solicitors' 
practising certificate fees and the interest eamt on client money in solicitors' tmst 
accounts.^ Solicitor members of disciplinary tribunals have donated their time. The 
lack of funding may suggest that the legislative changes were passed primarily 'as an 
expression of distaste and armoyance' with little expectation that they would actually 
work.^ However, the support which the society received from both sides of Parliament 
in parliamentary debates^ may also suggest that the govemment simply did not want 
to take on the responsibility of lawyer regulation itselfi At other times, the 
legislature was happy to sponsor the introduction of a fidelity fund and insurance 
ratiier than deal with criticisms of tiie society's ability to regulate members head-on. 
^The Legal Ombudsman was also paid from Queensland Law Society fiinds, which he^ tiiought 
tiireatened his perceived independence from the society: Legal Ombudsman (Queensland) 13' Annual 
Report July 1999-June 2000, 45. He called for govemment fiinding. hi 2001 he reported tiiat the 
government had increased tiie fiinding for his sole support staff from two to four days a week - tiie fu-st 
staffing increase stiice tiie office was created in 1985: Legal Ombudsman (Queensland), 14 Annual 
Report, July 2000-June 2001,30. , • • ^ „ • 
^ Michael Burrage, 'From a Gentlemen's' to a Public Profession: Status and Politics m the History of 
English Solicitors', (1996) 3 Intemational Joumal of the Legal Profession 45, 60. Discussed above 
section 3.10.2.1. 
^ Above sections 4.5.2,4.5.3. , , . , . 
'° For instance the Attorney-General's wistfiil hope in 1985 tiiat the legislative changes then 
implemented would 'end public concem about self-regulatory role of tiie Queensland Law Society', 
discussed above section 4.5.3. 
" Above section 4.5.1. 
'^  Above section 4.5.2. 
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fri contrast, until 2004, the legislature chose to ignore barristers totally, and the bar 
appears to have liked it that way. The bar never sought out the assistance of - and 
appeared suspicious of- the legislature. 
What can we conclude from the evolution of disciplinary stmctures in Queensland, 
and the role played by the professional bodies, judges and legislature? Why has such a 
complex stmcture been developed, but which for most of its history ortiy dealt with 
solicitors? Is there a greater need to protect the public from solicitors? Do these 
stmctures constitute ideological 'scaffolding' only erected in times of extemal threat, 
suffered more often by Queensland solicitors than barristers? Or could it be that they 
simultaneously protected and legitimated? 
9.2.5 A Greater Need for Structures to be Available to Protect from Solicitors? 
In the past, barristers have claimed that there is much more disciplinary scaffolding to 
deal with solicitors than with barristers because there is a greater need to protect the 
public from solicitors. 
While the bar remained small, it could perhaps have argued that informal, collegial 
forms of discipline were more effective than statutory regulation. But this may not 
be tme. Given that the Bar Association of Queensland was first established to 
blacklist direct-access barristers and tardy solicitors, any informal, collegial 
discipline exercised in later times may not have necessarily focused on public 
' ' It appeared particularly concemed that legislative powers would also lead to fiision of the profession: 
above section 4.3.4. 
^^ F Raymond Marks and Darlene Cathcart, 'Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is it Self-
Regulation?' (1974)2 University of Illinois Law Forum 193-236,205. 
Above section 4.3.1. 
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protection rather than self-interest. Given the secrecy which has surrounded bar 
discipline, it is difficult to know if this is ti^e. 
In addition, Queensland barristers were more geographically dispersed than is 
conducive to informal conttols. Finally, while the number of practising barristers was 
once very small, by 1991 it had surpassed the size of the solicitors' branch at the time 
that solicitors first became subject to stattitory control,'^ but was to remain without 
similar control for another 13 years. 
Is a barrister's work of less risk to the public than tiie work of a solicitor? Data from 
England and New South Wales suggests that, proportionately, barristers attract fewer 
complaints tiian solicitors.'^ The lack of any stattitory procedure for the receipt of 
complaints against Queensland barristers meant it was unclear whether a person 
unhappy with the conduct of a barrister should complain to the Bar Association of 
Queensland, the Barristers Board, the Legal Ombudsman, the Supreme Court or the 
Minister for Justice. This could have meant potential complainants were deterred and 
'^  W Wesley Pue 'Trajectories of Professionalism: Legal Professionalism after Abel' (1990) 19 
Manitoba Law Joumal 384, 404, discussed above section 3.2. 
'^  In 1991, membership of tiie Bar Association of Queensland stood at over 450 with another 250 
interstate counsel on tiie bar roll. The increasing difficulty of tiie association to enforce standards as the 
size of tiie bar increased was acknowledged by tiie president: 
Dmmmond above n 6, 7. Solicitors were fu-st subject to statutory discipline when tiiere were fewer 
tiian 400 of tiiem practising: Helen Gregory, The Queensland Law Society Inc 1928-1988 (Queensland 
Law Society, Brisbane, 1991) 74. . ^ . . ^, r-
'* In England and Wales tiie Office of tiie Legal Services Ombudsman Annual Report 2002-03, Facts 
and Figures Figure One, reports 89,045 solicitors in practice and 22,830 complaints (26 per cent) and 
13 601 barristers in practice but only 461 complaints (tiiree percent): <http://olso.org/AR2003/06-
fac'tsandfigures asp> at 23 January 2004. In New South Wales in 1998-99, 1890 banisters held 
practisuig certificates and 156 complaints were lodged against them. This comprises a complaint rate 
agamst barristers of 0.08. During tiie same period 14966 solicitors were in practice and 2506 
complaints were lodged against them, a complaint rate against solicitors of 0.167, twice the rate against 
barristers- New Soutii Wales Bar Association, Statistics Booklet -Volume Three (August 2002) 3; New 
Soutii Wales Law Reform Commission, Complaints Against Lawyers: Review of Part 10, Issues Paper 
18 NSW Law Reform Commission, Sydney, 2000, 23-4; Law Society of New Soutii Wales, 
Professional Standards, Annual Report 1998-99, October 1999, 39, Table 10. 
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any complaints dispersed. Hence, and not surprisingly, we have no comprehensive 
data about the number of complaints made against barristers. 
It should be conceded that there may be some forms of additional control on the 
conduct of barristers which may have made formal discipline less necessary. Where a 
barrister is instmcted by a solicitor, that solicitor can simply withdraw the brief if 
unhappy with the barrister's conduct. But barristers can also accept direct access 
clients and a briefing solicitor may actually approve of the barrister's misconduct. It 
can also be argued that barristers, as a group, are subject to greater day-to-day 
scmtiny by the court than are solicitors. But other controls are not as available in 
relation to barristers as they are in relation to solicitors -suggesting a greater need for 
discipline to fill the gap. An obvious example is advocates' immuitity, which was 
once partly justified by the High Court on the basis that another form of conti-ol apart 
from civil liability - discipline - was available to uphold the standard of barristers' 
conduct. 
The rate or nature of client complaints does not necessarily justify whether or not a 
formal disciplinary system is necessary. Complaints do not always mirror misconduct, 
for instance where the client benefits from the misconduct and so is unlikely to 
complain. Nor has the past disciplinary system responded to the profile of client 
complaints. Queenslanders have complained about costs and delay by solicitors but 
21 
the disciplinary system has focused on tmst account matters. 
" Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543, 580 (Brennan J). 
°^ Linda Haller, 'Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis', 
(2001) 13 Bond Law Review 1-45, 19. 
'^ Forty-six per cent of disciplinary cases against solicitors in Queensland have related to trust account 
matters: Ibid 18. 
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Nevertheless, the combined effect of the lack of a formal process for complaining 
about barristers, the disciplinary tribunal's focus on tmst account matters and the 
absence (and express banning) of the holding of a tmst account in a barrister's 
practice may have been to give the public - and the legislattire - the impression that 
higher ethical standards existed among barristers and hence, that there was less need 
for statutory regulation.^^ 
9.2.6 A Greater Need for Structures to Legitimate the Position of Solicitors? 
Legal professions are thought to be more active in creating the edifice of strong 
discipline during periods of extemal threat. ^^  The Queensland bar has not 
experienced the same periods of 'moral panic' which have preceded some activity 
within the solicitors' branch to change its disciplinary sttoictures. ^ "^  Queensland 
barristers also appear to have avoided any public outcry similar to that which 
enveloped barristers in New South Wales, when a number of them were found to have 
avoided their tax obligations. 
^^  John Forbes, The Divided Legal Profession in Australia: History, Rationalisation and Rationale 
(Law Book Co, Sydney, 1979) 259: 
'[an] emphasis upon monetary offences [in tiie disciplinary system] lends support to tiie old 
view that counsel are inherently more ethical when tiie tmth is tiiat they seldom handle clients' 
money. That ... explains why tiie 'lower branch' contains more public sinners, as sinners are 
now defined' 
^^  Terence Halliday, Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers, State Crises, and Professional Empowerment 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987), discussed above section 3.10.2.2; W Wesley Pue, 
'Moral Panic at tiie English Bar: Paternal vs Commercial Ideologies of Legal Practice m tiie 1860s' 
(1990) 15 Law and Social Inquiry 49-118. 
"^^  Above section 4.9. 
^^  Re Harrison{\991) 6 Disciplinary Reports (NSW) 29; New South Wales Bam Association v Hamman 
[1999] NSWCA 404; New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins [2001] NSWCA 284; New South 
Wales Bar Association v Somosi [2001] NSWCA 285; New South Wales Bar Association v Murphy 
[2002] NSWCA 138; Cameron v Bar Association of NSW [2002] NSWSC 191; Wardell v New South 
Wales Bar Association [2002] NSWSC 548; Paul Barry, 'As Caesar Judges Caesar, Bankrupt Barristers 
go on their Merry Way', Sydney Moming Herald (Sydney), 27 Febmary 2000, 4. 
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An episode in the history of the solicitors' branch of the profession in Queensland in 
the late 1920s and eariy 1930s does suggest a 'moral panic', to which the solicitors' 
branch responded by initiating the establishment of a fidelity fund. A period of 
anxiety if not 'moral panic' occurred again in more recent times, when the State 
Govemment ffrst threatened to remove the Queensland Law Society's role in 
27 
discipline. 
Even in the absence of a period of moral panic, solicitors as a group may be more 
sensitive than barristers to public demands for greater accountability. Traditionally, a 
barrister relies on solicitors to send work and it is the barrister's reputation among 
solicitors which ensures the receipt of future work. Conversely, a solicitor relies on 
receipt of work from members of the public. Solicitors may also establish longer-term 
relationships with clients than barristers and commuitications between the client and 
barrister are usually conveyed through the solicitor. These factors may mean that 
barristers have traditionally been less concemed than solicitors with the attitude of 
clients or stated more broadly, with the attitude of the general public and legislature, 
and may explain why the Queensland bar was much more complacent about the need 
to appease any public calls for change - even if such calls had existed. 
A different approach in the two branches is suggested by the work of Abel. He 
claimed that, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, English solicitors sought legitimacy 
^^  Mark Lunney, 'The Solicitor and the Bookmaker - the Foundation of the Solicitors' Compensation 
Fund' (1996) 26 Queensland Law Society Joumal 35-48. 
^^  Above section 4.5.4. 
^^  Richard Abel, 'England and Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and 
Solicitors' in Richard Abel and Philip Lewis (eds), Lawyers in Society, vol 1: the Common Law World, 
(1988). 
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through more formal and visible mechanisms than English barristers, such as 
through the promotion of technical competence, the use of scale fees and the 
development of highly refined ethical codes. While there are differences between 
the legal professions in England and Australia, Abel's claims may have some 
relevance in an historical context: the Queensland bar opposed moves to fuse the 
profession, partly because this would 'destroy the gentlemanly independence and 
honor of the higher branch.'^' Similarly, while some barristers were suspended or 
disbarred by the Supreme Court in the late 1880s for serious misconduct, the bar felt 
that, if it could control discipline, this had the advantage that 'only the most 
favourable image was presented to the public'. 
In the following section I summarise my findings in relation to disciplinary action. As 
1 mentioned in Chapter Three," the actual use of disciplinary stmctures is a much 
greater test of tme committnent to public protection than the mere constmction of 
scaffolding which may be used only occasionally. 
9.3 DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
9.3.1 The Use of Protective A Itematives to Discipline 
Earlier in this chapter 1 noted the increased certification powers given to the 
Queensland Law Society, and the more recent option of insisting that a solicitor or 
barrister undergo a health assessment if medical explanations for substandard conduct 
^' Ibid 62. 
^°lbid. 
'^ Ross Johnston, History of the Queensland Bar (Bar Association of Queensland, Bnsbane, 1979) 25. 
'^  Johnston, above n 30, 20. 
" Above section 3.10.2.4. 
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seemed likely.^ "^  Both of these had the potential to protect the public in ways other 
than discipline, including an area in which discipline had proved itself inadequate -
mental illness. But how often have these stmctures been used? The society has not 
been required to report - and has not reported^^ - the frequency with which it has 
suspended or cancelled practising certificates,^^ so it is difficult to know how often or 
why the society may have chosen to use its certification powers rather than issue 
disciplinary proceedings. This warrants further investigation in fiiture research. Later 
in this chapter 1 consider any symbolic role that discipline may play which may 
prompt a decision to prosecute, and the implications of this in relation to protection, 
legitimation and retribution. 
9.3.2 The Decision to Prosecute 
The Queensland Law Society chose to prosecute only a tiny proportion of the written 
complaints it received: 1.7% in the 1990s.^'' Without knowdng the detail of complaints, 
it is difficult to know if only 1.7% of the complaints met the statutory definition of 
conduct liable to discipline. Nor do we know how the other 98.3% of complaints were 
disposed of. This, combined with the lack of information in regard to the society's use 
of practising certificate powers, makes it difficult to assess the vigour with which the 
society undertook its role as regulator of Queensland solicitors. 
'^' Above section 9.2.4. 
^^  Above section 5.4. 
^^  Even if had chosen to do so, it is unlikely to have disclosed whether this was due to mental ilhiess or 
not, given the propensity to suppress information about mental illness, even in those cases which did 
proceed to discipline: above section 7.7.1. This is also reflected in tiie confidentiality provisions which 
surround health assessments: Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 537. 
^^  Haller, above n 20, 6. 
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There is clear evidence that the Bar Association of Queensland did not embrace the 
role of public protector. Instead, it allowed the Barristers' Board of Queensland to 
prosecute those serious cases which demanded action, ^ ^ even though it was the 
association - not the board - which appeared to have prosecutorial standing before the 
Supreme Court. 
9.3.3 Why Has the Common Law Definition of Misconduct Prevailed? 
One of the most interesting findings of this investigation has been the degree to which 
ttaditional notions of conduct liable to discipline have remained intact, despite the 
many years over which the legislative definition of discipline applicable to solicitors 
expanded. There are a number of possible explanations for this. 
In Chapter Three I discussed research - both within and outside the legal profession -
which found that regulators were unlikely to initiate prosecutions of new definitions 
of conduct subject to tiieir regulatory control, particularly where the changes 
weakened the need first to find culpability. '^^  This is much more likely to be the case 
where the same personnel are enforcing the old and tiie new legislation. In 
Queensland, the same society personnel were employed over many of the years of 
legislative change, and it was these individuals who decided which cases would be 
prosecuted, and so be brought before the tribunal or court for deliberation.^" 
^^  Above section 4.4. 
^' Above section 3.11. 
40 The society's Du-ector of Professional Standards decided which cases to refer to the Professional 
Standards Committee to autiiorise prosecution. The director over tiie period of most legislative change 
(1985-2004) joined tiie society ui 1982 and worked on audits and the fidelity fiind, before bemg 
appointed director in 1993, a position in which he remained until 2002. His assistant director joined the 
society in 1985 and was assistant director from 1994 until 2002. 
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As I foreshadowed in Chapter Three,^' the traditional view of a 'good lawyer' and 
'good discipline' was also likely to prevail among members of the solicitors' 
disciplinary tiibunal, as many of them previously had been president of the 
Queensland Law Society"*^ and it was common for members to remain on the tribunal 
for long periods of time. 
There are many possible reasons for the Supreme Court's failure to embrace the 
breadth of legislative change which occurred between 1927 and 2004, and which 1 
documented in Chapter Two. First, it was the society prosecutors who decided which 
cases to bring before the tribunal or court, and it was at this preliminary stage that 
decisions were made to continue to focus on the same type of cases as previously -
where dishonour or disgrace could be easily established. This is not a feature which 
can be necessarily attributed to a 'professional project' or the fact that the prosecution 
was instigated from within a professional body. Hawkins has found that persoimel in 
many regulatory agencies have been urtiikely to instigate a prosecution in the absence 
of blame.^ If prosecutors have already preselected those cases which involve most 
dishonour and disgrace, judges will not necessarily have an opportunity or need to 
reflect or comment upon the breadth of legislative definitions. 
Above section 3.11. 
"^  They mcluded ER Cuppaidge, WP Rowland, SC Foote, WH Hart, Sir John Rowell, Su- Sholto 
Douglas, GA Murphy, JSP O'Keefe, HW Peterson and GC Fox. Gregory has reported that some past 
presidents even retired from council to become members of the Statutory Committee: Gregory, above n 
17,96. 
Mr ER Cuppaidge served on the committee from 1952 until 1977, a period of 25 years. Mr WP 
Rowland served from 1940 until 1961. Sir Douglas Wadley was a member from 1960 until 1981 and 
RR Stephens from 1970 until 1983. Sir John Rowell served from 1973 until 1983. In more recent times, 
GA Murphy and TM Treston both served on the tribunal from 1983 - 2000, a period of 17 years. Mr 
JSP O'Keefe, appointed in 1983, sat on the tribunal until the early 2000s. The 'strong tradition of 
continuity of membership' is confirmed by Gregory: Gregory, above n 17, 205. 
Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002) 335. 
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There is another possible reason why the Supreme Court judges did not embrace the 
legislative changes: they had themselves all once been banisters. Even more so than 
solicitors, who had been subject to statutory discipline since 1927, barristers were 
wedded only to a common law notion of discipline. It would not be surprising if the 
members of the bench carried this understanding with them to the bench, and saw less 
need to read the legislative definitions closely. Had they been interpreting legislation 
dealing with the discipline of say, engineers or nurses, there may not have been a 
similar potential for personal understanding of any paradigm for understanding the 
purposes of discipline to overshadow the legislature's intent. 
Professional misconduct was defined primarily by the common law until 2004, and 
that definition required that colleagues of good repute and competency would 
consider the conduct disgraceful or dishonourable."*^ As is demonsttated particulariy 
well in tiie discussion of discipline in relation to tmst account breaches, even if the 
standards of conduct expected from lawyers are heightened extemally - such as 
through tmst account legislation - this is unlikely to be reflected in disciplinary 
proceedings for some time. The initial empathetic response of colleagues must wait 
until it gives way to a less tolerant response - which will only occur when the 
majority of the profession has internalised the 'dishonour and disgrace' of the conduct. 
The narrow, common law definition of conduct liable to discipline is also partly due 
to the deference to legal knowledge which exists in the disciplinary system. Not only 
was it fellow lawyers who needed to determine if the conduct was 'disgraceftil or 
"^  For a number of years, the legislation has extended tius to include a failure to respond to Queensland 
Law Society enquiries. The Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) broadened tiie definition much more 
extensively. 
^Allinson v General Council of Medical Education [1894] 1 KB 750, 761. 
''^  Above section 2.4.3.3. 
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dishonourable'. Testimonials also appear to have played an important part in 
disciplinary proceedings. As I explained in Chapter Seven, it is the testimonials of 
more elite members of the profession which were likely to carry more weight in 
disciplinary hearings. The opinions of lay people as to their view of the conduct have 
been discounted, if not fully ignored. This is yet another reason to explain why it was 
difficult for the wider, legislative definitions to gain traction. 
I am certainly not suggesting that there was any deliberate project undertaken by the 
profession or regulators to ignore the legislation and continue 'business as usual'. 
Larson was not suggesting her 'professional project' was a conscious plan.'*^ Nor was 
Hawkins suggesting that the search for blame in prosecutorial decision-making was a 
deliberate strategy to undermine Parliament's intent. ^ However, their theories 
provide useful explanations of the forces which may entrench a traditional view of 
discipline, whether consciously or not. 
In the next two sections I consider what influence the threads of protection, 
legitimation and retribution appear to have had on the types of orders made by 
disciplinary courts and tribunals. 
Above section 7.4. 
Above section 3.2. 
Instead it reflected a particular view of the best use which could be made of prosecutions within a 
broader regulatory framework: Hawkins, above n 44. This will not subvert the protective purpose of 
legislation provided other elements of a regulatory pyramid - below the pinnacle of the prosecution -
reflect the legislative intent. On the notion of a regulatory pyramid, see Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, 
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, (Oxford University Press, New York, 
1992)35. 
342. 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
9.3.4 The Use of Incapacitation in Discipline 
In Chapter Five 1 predicted that, if the disciplinary system was being used as part of a 
legitimation project, action was more likely to be taken - and taken harshly - where 
allegations of lawyer misconduct could not be resolved out of the public gaze. 1 
explained that this was more likely to be the case when clients could not be 
adequately compensated in private. '^ The experience in relation to Queensland 
solicitors is consistent with this hypothesis, largely because the disciplinary system 
has focused on tmst account matters, in particular, tmst account fraud. But it is more 
difficult to explain why the rate of sttike offs did not appear to vary depending on 
whether the disciplinary hearing was public or held behind closed doors. 
Much more difficult to explain is the use of suspensions. The high use of suspensions 
did not serve any legitimation project, as it sent ambiguous messages about the 
ttibunal's conmiitment to unequivocal protection of the public. In Chapter Five, I also 
reported on the propensity of the disciplinary ttibunal to suspend solicitors, even in 
defiance of court mlings regarding appropriate circumstances for suspensions. This 
practice compromised the protective ability of discipline, even though a second line of 
defence - in the form of practising certificates - may have been exercised later by the 
Queensland Law Society to prevent the individual returning to practice at the end of 
the period of suspension. Data that indicates how often this was the case is not 
presently available. I suggest the high use of suspensions reflects tiie presence of the 
very element which all deny in disciplinary proceedings - retribution. This is also 
'^ Above section 5.2.2. 
^^  Between 1930 and 2000, discipline was imposed behind closed doors and strike offs comprised 31% 
of orders made As noted in Chapter Eight, disciplinary heanngs were open to tiie public in late 1994. 
In tiie subsequent period 1995-2000 strike offs comprised 29.8% of orders made - slightiy less, but 
certainly no higher - than the rate during private discipline. Haller, above n 20, 25, Figure 3. 
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suggested by the use of suspensions in cases where mental illness reduced the 
culpability of misconduct, as documented in Chapter Seven. Larson's comment that 
lawyers are seen as having a lifetime's attachment to their role^^ may also explain the 
h i ^ use of suspensions. Again, this is not to suggest that regulators were consciously 
preferring the interests of individual lawyers over the public interest. It simply seems 
that numerous forces are likely to have been in play. 
But what of barristers? As I reported in Chapter Five, only one Queensland barrister 
has ever been suspended from practice in disciplinary proceedings, and that was in 
1882. As I mentioned in that chapter, there are many practical reasons why barristers 
may not have been suspended, including the fact that the court appeared to only see 
the most serious cases against barristers - making a strike off inevitable - and that 
that the 'second line of defence' of practising certificates was not in force against 
barristers.^'' Apart from these practical reasons, it is also possible that the court saw 
barristers in a more two-dimensional way than solicitors - of either good or bad 
character - making a 'compromise' disciplinary order such as a suspension less 
appropriate. 
9.3.5 The Use of Disciplinary Fines 
As I explained in Chapter Six, fines were the most popular method of disciplinary 
tribunals to dispose of cases against Queensland solicitors, comprising 41% of orders 
between 1930-2000.^^ Nevertheless, those fines on average remained quite small and 
never approached anywhere near the statutory maximum of $ 100,000. In Chapter Six 
Above section 3.9.3 
^'^ Above sections 5.3.8, 5.5. 
'^  Above section 6.8.1. 
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I explained why these fines -whether large or small - were unlikely to have much 
protective effect. They left tiie solicitor in practice and could have only negligible 
deterrent or educative effect during the many years when they were applied secretly. 
While it was the judges of the Supreme Court who sponsored amendments to the 
Rules of Court to allow the tribunal to fine solicitors up to $100,000, the judges were 
much less inclined than the tiibunal to endorse the use of fines when hearing 
individual cases. The court never imposed a fine itself - on either a solicitor or 
barrister - and only allowed a fine imposed by the tribunal to stand on rare occasions. 
As I explained in Chapter Six, the imposition of small fines by the disciplinary 
ttibunal was consistent with a legitimation project, because the fine itself usually 
allowed any publicity of the proceedings to be controlled. The solicitors' branch of 
the profession could say it was engaging in discipline, but those disciplinary 
proceedings did not need to be too closely examined. It is less easy to explain how 
large fines could have played into any legitimation project, as their mere size 
suggested that serious misconduct had occurred, raising questions about fitness to 
practise, and inviting the interest of the media, if the media became aware of it. There 
was often little chance of that occurring, as I discussed in Chapter Eight. 
Fines bear the closest analogy of all possible disciplinary orders to criminal 
punishment. There is also evidence that the tribunal was sometimes using a rettibutive 
approach - by looking at levels of culpability and harm - when it chose to unpose a 
fine rather than a more serious order. Interestingly, and as 1 discuss in Chapter Six, I 
do think there would be occasions on which the public would be more satisfied to see 
*^ Above 8.4.2. 
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a fine imposed than an order that may protect the public more directly - by facilitating 
a lawyer's rehabilitation, fri this regard, if public satisfaction increases the likelihood 
of the profession being allowed to retain its privileges and self-regulation, the 
retributive nature of fines may serve a legitimation project. 1 retum to this theme 
below. 
9.3.6 Publicity 
The Queensland Law Society played a much more active role than the Bar 
Association of Queensland in disseminating information about disciplinary 
proceedings to the broader legal profession and the public. This undoubtedly 
enhanced the protective effect of those proceedings, through general deterrence and 
education as to acceptable and unacceptable forms of conduct.^^ Its website reporting 
and naming of individual solicitors eventually surpassed what was required by the 
legislation.^^ The society appeared willing to take action to protect the public even 
when this may have been against the wishes of its members. However, it is hard to 
discount the argument that this was simply a rearguard response to a period of intense 
extemal threat,^^ as it coincided with the society's final battle to retain its disciplinary 
powers - a battle it lost in 2004. 
The Bar Association of Queensland was much more secretive. Serious cases of 
misconduct involving barristers were prosecuted by the Barristers' Board in the 
Supreme Court, and so publicised in the usual way. The few cases in which the Bar 
Association of Queensland chose to exercise its conttactual disciplinary powers 
" Above section 8.5.2. 
*^ Above section 8.3.2.3-4. 
^' Above section 4.5.4. 
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against members were not always reported, even to members. When they were 
reported, this was in a cursory, transient way which provided little of the educative 
value of the reports provided by the Queensland Law Society. The Queensland public 
was given very little insight into the world of barristers. 
9.3.7 Symbolic Disciplinary Action 
Lawyers have sometimes been disciplined even though they were no longer practising 
law, and so the public was already protected from them. This suggests that discipline 
has sometimes played a symbolic - as well as a practical role. But what does 
disciplinary action symbolise, and to whom? ft could play a role in intemal ideology 
by demonstrating to fellow lawyers that their profession does have ethical standards, 
that those standards are enforced, and that those who break those standards will be 
stripped of any right to call themselves 'lawyer'. In that way, discipline may serve an 
aspirational role. Some may argue tiiat, in that indirect way, disciplinary action can 
protect the public. However, this must always play a secondary role, and should never 
be a sufficient reason to take action. If too much focus is placed on symbolism, there 
is a danger that the disciplinary system will slide into a primary focus on the 
reputation of the profession, and an exercise in 'smoke and mirrors'. 
"^  Above section 8.3.2.6. , . , TT , • u 
" Prosecutions are seen as playing a symbolic role in a number of regulatory contexts: Hawkins, above 
n44 416 
^^  Linda Haller, 'Smoke and Mirrors: When Professional Discipline May Cause Harm' (2005) 8 Legal 
Ethics 70-86. 
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9.3.8 Disciplinary Action and Retribution 
I argued in Chapter Six that there may be some situations in which the public may 
prefer to see a lawyer fined than to see altemative action which may actually have 
more protective effect. ^^  In Chapter Seven I presented evidence that disciplinary 
outcomes have sometimes varied depending on the degree to which clients have 
suffered at the hands of lawyers,^ and concluded that more retribution pervades the 
disciplinary system - and the public's acceptance of that system - than has been 
previously conceded. This is more likely to be the case while disciplinary courts and 
tribunals focus their energies on judging the moral worthiness of lawyers, not their 
technical competence. 
My argument that discipline has been used not just for protection but also for 
retribution is not without some weaknesses. This is particularly tme where 
disciphnary action has been taken behind closed doors, as retribution is normally 
assumed to be a public act.^ ^ The C^eensland Law Society continued to prosecute 
disciplinary matters when they were held behind closed doors and there was very little 
reporting of the outcome. ^ ^ Nor was the harshness of disciplinary orders against 
solicitors less when imposed behind closed doors. 
Can this argument that that disciplinary action has contained elements of retribution 
be applied equally to the discipline of Queensland barristers? The absence of the tmst 
Above section 6.5.2. 
^ Above section 7.8. 
^' Above section 1.3.5. 
^ No disciplinary proceedings were reported in the Queensland Law Society Joumal between 
November 1988 and July 1993, apart from very brief statements to advise when a solicitor's right to 
practise was affected. Discussed above sections 8.3.2.3, 8.4.2. 
*^  Above n 52. 
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account in practice at the bar means that clients are unlikely to lose money at the 
hands of banisters to anywhere near the extent to which they could (and have) at the 
hands of solicitors. It is possible for clients to suffer in other ways due to the conduct 
of a barrister, such as through the loss of a case, but there the causal relationship will 
be much more indirect and tenuous. Therefore, retribution for client loss will be less 
likely in relation to barristers than solicitors. In fact, none of the disciplinary cases 
involving Queensland barristers have arisen as the result of a complaint about loss to a 
client. They arose as a result of deception or disrespect shown to the court or 
admission authorities,^^ or other concems about character. 
It is not only members of the public who may be satisfied to see retribution being 
taken against a lawyer. As I mentioned in Chapter Five, the pressure for disciplinary 
action and retribution can also come from fellow lawyers.^" This is particularly likely 
to be the case where fellow lawyers are likely to suffer loss. This loss does not need to 
be direct, but can also arise from the pressure which fraudulent colleagues place on 
fidelity fimds and, as a result, on other solicitors who are required to make 
contiibutions to it.^' This form of retribution does not require the proceedings to be 
published to the general public. It is enough that it becomes known among solicitors 
that action was taken. As barristers do not hold tiust money and have no fidelity fiind, 
it would be much less common for a barrister to suffer financially due to the 
misconduct of a colleague. 
'^ i? V Byme- in re Swanwick (1882) 1 May 1882, Queensland Law Joumal 66; Re Watson [1941] St R 
Qd 231 • Barristers' Board v Khan [2001] QCA 92; Barristers' Board v Young [2001] QCA 556. 
''^ Bart-]sters' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253 (serious dmg convictions and dishonesty); 
Barristers' Board v Pratt [2002] QCA 532 (convictions for serious child sexual offences). 
™ Above section 5.2.2. 
' ' Ibid. 
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The lack of any stattitory framework for barristers until 2004 meant that, for barristers, 
it was not a tiibunal of part-time, voluntary colleagues determining whether the 
ultimate disciplinary order - a strike off - would be applied, as it was for solicitors, 
but the Supreme Court. This is likely to dilute the degree of retiibution significantiy in 
Supreme Court disciplinary decision-making in relation to barristers. Any pressure for 
retribution then is simply likely to be as a result of anger felt by the court (all ex-
barristers) because of the damage caused to the reputation of the profession. 
9.4 WHEN LEGITIMATION AND RETRIBUTION MAY COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER 
Retribution can sometimes legitimate the position of the legal profession. Members of 
the public and the legislature may be more willing to leave discipluiary stmctures 
untouched where they feel culpable misconduct will be punished. Similarly, and as 
Larson noted, professional bodies must also legitimate their position of power to 
members. ^^  Queensland solicitors may have been more willing to continue to 
subsidise the disciplinary expenses of the Queensland Law Society when they felt the 
society would punish those solicitors who had caused them harm. 
9.5 VALUE OF SOCIAL THEORIES IN EXPLAINING QUEENSLAND EXPERIENCE 
In Chapter Three 1 concluded that Larson's emphasis on 'front-end' controls, such as 
education, admission and socialisation, weakened the explanatory force of her theory. 
^^  Above sections 3.5, 3.9.1. 
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As 1 have documented in this thesis, many 'back-end' controls exist in Queensland. 
They have been an important part of the regulatory landscape for many years and 
could only have been introduced because front-end controls were considered 
inadequate. It is not only the legislature which has introduced back-end controls. The 
profession itself has seen some advantage in seeking greater control through 
discipline and certification. 
If presented with this evidence, and in particular, the discrepancy between the back-
end controls established for the two branches of the profession, Larson and Halliday 
would simply say that the two branches had differing needs for the erection of 
scaffolding, as the level of extemal threat to their legitimacy differed. And no one 
would deny that the solicitors' branch of the profession has been subject to much 
more criticism than the barristers' branch, as 1 documented earlier in this chapter. 
A more serious challenge to Larson's tiieory comes when we examine, not just 
disciplinary structures, which could be dismissed as mere 'scaffolding', but the use 
which has been made of those stmctures. The barristers' branch of the profession in 
Queensland appears to have been more willing to rely on front-end controls alone and 
has avoided an active role in disciplinary prosecutions. The same cannot be said of 
solicitors. Disciplinary action - as well as stmcttire - appears to have been important 
to them. Given the absence of anything other than a minfrnal reference to discipline in 
Larson's work, I suggested an extension of her theoretical approach which would 
explain disciplinary action as serving both extemal and intemal fiinctions in the 
professional project. It could be used to display to the public that, while the occasional 
" I have concentrated on discipline, but have also refen-ed to certification powers: above section 5.4. 
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black sheep may slip through the controls of education and admission, he or she will 
be identified and expelled from the profession. In addition, within the profession, it 
could serve to control those at lower levels of the profession through the imposition of 
the elite's ideology of 'good lawyer' and 'good practice'. Particularly with this 
extension, Larson's work has proved to be a usefiil tool in the thesis to explain the 
forces which may influence the taking of disciplinary action. 
9.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The primary aim of this thesis was to determine the role played by the professional 
discipline of lawyers in Queensland. That has not been an easy task, largely because 
of the secrecy which has surrounded discipline in the past - particularly within the bar. 
It is to be hoped that the transfer of the prosecutorial role to an extemal body - the 
Legal Services Commissioner - will increase the tt-ansparency surrounding 
disciplinary proceedings. Early signs are promising, with the publication of 
disciplinary decisions in much greater detail than required by legislation, prosecution 
guidelines,'"^ and detailed and meaningftil statistics.''^ Disciplinary courts and tribunals 
must also clearly articulate the reasons for their orders, and how these relate to tiie 
protective fiinction of discipline. Now that all Queensland lawyers will come before a 
disciplinary tribunal constituted by a sitting Supreme Court judge, this is much more 
likely to occur. Nevertheless, as this thesis has clearly demonstrated, the rhetoric of 
decision makers - including judges - cannot always be reconciled with their action. 
Independent assessments of disciplinary action, as contained in this thesis, will always 
be necessary. 
"^^  Legal Services Commissioner, Prosecution Guidelines: Unsatisfactory Professional Conduct and 
Professional Misconduct, <http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/policies/prosecution270306.pdf> at 7 July 2006. 
^^  Legal Services Commissioner (Qld), Annual Report 2004-2005. 
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The thesis has provided a thorough account and analysis of disciplinary prosecutions 
of lawyers in Queensland. While, through the exhaustive treatment of all reported 
disciplinary cases in the State, this is as comprehensive an account of discipline in the 
Queensland legal profession as is possible, the regulatory picture is necessarily 
incomplete - and the threads of protection, legitimation and retribution remain a little 
tangled - until other aspects of the regulatory framework are explored. For instance, 
very few statistics have been available regarding the nattire of complaints against 
Queensland lawyers, how those complaints have been handled, and how decisions 
have been made to prosecute. Nor do we know how often, and in what circumstances, 
the Queensland Law Society has used its powers in relation to practising certificates 
rather than its prosecutorial powers. These, however, are all matters for another 
investigation. 
* * * * 
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